ITA-Manu:scripts

This paper is a systematic comparison of 15 institutions world-wide, which deliver technology assessment (TA) services to their respective parliaments, i.e. perform parliamentary technology assessment (PTA). The fields of comparison are: the role of the parliamentarians (members of parliament) in the TA process; the institutional location inside or outside the parliament; the competence in the parliament for dealing with TA; the type of financing of PTA activities; the mission of the (P)TA institution; its legal status; how topics are selected; whether the topics have a narrower or wider technology notion; what the time frame for the chosen topics is; the working modes; the methods; the number of staff and budget; and finally how they communicate their results.

This paper unpacks the notion of public and patient “participation” in medicine and healthcare. It does so by reviewing a series of papers published in the British Medical Journal, and by discussing these in the light of scholarship on participation in political and social theory. We find that appeals to public participation in this series are based on a diverse, potentially contradictory, set of values and motivations. We argue that if these diverse values and motivations are not carefully distinguished, appeals to participation can be an impediment, rather than an enhancement, to greater transparency and public accountability of health research.

The paper is concerned with new competencies and qualification in the context of Industry 4.0 (also addressed as the Industrial Internet). The introductory section will outline the state of re- search and highlight the deficits in the existing data. Although Industry 4.0 also affects many service and logistics sectors, the study concentrates on changes in the core areas of industrial manufacturing work, and focuses on the system of dual vocational education and training, as this has a high, almost unique significance in Germany and Austria. Beginning with develop- ment scenarios that are currently under discussion, and with the innovative capacity of the du- al system, the paper outlines specific competency and qualification requirements in relation to four qualification-relevant dimensions of Industry 4.0, and, lastly, uses these to make recom- mendations for policymakers, companies and social partners.

Although it is still not warranted to speak about the end of the fossil age, we certainly witness a trend towards renewable sources for energy and material. Properties of bio-resources however differ vastly from fossil as well as other renewable resources. They are storable, mainly de-central in their provision, have usually weak logistic properties and face severe competition from various sectors, in particular from the vital food sector. A stronger reliance on bio-resources to support the European energy system as well as to provide raw materials for conversion to material products therefore raises technical, societal and environmental issues that have to be resolved if a bio-economy is to become a viable development pathway.

Google has been blamed for its de facto monopolistic position on the search engine market, its exploitation of user data, its privacy violations, and, most recently, for possible collaborations with the US-American National Security Agency (NSA). However, blaming Google is not enough, as I suggest in this article. Rather than being ready-made, Google and its ‘algorithmic ideology’ are constantly negotiated in society. Drawing on my previous work I show how the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ gets inscribed in Google’s technical Gestalt by way of social practices. Furthermore, I look at alternative search engines through the lens of ideology. Focusing on search projects like DuckDuckGo, Ecosia, YaCy and Wolfram|Alpha I exemplify that there are multiple ideologies at work. There are search engines that carry democratic values, the green ideology, the belief in the commons, and those that subject themselves to the scientific paradigm. In daily practice, however, the capitalist ideology appears to be hegemonic since 1) most users employ Google rather than alternative search engines, 2) a number of small search projects enter strategic alliances with big, commercial players, and 3) choosing a true alternative would require not only awareness and a certain amount of technical know-how, but also effort and patience on the part of users, as I finally discuss.

In past technology controversies, aspects such as risk or ethics have played a major role, apart from economic arguments. Public debates on agricultural biotechnology or biomedicine differed in the dominant aspect they addressed, respectively. This article specifies such aspects as discursive frames being tacit agreements over what is relevant and which arguments count. It investigates the role of frames in past debates and the relation between frames and issues relevant for technology governance such as policy advice, public participation and the political legitimation of decisions. For a newly emerging technology such as synthetic biology, the framing of a debate to come is often expected to follow patterns known from previous debates, and to influence governance in a foreseeable way. However, new frames might emerge that could change both the debate on and the governance of emerging technologies.

Die Beiträge dieser Sondernummer basieren auf Vorträgen, die unter Beteiligung des ITA im Rahmen des Netzwerks TA auf einem Workshop der Arbeitsgruppe "Technikfolgenabschätzung und Governance" am 21. und 22.11.2011 in Berlin gehalten wurden:
Responsible Innovation: Neuer Ansatz der Gestaltung von Technik und Innovation oder nur ein Schlagwort? (Armin Grunwald) / Technikfolgenabschätzung als Ressource von Technology Governance (Georg Simonis) / Trotz aller Differenzen – Theoretische und empirische Perspektiven auf das Hummel-Paradox der (Technology-)Governance (Marc Mölders) / Leitorientierte Technologiegestaltung als Beitrag zur Umsetzung der Vorsorgeprinzips (Urte Brand, Arnim von Gleich) / Gerhard Fuchs (Zur Governance von technologischen Innovationen im Energiesektor (Gerhard Fuchs)

Long-term planning with a time-horizon beyond 20 to 30 years is an established element of policy- making in some core fields such as certain infrastructure policies, and is a substantial principle of sustainable development. At the same time short- and medium-term planning is much more usual in the search for ad-hoc solutions to environmental, economic and social challenges. Economic ac- tors apply flexible policies and use short-term opportunities for their profit. Environmental and so- cial problems also sometimes imply short-term solutions for the survival of a system in acute dan- ger. This creates a paradoxical situation: the society in question needs to define long-term targets for its infrastructure and achieves systematic changes pursuing those, but the necessary short-term actions and flexibility applied to stay functionable might not be in line with longterm goals. If this apparent paradox cannot be solved through an appropriate governance method, it might lead to a conflict between different policy goals. The concept of reflexive governance for transition man- agement tries to solve this apparent paradox and combines a number of short-term planning proc- esses in a stagewise and reflexive way to create a more comprehensive and innovative process of long-term planning for a sustainable development. Future-oriented analyses and forward-looking activities are a fix element at each stage. This contribution points out some key questions for a flexible long-term planning process within the framework of sustainable development. The main challenge is how different knowledge types such as citizens’ visions and experts’ recommenda- tions can be integrated into long-term planning in order to support an interactive decision-making process that considers a broader basis of information. CIVISTI, an innovative forward-looking ap- proach, addresses this challenge. The CIVISTI method has been developed during the recent EU- project on Citizen Visions on Science, Technolog

Participatory Technology Assessment (PTA) is said to increase democratic legitimacy, take up lay knowledge and improve technological solutions. Today it is part of science/technology policy rhetoric and, sometimes, practice. We confront some elements of the scholarly discussion on PTA with policy-makers’ understandings of the process in Austria. Here, participation often gets framed as a form of PR and a sensor for public sentiments rather than as a forum of multiple rationalities and co-development of policy projects. This understanding can be related to underlying conceptions of democracy and the public. As a conclusion, governance styles would have to change before PTA was to become more than a laboratory experiment.

It is still disputed whether foresight exercises should be based on top-expert assessments or on a broader base of less specialised experts, and whether the self-rating of experts is an acceptable method. Using the German 1993 and the Austrian 1998 Technology Delphis, this study addresses both questions: Self-rating is in fact an appropriate method for selecting experts. But the assessment of self-rated top-experts tend to suffer from an optimism bias, due to the experts’ involvement and their underestimation of realisation and diffusion problems. The degree of optimism is positively correlated with the degree of self-rated knowledge, and it is more pronounced for the least pioneering and for organisational innovations. Experts with top self-ratings working in business have a stronger optimism bias than those working in academia or in the administration. Consistent with the insider hypothesis, they are most optimistic with regard to realisation, innovativeness, and potential leadership in economic exploitation. Given the optimism bias, foresight exercises should base their panels on a fair mixture of experts of different grades, with different types of knowledge and affiliation, and not only on top specialists of the respective field. Delphi-type exercises, therefore, offer an advantage relative to forum groups or small panels of specialists.

The gate/resonance model provides an analytical frame for the description of technology conflicts. It offers an analytical scheme to conceptualise the interaction between public opinion, interest representing organisations, the media and the political system. The model distinguishes structural elements, functional elements and processes. Structural elements are the public with sub-publics and representational fields, the regulatory system with its institutions, intermediary organisations representing interests and bridging the gap between the public(s) and the regulatory system, the regulatory space and the media that mirror and participate in interest conflicts. Functional elements are resources, which enable intermediary organisations to convey interests to regulation, and filters that prevent information overflow within regulatory institutions: the gate as a formal function selects information according to statutory criteria, detectors according to usefulness for the institution. Processes described are the movement of issue fields due to re-interpretation; resonance, the tuning-in on issue interpretation among different actors; mobilisation, the generation of political pressure through resonance; and policy change through the abolishment of established interest and actor equilibrium due to mobilisation and ensuing gate failure. The model is applied to the example of biotechnology conflicts.

Modern societies are vulnerable. We have known this long before the attacks of September 11, but they made it clear to everyone. The second lesson learned was that it is impossible to foresee such events. Although these attacks to the real world were “low-tech”, now there are attempts around the globe to control especially the electronic or virtual world. However, does more surveillance really lead to more security? If so, what will be the price we have to pay? This paper gives an overview over what happened on a governmental level after September 11 in the EU, in some EU-member states and in the USA. Apart from political actions, we already face even direct socio-economic implications as some anonymizer services were shut down. They empowered Internet users to protect their right of privacy, and they were the first targets of investigation and suspicion. Shutting down these services reduces the potential room of users to protect their privacy by using privacy enhancing technologies (PETs). This is an indicator for a serious societal problem: democracy already has changed. In a second part this paper analyses the relationship between surveillance and security. It is argued that, the international over-reactions will not lead to the intended effects. Rather, they will have long-term implications for the respective societies.

The world-wide diffusion and recognition of Technology Foresight suggests that it is of value for quite diverse types of economies and societies. Its merit as an important tool of strategic intelligence for policy-making also in small countries and transition economies depends on a careful tailoring to specific needs. Practice of Foresight is rather diverse also among small countries, but approaches tend to be more selective in scope, have more specific goals, and put greater emphasis on demand aspects than in bigger countries. Austria’s first systematic Foresight programme (completed in 1998) is an example of an innovative approach adapted to the needs of a small country. This contribution shows how “Delphi Austria” was tailored to a small economy which had undergone a successful catch-up process and how the Foresight process as well as its results have been utilised. The specific goals of Delphi Austria and its approach are explained as a selective, demand-, problem-, and application-oriented Foresight exercise with a number of innovative elements. It has been built on a series of preparatory studies, expert panels, and two parallel large-scale Delphi exercises: a Technology Delphi in conjunction with a Society and Culture Delphi. Experiences with some other innovative elements are outlined: the modification of the classical Delphi towards a decision Delphi; a broader definition of the expert base; the focus on technological as well as organisational innovations; a higher degree of “finalisation” of measures; and the application of a so-called “mega-trends section” in a multiple function. The focus of the Austrian Technology Delphi has been on the following subject areas: Tailor-made New Materials (focus on metals); Production and Processing of Organic Food; Environmentally Sound Construction and New Forms of Housing; Lifelong Learning; Medical Technologies and Supportive Technologies for the Elderly; Cleaner Production and Sustainable Development; Mobilit