Preferences / / ed. by Christoph Fehige, Ulla Wessels.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Philosophy 1990 - 1999
• MitwirkendeR: BOK, HILARY,; BOMBOSCH, UWE,; BRANDT, RICHARD Β .,; BROOME, JOHN,; CORRADINI, ANTONELLA,; DANIELSSON, SVEN,; FEHIGE, CHRISTOPH,; GAUTHIER, DAVID,; GIBBARD, ALLAN,; HARE, RICHARD Μ.,; HEGSELMANN, RAINER,; HINSCH, WILFRIED,; KRAUSE, ULRICH,; KUSSER, ANNA,; KUTSCHERA, FRANZ VON,; LADEN, ANTHONY SIMON,; LENZEN, WOLFGANG,; LUMER, CHRISTOPH,; MCMAHAN, JEFF,; MEGGLE, GEORG,; MILLGRAM, ELIJAH,; NIDA-RÜMELIN, JULIAN,; NORTMANN, ULRICH,; SCHÜSSLER, RUDOLF,; SHOEMAKER, SYDNEY,; SINGER, PETER,; SPITZLEY, THOMAS,; TRAPP, RAINER WERNER,; VELLEMAN, J. DAVID,; WESSELS, ULLA,; WIGGINS, DAVID,; WILLASCHEK, MARCUS,; ÅQVIST, LENNART,
• HerausgeberIn: Fehige, Christoph,; Wessels, Ulla,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2011]; ©1998
• Year of Publication: 2011
• Language: English
• Series: Perspektiven der Analytischen Philosophie / Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy ; 19
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (568 p.) :; Num. figs.
• Other title: I-VI --; Preface --; Contents --; Abstracts --; Introduction --; Preferences - an Introduction --; Preferences - a Short Bibliography --; Part I: Preference and Decision --; Deciding to Desire --; Desiring at Will (and at Pill): A Reply to Millgram --; Which Preferences Shall Be the Basis of Rational Decision? --; Intrinsic Desirabilities: A Reply to Lumer --; The Rational Criticism of Preferences --; Rational by Shock: A Reply to Brandt --; Is Motivation Internal to Value? --; Motivation and Value: A Reply to Velleman --; Numerical Representations of Value-Orderings: Some Basic Problems --; Interval Orders Defended: A Reply to Danielsson --; Part II: Preference and Metaethics --; Prima Facie Obligations in Deontic Logic: A Chisholmian Analysis Based on Normative Preference Structures --; The Meaning of "Ought, Prima Facie" and Decision Situations: A Reply to Åqvist --; Values and Duties --; Beyond Duty: A Reply to von Kutschera --; Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Obligation --; Autonomy and Morality: A Reply to Willaschek --; In a Subjectivist Framework, Categorical Requirements and Real Practical Reasons --; Subjective Obligation: A Reply to Wiggins --; Preference and Preferability --; Goodness and Rational Preferability: A Reply to Gibbard --; Part III: Preference and Ethics --; Extended Preferences --; Wish You Were Me: A Reply to Broome and a Comment on Harsanyi's Extended Preference Theory --; Experimental Ethics: A Computer Simulation of Classes, Cliques, and Solidarity --; Solidarity among Rational Egoists: A Reply to Hegselmann --; The Potentialities and Limits of a Rational Justification of Ethical Norms, or: What Precisely Is Minimal Morality? --; A Hobbesian Choice: Reply to Trapp --; Symposium on Possible Preferences --; Introduction to Possible Preferences --; Possible Preferences --; Preferences of Possible People --; Who Counts? --; Procreation --; Preferences, Death, and the Ethics of Killing --; McMahan on Psychological Continuity and the Value of Future Goods --; A Pareto Principle for Possible People --; Notes on Contributors --; Name Index --; Subject Index --; 569-570
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9783110804294; 9783110636901
• DOI: 10.1515/9783110804294
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: ed. by Christoph Fehige, Ulla Wessels.