E-Physicalism : : A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness / / Reinaldo J. Bernal Velásquez.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Backlist Complete English Language 2000-2014 PART1
• VerfasserIn: Bernal Velásquez, Reinaldo J.,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2013]; ©2012
• Year of Publication: 2013
• Language: English
• Series: Phenomenology & Mind , 14
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (216 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; TABLE OF CONTENTS --; ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --; INTRODUCTION --; CHAPTER 1: A PHYSICALIST APPROACH TO CONSCIOUSNESS --; CHAPTER 2: STRONG AI AND COMPUTATIONALISM --; CHAPTER 3: SUBJECTIVITY AND THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS --; CHAPTER 4: SUPERVENIENCE, EMERGENCE, AND ONTOLOGICAL NOVELTY --; CHAPTER 5: E-PHYSICALISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS --; CHAPTER 6: E-PHYSICALISM AND PHENOMENAL QUALITIES --; CONCLUSION --; REFERENCES
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9783110325560; 9783110238570; 9783110238488; 9783110636949; 9783110331219
• ISSN: 2198-2058
• DOI: 10.1515/9783110325560
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Reinaldo J. Bernal Velásquez.

This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with original causal powers, with respect to the micro-constituents of the conscious entity. Fifthly, he addresses the “zombie argument” and the “supervenience argument” within the e-physicalism framework. Finally, he elaborates on the claim that phenomenal properties are physical and discusses the “knowledge argument”.