Atomic Assistance : : How "Atoms for Peace" Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity / / Matthew Fuhrmann.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Backlist 2000-2013
• VerfasserIn: Fuhrmann, Matthew,
• Place / Publishing House: Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2012]; ©2012
• Year of Publication: 2012
• Language: English
• Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (344 p.) :; 27 tables, 1 line figure, 18 charts
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; List of Tables and Figures --; Preface and Acknowledgments --; List of Abbreviations --; Introduction: Unintended Consequences in International Politics --; 1. Definitions and Patterns of Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation --; Part I. Atoms for Peace --; 2. Economic Statecraft and Atoms for Peace: A Theory of Peaceful Nuclear Assistance --; 3. The Historical Record: A First Cut --; 4. Nuclear Arms and Influence: Assisting India, Iran, and Libya --; 5. The Thirst for Oil and Other Motives: Nine Puzzling Cases of Assistance --; 6. Oil for Peaceful Nuclear Assistance? --; Part II. Atoms for War --; 7. Spreading Temptation: Why Nuclear Export Strategies Backfire --; 8. Who Builds Bombs? How Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Facilitates the Spread of Nuclear Weapons --; 9. Have International Institutions Made the World Safer? --; Conclusion: What Peaceful Nuclear Assistance Teaches Us about International Relations --; Notes --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9780801465758; 9783110536157
• DOI: 10.7591/9780801465758
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Matthew Fuhrmann.

Nuclear technology is dual use in nature, meaning that it can be used to produce nuclear energy or to build nuclear weapons. Despite security concerns about proliferation, the United States and other nuclear nations have regularly shared with other countries nuclear technology, materials, and knowledge for peaceful purposes. In Atomic Assistance, Matthew Fuhrmann argues that governments use peaceful nuclear assistance as a tool of economic statecraft. Nuclear suppliers hope that they can reap the benefits of foreign aid-improving relationships with their allies, limiting the influence of their adversaries, enhancing their energy security by gaining favorable access to oil supplies-without undermining their security. By providing peaceful nuclear assistance, however, countries inadvertently help spread nuclear weapons. Fuhrmann draws on several cases of "Atoms for Peace," including U.S. civilian nuclear assistance to Iran from 1957 to 1979; Soviet aid to Libya from 1975 to 1986; French, Italian, and Brazilian nuclear exports to Iraq from 1975 to 1981; and U.S. nuclear cooperation with India from 2001 to 2008. He also explores decision making in countries such as Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Syria to determine why states began (or did not begin) nuclear weapons programs and why some programs succeeded while others failed. Fuhrmann concludes that, on average, countries receiving higher levels of peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to pursue and acquire the bomb-especially if they experience an international crisis after receiving aid.