Useful Adversaries : : Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 / / Thomas J. Christensen.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999
• VerfasserIn: Christensen, Thomas J.,
• Place / Publishing House: Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2020]; ©1997
• Argitaratze-urtea: 2020
• Hizkuntza: English
• Saila: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics ; 179
• Deskribapen fisikoa: 1 online resource (352 p.) :; 1 halftone 16 line illus.
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Figures and Tables --; Preface --; Note on Translation and Romanization --; Chapter 1. Introduction --; Chapter 2. Grand Strategy, National Political Power, and Two-Level Foreign Policy Analysis --; Chapter 3. Moderate Strategies and Crusading Rhetoric: Truman Mobilizes for a Bipolar World --; Chapter 4. Absent at the Creation: Acheson's Decision to Forgo Relations with the Chinese Communists --; Chapter 5. The Real Lost Chance in China: Nonrecognition, Taiwan, and the Disaster at the Yalu --; Chapter 6. Continuing Conflict over Taiwan: Mao, the Great Leap Forward, and the 1958 Quemoy Crisis --; Chapter 7. Conclusion --; Appendix A. American Public Opinion Polls, 1947-1950 --; Appendix B. Mao's Korean War Telegrams --; Bibliography --; Index
• Gaia: This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek's KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States. Christensen first develops a novel two-level approach that explains why leaders manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize popular support for expensive, long-term security strategies. By linking "grand strategy," domestic politics, and the manipulation of ideology and conflict, Christensen provides a nuanced and sophisticated link between domestic politics and foreign policy. He then applies the approach to Truman's policy toward the Chinese Communists in 1947-50 and to Mao's initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. In these cases the extension of short-term conflict was useful in gaining popular support for the overall grand strategy that each leader was promoting domestically: Truman's limited-containment strategy toward the USSR and Mao's self-strengthening programs during the Great Leap Forward. Christensen also explores how such low-level conflicts can escalate, as they did in Korea, despite leaders' desire to avoid actual warfare.
• Formatua: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9780691213323; 9783110442496
• DOI: 10.1515/9780691213323?locatt=mode:legacy
• Sartu: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Thomas J. Christensen.

This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Com...