Fearing the Worst : : How Korea Transformed the Cold War / / Samuel F. Wells.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Columbia University Press Complete eBook-Package 2020
• VerfasserIn: Wells, Samuel F.,
• Place / Publishing House: New York, NY : : Columbia University Press, , [2019]; ©2020
• Year of Publication: 2019
• Language: English
• Series: Woodrow Wilson Center Press Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource :; 20 b&w figures
• Other title: Frontmatter --; CONTENTS --; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --; INTRODUCTION --; PART I: THE WAR --; 1. STALIN ENDORSES WAR IN ASIA --; 2. KIM IL-SUNG PLANS AN ATTACK --; 3. TRUMAN CONSOLIDATES US COMMITMENTS --; 4. JOSEPH MCCARTHY SELLS THE POLITICS OF FEAR --; 5. PAUL NITZE SOUNDS THE TOCSIN --; 6. NORTH KOREA DRIVES SOUTH --; 7. TRUMAN REVERSES POLICY --; 8. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR GAMBLES AND WINS --; 9. MAO ZEDONG INTERVENES MASSIVELY --; 10. PENG DEHUAI AND MATTHEW RIDGWAY FIGHT TO A STALEMATE --; PART II: THE TRANSFORMATION --; 11. GEORGE C. MARSHALL AND ROBERT LOVETT GUIDE A US BUILDUP --; 12. DEAN ACHESON LEADS THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE --; 13. ANDREI TUPOLEV CREATES A STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCE --; 14. CURTIS LEMAY BUILDS THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND --; 15. IGOR KURCHATOV DEVELOPS SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS --; 16. WALTER BEDELL SMITH REFORMS AND EXPANDS THE CIA --; 17. KOREA TRANSFORMS THE COLD WAR --; Chronology --; Notes --; Selected Bibliography --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9780231549943; 9783110710977
• DOI: 10.7312/well19274
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Samuel F. Wells.

After World War II, the escalating tensions of the Cold War shaped the international system. Fearing the Worst explains how the Korean War fundamentally changed postwar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union into a militarized confrontation that would last decades.Samuel F. Wells Jr. examines how military and political events interacted to escalate the conflict. Decisions made by the Truman administration in the first six months of the Korean War drove both superpowers to intensify their defense buildup. American leaders feared the worst-case scenario-that Stalin was prepared to start World War III-and raced to build up strategic arms, resulting in a struggle they did not seek out or intend. Their decisions stemmed from incomplete interpretations of Soviet and Chinese goals, especially the belief that China was a Kremlin puppet. Yet Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il-sung all had their own agendas, about which the United States lacked reliable intelligence. Drawing on newly available documents and memoirs-including previously restricted archives in Russia, China, and North Korea-Wells analyzes the key decision points that changed the course of the war. He also provides vivid profiles of the central actors as well as important but lesser known figures. Bringing together studies of military policy and diplomacy with the roles of technology, intelligence, and domestic politics in each of the principal nations, Fearing the Worst offers a new account of the Korean War and its lasting legacy.