Too Little, Too Late : : The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises /

Too Little, Too Late : : The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises / / ed. by Martin Guzman, José Antonio Ocampo, Joseph E. Stiglitz.

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The current approach to resolving sovereign debt crises does not work: sovereign debt restructurings come too late and address too little. Though unresolved debt crises impose enormous costs on societies, many recent restructurings have not been deep enough to provide the conditions for economic rec...

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Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Columbia University Press Complete eBook-Package 2016
MitwirkendeR:
Brooks, Skylar,
Chodos, Sergio,
Conn, Richard A.,
DeSieno, Timothy B.,
Gelpern, Anna,
Gitlin, Richard,
Guzman, Martin,
Haley, James A.,
Heller, Ben,
Herman, Barry,
House, Brett,
Howse, Robert,
Kaiser, Jürgen,
Lombardi, Domenico,
Ocampo, José Antonio,
Raffer, Kunibert,
Stiglitz, Joseph E.,
Uy, Marilou,
Varoufakis, Yanis,
Zhou, Shichao,
HerausgeberIn:
Guzman, Martin,
Ocampo, José Antonio,
Stiglitz, Joseph E.,
Place / Publishing House:New York, NY : : Columbia University Press, , [2016]
©2016
Year of Publication:2016
Language:English
Series:Initiative for Policy Dialogue at Columbia: Challenges in Development and Globalization
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (312 p.) :; 13 b&w illustrations
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Table of Contents:
  • Frontmatter
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • Part I. General Issues of Sovereign Debt Restructuring
  • 1. Creating a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring That Works
  • 2. Sovereign Debt of Developing Countries: Overview of Trends and Policy Perspectives
  • 3. Private Creditor Power and the Politics of Sovereign Debt Governance
  • Part II. Two Case Studies: Argentina and Greece
  • 4. From the Pari Passu Discussion to the "Illegality" of Making Payments: The Case of Argentina
  • 5. Greek Debt Denial: A Modest Debt Restructuring Proposal and Why It Was Ignored
  • Part III. Improvements to the Contractual Approach
  • 6. Count the Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in Sovereign Bonds
  • 7. Contractual and Voluntary Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: There Is Still More to Do
  • 8. Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Coasean Perspective
  • 9. Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Understanding the Benefits and Addressing Concerns
  • Part IV. Proposals for a Multinational Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Principles, Elements, and Institutionalization
  • 10. A Brief History of Sovereign Debt Resolution and a Proposal for a Multilateral Instrument
  • 11. Toward a Multilateral Framework for Recovery from Sovereign Insolvency
  • 12. Making a Legal Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring Operational: The Case for a Sovereign Debt Workout Institution
  • 13. Perspectives on a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Framework: Less Is More
  • 14. Toward a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring: What Can Public International Law Contribute?
  • 15. Debts, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law: Advocating a Fair and Efficient Sovereign Insolvency Model
  • Contributors
  • Index

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