Short- and medium term effects of informal care provision on health

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Health, Education and Retirement over the Prolonged Life Cycle – Vienna






- Low birth rates and prolonged life cycle: population ageing
- \Rightarrow strong implications for the labor market and social security systems.
 - Long-term care is one important part
 - Publicly funded costs of long-term care in the EU27 increase from 1.2% of GDP to 2.5% in 2060

Motivation II

in Germany:

• 2011: 2,32m receive long-term care (LTC) services in total



• 1,54m (65%) are cared by relatives (1,05m exclusively)

Research question

Is there any negative health effect for informal caregivers?

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Economic Studies

- Coe und Van Houtven (2009), Do et al. (2013): care and diseases
- Van Houtven et al. (2005); Schmitz und Stroka (2013): care intensity and drug prescription
- Van den Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2007); Bobinac et al. (2010); Leigh (2010): care and well-being

Medical studies: many, but:

- Small, non-representative samples
- Descriptive analysis, cross-section
- Focus on dementia patients

Own contribution:

Medium-term effects

Socio-economic Panel (SOEP)

- Representative household survey with currently 22,000 individuals from Germany
- Covers topics on health, labor, education, income, etc.
- Waves 2002-2010

Outcome variable: health

- Version of the SF12v2-questionnaire
- Summary scale for mental (MCS) and physical health (PCS)
- Range between 0 and 100, mean = 50, std. dev. = 10

Care in the SOEP: "What is a typical day like for you? How many hours do you spend on care and support for persons in need of care?" Matching algorithm (Propensity score, Gauß-Kernel) • $T = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if provided at least 2hrs care in } t = 0 \\ 0, & \text{else} \end{cases}$


We would like to know $ITE_i = Y_{i1} - Y_{i0}$

- *Y*_{*i*1}: Outcome of *i* with care,
- Y_{i0} : Outcome of *i* without care

Instead, we focus on the $ATT = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | T = 1)$.

Main assumption: CIA

$$Y_0, Y_1 \perp \!\!\!\perp T | X \tag{1}$$




Selection of healthy individuals into care \Rightarrow Matching on outcome variables t - 1 (pre-treatment)

Selection out of care \Rightarrow No problem

Further unobserved heterogeneity \Rightarrow Stratified estimation

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



Only women are considered


	t=0	t=1	t=3	t=5	t=7
Hours of care = 0	29,080	26,667	18,956	11,455	5,194
Hours of care $= 1$	862 (= 41%)	800	564	357	160
Hours of care $= 2$	507 (= 24%)	479	317	197	85
Hours of care $= 3$	203 (= 10%)	193	140	81	36
Hours of care $= 4$	167 (= 8%)	152	100	53	24
Hours of care > 4	358 (= 17%)	331	211	111	53
All observations	31,177	28,622	20,288	12,254	5,552
Country COED course calculations. Number in country have in the charge					

Source: SOEP, own calculations. Number in parentheses is the share among all individuals with positive hours of care. Hours of care are measured in t = 0 only.














t= - 1	t=0	t=1
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












To sum up

- comparing each of the $2^8 = 256$ different paths is not managable
- observations in each path are very small
- Even then, we could not model the yearly transitions appropriately

Thus, we are able to answer:

- What is the average effect of care in one year on health in later years?
- not possible: What is the average effect of different years of care?

Matching variables

Why do people care?

- 1. Because they have to
- 2. ... and they want to
- 3. ... and they are able to.

Variables for 1


- Mother alive, father alive, age of parents
- Number of sisters, number of brothers

Variables for 2

- Socio-economics characteristics (age, family status, education, labor force participation)
- Personality traits (BIG 5, reciprocity, acceptance of private participation in health care)


Variables for 3

• MCS, PCS, health satisfaction




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
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
Results: MCS




Results: PCS




Results: PCS



Results: MCS for different care intensities




Results: MCS for different care intensities




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
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Results: MCS for different care intensities





Results: MCS, control group of never carers



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Main results so far:

- Considerable short-term effects of informal care on mental health of female caregivers
- Effects increase with more care intensity
- Irrespective of the intensity: effects attenuate over time (and are insignificant)

Why is that?

- Majority has stopped caring after 3 years
- Short-term effects are driven by active care (and maybe by the bereavement effect)
- There is no "scarring effect"

Sensitivity analysis (Ichino et al., 2008). Is a potential failure of the CIA crucial?

Assessment: slightly relax the unconfoundedness assumption. We assume that

 $Y_0, Y_1 \searrow T | X$

but the failure is due to an unobserved binary variable *U*. Could we condition on it, we had

$$Y_0, Y_1 \perp \!\!\!\perp T | (X, U) \tag{1'}$$


Example: *U* is genetic endowment (U = 1 good, U = 0 bad).

Idea: make some assumptions on U (in particular how it drives the selection and the outcome), simulate and match on it.




Good health $Y > \overline{Y}$	Bad health $Y < \overline{Y}$	Good health $Y > \overline{Y}$	Bad health $Y < \overline{Y}$	
Care (T=1)		No Care (T=0)		

$$p = Pr(U=1 | group)$$




Good health $Y > \overline{Y}$	Bad health $Y < \overline{Y}$	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Good health} \\ Y > \overline{Y} \end{array}$	Bad health $Y < \overline{Y}$	
Care (T=1)		No Care (T=0)		

$$p = Pr(U=1 | group)$$



$$p = Pr(U=1 | group)$$




Justification of choice of *d* and *s*


Assumption: unobserved *U* has a stronger effect than each single observable (but not too strong). Choices:


- 1. Outcome effect = 0.2 (0.3) and Selection effect = 0.2 (0.3)
- 2. Outcome effect = 0.2 (0.3) and Selection effect = -0.2 (-0.3)


Table : Distribution of p_{ij} across control variables in the sample


	d	S	Effect
Mother alive	-0.05	-0.05	(+)
Number of sisters	0.01	-0.03	(-)
Age	0.21	0.19	(+)
Married	0.19	0.16	(+)
Divorced	-0.03	-0.02	(+)
Full time	-0.04	-0.07	(+)
MCS	-0.03	-0.09	(+)
PCS	-0.12	-0.12	(+)














Summary

Summary:

- Short-term effects of informal care on mental health (females)
- After about 5 years they are back at to the base level
- Short-term effects increase in care intensity, medium-term effects do not
- No significant effects for physical health
- Results hold for certain deviations from the CIA assumption

Main limitations: Estimated effect is compound of many different effects

- Intensity and duration
- Relation to care recipient
- Combination of care with other burdens (care & full-time work)

Thank you for your attention

Backup slides

Years of consecu- tive care as of t=0		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total
Uncensore	d Obs.	309	51	24	9	7	7	5	-	412
	Share	75%	12%	6%	2%	2%	2%	1%	-	100%
Censored	Obs.	265	244	84	108	37	42	12	23	815
	Share	33%	30%	10%	13%	5%	5%	1%	3%	100%
Total	Obs. Share	574 47%	295 24%	108 9%	117 10%	$44 \\ 4\%$	49 4%	17 1%	23 2%	1227 100%

Source: SOEP, own calculations. Uncensored individuals did not provide care in t = -1 and stopped caregiving some time before t = 7. Therefore, the maximum observable care duration is 7 years.


Effects in t = 1 (baseline specification)

- 2 hours: -2.00
- 3 hours: -3.02

Some results from the literature using the MCS measure

- Schmitz (2011): Unemployment (plant closure): +0.5 to -1.5 (insign.)
- Marcus (2013): Unemployment of couples (plant closure): -2.7 (sign.)
- Lechner (2009): Sport participation, 16 years after: +0.9 (insign.)

Results: MCS, balanced and unbalanced



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Informal Care

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	Trea	ted	Cont	rols	Matched controls		Standardized bias			
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	unmatched sample		ample (0.03)	
Stage i): care obligations										
Age mother	44.94	34.76	37.92	30.65	44.81	33.3	21.43	4.37	0.40	
Mother alive	0.44	0.5	0.49	0.5	0.44	0.5	-9.13	-1.58	-0.35	
Father alive	0.22	0.41	0.34	0.47	0.23	0.42	-28.5	-6.16	-2.28	
Number of sisters	0.89	1.29	1.03	1.33	0.89	1.25	-10.51	-2.13	-0.48	
Stage ii): willlingness to	provide ca	re								
NEURO	4.52	0.68	4.37	.72	4.52	0.71	21.84	6.44	0.96	
CONSC	6.04	0.75	5.97	0.79	6.04	0.77	10.01	3.34	0.94	
AGREE	5.61	0.84	5.58	0.84	5.6	0.84	3.41	1.30	0.54	
OPENN	4.37	1.15	4.51	1.12	4.38	1.13	-12.43	-4.48	-1.55	
EXTRA	5.01	0.92	5.04	0.95	5.01	.95	-2.66	-0.69	0.10	
Positive reciprocity	5.67	0.95	5.55	0.99	5.67	0.96	11.77	3.01	-0.18	
Negative reciprocity	2.71	1.20	2.87	1.24	2.73	1.21	-12.93	3.01	-1.65	
Acceptance of private	3.31	0.81	3.29	0.80	3.31	0.81	2.68	0.66	-0.10	
funding										
Age	56.20	12.94	46.54	16.35	55.19	13.74	45.19	6.88	3.91	
Age squared	3326.24	1426.78	2721.65	1691.83	3234.7	1495.73	38.63	13.94	5.85	
Married	0.80	0.40	0.63	0.48	0.78	0.41	38.82	13.01	4.33	
Divorced	0.07	0.25	0.09	0.28	0.07	0.25	-7.38	-2.81	-1.02	
Single	0.07	0.25	0.17	0.38	0.08	0.27	-32.61	-11.03	-4.29	
Children in hh	0.18	0.38	0.30	0.46	0.19	0.40	-29.00	-10.43	-3.65	
Educ general	0.17	0.37	0.17	0.38	0.17	0.38	-1.76	-1.02	-0.68	
Educ middle	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.54	0.50	11.73	3.52	0.56	
Foreign	0.04	0.20	0.06	0.24	0.04	0.2	-10.29	-3.71	-1.42	
West	0.69	0.46	0.75	0.43	0.69	0.46	-13.92	-4.78	-1.26	
Full time	0.13	0.34	0.26	0.44	0.14	0.35	-34.34	-11.36	-3.70	
Stage iii): ability to prov	ide care									
MCS	47.32	10.51	49.46	10.13	47.41	10.9	-20.72	-6.54	-0.90	
PCS	46.42	10.03	49.02	10.14	46.68	10.48	-25.8	-8.53	-2.52	
Satisfaction health	6.19	2.21	6.58	2.17	6.21	2.23	-17.91	-5.72	-1.36	
Satisfaction life	6.58	1.86	6.97	1.76	6.6	1.93	-21.34	-6.69	-1.08	
N		1 227		30 270		30 270				

$$\begin{split} A\hat{T}T &= \frac{1}{n_1} \sum_{i \in I_1} \left[Y_{1i} - \sum_{j \in I_0} \omega(i, j) \cdot Y_{0j} \right] \\ \omega(i, j) &= \frac{K(\frac{p_i - p_j}{h})}{\sum_{\{j \in D = 0\}} K(\frac{p_i - p_j}{h})}, \quad K(u) = exp(-u^2/2) \end{split}$$

Exploit the double robustness property (Bang & Robins, 2005) double Robustness Property:

$$\hat{\beta}_{ATT} = \left(\mathbf{X}'\mathbf{W}\mathbf{X}\right)^{-1}\mathbf{X}'\Delta y$$

- *ATT*: weighted average
- control again for the confounding factors
- \Rightarrow doubly consistent estimator
 - robust standard errors: similar, but slightly more conservative

Stratifiziertes Matching

$$\widehat{ATT} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in 1,2} n_i \cdot ATT_i \qquad \qquad \widehat{se} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i \in 1,2} n_i^2 \cdot se_i^2}$$

SF-12 Questionnaire

Health and Illness

99.	How would you describe your current health?
	Very good
	Good
	Satisfactory
	Poor
	Bad
1.00	
100.	When you ascend stairs, i.e. go up several floors on foot: Does your state of health affect you greatly, slightly or not at all?
	Greatly
	Slightly
	Not at all
101.	And what about having to cope with other tiring everyday tasks, i.e. when one has to lift something heavy or when one requires agility:
	Does your state of health affect you greatly, slightly or not at all?
	Greatly
	Slightly
	Not at all

SF-12 Questionnaire

