



Cross-national variation in the influence of parental socio-economic status on union formation decisions: What's the SDT got to do with it?



Anne Brons, Aart C. Liefbroer & Harry Ganzeboom

2-4 December 2015



INTRODUCTION + CONTRIBUTION

- Young adults from high SES families delay their first union
- However, strength of the effect of parental SES on timing union formation varies between countries
- Which country level indicators can explain this between-country variation in the effect of parental SES?

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND (1)

Individualization

- Second Demographic Transition (SDT): in more individualized societies:
 - *future chances of a child less dependent on parental background*
 - *Increased possibilities to make own choices in life, separately from parents*
- Individualization varies between countries
 - *Started in Northern & Western Europe, followed by Eastern & Southern Europe*
- *Impact of parental status on timing of union formation weaker in more individualized societies*

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND (2)


Structural individualization

- Social-economic change in society
- Intergenerational educational mobility
 - *Correlation between educational level of respondent and average educational level of parents*

Cultural individualization

- Change in norms & values
- Individualistic values
 - *Role of the family & intergenerational support*

DESIGN OF THE PAPER



DATA & METHODS (1)

Data

- Third round of European Social Survey (ESS, 2006)
- 25 European countries
- N = 45,288

Dependent variable

- Age of entry into first union (including both marriage or cohabitation)
- Young adulthood: between the age of 15 and 35



DATA & METHODS (2)

Independent variables

- Parental socio-economic status
 - *International Standard Level of Education (ISLED)* (Schroder & Ganzeboom, 2014)
 - *International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI)* (Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996)

- Macro indicators
 - *Intergenerational educational mobility*
 - *Correlation parental education & individuals education per country*
 - *ESS round 1 – 6 (2002–2012)*
 - *Familialism*
 - *Intergenerational support*
 - *Two questions from European Value Study (2008)*


DATA & METHODS (3)

Analysis

- Multilevel discrete-time hazard models
 - *Person period file*
 - *Random slope for parental SES at the country level*
 - *Cross-level interaction between parental SES and macro indicators*
 - *Focusing on women*

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES

Median age at entry of first union for women



RESULTS FIRST UNION FOR WOMEN

	Model 1		Model 2 (Mobility)		Model 3 (Familialism)		Model 4 (Combined)	
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>
First & second level								
Parental SES	-0.166 **	.021						
Mobility								
Mobility *pses								
Familialism								
Familialism*pses								
Random effects								
Variance (cntry)	.046	.013						
Random slope (pses)	.009	.003						


* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, Models also controlled for age, age², age³, year of birth, year of birth²

RESULTS FIRST UNION FOR WOMEN

	Model 1		Model 2 (Mobility)		Model 3 (Familialism)		Model 4 (Combined)	
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>
First & second level								
Parental SES	-.166 **	.021	-.164 **	.017				
Mobility			.616	.656				
Mobility *pses			.934 **	.263				
Familialism								
Familialism*pses								
Random effects								
Variance (cntry)	.046	.013	.044	.013				
Random slope (pses)	.009	.003	.006	.002				

* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, Models also controlled for age, age², age³, year of birth, year of birth²

FIGURE PARENTAL SES & MOBILITY



RESULTS FIRST UNION FOR WOMEN

	Model 1		Model 2 (Mobility)		Model 3 (Familialism)		Model 4 (Combined)	
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>
First & second level								
Parental SES	-.166 **	.021	-.164 **	.017	-.166 **	.018		
Mobility			.616	.656				
Mobility *pses			.934 **	.263				
Familialism					-.108	.406		
Familialism*pses					-.512 **	.166		
Random effects								
Variance (cntry)	.046	.013	.044	.013	.046	.013		
Random slope (pses)	.009	.003	.006	.002	.006	.002		

* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, Models also controlled for age, age², age³, year of birth, year of birth²

RESULTS FIRST UNION FOR WOMEN

	Model 1		Model 2 (Mobility)		Model 3 (Familialism)		Model 4 (Combined)	
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>
First & second level								
Parental SES	-.166 **	.021	-.164 **	.017	-.166 **	.018	-.165 **	.017
Mobility			-.616	.656			.749	.789
Mobility *pses			.934 **	.263			.675 *	.301
Familialism					-.108	.406	.145	.479
Familialism*pses					-.512 **	.166	-.284	.182
Random effects								
Variance (cntry)	.046	.013	.044	.013	.046	.013	.044	.013
Random slope (pses)	.009	.003	.006	.002	.006	.002	.005	.002


* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, Models also controlled for age, age², age³, year of birth, year of birth²

INCLUDING OWN EDUCATION

	Model 1		Model 2 (Mobility)		Model 3 (Familialism)		Model 4 (Combined)	
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>
Parental SES	-.075**	.020	-.074**	.017	-.074**	.018	-.074**	.017
Educational level	-.090**	.010	-.090**	.010	-.090**	.010	-.090**	.010
Enrollment	-.528**	.025	-.529**	.025	-.528**	.025	-.529**	.025
Macro level								
Mobility			-1.12	.728			.988	.876
Mobility *pses			.718**	.253			.502 #	.293
Familialism					.242	.228	.073	.269
Familialism*pses					-.205**	.079	-.120	.089
Random effects								
Variance (cntry)	.060	.017	.055	.016	.058	.017	.055	.016
Random slope (pses)	.007	.003	.005	.002	.005	.002	.005	.002

* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, Models also controlled for age, age², age³, year of birth, year of birth²

FIRST CONCLUSIONS (1)



FIRST CONCLUSIONS (2)

- The context in which people live matters!
- The impact of parental SES on timing first union is weaker in more individualized societies
 - *High level of intergenerational educational mobility*
 - *Low level of familialism (intergenerational support)*
- Remains after including own educational level

Next steps

- Macro indicators not only **per country**, also **per cohort** within countries
 - *Extra level for cohort: both between- & within-country variation*
- **First union vs first marriage**
 - *Different impact of parental SES on marriage?*

Thank you

M.D. Brons brons@nidi.nl

A.C. Liefbroer liefbroer@nidi.nl

H.B.G. Ganzeboom harry.ganzeboom@vu.nl

CON / OPP

CONTEXTS OF OPPORTUNITY



European Research Council
Established by the European Commission
Supporting top researchers
from anywhere in the world

Acknowledgement ERC project

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013) / ERC Grant Agreement n. 324178



KONINKLIJKE NEDERLANDSE
AKADEMIE VAN WETENSCHAPPEN




NIDI is an institute of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences KNAW

www.nidi.nl

PRELIMINARY RESULTS (1)


Effect parental SES on first union for women



* Controlled for age, age², age³, year of birth, year of birth²

PRELIMINARY RESULTS (1)

Effect parental SES on first marriage for women



* Controlled for age, age², age³, year of birth, year of birth²

NEXT STEPS (2)

- Results first marriage
 - *Some countries stronger effect of parental SES on timing first marriage (for example, Spain, Portugal)*
 - *Some countries weaker (or no) effect of parental SES on timing first marriage (for example, Norway, Sweden, Finland)*
- So, **different impact of parental SES on first marriage compared to first union**
- Maybe also different impact of country level indicators?