

# Infection Risk at Work, Automatability, and Employment

Ana L. Abeliansky  
Klaus Prettnner  
Roman Stöllinger




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# Introduction




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# Introduction



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# Industrial robots worldwide



Worldwide Stock of Operational Industrial Robots (source: IFR, 2018)


# Different forms of automation

- ① Industrial robots (mass production).
- ② 3D printers (customized production).
- ③ Autonomous driving (taxis and trucks).
- ④ Machine learning and AI:
  - ChatGPT,
  - writing reports, newsflashes, ads, etc.,
  - diagnosing diseases (IBM Watson),
  - doing science.

What are the causes of automation?

- ① Technological change (Frey and Osborne, 2017; Arntz et al., 2017).
- ② High wages (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018; Krenz et al., 2021).
- ③ Labor market tightness (Cords and Prettnner, 2022).
- ④ Demographic change (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2022; Abeliensky and Prettnner, 2023).

# Global robot density and demography



Global Robot Density. Source: Abeliansky and Prettnner (2023)

## Is there a role for transmissible diseases?

- Robots cannot be infected by (biological) pathogens.
  - Robots do not transmit diseases.
  - Robots are typically not on sick leave.
  - Robots do not suffer from reduced productivity when sick and from long-term consequences of infection.
- ⇒ All of this should imply that a pandemic raises the incentives to automate.



Is there indication that the pandemic matters?

- 1 We provide a theory of the decision to employ workers versus robots in the face of a pandemic.
- 2 We test the theory on Austrian employment data before and after COVID-19.

# Theory: Final goods production and tasks

- Goods producers have access to a production function of the form

$$Y_t = K_t^{1-\alpha} \sum_{\omega=1}^J x_{t,\omega}^{\alpha},$$

where

- $K_t$  is traditional capital (the assembly line);
  - $x_{t,\omega}$  are tasks performed along the assembly line.
- The inverse demand function for specific tasks follows as

$$pr_{t,\omega} = \alpha K_t^{1-\alpha} x_{t,\omega}^{\alpha-1}.$$

- Tasks can be supplied according to a production function of the form

$$x_{t,\omega} = [a_{t,l,\omega}(i_{t,l,\omega}) \cdot l_{t,\omega} + a_{t,p,\omega} \cdot p_{t,\omega}]^{\beta},$$

where

- $a_{t,l,\omega}(i_{t,l,\omega})$  is the productivity of humans;
  - $a_{t,p,\omega}$  is the productivity of robots;
  - technically, humans and robots are perfect substitutes.
- Task suppliers (could be in-house) maximize profits given by

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{t,\omega} &= pr_{t,\omega} x_{t,\omega} - w_{t,l} l_{t,\omega} - \gamma r p_{t,\omega} \\ &= \alpha h_t^{1-\alpha} [a_{t,l,\omega}(i_{t,l,\omega}) \cdot l_{t,\omega} + a_{t,p,\omega} \cdot p_{t,\omega}]^{\alpha\beta} - w_{t,l} l_{t,\omega} - \gamma r p_{t,\omega}.\end{aligned}$$

- Profit maximization implies

$$\frac{\partial \pi_{t,\omega}}{\partial l_{t,\omega}} = 0,$$
$$\frac{\partial \pi_{t,\omega}}{\partial p_{t,\omega}} = 0.$$

This allows determining optimal human employment and robot use:

$$l_{t,\omega} = \left[ \frac{w_{t,l}}{a_{t,l,\omega}(i_{t,l,\omega})\alpha^2\beta K_t^{1-\alpha}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha\beta-1}} \cdot \frac{1}{a_{t,l,\omega}(i_{t,l,\omega})},$$
$$p_{t,\omega} = \left[ \frac{\gamma r}{a_{t,p,\omega}\alpha^2\beta K_t^{1-\alpha}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha\beta-1}} \cdot \frac{1}{a_{t,p,\omega}}.$$

- Profits of firms that produce with workers ( $\pi_{t,\omega,l}$ ):

$$\pi_{t,\omega,l} = (1 - \alpha\beta)\alpha K_t^{1-\alpha} \left[ \frac{w_{t,l}}{a_{t,l,\omega}(i_{t,l,\omega})\alpha^2\beta K_t^{1-\alpha}} \right]^{\frac{\alpha\beta}{\alpha\beta-1}}.$$

- Profits of firms that produce with robots ( $\pi_{t,\omega,p}$ ):

$$\pi_{t,\omega,p} = (1 - \alpha\beta)\alpha K_t^{1-\alpha} \left[ \frac{\gamma r}{a_{t,p,\omega}\alpha^2\beta K_t^{1-\alpha}} \right]^{\frac{\alpha\beta}{\alpha\beta-1}}.$$

- Sort tasks according to the **effective cost of production** and search for a solution where  $\pi_{t,\omega,l} = \pi_{t,\omega,p}$ .

# Theory: Production choice II (cut-off productivity)


- After some reformulations, we arrive at the cut-off condition:

$$\frac{a_{t,l,\omega}(i_{t,l,\omega})}{a_{t,p,\omega}} = \frac{w_{t,l}}{\gamma r}.$$

- Interpretation:
  - LHS: productivity ratio between workers and robots.
  - RHS: Cost ratio between workers and robots.
  - In case of a higher productivity ratio, task is performed by workers.
  - In case of a lower productivity ratio, task is performed by robots.


# Theory: Sorting of tasks according to automatibility

- If  $\frac{a_{t,l,\omega}(i_{t,l,\omega})}{a_{t,p,\omega}} > \frac{w_{t,l}}{\gamma r}$ , task is produced by workers.
- If  $\frac{a_{t,l,\omega}(i_{t,l,\omega})}{a_{t,p,\omega}} < \frac{w_{t,l}}{\gamma r}$ , task is produced by robots.
- If a pandemic occurs,  $i_{t,l,\omega}$  shifts upwards.
- This changes the ratio of productivity between workers and robots.
- **However:** This only affects workers who are susceptible to automation.



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## Testable hypotheses

- 1 Automation risk **reduces employment**.
- 2 The COVID-19 pandemic has **negative effects** on employment for workers that exhibit a **high automation risk**.
- 3 The COVID-19 pandemic has **no effect on employment** for workers that that exhibit a **low automation risk**.

Regression equation:

$$L_{g,s,a,\omega,j,r,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot VTR_{\omega} + \beta_2 \cdot C19 + \beta_3 \cdot RTI_{\omega} + \beta_4 \cdot (VTR_{\omega} \cdot C19) + g + s + a + j + r + \omega + \epsilon_{g,s,a,\omega,j,r,t},$$

where

- $VTR$  is the viral transmission risk and  $RTI$  the automatibility of occupation  $\omega$ ;
- We control for gender ( $g$ ), skills ( $s$ ), age ( $a$ ), industry ( $j$ ), and region ( $r$ );
- Our hypotheses imply:
  - Hypotheses 1:  $\beta_3 < 0$ ;
  - Hypothesis 2:  $\beta_4 < 0$  for automatable jobs;
  - Hypothesis 3:  $\beta_4 = 0$  for non-automatable jobs.


- Time period: 2015-2021.
- Austrian microcensus (“Mikrozensus Arbeitskräfteerhebung”):
  - employment,
  - hours worked (work volume),
  - age, gender, education, industry, region, occupation.
- VTR: constructed for Austria based on Chernoff and Warman (2023).
- RTI: constructed for Austria based on Autor et al. (2003).

Table: COVID-related labor market outcomes

Sample:	Employment (log)			Work volume (log)		
	Automatable occupations	Non automatable occupations	All occupations	Automatable occupations	Non automatable occupations	All occupations
RTI	-0.3856** (0.1313)	-0.1330 (0.1282)	-0.1431 (0.0944)	-0.5919*** (0.0935)	-0.1219 (0.2098)	-0.1829 (0.1394)
VTR	0.5726* (0.2756)	0.3205*** (0.0793)	0.4102** (0.1305)	0.4733* (0.2154)	0.3840** (0.1300)	0.4031* (0.1879)
VTR x C19	-0.0772** (0.0214)	0.0596 (0.0661)	0.0296 (0.0357)	-0.1513*** (0.0390)	0.0447 (0.1062)	-0.0032 (0.0573)
C19	0.0207*** (0.0051)	-0.0188 (0.0292)	-0.0155 (0.0157)	-0.0138 (0.0145)	-0.0811* (0.0359)	-0.0676** (0.0208)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Industry FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Occupation FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	96,671	75,141	171,812	92,693	72,185	164,878
R-sq.	0.3515	0.3472	0.3326	0.3279	0.3049	0.3017

Note: \*, \*\* and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Two-way standard errors clustered at the level of ISCO-1-digit occupations and years. Standard errors in parenthesis.

# Employment over time across different risk groups



Employment in different occupations before and after COVID-19

- Automatibility affects employment in the Austrian labor market.
- Viral transmission risk at work affects employment in a pandemic.
- The employment effect, however, is only visible for automatable jobs.
- Effects are stronger for work volume as compared with number of workers.
- This implies that the “Kurzarbeit” schemes have had the intended effects.

Thank you very much!