

rGya dmar ba - *dBu ma'i de kho na nyid*: Translation

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A. [Homage]

I bow to those [[[Who? Those who know the two truths. What are they? Here's a simile:]]] who are the sunlight of knowledge and the moonlight of kindness who dwell without abiding [[[at the limits of great wisdom and surpassing compassion]]] in the sky [[[of knowledge]]]—reality devoid of proliferations [[[the ultimate]]]—of a world which is like an illusion [[[conventional]]]. [[[We speak of the center of boundless knowledge like we speak of the center of the sky.(?)]]]

[[[He praises the perfectly and completely Enlightened Ones by recollecting their virtues, and praises his lamas by recollecting their kindness.]]]

I salute the lord,¹ bodhisattva [[[Gangpa Lodrö Jangchub (Gangs pa blo gros byang chub)]]]² of [[[endowed with]]] stainless [[[devoid of any defilements, consisting of ignorance and mistaken cognitions]]] discriminative intellect, who has the treasure of boundless virtues, known in the world to be like the sun, an illuminator. [[[Just as the sun is known to all as luminous, this one too is known to those who hear as knowledgeable and virtuous.]]]

B. [Statement of Purpose]

The root of all faults is attachment to [things having] characteristics and hence is to be eliminated. Wishing to achieve excellences for the sake of oneself and others [[[this is the ultimate purpose]]], I will explain so that the absence of nature of all phenomena [[[this is the topic]]] will be realized [[[this is the purpose (of the treatise). This is indirectly the connection between them.]]]³.

¹ We take *rje btsun dag* as honorific, rather than plural, given the identification of the object of the homage.

² The annotator identifies the object of homage as Gang pa blo gros byang chub; the verse uses the latter two parts of this name, *blo gros* ("intellect") and *byang chub*, here part of "bodhisattva."

³ Cf. Broido 1983: 5: "The *dgos- 'brel* of a work is often discussed under five headings, viz. the *text (rjod-byed, abhidhāna), its *topic (brjod-bya, abhidheya), the immediate *purpose (dgos-pa, prayojana) for which it was written, the more *distant purpose (dgos-pa'i dgos-pa or nying-dgos, prayojanaprayojana), and the *connection ('brel-ba, sambandha) between them."

C. [The three characteristics within the Two Truths and the division of provisional and definitive meaning⁴]

C1 (Summarized explanation)

By turning three times the wheel of the dharma consisting in the twelve divisions of the Buddha's words, which are collected in the two or three baskets,⁵ (the Buddha) made clear the system of the middle, free of the extremes of deprecation and reification [[[It is free of the superimposition of existence because the duality of object and mind, or cognition, and so forth, do not exist ultimately. It is free from the extreme of non-existence because although these things do not exist, we do not call them non-existent.]]], by means of the three characteristics within the two truths.⁶ [[[This is the summarized explanation.]]]

C2 (Extended explanation)

C21 [The three characteristics within the two truths according to the respective philosophical systems]

C21.A [Hearers]

[[[Hearer]]]* sectarians accept as the definitive meaning of the middle that rejects the two extremes [[[Since they assert object and mind, the dependent character, they do not make the deprecation "non-existence"; insofar as these are devoid of a personal self, they do not superimpose the existence of a personal self]]] the meaning of the three characteristics [[[two are ultimate; the twofold imputational character⁷ is conventional]]] being taught within the two truths, namely [[[the sayings of the initial (turning)]]] positing [[[the duality of]]] object and mind, which are the dependent character [[[these are held to be true as entities, whereby the phenomenal self of object and subject is also asserted to be

4 Elements of this discussion might have their source in the *Madhyamakāloka* (to be investigated further).

5 Vetturini (2007 : 65) records that Lo dgon pa bSod nams lha'i dbang po (1423-1496), the author of the *bKa' gdams rin po che'i chos 'byung rnam thar nyin mor byed pa'i 'od stong* ("Myriad Rays of the Sun"), mentions three or four turnings of the Dharma Wheel, and "twelve scriptural categories or three baskets (tripitaka) which may be considered the Buddha's word (dvādaśāṅgabuddhavaśana)." Vetturini (n. 292) lists the twelve as they are identified in the dByangs can lha mo, a dictionary of Buddhist terminology: 1. *mdo* (sūtra), 2. *dbyangs kyis bsnyad pa* (geya), 3. *lung bstan* (vyākaraṇa), 4. *tshigs bcaḍ* (gāthā), 5. *ched brjod* (udāna), 6. *gleng gzhi* (nidāna), 7. *rtogs brjod* (avadāna), 8. *de lta bu byung ba* (itivṛttaka), 9. *skyes rab* (jātaka), 10. *shin tu rgyas pa* (vaipulya), 11. *rmaḍ byung* (adbhūta) and 12. *gtan phab* (upadeśa).

6 The "three characteristics" (*mtshan nyid gsum*) are here the characterizations 'dependent' (Skt. *paratantra*), 'imputational' (Skt. *parikalpita*) and 'perfected' (Skt. *pariṇiṣpanna*) related to the model of the Three Natures (Skt. *trisvabhāva*) developed by Indian Buddhist idealist philosophers such as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (both c. 4th–5th c.). See Wood 1991: 31–60 and Thakchoe 2016 (§3.1).

7 In Chap. V, v. 14, a distinction is made between two kinds of incorrect conventional corresponding to the substantialists' imputational character, namely, conceptualizations and mistaken non-conceptual (i.e., hallucination etc.).

This might also be referring to the division of the imputational character into the "authentic imputational character" (*kun brtags mtshan nyid pa*) and the "conventional imputational character" (*tha snyad tsaṃ du yod pa'i kun brtags*). (REF)

true]]], [[[as the object in the perspective of being]]] devoid of personal self as the ultimate.

*[[[We accept the following: With regard to the basket of the Hearers, Hearers are practitioners who depend on teachers; Solitary Buddhas do not depend on a guru; bodhisattvas are those who practice in such a way for the welfare of others.]]]

C21.B [Mādhyamikas]

[[[Taking into account what is said correctly,]]] Mādhyamikas accept in that way (that is, as the definitive meaning of the middle that rejects the two extremes) the meaning of the three characteristics being taught within the two truths, namely [[[the sayings of the intermediate (turning)]]] explaining the emptiness of all characters [[[dependent and imputational characters are both conventional; the perfected character is ultimate truth]]], such as real cause and effect, as the ultimate [[[all superimpositions as true on these dependent characters that are like illusions are the imputational character. The perfected character is (the emptiness of all characters)]]].

C21.C [Yogācāra]

The Yogācāra accept in that way (that is, as the definitive meaning of the middle that rejects the two extremes) the meaning of the three characteristics being taught within the two truths, namely [[[the sayings of the final (turning)]]] positing the dependent character, mere cognition, [[[Taking that as true, the imputational character superimposes onto that (mere cognition) the duality of object and subject as the phenomenal self and personal self; that (mere cognition) being]]] devoid of the dualism of object and subject, and so forth, as the ultimate.

Table 1: The three characteristics within the two truths				
Conventional				
Ultimate				
Definitive meaning (according to the author)				
	turning of the wheel	dependent	imputational	perfected
Hearers	1st	object and mind (asserted to be true as entities)	personal self	object and mind devoid of personal self
Mādhyamikas	2nd	illusion-like cause, effect, etc.	superimposition of dependent characters as true	emptiness of all characters
Yogācāra	3rd	mere cognition	superimposition of mere cognition as dual (subject/object) and as having phenomenal self and personal self	mere cognition devoid of dualism, etc.

C22 (Teaching the distinction between the provisional and definitive meanings)

The way things are [[[the system]]] is set forth from the perspective of disciples.

[Verse 1]

While the sage spoke in manifold ways [[[cultivating the dharma as antidotes to the 84,000 afflictions]]] in accordance with disciples [[[as said in *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* X.406) "according to the illness"]],

It is said that the absence of character [[[the sayings of the intermediate (turning)]]] is the definitive meaning; the rest [[[the initial and final (turnings)]]] are of provisional meaning.

[[[A further distinction between the definitive and provisional meanings: the nature of things that is established by reasoning is the definitive meaning; scripture that is invalidated by final reasoning is of provisional meaning.]]]

C22.1 (Provisional meaning)

The three characteristics taught within the two truths [[[in the initial and final occasions]]] —namely [[[according to) the sectarians and Yogācāra]]] the dependent character and perfected character are posited as ultimate; the imputational character alone is said to be conventional—is a saying of provisional meaning. Indeed, according to the system of others' [[[people]]] thinking, even the ultimate itself [[[which is taught (in that system) but is not true in that way]]] [[[when Mādhyamikas correctly explain, the dependent character they assert]]] is just false conventional.

Both the imputational character—cause and effect [[[being true]]] as ultimate and so forth—and the dependent character—illusion[[[-like cause and effect, which Mādhyamikas themselves accept to be true as such]]]—are posited to be conventional, and the emptiness of all characteristics ultimately is taught.

This is a saying of definitive meaning because it does not invite another meaning [[[when one observes) "it is not true as such"]]] and [[[once it is known]]] it is not to be rejected. This is because it is something [[[the dharma taught in the intermediate (turning)]]] that abides for [[[when analyzed by]]] final reasoning and what has a meaning opposite [[[to the dharma taught in the intermediate (turning)]]] is (to be rejected)⁸ [[[is invalidated by reasoning]]]. [[[This is) the provisional meaning.]]]

C22.2 (Explaining the purpose of the sayings of provisional meaning)

[[[Explaining the purpose of the sayings of provisional meaning.]]]

[[[**Objection:** The intermediate teachings alone suffice; the initial and final teachings are not necessary. Why are they taught through some intention?

(In answer) to that, there are three parts:

[°1] the purpose of intentional teaching;

[°2] the intentional ground; and

[°3] the invalidation of what is literal.⁹]]]

8 The literal reading of the text (*bzlog pa'i don can yin*) invites the understanding “and it has a meaning that is opposite,” which is does not make sense. In our translation, we solve the problem by relating “*yin*” to the “*ma yin*” in the preceding sentence. It is possible that the text is faulty and should read *bzlog pa'i don can ma yin* (“it does not have an object that is opposed”). But one should observe that the annotations try to make sense of the text as it is, by supplementing “*la rigs pas gnod pa*,” leading to the reading “what has an opposite meaning is invalidated by reasoning.”

9 On the trio of the “purpose” (*dgos pa*), the “intentional ground” (*dgongs gzhi*) and “invalidation of what is literal” (*dnagos yin pa la gnod pa*) see Seyfort Ruegg 2010, chapters 7 (“Purport, Implicature, and Presupposition: Sanskrit *abhiprāya* and Tibetan *dgongs pa/dgongs gzhi* as Hermeneutical Concepts”) and 8 (“An Indian Source for the Tibetan Hermeneutical Term *dgongs gzhi*, “Intentional Ground”). Phya pa makes frequent use of these categories when analyzing passages of Scriptures in his commentary on the *Madhyamakāloka*. Seyfort Ruegg (2010: 198, n. 12) mentions their use by bSod nams rtse mo (1142-1182), who had been a student of Phya pa. They are further discussed by Sa skya Paṇḍita (bSod nams rtse mo’s nephew) in the *mKhas ’jug* and the *sDom gsum rab dbye*.

C22.21 (The purpose of intentional teaching)

[[[It is taught]]] In order for those [[[the sectarians]]] whose perspective is terrified of [[[the teaching of]]] emptiness because they adhere to characters to enter the teaching gradually and in order to safeguard those [[[people]]] who would adopt a nihilistic view by taking the Buddha's words regarding the absence of all characteristics to the letter [[[they understand non-existence in every way through the teaching "from form to omniscient consciousness, [all things] are non-existent"]]]¹⁰,

C22.22 (The intentional ground)

[[[the intentional ground]]] intending the dependent nature [[[illusion-like dependent arising]]] to be existent as correct conventional,

C22.23 (The invalidation of its being literal)

[[[The valid cognition that invalidates its being literal should be added.]]]
[the Buddha] taught the initial and final wheel of the dharma [[[the general meaning of the baskets]]].

C22.3 (Specific explanation of the definitive meaning)

[[[The specific explanation of the definitive meaning has five parts:

- [°1] the meaning of the term;
- [°2] the division of the scriptural tradition that teaches that;
- [°3] establishing the details (of the scriptural tradition);
- [°4] negating attachment to entities; and
- [°5] the effects of cultivating emptiness.]]]

C22.31 (The meaning of the term)

[[[The meaning of the term has four parts:

- [°1] the literal meaning of the term <→ C22.31>;
- [°2] presenting as genuine <→ C22.32>;
- [°3]? <→ C22.33>;
- [°4] the reason to apply (this term) to the state of affairs and the texts <→ C22.34>]]]

C22.311 (The literal meaning of the term)

The wheel of dharma of the absence of characteristics, the precious sutra collection of definitive meaning, is a meaning that is taught directly in sutras such as the three Perfection of Wisdom, i.e., the extended one, the middle-length one, and the brief one, and a meaning that is to be understood [[[indirectly]]].

C22.311.i The meaning that is taught directly

The first: the essence of the path that has an object is condensed in the eight chapters [of the Perfection of Wisdom] into the five paths, the path of accumulation through the path

10 Maybe a quote from the *Āryacandragarbhaprajñāpāramitāmahāyānasūtra.

of no more learning.¹¹ That is also explained in the instructional treatises, along with related texts. [[[This is not taught here.]]]

C22.311.ii The meaning that is to be understood

The second [[[the essence of the object being condensed in the two truths]]] is explained by the *Collection of Reasoning*, along with related texts [[[by texts related to the *Collection of Reasoning*]]]: principally, [[[this is taught:]]] the path [[[whose essence is realizing that]]] and what it perceives [[[i.e., its object]]].

C22.311.iiA [The state of affairs, the path and the texts are “the Middle Way”]

C22.311.iiAA [The state of affairs is “the Middle Way”]

What is perceived by the path, the two truths [[[whose duality is found in reality]]], is the state of affairs called the “Middle Way” because, whether [[[the two truths are]]] taken individually or interrelatedly, they are beyond the extremes of reification and deprecation, namely permanence and annihilation and so forth.

[[[As for the conventional, in as much as one accepts that as long as causes exist, effects also exist, one does not subscribe to annihilation. With the elimination of causes, effects cease, and so one does not subscribe to permanence. For this very reason, it is free from reification and deprecation. Since the ultimate is beyond all expression, it is free from permanence and annihilation, as well as reification and deprecation. Based on both (truths), conventionally, since one accepts that effects come from causes, there is freedom from annihilation; ultimately, since one accepts that nothing is established whatsoever, there is freedom from superimpositions.]]]

C22.311.iiAB The path is “the Middle Way”

What takes as its object that previously described state of affairs [[[the wisdom that realizes the two truths]]] is the path that is the “Middle Way” as well, because it realizes the elimination of all extremes.

C22.311.iiAC The texts are “the Middle Way”

The texts [[[sūtras and treatises]]] that express those (two truths) are also the “Middle Way” because they express the elimination of all extremes [[[namely, reification and deprecation]]].

C22.311.iiB [The state of affairs, the path and the texts are “the Perfection of Wisdom”]

Those [[[three]]] are the “Perfection of Wisdom”: the path that is the “Perfection of Wisdom”; the state of affairs that is the “Perfection of Wisdom”; and the texts that are the “Perfection of Wisdom.”

C22.312 (Presenting as genuine)

C22.311.iiBi The path is the Perfection of wisdom

As for the path, assigning the genuine wisdom within the stage of ordinary beings [[[it is the inferential cognition that examines the absence of nature]]] or assigning it within the path of seeing [[[it is the wisdom that directly beholds the ultimate]]] differ in many ways. However, master Dignāga assigns it [[[genuine wisdom]]] only to [[[Buddhahood (at the end of)]]] the path of no more learning, as it is said:

¹¹ The five paths are: tshogs lam, sbyor lam, mthong lam, sgom lam, mi slob pa'i lam (path of accumulation, of joining, of seeing, of meditation, of no more learning)

The Perfection of Wisdom is non-dual; [[[the wisdom is gnosis]]] that gnosis [[[which is non-dual gnosis]]] is [[[found in]]] the Tathāgata. Since the state of affairs, which is the result [[[genuine wisdom]]], is endowed with them [[[texts and the path]]], the path and texts [[[which are wisdom]]] are designated by the word (for) that [[[for that, which is the genuine result]]].¹² However, in general, genuine wisdom is indeed encapsulated within the path [[[all three (presentations) agree on accepting (genuine wisdom) for the path]]].

C22.313 (Conventional cognition is wisdom (?))

[[[How can a conventional cognition be wisdom?]]] Conventional seeing as an illusion is wisdom from the point of view of not conceiving the three spheres (of agent, action, and object), and so there is no contradiction with (the verse ending with) "It is explained for the sake of cognizing the ultimate"¹³ [[[cognizing the state of affairs is explained to be wisdom]]]. This is like the saying, "The giving that precedes giving is wisdom."¹⁴ [[[While giving is conventional, when it is encompassed in wisdom it is perfected.]]]

C22.314 (The reason to apply this term to the state of affairs and the texts)

C22.311.iiBii The state of affairs is the Perfection of wisdom

As for the state of affairs [[[being the Perfection of Wisdom]]], it is because it is what is perceived by wisdom, because it is explained:

[I bow to the mother of the Jinās of the three times,
Perfection of Wisdom, who is ineffable, inconceivable, unutterable.
Unborn, unceasing, she is of the nature of space,
[And in the scope of *so so rang rig ye shes*.]¹⁵

One expresses with the word for that [[[the perceiver]]], that which it (the perceiver) perceives, like *pratyakṣa*, etc.. [[[Like blue, the object of that (i.e., of *pratyakṣa*) is called "blue *pratyakṣa*."]]]¹⁶

C22.311.iiBiii The texts are the Perfection of wisdom

As for the texts (being the Perfection of Wisdom), this is because they are the cause of wisdom and they express it, just as one calls the words that are the cause of inference by

12 Dignāga, *Āryaprajñāpāramitāsaṅgrahakārikā*, verse 1.

13 Asaṅga, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* XVI.15c.

14 **Āryaprajñāpāramitāsaṃcayagāthā*, Tib. 'Phags pa shes rab kyi ph arol tu phyin pa sdud pa tshigs su bcad pa, D34-1-5a.

15 Kun dga' snying po (**Ānandagarbha*), **Prajñāpāramitāmaṇḍalopāyikā*, Tib. *Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i dkyi 'khor gyi cho ga* D254b; Ratnakīrti, **Yogacaturdevastotra*, Tib. *sByor ba bzhi'i lha la bstod pa* D247b. Translation: Kapstein 2000: 111.

16 The word *pratyakṣa* in Sanskrit, as well as the word *mngon sum* in Tibetan, can refer either to a perception or a perceived object.

the name of that [[[i.e., of inference; namely they are called "inference for others"]]]¹⁷; or again, one calls a treatise on [[[that expresses]]] epistemology "epistemology."¹⁸

C23.32 (The division of the scriptural tradition that teaches that)
[[[The division of the scriptural tradition]]]

C22.321 (Setting forth the opponent's position)

[[[Setting forth the opponent's position]]]

As for delineating the meaning to be understood in the discourses (*bka'*) that are Middle Way texts:

Previous generations made a twofold convention:

- foundational Madhyamaka [[[The scriptures of Nāgārjuna, who received the prophecy of enlightenment, are foundational because they cannot be refuted.]]] and
- Madhyamaka that takes sides.

Madhyamaka that takes sides is explained [[[by previous generations]]] to be (threefold) regarding the ultimate:

- Illusion-like,
- Non-Abiding, and
- Paradoxical;¹⁹

and (three) regarding the conventional:

- Yogācāra,
- Sautrāntika, and
- "Compatible with Both" or "Unspecified."²⁰

[[[The refutation of that:]]]

That is not sound because regarding Paradoxical [[[for instance, on one hand) since it perceives something as having parts it is not one and since it is not (one), it is not many; on the other hand the perception of something having parts entails being one; therefore (there is a paradox)]]] and so forth, since bad conceptions are limitless,²¹ such side-takers

17 This reference to the metaphorical application of the term “inference” (Skt. *anumāna*) to inference-for-others (Skt. *parārthānumāna*) goes back to Dignāga (PSV ad PS 3.1ab) and Dharmakīrti (PVin 3 ad PVin 3.1ab). The term “inference” refers directly to “inference-for-oneself,” which is a mental event. An inference-for-others, on the other hand, consists in a statement meant to indicate to the opponent a triply characterized reason, and thereby enabling her to achieve an inference-for-oneself. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti describe the metaphorical application of the term as that of the effect to the cause (*kāraṇe kāryopacārāt*).

18 This metaphorical use of the term *tshad ma* speaks in favor of considering the expression *tshad ma* figuring at the beginning of the title of a number of Tibetan epistemological works as a “topic marker.” (E.g., Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge’s *Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel*).

19 More literally:

1. Those who claim [that phenomena are] like illusions (*sgyu ma ltar smra ba*)
2. Those who hold [that phenomena] do not abide whatsoever (*rab du mi gnas par 'dod pa*)
3. Those who hold what is paradoxical to be ultimate (*'gal 'dus don dam par 'dod pa*)

20 “Not incompatible with both traditions” (*gnyi ga'i lugs dang mi 'gal ba*) or “Those who judge by apprehending in general (?)” (*spyi bzung zhal che ba*). The rNying ma scholar Rog Bandhe Shes rab ‘od (1166-1244) utilizes as third category “upholders of the general textual tradition” (*dbu ma spyi gzhung gi zhal mchu pa*, which Cabezon emends to *dbu ma spyi gzhung gi zhal gyis bzhes/'ches pa* in Cabezon 2013: 200-201) that he links with Kamalaśīla.

21 The phrase “bad conceptions are limitless” is also found on fol. 29a7 after the enumeration of the main four non-Buddhist systems to be refuted.

would be innumerable [[[since one must count also *nag po rim lu*²²]]. [[[Further, regarding the conventional]], it is not sound because there are those [[[such as *Jñānagarbha*]]] whose assertions are similar to the Vaibhāṣikas, who are not included among Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras; it is impossible to assert something compatible with both Sautrāntika and Yogācāra; and if one held tenets that were compatible with both, which are incompatible (with each other), it would not be suitable for those who reason to be scholars.²³ Not making a judgement (?) but repeating both systems without taking any position oneself is not found in texts.

C22.322 (Presenting our own position)

[[[Presenting our own position]]]

Thus, regarding the ultimate, there are two: Illusion-like and Non-Abiding;²⁴ regarding the conventional, there are two:

- Yogācāra [[[these are twofold: True Aspectualists and False Aspectualists]]] and
- Realists.²⁵

And [[[regarding Realists]]] objects are asserted in accordance with Sautrāntika or in accordance with Vaibhāṣika.

Table 2: Subdivisions of Madhyamaka		
rGya dmar ba's own position		
According to previous authors		
Foundational	That takes sides	
	Regarding the ultimate	Regarding the conventional
	i. illusion-like ii. non-abiding iii. paradoxical	i'. Yogācāra ii'. Sautrāntika iii'. 'Compatible with both' or 'Unspecified'
According to rGya dmar ba		
	i. illusion-like ii. <u>non-abiding</u>	i'. Yogācāra ii'. Realists ii'a – in accordance with Sautrāntika ii'b – in accordance with Vaibhāṣika

C22.33 (Establishing the details [of the scriptural tradition])

[[[Establishing the details of the scriptural tradition]]]

22 This is probably the name of philosophical or religious system. It is not found in the famous list of 120 names of doctrines in Bhāviveka's *Tarkajvālā*. If referring to an Indian system, "Nag po" could refer to Kṛṣṇā. In Tibet, "Nag po" could refer to the black Mahākāla. "Rim lu" may indicate a "succession of knots."

23 rGya dmar ba may here simply call this position unreasonable or he may provide an analogous case, in which "being reasonable" should be associated with "being learned" but here it would not be (because of still being compatible with "not being learned" as well).

24 This twofold distinction is criticized in Gro lung pa's *bsTan rim chen mo* 437b7-438a1: **blun po kha cig** dbu ma'i lugs gnyis te / rab tu mi gnas pa dang sgyu ma lta 438a1 bur smra ba'o //, the qualification "fools" echoing rNog lo's rejection of this distinction in *Sprin yig bdud rtsi thig le*, verse 13. (cited and translated in Cabezon 2010: 27, n. 50: sgyu ma gnyis med chos kun mi gnas dbu ma yi lugs gnyis rnam⁵⁰ 'byed de yang rmongs pa mtshar bskyed yin « Distinguishing the Madhyamaka into [those who claim] "that illusoriness is nonduality," And [those who claim that] "no phenomenon exists" is [an intellectual exercise] astonishing only to fools. ». Phya pa also agrees (see his *Grub mtha'* 30a7 : ... mun sprul gyi bshad pa), as does Tsong kha pa (Cabezon 2010 : 27-28, n. 52). On these two categories of Madhyamaka, see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 33-35, n. 60, Almogi 2009: 38-39 and Almogi 2010, Hugon 2016 (fleeting episode): 57, n. 15.

25 Literally: (those holding) the existence of external objects (*phyir rol don yod pa*).

What is to be realized in the sutras of the absence of characteristic will be established as the definitive meaning by delineating the system of the two truths, in accordance with our own way of taking sides, along with refuting others.

D. [Explanation of the division of the Two Truths]²⁶

[Verse 2]

Here, the explanation of the division of the two truths is to be known through six points: (I) the basis of division, (II) the meaning of the division, (III) the meaning of the terms, (IV) the specification of the number, (V) the definitions, and (VI) the valid cognitions (that establish the definitions).

(There will six points:)

- I. The basis of division,
- II. the meaning of the division,
- III. the meaning of the terms
- IV. the specification of the number
- V. the definitions
- VI. the valid cognitions (that establish the definitions).

²⁶ Section D is subsumed under C22.33. However, to simplify the numbering of the subsections in this central part of the work, “C22.33” will not be repeated up to C22.34.

I. The Basis of Division

Here, we assert the basis of division to be the object of cognition without specification (literally, “mere object of knowledge”) [[[that is, not qualified by another property]]], (cognized by anyone) from omniscient knowers to the tiniest insects. ²⁷

²⁷ Compare with the same idea in Gro lung pa’s Lam rim chen mo 357a4-5 : bden par gzhas bya shes pa dang shes bya’i don 357a5 mtha’ dag ste, thams cad mkhyen pa’i ye shes nas ‘gro ba phra mo yan chad kyi blo ‘khrul pa dang ma ‘khrul pa thams cad kyi dmigs pa’i don ma lus pa’o //

II. The Meaning of the Division

[[[Here, from among the three ways (of being distinct)²⁸]]] The meaning is that (the two truths) are two in terms of merely negating identity (=d below); they are property-possessor and property without division between appearance and emptiness, because one cannot speak of (their) identity or alterity. But it is not the case that they have the exact same defining characteristic²⁹ or that they are different natures (=b).

Here, (there are four options):³⁰

(a) there is absolutely no difference;

or, if there is (a distinction),

(b) a distinction of natures;³¹ or

(c) a distinction of properties for the same nature³²;

(d) a distinction in terms of merely negating identity³³.

The first (a) and second (b) are to be refuted by the four respective faults stated in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*.³⁴ The third (c) and fourth (d) are to be examined from the distinction between the Illusion-like and Non-Abiding perspectives.³⁵

28 The three are (B), (C) and (D) listed below.

29 This could suggest another type of difference not listed below, namely the case of true synonyms, or amount to (c), with “same defining characteristic” amounting to “same nature.” But this seems contradicted below in Bii-ii [a] “**Objection:** We accept that there is no distinction pertaining to the nature. But as for the defining characteristic, there is a distinction”.

³⁰ Moriyama 2010 deals with a similar analysis by Phya pa, who adds the option of being different just in terms of name. Gro lung pa carries out the analysis in *Lam rim chen mo* (357a5ff.) by looking at the three options (b), (c) and (d). He refutes the first two and vouches for (d) – just like rGya dmar ba, and hence cannot be identified as the « Geshepa » holding (c). (Which would be the view ascribe to him by Tsong kha pa (source)). [ci kun rdzob dang don dam pa 'di gnyis byas pa dang mi rtag pa ltar gcig la chos kyi dbye 357a6 bas tha dad du bzhag pa'am, 'on te bum pa dang snam bu ltar ngo bo tha dad pa'am, de ste dngos po dang dngos po med pa ltar gcig tu ma grub pa tsam las tha dad du bzhag ce na,](#)

[dang po gnyis ni ma yin te, de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du med pa nyid kyes gcig pa bkag 357a7 pa tsam gyi tha dad du zad do.](#)

³¹ Moriyama 2010 :133 reports that Nga dbang dpal ldan ascribes this option to the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika. Hopkins reports that this is also the option adopted by the Jo nang pa. Hopkins 1996 : 415, n. 316, mentioned by Moriyama.

³² This is the option that will be adopted by Phya pa, and is ascribed to him by Tsong kha pa.

³³ This is the option that will be adopted by rGya dmar ba. Moriyama 2010 :133 (referring to Newland 1992) reports that ‘Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ascribes it to rNgog Blo ldan shes rab. (Tsong kha pa ascribes it to Gro lung pa ? source ?)

³⁴ The source of the discussion is SNS III.3–5, where one finds the refutation of the view that the characteristic of the conditioned (‘*du byed kyi mtshan nyid*) and the characteristic of the ultimate (*don dam pa'i mtshan nyid*) are different (*tha dad pa yin*), and the refutation of the view that they are not different (*tha dad pa ma yin*). The sūtra aims at showing that the ultimate transcends the notions of identity and difference with the conditioned. The four faults indicated in the sūtra are rephrased here in the form of arguments by consequence. For an analysis of Phya pa’s views on the same topic see Hugon 2016: 908–929. A preliminary discussion of rGya dmar ba’s views in the *dBu ma de kho na nyid* and his *bDen gnyis rnam bshad* is to be found on pp. 925–928.

³⁵ See n. 78.

A. [The sayings of Geshepa³⁶]

[[[According to Geshepa]]]

AA [The view that the two truths are distinct properties for the same nature (c) does not have the four faults stated in the SNS (against the view that there is no distinction)]

[[[As for the stated faults (there are four): (i) when seeing the conventional, one would also see the ultimate and therefore it would follow that one would attain nirvāṇa; (ii) just as defilements increase in dependence on the conventional, it would follow that they would also increase in dependence on the ultimate; (iii) just as the ultimate is without distinction, it would follow that the conventional is also without distinction; (iv) just as the conventional cannot be sought apart from seeing and hearing, it would follow that the ultimate also could not be sought apart from seeing and hearing.]]]

For those who accept a distinction of properties for the same nature (c), the four faults of the *Sūtra* (against the view that there is no distinction) do not apply.

AAi [There is no fault of attaining nirvāṇa when seeing the conventional (i)]

There is no contradiction for there to be superimpositions when seeing the conventional because even though the ultimate is seen, it is not ascertained, just like momentariness [[[just like superimposition of permanence when seeing blue]]]. Therefore, there is no [[[fault of]]] attaining nirvāṇa.³⁷

AAii [There is no fault of increase of defilements in dependence on the ultimate (ii)]

There is no contradiction for one [[[the conventional]]] to be the support of thorough affliction but for the other property [[[the ultimate]]] which has the nature of that [[[the conventional]]] not to be [[[the support of affliction]]] [[[because they are two distinct properties]]], just like [[[for instance]]] blue is desired but momentariness is despised [[[by someone]]]. Thus [[[for this reason]]], there is no [[[fault of]]] increase of defilements in dependence on the ultimate [[[as there is with the conventional]]].³⁸

AAiii [It is not the case that conventionalities are not distinct (iii)]

There is no contradiction for subjects to be mutually distinct but for their properties not to be distinct, as it is said (by Dharmakīrti):

36 According to the position of the two interlinear notes identifying the proponent, Geshe pa's view includes the defense of C and the refutation of B.

37 SNS III.3: *gal te 'du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam pa'i mtshan nyid tha dad pa ma yin par gyur na ni des na byis pa so so'i skye bo thams cad bden pa mthong ba yin par yang 'gyur / so so'i skye bo kho nar gyur bzhin du grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa 'thob par yang 'gyur / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar yang 'gyur ro //*

38 This fault is different from the second fault in SNS III.4: *gal te 'du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam pa'i mtshan nyid tha dad pa ma yin par gyur na ni / des na ji ltar 'du byed kyi mtshan nyid kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mtshan nyid du gtogs pa de bzhing du don dam pa'i mtshan nyid kyang kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mtshan nyid du gtogs par 'gyur ro //*

"(Similar instances) are things which are similar on account of (possessing) the universal which is the property to be proven [[[e.g., smoke, etc.]]]³⁹.⁴⁰

If it were otherwise [[[if there is no similarity on account of a universal]]], since mutually distinct property-possessors could not have any commonality [[[something like a mountain (cannot have any commonality) with a kitchen]]], their properties also could not [[[the mere fire on the mountain would have no commonality (with the kitchen)]]]. Thus, it is not the case that conventionalities are not distinct [[[in the way that reality is not distinct]]].⁴¹

AAiv [It is not the case that the ultimate could not be sought apart from seeing and hearing (iv)]

While we accept that [[[the ultimate]]] is not to be sought as a different entity [[[from the conventional]]], it is a differentiation of characteristic, just as even though one realizes blue, momentariness is (still) to be known [[[the entailment between being of the same nature and not being sought as a different characteristic is not established]]]. Thus, it is not the case that the ultimate is not to be sought apart from seeing and hearing.⁴² [[[Well then, are you positing that the faults of the *Sūtra* are not forthcoming?]]] Therefore, if one does not accept even a mere distinction of characteristic [[[if one does not accept a mere distinction of exclusion properties]]], there is no doubt that these faults are to be stated.

AB The view that the two truths are distinct natures (b) is liable to the four faults stated in the SNS (against the view that there is a distinction)⁴³

If (the two truths) are distinct natures (=b), there are four faults.

ABi [Nirvāṇa would not be attained when seeing the ultimate (i)]

⁴⁴[[[1]]] Even when one manifestly sees the ultimate, since one would (still) perceive the conventional—the support of thorough affliction—separately [[[from the ultimate]]], nirvāṇa would not be attained.

39 The property to be proven is actually "fire".

40 PVin 3 D202a2; P299b1; NB_{Tib} D232a1-2. This is Dharmakīrti's definition of "similar instance" (*sapakṣa*) in an inference. For instance, when inferring that there is fire on a mountain pass because one observes that there is smoke, the similar instances are all the loci where there is fire (for instance, a kitchen).

41 SNS III.5 a: *gal te 'du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam pa'i mtshan nyid tha dad pa ma yin par gyur na ni / des na ji ltar don dam pa'i mtshan nyid 'du byed kyi mtshan nyid thams cad la bye brag med pa de bzhin du 'du byed kyi mtshan nyid thams cad kyang bye brag med pa dang /*

42 SNS III.5 b: *...rnal 'byor pa dag 'du byed rnams la ji ltar mthong ba dang ji ltar thos pa dang ji ltar bye brag phyed pa dang ji ltar rnam par shes pa las gong du don dam pa yongs su 'tshal bar yang mi 'gyur ro //*

43 On this set of four arguments and their source in the SNS see Hugon 2016: 925–925.

44 SNS III.3: *gal te 'du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam pa'i mtshan nyid tha da dpa yin par gyur na ni / des na bden pa mthong ba rnams kyang 'du byed kyi mtshan ma dang ma bral bar 'gyur (a) / 'du byed kyi mtshan ma dang ma bral ba'i phyir bden pa mthong ba mtshan ma'i 'ching ba las rnam par 'grol bar yang mi 'gyur (b) / mtshan ma'i 'ching ba las rnam par ma grol na / gnas ngan len gyi 'ching ba las kyang rnam par ma grol bar 'gyur (c) / 'ching ba de gnyis las ma grol nab den pa mthong bas grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa thob pa 'ang mi 'gyur (d) / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar yang mi 'gyur ro (e) /*

ABii [The ultimate could not be the true nature of the conventional (ii)]

⁴⁵ [[[2]]] [[[Something that is a distinct entity (from something else) cannot be the true nature (of the latter).]]] Just like the pot (cannot be the true nature of) the blanket, the ultimate could not be the true nature of the conventional [[[because the ultimate and conventional are distinct entities]]].

ABiii [The selflessness or mere non-establishment of the conventional would not be the ultimate (iii)]

⁴⁶ [[[3]]] Just as the mere non-establishment of a pot is not a blanket [[[because these two are distinct entities]]], the selflessness or mere non-establishment of the conventional is not the ultimate [[[because the two are distinct entities]]].

ABiv [Afflictions and purification would occur simultaneously in a single continuum (iii)]

⁴⁷ [[[4]]] Just as the cognition of a pot and a blanket [[[occur at the same time]]], [[[if the two are distinct]]] since their apprehension is established to be individual, thorough affliction and purification would arise in the same continuum simultaneously [[[they would occur at the same time]]].
[[[So said Geshepa.]]]

A'. [Reconsideration of the arguments against view (b) in AB above]

[[[In order to 'purify' that position (i.e., rejection of b)⁴⁸,

[°1] setting forth rejoinders and

[°2] teaching these rejoinders are not suitable]]]

A'1 (Setting forth [against the four faults against view (b)]⁴⁹)

[[[The rejoinders:]]]

45 SNS III.4: *gal te 'du byed ki mtshan nyid dang / don dam pa'i mtshan nyid tha dad pa yin par gyur na 'ang / des na 'du byed kyi mtshan nyid thams cad la don dam pa'i mtshan nyid spyi'i mtshan nyid du gyur pa ma yin par 'gyur ro //*

46 SNS III.5 a: *gal te 'du byed ki mtshan nyid dang / don dam pa'i mtshan nyid tha dad pa yin par gyur na ni / des na 'du byed rnams kyi bdag med pa tsam dang ngo bo nyid med pa tsam nyid don dam pa'i mtshan nyid yin par yang mi 'gyur /*

47 SNS III.5 b: *...kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mtshan nyid dang / rnam par byang ba'i mtshan nyid kyang dus gcig tu mtshan nyid tha dad du grub par 'gyur ro //*

48 Alternatively, one can understand “rejoinders in order to justify that position (=B)”.

49 In the four subsections that follow, the author analyzes each argument according to the rules of inference set by Dharmakīrti. These require that (a) the logic reason qualifies the subject, and that (b) the logical reason entails the property to be proven. If (a) fails to obtain, the logical reason is termed “non-established.” Characteristic (b)—entailment—fails to obtain if a counter-example can be found, i.e., a case that is qualified by the logical reason but not by the entailed property.

In the arguments under consideration, which are arguments by consequence (analogue to *reductio ad absurdum*), what the logical reason entails is not properly speaking a property “to be proven” but rather is part of an “absurd conclusion,” something that the opponent is not expected to subscribe to. It is hence referred to in the summarizing tables as “entailed property.” While the rules of inference require that (a) and (b) obtain in reality and are ascertained by a means of valid cognition by the cognizing subject, the rules of argumentation by consequence only require that (a) and (b) are accepted by the opponent (which can be the case even if they do not obtain in reality).

This is to be reconsidered.⁵⁰

A1'A [Rejoinder against the first fault (i)]

[[[As for) the first fault (i),]]] (it does not apply) even if (the two truths) are distinct natures, insofar as,

(a) when one sees the ultimate, perceiving the conventional is not ascertained to occur.

[[[The logical reason, "the conventional is perceived separately," is not established at the time of seeing the ultimate.]]]

(b) [[[Even if we allow that it is established]]] becoming thoroughly afflicted due to merely perceiving the conventional is not ascertained by the Noble Ones.⁵¹ [[[This is because although the Noble Ones perceive conventionalities such as form, they do not become afflicted.]]] [[[If one thinks in terms of a more specific logical reason,]]]

(c) Even if (the logical reason) is "because of perceiving the conventional separately [[[as a separate nature]]] from the ultimate," it [[[i.e., the more specific logical reason "perceiving the conventional separately"]]] entailing "being thoroughly afflicted" is not established in any case.

Therefore, how do you draw the conclusion that there is no nirvāṇa?

Fault (i) against position (b)				Rejoinder against (i)
Subject	S	when one manifestly sees the ultimate	First characteristic of the logical reason (C1): L occurs for S Second characteristic of the logical reason (C2): L entails K Second characteristic of the specific logical reason (C2'): L' entails K	(a) C1 does not obtain (b) C2 does not obtain (counterexample: the Noble ones) (c) C2' does not obtain (counterexample: any case) (d) T does not follow
Logical reason	L	perceiving the conventional		
Specific logical reason	L'	perceiving the conventional separately from the ultimate		
(Directly) entailed property	K	one would have thorough affliction		
(Indirectly) entailed property	T	nirvāṇa would not be attained		

A'1B [Rejoinder against the fourth fault (iv)]

For the same reason, the final argument by consequence (iv) (does not apply) because

(a) there is no ascertainment that they are undoubtedly perceived individually, even though they are different entities. [[[The logical reason, "being perceived simultaneously,"⁵² is not established. Even if we allow that it is established,]]]

(b) Due to merely perceiving that [[[that is, the conventional]]] at the time of this [[[of seeing the ultimate]]], there is no ascertainment [[[by the Noble Ones]]] of the consequence that there is thorough affliction [[[due to merely perceiving the conventional]]] at the time of purification.

50 This phrase "'di snyam du dypad de" (lit. 'analysis, keeping this in mind') is often used by rGya dmar ba to signal he wants to correct, to some extent, a previous view. But since rGya dmar ba accepts that (b) should be refuted, these rejoinders must be ascribed to a partisan of (b). Alternatively, one can understand that they are by an opponent of (b) who only disagrees with Geshepa's method to refute (b).

51 The text literally reads "by the Noble ones", but this should probably be understood as "in the case of the Noble ones", as the interlinear note makes clear.

52 Actually, the logical reason is "being perceived individually". The note adds the specification that this perception is simultaneous, which is essential for the conclusion to be drawn, namely, that affliction and purification are simultaneous.

Fault (iv) against position (b)				Rejoinder against (iv)
Subject	S	the two truths having distinct natures	First characteristic of the logical reason (C1): L occurs for S Second characteristic of the logical reason (C2): L entails K	(a) C1 does not obtain (b) C2 does not obtain (counterexample: the Noble ones) ((c) T does not follow)
Logical reason	L	being apprehended individually		
Entailed property	K=T	thorough affliction and purification would arise in the same continuum simultaneously		

A'1C [Rejoinder against the second and third faults (ii),(iii)]

[[[One must analyze to whom the two intermediate faults are addressed, those who accept or do not accept that the two truths are distinct.]]]

(a) If one accepts that (the two truths) are distinct natures, one would accept the two intermediate arguments by consequence.

(b) If one does not accept that [[[i.e., that they are distinct]]], the logical reason [[[“because they are distinct”]]] would not be found in reality or accepted. For whom would such an argument by consequence be voiced? ⁵³

Fault (ii)/(iii) against position (b)				Rejoinder against (ii)/(iii)
Subject	S	(the two truths)	First characteristic of the logical reason (C1): L occurs for S Second characteristic of the logical reason (C2): L entails K	(a) For supporters of B, K=T is accepted (b) For detractors of B, C1 is not established and not accepted
Logical reason	L	having distinct natures		
Entailed property in (ii')	K=T	the ultimate could not be the true nature of the conventional		
Entailed property in (iii')	K=T	the selflessness or mere non-establishment of the conventional is not the ultimate		

Thus, these faults (i–iv) are to be rejected. [[[The argument is that the faults of the Sūtra do not apply (to position [b]).]]]

A'2 (Teaching that the rejoinders are not suitable)

[[[Teaching that this answer is incorrect here]]]

A'2A [Regarding the rejoinders against first and last faults (i), (iv)]

(a_i*) We accept that the conventional is the support of thorough affliction. [[[The conventional is the *** object of the Noble Ones and the object of ordinary people. Pleasant and unpleasant are superimposed on it.]]] If that [[[i.e., the conventional that is the support of affliction]]] is a different substance from the ultimate, it is not contradictory to perceive it [[[i.e., the conventional]]] separately, even when manifestly seeing the ultimate. [[[Just like, since a pot and blanket are distinct, when one perceives the pot, it is possible to perceive the blanket also.]]]

⁵³ (a) means that an opponent who accepts position B would actually also accept the conclusion drawn in the argument by consequence (Cf. below 2.2 on whether the conclusion could be eliminated by Scriptures or has to be accepted). It follows from (a) and (b) that the arguments (ii') and (iii') are not proper arguments by consequence.

Therefore, the occurrence of thorough affliction is not prevented [[[because it is possible]]]. Therefore, the conclusion of the first and last arguments by consequence are implied. But they cannot be accepted.

[Argument assuming the acceptance that “there is liberation through having made manifest the ultimate”]

(d_i*)

Alternatively, [[[since this is the intention of the Sūtra/if (you) say that this is the intention of the Sūtra]]] the assertion of liberation through the cause consisting in having made manifest the ultimate would be entirely impossible [[[for you]]] because, on account of perceiving the conventional (**L**) [[[which is separate from the ultimate which is being taken directly but separately]]], the support of thorough affliction that has the character of being superimposed as suffering and so forth, is not undermined [[[by this separate apprehension of the ultimate]]]. Just like by ascertaining sound to be impermanent, the apprehension of a pot as permanent is not excluded, because they [[[the two truths]]] are distinct objects.

As it is said (in PV II.222ab):

If its object is not refuted, it is not possible to reject it.⁵⁴

Thus, liberation through the cause consisting in having made manifest the ultimate would be entirely impossible.

Further, even if it were (possible), (**c_{iv}***) having thorough afflictions at the very time [[[of making manifest the ultimate]]] (**K**) would not be contradictory and would be possible, just like superimposition of a pot as permanent [[[is possible]]] at the time of ascertaining sound to be impermanent, because (**a_{iv}***) it is not contradictory to perceive individually (**L**) [[[because the objects are distinct]]].

In summary, in so far as it is not contradictory to apprehend erroneously conventionalities (**a_i***) and to see the ultimate separately (**a_{iv}***), the mere possibility of the asserted position [[[that there is liberation through the cause consisting of having made manifest the ultimate]]] is refuted (=d_i*) and the undesired position [[[it is not desired that it is possible to perceive thorough affliction separately at the time of seeing the ultimate]]] follows (=c_{iv}*).⁵⁵

(b_i*)

[[[Having previously had the doubt that (becoming afflicted due to perceiving the conventional) is not ascertained by the Noble Ones, a specific (logical reason) was taken.]]]

Even without relying on [[[the specific logical reason, i.e.,]]] the specific apprehension of the conventional that is the support of thorough afflictions (**L' in i'**), there is no fault (**b**) that (becoming afflicted due to perceiving the conventional) is not ascertained by the

54 C. Pecchia (personal communication) proposes the translation “If its object (the self) is irreproachable/faultless, it is not possible to relinquish it” for this half-verse. “It” refers to affection (*sneha*). Possibly, this verse is cited here to show the parallel with the case of affliction: thorough affliction (**K**) cannot be relinquished, because its support—the conventional—is not undermined.

55 Namely, for proponents of B, that nonT is the case for S in (i') is not established, and that K=T follows for S in (iv') is established.

Noble Ones [[[the fault) “it is not ascertained because even though the Noble Ones see the conventional, they do not become afflicted”]]].

This is for the following reason: Even though there is the mere apprehension of the conventional (L) [[[for the Noble Ones]]], [[[the Noble Ones]]] making manifest the emptiness of all characters [[[making manifest) as empty]]], which is the true nature [[[or, the natural state]]] of conventionalities, is incompatible with apprehension [[[as distinct from the ultimate]]] under a mistaken aspect [[[as having afflictions]]]. But [[[for you it would follow that]]] these [[[that is, the occurrence of false superimpositions on the conventional and making manifest the ultimate]]] are compatible in the position of (the Two Truths) being [[[asserted to be]]] distinct [[[in reality]]].

Fault (i) against position (b)				Rejoinder against (i)	Rejection of the rejoinder against (i)
Subject	S	when one manifestly sees the ultimate	First characteristic of the logical reason (C1): L occurs for S Second characteristic of the logical reason (C2): L entails K Second characteristic of the specific logical reason (C2’): L’ entails K	(a) C1 does not obtain	(a _i *) C1 obtains: it is not contradictory for L to occur for S
Logical reason	L	perceiving the conventional		(b) C2 does not obtain (counterexample: the Noble ones)	(d _i *) Given S and L, K and T follow; holding S and notT is impossible for proponents of B
Specific logical reason	L’	perceiving the conventional separately from the ultimate		(c) C2’ does not obtain (counterexample: any case)	(b _i *) In reality, for Noble ones K is incompatible with S and L. But for proponents of B, K is compatible with L, thus C2 obtains
(Directly) entailed property	K	one would have thorough affliction		(d) T does not follow	
(Indirectly) entailed property	T	nirvāṇa would not be attained			
Fault (iv) against position (b)				Rejoinder against (iv)	Rejection of the rejoinder against (iv)
Subject	S	the two truths having distinct natures	First characteristic of the logical reason (C1): L occurs for S Second characteristic of the logical reason (C2): L entails K	(a) C1 does not obtain	(a _{iv} *) C1 obtains: it is not contradictory for L to occur for S
Logical reason	L	being apprehended individually		(b) C2 does not obtain (counterexample: the Noble ones)	(c _{iv} *) (Given S and L), K/T is not contradictory and is possible for S
Entailed property	K= T	thorough affliction and purification would arise in the same continuum simultaneously		((c) T does not follow)	

A'2B [Regarding the rejoinders against the two intermediate faults (ii), (iii)]

Fault (ii)/(iii) against position (b)				Rejoinder against (ii)/(iii)	Rejection of the rejoinder against (ii)/(iii)
Subject	S	(the two truths)	First characteristic of the logical reason (C1): L occurs for S Second characteristic of the logical reason (C2): L entails K		
Logical reason	L	having distinct natures		(a) For supporters of B, K=T is accepted	(a) K=T is not accepted. It is eliminated by the reasoning that establishes the opposite (but not by the Scripture that states the opposite)
Entailed property in (ii')	K=T	the ultimate could not be the true nature of the conventional		(b) For detractors of B, C1 is not established and not accepted	
Entailed property in (iii')	K=T	the selflessness or mere non-establishment of the conventional is not the ultimate			

[[[If one thinks:]]] One does not accept the middle two consequences (ii', iii'), does one?
[[[In this regard, there are two points:

[°1] refuting others' position and

[°2] presenting the answer according to our own position.]]]

A'2B.1 (Jotsün's) (Refuting others' position)⁵⁶

Suppose one [[[Jotsün]]] would conceive of the following:

If one says that it is not the case (that one accepts the consequences), as this is eliminated by scripture [[[because it is established by scripture that the ultimate is the true nature of the conventional and the mere selflessness of the conventional is the ultimate (=nonK/nonT).]]], (one [i.e., Jotsün] replies:) [[[We do not accept that one's own scripture establishes one's own scripture.]]] How can you say that the [[[posited]]] consequence (from a logical reason) that is contradictory with scripture is [[[eliminated]]] by scripture? [[[Scripture is not accepted (to have this power); if scripture is accepted (to have this power)]]] It would have sufficed to say [[[in the first place]]], “[[[It is said (in the scripture) that]]] those two [[[i.e., the two truths]]] do not have different natures.”

Why should one depend on the action of scripture that eliminates something (to be) accepted that follows indirectly (from the premises in an argument by consequence)?⁵⁷ [[[Once one has stated, based on scripture, that what is explained to be the subject and its nature, etc., is not like that⁵⁸, then what is the use of putting forth an elimination by scripture of what is accepted (following the premise)?]]]

If it [[[the preceding]]] is not the case [[[if nothing is achieved by stating, through scripture, that it is not the case that the natures (of the two truths) are distinct]]], then scripture would not be suitable as a means to eliminate a thesis [[[i.e., as what is presented as eliminating what is accepted (following the premise)]]]⁵⁹ either.

A'2B.2 (Presenting the answer according to our own position)

That the ultimate is the real nature of the conventional (notT=notK) must be accepted [[[through just reasoning]]] without depending on scripture. Otherwise, [[[because]]]⁶⁰ it is unsuitable for that very conventional that is different from the ultimate [[[in your assertion]]] not to have some natural state of being just as it is, i.e., as the object of analysis by final reasoning, this [[[natural state]]] precisely, which is the true nature of that [[[conventional]]], is the ultimate itself.

56 We understand here that the “others' position” that is being refuted is that the conclusion of the consequence can be refuted through Scripture, and that the arguments against this position were put forward by Jo tsun. In spite of the problematic “*rtog na*” at the end of this section (which we translate: “suppose one would conceive”), rGya dmar ba does not reject these arguments.

57 Or: “Why would the elimination of (what the opponent) accepts, which follows indirectly, depend on the action of scripture?”

58 We understand this to paraphrase the previous sentence, namely, that the first premise is said not to obtain based on scripture (*chos can* and *chos nyid* would be referring to the subject and to the logical reason).

59 The author of the annotations understand *dam bca'* in the sense of the conclusion of the consequence. But *dam bca' ba'i sel byed du* could also refer to scripture being a means to invalidate a thesis in inference for others, following Dignāga's definition of a thesis.

60 Without the additional “because” (which appears in the gloss) it is difficult to construe the sentence in Tibetan

Therefore, the [[[object]]] separate [[[from the conventional]]] asserted [[[by you]]] to be the ultimate, isn't the natural state of anything, nor the partner of anything, (it is not) the ultimate that is [[[asserted to be]]] the true nature of all phenomena, and is not what is decided upon in the context of analyzing whether the conventional is identical (to) or distinct (from the ultimate) and [[[therefore]]] there is no affirmation or negation [[[of identity or distinction]]] with regard to this [[[i.e. your ultimate]]] that is like something freely imagined.

Therefore, the [[[two]]] consequences apply to (your) combination of incompatible items: when asserting, (i) for the conventional, which is the object of mistaken awareness, that its true nature—[[[the natural state of]]] being just the way that it is, i.e., as the object of analysis [[[by reasoning]]]—is the very ultimate, [[[this has been analyzed above (?)]]] saying that (ii) these two [[[that is, the two truths as you have asserted]]] have distinct natures.

Due to just that [[[the presentation of consequences to one who accepts that (the ultimate) is the true nature of the very conventional and that the two (truths) are distinct (natures)]]], when anyone [[[i.e., any supporter of a philosophical system]]] presents the two truths in terms of being either [[[false, objects]]] of mistaken awareness or [[[true,]]] objects of non-mistaken awareness, the [[[two intermediate]]] consequences apply (to the two incompatible assertions): (i) insofar as, (for) the object of mistaken (awareness) [[[e.g., (an awareness) apprehending mother-of-pearl to be silver]]], the emptiness of truth as such [[[of being silver in the case of mother-of-pearl]]] is the perfected (character) devoid of the imputational (character), this is generally asserted [[[by the opponent herself]]] without depending on Scripture, and yet (ii) the assertion that these [[[the imputational and the perfected (characters)]]] are asserted to be distinct. Thus, [[[insofar as the elimination of the conclusion (*thal ba*) does not depend on scripture (in our opinion)]]] (I) think there is no fault [[[that it is not reasonable for scripture to eliminate consequences (*thal 'gyur*)]]]⁶¹.

B. [Refuting the view of a distinction of properties for one nature (c)]

If [proponents of view c] say:

[[[From the perspective of the exclusion property of being the support of afflictions, on the basis of which impurity increases, it is conventional; from the perspective of the exclusion property of being the support of mental purification, on the basis of which it is a basis for the extinction of all obscurations of the embodied, it is ultimate. Therefore,]]]⁶² Is it not the case that it (the division between the Two Truths) is a distinction of properties for the same nature, like produced and impermanent? This is explained clearly in the *Commentary to the Eight-Thousand (Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra)*. Also, it is explained in the *Ornament of the Middle Way* that when one sees the conventional, the ultimate appears but is not ascertained. Similarly, in the *Lamp of the Middle Way*, the meaning of the sūtra passage, "Not seeing anything at all," is explained to be a term-bound negation (i.e., in the sense of "Seeing nothing at all"). In that way, it is clear that these

61 The fault identified in the gloss corresponds to the last argument in 2.2.1.

62 With the expression "*ldog pa nas*", the author of the gloss probably has in mind the notion of *ldog pa tha dad* (distinct exclusion properties) as an equivalent of *chos kyi dbye ba* (distinct properties).

(texts/authors) assert that illusion is the ultimate, and so this is [[[must be]]] accepted.

We answer: No, because this [[[the acceptance that illusion is ultimate]]] is invalidated [°i] by scripture and [°ii] by reasoning.

Bi Refutation by scripture (that illusion is ultimate)

- The *Diamond-Cutter Sūtra* states, "Any phenomenon for a manifestly, completely Awakened One is neither true nor false." [[[This states that illusion is not the ultimate.]]]
- The *Spell for Entering into the Non-Conceptual* states, "Non-conceptual wisdom [[[of meditative equipoise]]] knows all phenomena to be like the center of the sky; [[[If illusion existed ultimately, it would be correct that it is known by the wisdom of meditative equipoise; but this is not the case.]]] subsequently attained wisdom knows all phenomena to be like illusions."
- Innumerable (scriptures) teach by way of the example (of space exclusively), such as the (*Eight-Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom*): "Sentient beings use the words 'Seeing space.' Consider the meaning of 'like seeing space'."⁶³ [[[When calling not seeing at all "seeing", if (the ultimate that is seen were) like an illusion, why (does the sūtra say) this cannot be considered through another example?]]]
- (The *Teachings of Akṣayamati Sūtra* states), "There is not even movement of mind pertaining to the ultimate; how much less could it expressed in syllables?"⁶⁴
- [[[Mañjuśrī's Questions to the Conqueror's Children about the mode of existence of the ultimate (states).]]] "The Conqueror's son Vimalakīrti remained silent"⁶⁵

These are to be elucidated in that way.

Bii Refutation by reasoning (that illusion is ultimate)

It [[[the assertion that illusion is ultimate]]] is also invalidated by reasoning because [°i] there is nothing that proves it and [°ii] there is (an argument) that invalidates it.

63 Alternative translations of this passage are for instance:

- Conze 1973: 32: "A vision of space is a being, so they declare. A vision like that of space, so should you consider that object! Thus has the vision of Dharma been expounded by the Tathagata. But it is not possible to report on that vision by definite statements [that differ from it]."
- Hopkins 2008: 131:
"Analyze how space is seen as in the expression
By sentient beings in words, "Space is seen."
The One-Gone-Thus teaches that seeing the *dharma* is also like that.
The seeing cannot be expressed by another example."
- Apple 2016: 709: "Sentient beings call that "seeing space." Through examining this meaning of how to see space, in this manner, the Tathāgata indicates seeing dharma as [8a] well. [This type of] seeing is not relatable through another example"

64 Eckel (1987: 74, 121) translates: "Ultimate truth cannot even be known, let alone conveyed in syllables."

65 We changed our previous translation following the discussion by Ma (forthcoming, fn. 30), who argues that *dri ma myed par grags pa* is Vimalakīrti, Previous translation: "Conqueror's children, since it is known to be devoid of stain, it is just said to be pure." Or: "Since the conqueror's children are known to be devoid of stains, they are said to be pure." But the gloss suggests that the "conqueror's children" are the persons spoken to in the sūtra.

Bii-i There is nothing that proves (that illusion is ultimate)

[[[Of the two (potential) means of proof, there is no perception (that proves that illusion is ultimate); it would have to be an inference through (the logical reason) ‘neither one nor many.’]]]]

[a]

In the case of the verbally-bound negation of ‘one or many’ [[in the sense of not being established because of being non-existent]] [[if you assert that to be the logical reason]], (the reason) would be inconclusive because of rabbit’s horns, and so forth. [[This is because even though the logical reason is actually found in (those), these are not established (?) to be existent as illusions.]]⁶⁶

[b]

In the case of a term-bound negation, namely if one asserts (as a logical reason) “because of appearing while not existing as one or many,” then (the reason) is deviant with regard to illusion-as-ultimate. [[Inferring a specific from the general is deviant, like inferring śimśapa from tree-without-specification.]] [[This is because correct conventional and so forth, which also do not exist as one or many, appear.]]⁶⁷

[c] In the case of a characterized [[logical reason,]] namely, if one asserts “because of appearing while being neither one nor many and being the object of reasoning,” [[Since ‘being the object of reasoning is not found for correct conventionals, there is no inconclusiveness, however]] the characterized [[reason]] is not established due to the nature of the reason [[devoid of one or many]] and the characterization [[appearing and being the object of reasoning]] being incompatible because objects of reasoning [[which others positively assert]] do not go beyond being one or many [[these are not established to be neither one nor many]].⁶⁸

If this were not the case [[that this (reason, neither one nor many) is not a means of proof]], [[namely, if one does not concede (?) this difficult point as a refutation]] Dignāga’s proof of ultimate non-duality [[as experienced]] on account of there being an invalidation of duality [[of subject and object]] [[as the Idealist accepts]] and clear experience [[as being devoid of the duality of subject and object]] would become a correct reason [[that is not invalidated]] and so Idealism could not be refuted.⁶⁹

Given that the explanation in the *[Madhyamaka-]āloka* refutes (Dignāga’s argument), stating, “the experience as true of a nature for which there is the invalidation of duality

66 In the *bDen gnyis ti ka*, rGya dmar ba gives the argument in the form: “it would be inconclusive, because it is present in rabbit’s horns, etc., which do not exist as illusions.”

67 “Appearing” is equated here to “illusion” in general, whereas the property to be proven is illusion-as-ultimate, i.e., a specific instance of illusion.

68 Presumably “reasoning” refers here to reasoning consciousness, whose object is the ultimate. Therefore such a reason would not characterize correct conventionals.

69 A parallel is being drawn between the logical reasons considered in (b) and (c) above and the two arguments of Dignāga. If the aforementioned reasons were acceptable, in a parallel way, Dignāga’s arguments would be bullet-proof. But, as shown in the next paragraph, they are actually refuted in the *Āloka* (probably Kamalaśīla’s *Madhyamakāloka*). The reference to Dignāga is noteworthy, as the two arguments in favor of idealism are usually associated with Dharmakīrti. They are developed in PVin and PV, but not in Dignāga’s *Ālambanaparīkṣā*.

[[[of subject and object]]] is not established and a proof of the specific [[[instance of experience]]] --ultimate [[[experience]]]-- from the general – experience-without-specification -- is inconclusive,” it is also to be stated here (with regard to the putative logical reason for proving that illusion is ultimate).[[[(As said above in (b) and (c):) “This is because if one posits (as the logical reason) appearing-without-specification while not existing as one or many, (the reason) is inconclusive due to the correct conventional and if one posits a characterized (logical reason), appearing and being established by reasoning, (the reason) is not established because the nature of the logical reason and the characterization are incompatible.”]]]]

Similarly, by this analysis, the refutation of the four alternatives of arising, etc.,[[[The verbally bound negation, devoid of production from the four alternatives, is inconclusive because of the donkey’s horns; (the term-bound negation) appearing-without-specification while being devoid of production from the four alternatives, (in which) something specific is deduced from the general, is inconclusive because of correct conventional; the characterized (reason is not established) because the nature (of the reason) and the characterization are incompatible. This also applies to other cases.]]] are not suitable logical reasons (to prove ultimate illusion), and so there is no means of proof.

Bii-ii There is something that refutes (that illusion is ultimate)

There is something that refutes:

[a]

The meaning of illusion is the collection of being empty of truth and being a dependent arising; from that perspective [[[of being empty of truth and being a dependent arising]]], correct conventional also is (illusion), and so these [[[the two, ultimate illusion and correct conventional]]] would be indistinguishable.

Objection: We accept that there is no distinction pertaining to the nature. But as for the defining characteristic, there is a distinction [[[of defining characteristic]]]: when something is seen, it is a support devoid of desires because defilements are extinguished for all the embodied – this is what it is to be ultimate; the opposite is (the defining characteristic) of conventional.

Answer: The ground for positing illusion, based on the concept of a collection of two properties [[[void of truth and being a dependent arising]]] is also the [[[very same]]] ground for (positing something as) correct conventional. Thus, it is not correct (for something) [[[a single concept]]] to be the support of purification [[[from the perspective of ultimate illusion]]] and the very opposite [[[(from the perspective of the) conventional, to be the support of affliction]]], [[[because there is no distinction of concept; for instance:]]] just like based on the (same) concept of being momentary, the state of depression and the state of desire are incompatible.

[b]

[[[The analysis of the negandum also is similar:]]] Furthermore, if illusion is established by reasoning, one must investigate whether it is established as one or established as many and whether it is produced from self or produced from other.

Objection: The investigation [[[in terms of being one or many]]] does not apply to illusion.

Answer: If it does not bear investigation [[[while it can be illusion]]], (illusion) being something ultimate that is established [[[positively]]] by reasoning is undermined.

[c]

Moreover, [[[the one who accepts in this way (that illusion is the ultimate) is surpassed in view even by the Substantialist Idealists]]], it is said (in the *Thirty Stanzas on Consciousness*):

[[[The Idealist,]]] Having in thought “These two are ‘mind only’”

If one places anything at all [[[the support of a positive determination]]] before oneself through contemplation,

It [[[the entity that is placed before oneself]]] does not abide in this mere (Consciousness).⁷⁰

[[[Gya(mawa) said: Some people hold that the two – the perfected and the dependent – are one nature. This also is not correct. Even the Idealists assert that the support of meditation is a simple negation. And the Mādhyamikas also assert that. And so, if it were to be identical with an implicative negation (or, negation with a positive remainder), it would be a mistaken cognition, and therefore would not be suitable as the path.]]]

And (saying, in the *Thirty stanzas on consciousness*):

The established [[[i.e., perfected]]] (Nature) is the complete absence of the preceding one [[[the imagined (cf. v. 20)]]] in that [[[i.e., the dependent]]].⁷¹

(It) [[[this perfected nature (is)]]] is not different [[[and is]]] not non-different [[[from the dependent]]]; it is said to be like impermanence, etc.

70 We translate on the basis of the Tibetan and in line with the interpretation of rGya dmar ba according to the interlinear note that follows, namely, that the “non-abiding” of the support of meditation means that it is a simple negation. The canonical version reads “through apprehension” rather than “through meditation”. Kellner and Taber (2014: 747) translate the broader passage: “As long as cognition does not abide in mere-cognition the burden of the duality of apprehension does not cease. For even through the apprehension, ‘[All] this is mere cognition’, one does not abide in that [cognition] alone, because one [still] places something before oneself. If, on the other hand, cognition does not apprehend an object-support, then it stands firm in being mere cognition because, due to the absence of that [object] which is grasped, there is [also] no grasping of that [cognition which would grasp the object].”

71 We translate on the basis of the Sanskrit and the Tibetan canonical version. The Tibetan version in the *dBu ma de kho na nyid*, which reads *dag* instead of *gang*, is problematic.

Vasubandhu explained the perfected to be inexpressible as the same as or different from the dependent through the example of impermanence consisting in non-existence after destruction being inexpressible as the same as or different from entity.

And Asaṅga said (in the *Collection of the Great Vehicle*):

If the [[[external]]] object were established as the object [[[positively, as the object that is the support of meditation]]]

There would be no non-conceptual cognition [[[because it would be conceptual, there would be no non-conceptual wisdom]]]

In the absence of that, it is not possible to attain Buddhahood.

In that way, even the Substantialist Idealists assert that the support of meditation, the perfected, is a simple negation and so meditating on non-duality is meditation on emptiness. This being the case, meditating on illusion as the support of positive determination [[[I.e., in the case of Jotsūn positing illusion as established by reasoning]]] is the perfection of the fruition of a weary intellect.

B' [Reconsideration of the arguments against (c)]

B'A [Rejoinder – Jotsūn's claim]

[[[According to Jotsūn, insofar as one asserts the subject to be appearing, because one understands the collection, in terms of the 'elimination of non-relation' (Skt. *ayogavyavaccheda*) between the property 'absence of nature' and the property-bearer, it is not possible to refute the logical reason consisting in the simple negation of one or many.]]]

This is to be reconsidered:⁷² since we assert as a logical reason the simple negation of one or many, the other faults [[[when set forth above]]] do not apply.⁷³

And since illusion is the probandum consisting in a universal that is a collection [[[of being a dependent arising and empty of truth]]], what would be the need to explain the pervasion [[[of the reason]]] by that [[[collection]]].

And since the rabbit's horn is endowed with the property to be proven [[[i.e., absence of nature]]], it is a similar instance. Yet, we do not assert positive concomitance in an example that (must) be a universal that is a collection.⁷⁴

Thus, the teacher Dignāga said (in the *Compendium of valid cognition*, 2.11):

The logical reason that is [[[a property that is]]] non-deviant from the property [[[to be proven]]] has to be shown elsewhere [[[in an example]]].

⁷² As in 2.1, the author of the contestation is here also not Gyamarwa.

⁷³ That is, the faults mentioned for options [b] and [c] in 2.1 above

⁷⁴ In 2.1 (a), the objection against the reason as *med dgag* was that it would be inconclusive because the reason as a simple negation is found in rabbit's horns, which are not illusions.

When it *[[[the logical reason]]]* is established in that *[[[property possessor]]]*, (the) property-possessor is made known to be endowed with that (property to be proven).⁷⁵

[[[this property possessor (is made known to be endowed with the property) to be proven]]]
*[[[the collection of (the property-possessor) and the [property] to be proven (is made known)]]]*⁷⁶

[[[Given concomitance with an example that [has] the property to be proven]]] If this wasn't the case, *[[[the logical reason]]]* 'smoke' would also be inconclusive (with regard to proving fire) because it is found in the kitchen which lacks a fiery mountain. The answer (to that absurd consequence), that it (i.e. 'smoke') is actually a similar instance *[[[and thus there is no inconclusiveness]]]*, etc., is the same *[[[in all cases]]]*. *[[[(Namely): "The rabbit's horn as well is endowed with the property 'absence of nature', hence it is a similar instance, hence there is no inconclusiveness]]]*

Thus, *[[[what Jotsün teaches is:]]]* it is extremely difficult to refute illusion itself, which has to be accepted, insofar as the collection consisting in the 'elimination of non-connection'⁷⁷ with 'absence of nature' appears in inference.

B'B [Refutation of Jotsün's rejoinder]

Objection: Then, this *[[[simple negation of one or many]]]* is a correct logical reason to prove that *[[[, yes?]]]*.

[[[Since Jotsün is himself mistaken, (here is) the refutation of this.]]]

Answer: Taking as the probandum the collection consisting in the 'elimination of non-connection or of non-collection' *[[[as Jotsün does]]]*, what is this so-called "non-connection" that is what is to be eliminated *[[[, which is a negandum]]]*? Is it *[[[is this negandum]]]* the *[[[mere]]]* verbally-bound negation of 'connection' or *[[[is the negandum]]]* a term-bound negation?⁷⁸

[a]

In the former case,

⁷⁵ Translated on the basis of the Tibetan. The Sanskrit reads, rather "the non-deviance of the logical reason with regard to the property has to be shown elsewhere."

Hayes (1980: 256) translates: "It is the invariable relation of the indicator with the (inferred) property that is pointed out elsewhere. When it is established there, it will make the property-locus known to be endowed with that property."

Hayes (1988: 243) translates: "But it is the sign's inerrant occurrence with the property that is pointed out elsewhere. When known there it will make the property-bearer known to be endowed with the property."

⁷⁶ The two glosses offer redundant explanation of the sentence, but cannot be read together.

⁷⁷ The "elimination of non-connection" (*ayogavyavaccheda*) is one of the three kinds of affirmation distinguished in Indian philosophy, the other two being the "exclusion of connection with that which is other than the qualificand" (*anyayogavyavaccheda*) and "exclusion of absolute non-connection" (*atyantāyogavyavaccheda*). See Kajiyama 1973.

⁷⁸ We would read: 'brel pa myed par dgag *[[[tsam]]]* mam *[[[dgag bya]]]* ma yin par dgag pa zhig.

- Since the negation of a negation [[[i.e., of the verbally-bound negation of connection]]] is an affirmation [[[of connection]]], it isn't suitable that it (the verbally-bound negation of one and many) is a negating logical reason. [[[If one thought that it is an affirming logical reason,]]]
- And it is not suitable that what [[[the logical reason consisting in a verbally-bound negation]]] is taught as entailing a property [[[to be proven]]] that is a verbally-bound negation [[[since you say that the non-collection or non-connection of the subject and 'non-existence of nature' is negated]]] is an affirming logical reason.⁷⁹
- And there is no other (sort of) logical reason [[[apart from affirming and negating]]].

[b]

Objection: [[[If one asserts that (the reason) is a negating reason,]]] [[[There are two forms of negation, verbally-bound and term-bound; from those two, this is the second.]]] It is a logical reason that negates in that it applies as a term-bound negation.

Answer:

(No,) Because, by saying (in the *Commentary on valid cognition*)

This is because by this one [[[i.e., non-perception]]], a negation is established for an entity without a real part being included (/accepted)

(And) the previous probans [[[i.e. essential property and effect]]] affirm a term-bound negation.

a term-bound negation is explained (by Dharmakīrti) to be affirmed (not negated) (by the logical reason consisting in essential property or effect), and because it is logically correct (that it should be so).

And since this [[[a term-bound negation]]] and the logical reason [[[neither one nor many]]] are not established to be connected, the former [[[the probandum that is a term-bound negation]]] cannot be inferred (from the latter) [[[from the logical reason 'neither one nor many']]]. And if it were inferred although not connection is established, there would be absurd consequences [[[it would follow that 'pot' would be inferred from 'blanket']]].

Objection: [[[According to Geshepa, when speaking of "elimination of non-connection"]]] What is to be eliminated (i.e., non-connection) is a term-bound negation because what is to be eliminated is the appearing subject existing as an ultimate entity.

Answer: [[[We also accept that.]]] However, when we speak of "the negation of non-collection or non-connection [[[of the appearing subject and existing as an ultimate entity]]], it is not the case that a collection, in which non-connection is negated, is established. Since that [[[the probandum which would be the negation of non-

⁷⁹ This might point out to the sādhyadharmā 'non-existence of nature' being a verbally-bound negation, or to the phenomenon that is the sādhyā being a verbally-bound negation, because of the way the sādhyā is conceived of.

connection]]] is a verbally-bound negation, it is not the illusion that is the same nature as dependent arising. [[[Thus, it is actually not the probandum, in which illusion is the property to be proven.]]]

These points will be explained when identifying the five elements (of the inference establishing naturelessness).⁸⁰

B’C [Gangpa’s teaching of four faults against illusion being ultimate]

[[[Gangpa’s statement:]]] Moreover, this [[[reason-established illusion]]]⁸¹ has four faults:

- i. It (illusion) is not suitable as the probandum because the characteristic of the negandum applies (to it)
- ii. Absurdity would follow
- iii. Paradox
- iv. It is similar to the analysis of ‘genuine’

i. It (illusion) is not suitable as the probandum because the characteristic of the negandum applies (to it)

What is the characteristic of the negandum for the Madhyamaka?⁸²

[a]

If one holds that it is the intentional object [[[the entity]]] accepted to have a nature that resists analysis and investigation [[[by reasoning]]],⁸³ the ultimate itself,⁸⁴ we answer that it [[[the characteristic of the negandum]]] amounts to the following: the intentional object which is analyzed by final reasoning, which is established by reasoning and not invalidated, called “ultimate entity”. Therefore, if illusion also was the object analyzed by final reasoning [[[i.e., established by reasoning (as you claim)]]], it [[[illusion]]] would be the negandum.

⁸⁰ In chapter VI, B-i.

⁸¹ Cf. Grolung pa’s reference to the view as *sgyu ma rigs grub*, Cabezon 2010: 27-28.

⁸² The characteristic of the negandum is:

(a) Established by reasoning

(1) Veridical = established by reasoning

(2) Veridical = established by reasoning to be veridical (≠ Established by reasoning)

(3) Veridical = resisting analysis

(4) Veridical = genuine

(4.1) Genuine = capable of causal efficacy

(4.2) Genuine = ultimately causally efficient

(5) Veridical = Found to be one or many when analyzing

(b) Basis for eliminating afflictions

⁸³ The term “brtags” is also linked on f. 16b with the characterization of the negandum as “imputed”. But because of the place of “rigs pas”, the understanding “imputed by reasoning” is unlikely, and the current translation seems correct. In support, cf. 4a1, on the discussion about investigating whether illusion is produced by itself or other.

⁸⁴ This seems to correspond to the position ascribed to Gangs pa in 16b5: *dgag bya ni rigs pas dpyad du snyed pa’i rang bzhin du khas blangs pa’i zhen yul dngos po nyid de*

Opponent's answer: What is [[[an entity established by reasoning to be]]] *veridical* is the negandum. But illusion is [[[established by reasoning to be]]] falsidical, therefore it is not that [[[i.e., the negandum]]].

Retort: What is the meaning of “veridical”? [[[Since one does not find another (meaning) than ‘established by reasoning’]]]

Opponent's answer (1): (The meaning of “veridical” is:) Established by reasoning and not invalidated.

Retort: Illusion [[[that you assert]]] also would be the negandum [[[because it is established by reasoning and not invalidated]]].

Opponent's answer (2): [[[Having thought that ‘established by reasoning’ and ‘veridical’ are different,]]] What is established by reasoning *to be veridical* is the negandum. But [[[illusion is established by reasoning to be falsidical, hence]]] what is established by reasoning – without specification – is not [[[the negandum]]]. Therefore, there is no fault [[[that it follows that (illusion) is the negandum]]].

Retort: On account of what division between ‘established by reasoning’ and ‘veridical’ [[[indeed, the two are synonyms]]] do you characterize (‘established by reasoning’) with ‘veridical’ (i.e., saying ‘established by reasoning *to be veridical*’)? [[[This means that a distinction between these two is not found.]]]

Opponent's answer (3): ‘Veridical’ means resisting analysis.

Retort: If the meaning of ‘resisting analysis’ depends on an analyzing awareness [[[one accepts that it resists analysis by some awareness]]]⁸⁵, is the analyzing [[[awareness]]] final reasoning or something other than that [[[a conventional awareness]]]?

- In the former case, illusion is established as the negandum [[[because it would resist analysis by final reasoning]]].
- In the latter case [[[if it is analyzed by a conventional awareness]]], even if one applies the term ‘veridical’ [[[to the object of conventional awareness]]], it is not the negandum [[[consisting in something genuine]]].

Opponent's answer (4): Veridical means genuine.

Retort: [[[When thinking ‘What is the meaning of genuine?’]]] Even if you call it by a different name, we consider the characteristic of the meaning. [[[Therefore, the fault remains.]]]
[[[So, if one asks ‘what is called genuine?’]]]

Opponent's answer (4.1): It is what is analyzed (in the verse of the *Ascertainment of valid cognition* saying:)

What is capable of causal efficacy, this is here what is ultimately existent.

[[[This is the negandum.]]]

Retort: Is it [[[i.e., this causal efficacy]]] causal efficacy found as an object of reasoning or is it causal efficacy without specification? [[[In the first case,]]] illusion would also be that [[[i.e., a negandum]]] [[[because it has causal efficacy found as an object of

⁸⁵ The meaning of “*su*” in the interlinear note is unclear.

reasoning]]] or [[[in terms of causal efficacy without specification]]] (something causally efficient) would not be suitable as a negandum [[[like an entity from the point of view of appearance]]].

[[[Furthermore,]]] if you accept something [[[anything at all (?)⁸⁶]]] that has a nature empty of causal efficacy to be ‘veridical’, [[[this is also what is asserted by Geshepa]]] it is also the case that it is not the negandum.

Opponent’s answer (4.2): [[[Illusion is not ultimately causally efficient. But the negandum, ‘what is genuine’]]] [[[is characterized by that (i.e., ‘ultimate’)]]] It (i.e., ‘what is genuine’) is *ultimately* causally efficient.

Retort: If ‘ultimate’ [[[the property that characterizes causal efficacy]]] is different from ‘established by reasoning’, you must state the [[[respective]]] definition of that [[[of those two, established by reasoning and ultimate]]].

Opponent’s answer (5): [[[The distinction is the following:]]] ‘Veridical’ [[[is]]] what is found to be one or many when analyzing; ‘illusion’ [[[is established by reasoning; however, when analyzing whether it is one or many]]] is not established by reasoning *to be these*. [[[It is established by reasoning, however, it is not established by reasoning *to be veridical*]]] And so [[[therefore]]] there is a difference [[[a distinction]]] between ‘veridical’ and ‘established by reasoning.’

Retort: In general, ‘object [[[positively]]] established by reasoning’ entails (establishment as) ‘one or many’ [[[therefore it is also ‘found to be one or many when analyzing’]]]. [[[However,]]] If ‘found to resist analysis by reasoning’ is not suitable as the characteristic of [[[i.e., to posit as]]] ‘veridical’, then, one can also not define it [[[i.e., ‘veridical’]]] by ‘[[[found when analyzing]]] being characterized as one or many’ (i.e., by ‘found *to be one or many* when analyzing’). The same arguments [[[as when saying ‘found to resist analysis by reasoning’ is not sufficient to be ‘veridical’]]] apply.

[[[Although one applies many names, such as ‘veridical’, ‘genuine’, ‘causally efficient as an object of reasoning’, etc., the meaning is not different from ‘established by reasoning’.]]]

[[[If one searches for a difference between ‘veridical’ and ‘established by reasoning’, there are faults.]]] Therefore, ‘established by reasoning’ itself, [[[is]]] the meaning of veridical, [[[but]]] is not established apart from the negandum.

[b]

Opponent’s suggestion: As for (illusion being) the negandum, we call ‘the ultimate’ that which is the intentional object accepted to be the object of pure wisdom, the basis for extinguishing afflictions when it is seen.⁸⁷ Hence, illusion is not such (and so is not an ultimate entity) [[[therefore there is a distinction]]].

86 The meaning of the note “*ji zhig cig du*” is unclear.

87 KV: The opponent here is trying to distinguish illusion from the ultimate. It's not that the ultimate is the *dgag bya*, ultimate entity is the *dgag bya*. And the opponent wants to say that illusion is neither.

Retort: [[[No.]]] Any object [[[such as) illusion]]] that is attested by correct reasoning becomes an antidote for error when correctly meditated upon and so is the very basis for the extinction of afflictions and is also the very object of pure wisdom, which is made manifest (through) the cultivation of just that. Therefore, since illusion would be (for you) an object that is attested by reasoning, its having the characteristic of the negandum is established.

ii. Absurdity would follow

For the very same reason, absurdity would follow.

(Consider the following inference proving that illusion is veridical:)

“What is ‘established by reasoning’ is ‘veridical,’ for example, like something established as veridical by reasoning [[[like you yourself assert, to be (established by) reasoning to be veridical]]], or like something established conventionally by conventional reasoning, (for instance) that blue is veridical [[[conventionally, blue is veridical]]]. Illusion is established by final reasoning, therefore... [[[it is veridical]]]”

[[[Others say:]]]

(‘Established by reasoning’) is a fallacious logical reason (to establish that illusion is veridical):

- i. ‘Establishment by reasoning’ without specification is [[[an]]] inconclusive [[[reason, thinking that it would amount to inferring a specific from the general.]]]
- ii. ‘Established [[[by reasoning]]] to be falsidical’ is contradictory [[[because) being falsidical and establishment by reasoning are contradictory]]]⁸⁸
- iii. ‘Established [[[by reasoning]]] to be veridical’ is not established.

And so you must state the difference [[[the distinction]]] between ‘veridical’ and ‘established by reasoning.’ Just like (stating the difference between ‘existent’ and ‘impermanent’), teaching [[[to one who asserts that gods’ or demons’ pots exist but are permanent,]]] that, one does not say

(□ ii) “Because it exists as permanent, it is impermanent” [[[which is contradictory]]]

nor

(□ iii) “Because it exists as impermanent, it is impermanent” [[[because these) cannot be logical reason and what has the logical reason (I.e., the property to be proven)]]]

Rather, one points out:

Alternatively: The negandum called ‘the ultimate’ is the intentional object accepted to be the object of pure wisdom when something is contemplated, namely the basis for the extinction of afflictions.

⁸⁸ According to the note, the logical reason is here « contradictory » in itself, not in the sense that it would prove the opposite of what is to be proven.

(□i) “That which is asserted to be [[[existent as]]] permanent [[[this flesh-eater's pot]]], because it exists – without specification - ...[[[it follows that it is impermanent]]]

[[[I.e., you should state:) We do not posit ‘established to be falsidical’ or ‘established to be veridical’ as logical reason, but we posit ‘established by reasoning without specification’:]]]

Thus (if no specification is involved), ‘established by reasoning’ does not go beyond ‘veridical’, so (these two) cannot be logical reason and what has the logical reason (i.e., property to be proven) [[[namely, positing (as logical reason) for ‘veridical’ ‘because it is established by reasoning’ would amount to saying ‘it is veridical because it is veridical’]]].

[[[But this is not the case for the definiens of ‘veridical.’]]] Hence, here, from the definiens ‘[[[due to being]]] established by reasoning’, applying the definiendum, the convention ‘veridical,’ follows. The entailment has already been established.

[[[Some people understand as follows:]]]

Therefore, if it was the case that because (something) is established by reasoning *to be falsidical*, it is *veridical* (=option ii above) somebody could say [[[in a parallel argument]]]:

“because [[[sound]]] is established by reasoning *to be impermanent*, it is *permanent*.”

To that, (using the same parallel) one would need to ask (if option i above is chosen, and the argument is made that [[[by positing as a logical reason the definiens, one can infer the convention of the definiendum]]]): Just like the definition of ‘veridical’ is ‘attested when analyzed by reasoning’ (without specification) [[[isn’t it?]]] ⁸⁹, the definition of ‘permanent’ would be ‘established by valid cognition without specification,’ no?

[[[If this is the case, one could (say) “Because this impermanent thing is established by valid cognition (without specification), it follows that it is permanent”. But since this is not the case, it is not parallel⁹⁰.]]]

This is nonsense.

iii. Paradox

(D1) If ‘established by reasoning’ [[[positively]]] were not contradictory with ‘falsidical’ [[[although it is contradictory, then one could make the parallel argument,]]]

(D2) white would not be contradictory with black.

(D2’) Answer: If something is white, how can it be black?

89 The “*pas sam*” at the beginning of the note is difficult to translate. It may be related to the interrogative particle at the end of the parallel statement.

90 A possible interpretation of the expression “*go mi ‘gre*” would be that the parallel does not hold in the case of illusion. Namely, the opponent would accept that one can conclude from ‘illusion being attested when analyzed by reasoning’ (without specification)’ that ‘illusion is veridical’.

(D1') Parallel answer: If something is falsidical, how can it be established by reasoning?
This is the same!

(Retort:)

(D1) If one said [[[when one says]]], “ ‘Illusion’ is contradictory with ‘established by reasoning to be veridical’, but why would it (i.e., illusion) be contradictory with ‘established by reasoning to be falsidical’?”

(D2) ‘white’ is contradictory with ‘non-white black’ but why would it (i.e. white), just by being white, be contradictory with black (without specification)?

(D2') Answer: It (i.e., white) is contradictory to black precisely in that it is white

(D1') Parallel answer: It (i.e., illusion) would be contradictory with ‘falsidical’ precisely in that it would be established by reasoning, because the definition of ‘veridical’ is not different from that [[[established by reasoning]]].

iv. It is parallel to the analysis of ‘genuine’

[[[Jotsūn also says this; here are the details:]]] [[[There are two positions.]]]

(1)

(D1) What is the fault in accepting ‘genuine, veridical entity’ [[[as the negandum]]]? Having stated [[[the faults]]] “(does this veridical entity) [[[exist]]] upon production or [[[exist]]] without being produced” and so forth,

(D2) one should analyze whether illusion, given that it is established by reasoning, is established by reasoning upon production or without production.

(D2') If one says: Whether explained as produced or not produced, it (illusion) is falsidical due to its very lack of establishment.

(D1') (We retort, in parallel) It [[[the negadum, what is genuine]]] is genuine due to its very lack of establishment [[[as produced or not produced]]]

(D1) (Opponent's answer) If it is not established [[[as produced or not produced, and so forth]]], this impairs its being veridical, genuine.

(D2) (In parallel) If [[[illusion also]]] is not established when analyzing, this impairs its being an object to be cognized by reasoning.

(2)

[[[Further, this is the second (view):]]]

[[[If some say: how would the investigation in terms of one or many apply to illusion asserted to be emptiness? (One answers:) If it is asserted to be emptiness, is it established as a simple negation or established as an implicative negation? In the first case, it is like the Non-Abiding (position). In the second case, given that it is asserted positively, it does not surpass the investigation in terms of one or many.]]]

(D1 Opponent) The analysis of produced or not produced does not apply to the illusion that is accepted to be falsidical.

(D2) This analysis would not apply to a genuine entity either.

(D2') A genuine (entity) does not surpass being produced or not produced, being one or many, and so forth.

(D1') This is the same for illusion accepted to be an object cognized by reasoning. In general, falsidical without specification has no basis for analyzing in terms of a veridical one or a veridical many and so forth; the analysis of entities does not apply to such a non-entity. However, as for this very thing [[[falsidical illusion]]] asserted to be an object attested [[[positively]]] by reasoning, it is just the same in every way.

C. Our own position (=d)

Thus, it is not the case either that (the two truths) are distinct properties of a single nature (c), but we assert as a convention that they are two due to the mere negation of identity (=d); in reality, their being two makes no sense. For example, strands of hair⁹¹ [[[in an appearance that is a mistaken cognition]]] and the void of that [[[i.e., of true floaters]]] are not like that⁹² because they are not perceived simultaneously [[[because a non-mistaken cognition perceives the sky devoid of true strand of hairs, but does not perceive stands of hair]]].

Further, this is because [[[something]]] being one essence [[[with something]]] entails (that they are) properties of entities (or real properties?), like product and impermanence; but here, there are not two properties of entities [[[that we could refer to as “appearance as floaters” and the “void of those”]]].

[[[“Aren't they two natures?” (=)]]] They are not distinct either because there are no independent floaters apart from the void [[[of true floaters]]].

Thus, one cannot speak of identity or alterity for emptiness with regard to floaters [[[appearing in mistaken cognition]]] or for appearance with regard to mere emptiness [[[of true floaters]]]. In the same way, in reality, [[[conventional]]] appearances apart from the void [[[of a true nature]]] are not established independently and so there is no alterity. Absence of proliferations is also not a conventional entity and so it is not something of the same nature as would be ascertained among two properties of entities.

The meaning of the division (is that the two truths are two) in terms of the mere negation of identity; (they are) property-possessor and property without identity or alterity. Since we analyze the meaning of the division in that way, we hold in common with Śāntideva and Jñānagarbha the system of Madhyamaka that takes sides regarding ultimate truth (i.e., the non-abiding position).⁹³

⁹¹ Or less literally “floaters.”

⁹² Presumably, the author is giving an example for things that are not “two”, but he could also be illustrating two things that are not distinct properties of a single nature (as in the subsequent sentence).

⁹³ In a parallel passage in his *Byang chub ṭīka* (59b4–5), rGya dmar ba specifies that his position on the meaning of the division relies on the Non-abiding position—which he identifies as Śāntideva's view—whereas those holding the Illusion-like position subscribe to position (C) (*dngos po cig la chos kyi dbye ba*) (*dbye ba'i don 'di ni rab du mi gnas pa'i lugs la ltos ste rnam par bzhas pa'o // sgyu ma lta bu' ni byas pa dang mi rtag pa bzhin du bden pa gnyis dngos po cig la chos kyi dbye ba gnyis su 'dod mod kyi / slob dpon 'di 'i lugs ma yin pas snga ma ltar yin no //*).

III. The Meaning of the Terms

[[[The meaning of the term includes three points:

[°1] the actual meaning (?),

[°2] refuting a particular part of the explanation of other teachers,

[°3] explaining what is correct and faulty]]]

i. Explanation of the Meaning of the Terms /

= 1. The actual meaning

[Verse 3]

Truths are asserted to be two in dependence on the perspectives of erroneous and non-erroneous consciousnesses.

i-1 [Concealed]

Concealed are consciousnesses that are erroneous in the sense of obscuring [[[reality and the arising of the path]]]; *saṃvṛti* is known to mean what obscures.⁹⁴ Since it is true in so far as it is true in that [[[erroneous]]] perspective, it is the true as object of the concealed. That itself is called “what is concealed” in so far as it is the referent of the erroneous concealer; it is not established in reality. It is said [by Nāgārjuna (in *Yuktiṣaṣṭika* 35)]]]:

Since the Conquerors have declared that nirvāṇa alone is true, what wise person would not think, ‘the rest are wrong’?

i-2 (Ultimate)

[[[The meaning of the term, ultimate]]]

Since it is to be sought [[[by beings]]] as a goal, it is an object (*don*): a consciousness that is reasoning that sees correctly. Since just that [[[reasoning consciousness]]] is excellent and superior, it is also supreme (*dam pa*);⁹⁵ because it is a consciousness that realizes reality, having the nature of being non-delusive regarding the object, reality, it is not invalidated. Since it is true in that perspective [[[of a reasoning consciousness]]], it is true (*bden pa*); it is true as an object of the ultimate (*don dam pa*).

94 rGya dmar pa here offers an explanation of the Tibetan term, *kun rdzob*, with reference to the Sanskrit term, *saṃvṛti*, meaning “what obscures.” See *Satyadvayāvatāra* 15ab.

95 The author explains here the term *don dam pa* (“ultimate”) as the conjunction of *don* and *dam pa*. On various explanations of paramārtha in the Madhyamaka tradition see Nagashima 2004. Cf. for instance SDVV ad 4ab: *tshul gsum pa’i rtags kyis bskyed pa’i rtogs pa gang yin pa de ni dam pa yang yin la / don yang yin pas don dam pa’o* //. See also PsP (494,1): *paramas cāsāv arthaś ceti paramārthaḥ* /.

ii. Refuting a particular part of the explanation (of others)

= 2. Refuting a particular part of the explanation of other teachers

ii-1 Setting forth the explanation (of Gangpa)

= A Gangpa

[[[Setting forth the explanation]]]

[[[...]]]

The following is said [[[by Gangpa]]]:

Regarding this, there is the mere invalidation of existence [[[, the negandum]]]. The mere non-establishment of existence is taken conventionally to be true from that perspective [[[of a reasoning consciousness]]]; however, there is nothing whatsoever that is attested [[[that is, established]]] [[[in the sense of a positive determination]]] as true as an actual object [[[of a reasoning consciousness]]].⁹⁶

Objection: If there is nothing attested as an object, how could reasoning conventionally take anything to be true as an object?

Answer: The invalidation of existence by reasoning, the negation of existence by reasoning, and mere non-establishment are merely just taken conventionally as the object of that [[[reasoning consciousness]]]. In so far as there is nothing attested [[[in the sense of a positive determination]]] as an object, the Conqueror's sons remain silent.

In so far as reasoning merely completes the invalidation of existence, these meanings of the terms conveying "true as the object of ultimate reasoning" merely characterize the etymological explanation; they are not the definition. [[[If they were]]] What is conventional for omniscience [[[which has the nature of gnosis]]] does not entail obscuration [[[which is the meaning of the term, conventional]]]. As for reasoning consciousness also, it amounts to explaining the meaning of the term from the perspective of being a goal to be sought and being superior [[[if being true in that perspective was asserted to be the definition, ultimate truth would not be possible: since it is free of all extremes of existence, non-existence and so forth, ???; if it were possible, it would become the extreme of non-existence.]]]; since in reality it has the nature of being concealed, it is not ultimate.

ii-2. The refutation of that (i.e., Gangpa's explanation)

=A' Reconsideration

[[[Regarding the refutation of a particular part of that explanation, namely, saying that there is nothing attested as the epistemic object of a reasoning consciousness, there are two items:]]]

⁹⁶ This is repeated in Chap. V, 12[1].i

Reconsidering this, we explain: There is actually something attested as the object of reasoning [[[this is] our own position]]] and that there is not something attested is to be negated [[[this is] our own position]]].⁹⁷

ii-2-i There is actually something attested as the object of reasoning

This is explained by the following four points: the absence of nature is to be asserted as an epistemic object; it is not the case that realizing that (absence of nature) is not correct; there do not come to be proliferations through realizing; the fact that accords with conventions is attested.

ii-2-i.i The absence of nature is to be asserted as an epistemic object

While it might be the case that the invalidation of existence [[[, the negandum]]] is completed by reasoning and that this is the mere non-establishment of existence [[[we ourselves also accept this]]], while precisely that [[[that is, the absence of nature]]] is not the object of a valid cognition that affirms, why wouldn't it be the object of a valid cognition that negates? The very non-establishment of existence is the definition of non-existence. If one [[[namely, you]]] accepts that the completion of the invalidation of existence by reasoning is just the non-establishment of existence, then the definition of non-existence is indeed recognized [[[there is recognition] as non-existence]]] by reasoning [[[that is, one realizes non-existence]]] [[[Therefore, non-existence is established as the epistemic object of valid cognition]]].

[[[Objection: If it were established as that, there would be the proliferation of non-existence.]]]

There is no [[[setting forth]]] “non-existence” attested in dependence upon existence. Since “dependence” means to be of benefit, is there anything positive [[[a positive non-existence]]] that benefits from existence? Or, would it be the case that [[[complete]]] (non-existence) is the repeated sublation of a passed existence? We do not assert a [[[non-existence that is a]]] companion elicited by its pair [[[for instance, “absence of nature”]]], and so forth, to be the meaning of non-existence; rather, the definition of that [[[namely, non-existence]]] is just the non-establishment of existence. That is attested [[[the definition of that (non-existence is attested) for emptiness]]] even though one does not experience an existent established from the beginning.

- If one accepts that [[[the absence of nature is a non-existence in the sense of the mere non-establishment of existence]]], then if one asserts [[[that there is realization (of that)]]] from reasoning, whereas it is incorrect [[[to realize that]]] from mere words, do you deny [[[saying “there is not (such a thing)”]]] while accepting [[[the absence of nature as an epistemic object]]]?
- If one does not accept the mere non-establishment of existence [[[which is the meaning of non-existence]]] due to its non-existence, then the negandum [[[ultimate nature]]] would become existent [[[because the negation of a negative is a positive]]].

97 This is repeated in Chap. V, 12[1].ii

Therefore, “the completion of the invalidation of existence by reasoning, which is the mere non-establishment of existence” is to be recognized as the meaning of non-existence.⁹⁸

ii-2-i.ii It is not the case that realizing that (non-existence) is not correct

Objection: There is just the invalidation [[[by reasoning]]] of existence [[[the negandum]]]; there is no realization of non-existence [[[through taking it as an epistemic object]]].

Answer: No one accepts the realization of non-existence in the sense of positively realizing. The mere elimination of the negandum is the definition of non-existence; when reasoning eliminates the negandum [[[eliminating the negandum being) the definition of non-existence]]], reasoning indeed realizes that. If reasoning did not eliminate it, would it be eliminated by a mistaken cognition? This is nonsense! [[[And further, when reasoning eliminates it, non-existence is established to be the epistemic object of a valid cognition.]]]

ii-2-i.iii There do not come to be proliferations through realizing

Objection: There is merely invalidation toward existence, the negandum [[[by reasoning]]]. If it [[[that is, a reasoning consciousness]]] realizes as an object “non-establishment” or “mere elimination,” then there would be the proliferation of non-existence.

Answer: That would be true if one asserted any positive determination as a referential object [[[of a reasoning consciousness]]]. Positive determination is the operation of establishment [[[of a valid cognition]]]. On the other hand, the operation of elimination is the mere elimination toward existence, the “non-establishment of existence.” We do not assert [[[valid cognition that is]]] a negative realization other than [[[apart from]]] reasoning eliminating the negandum because there is no other definition [[[for a valid cognition that negates apart from the elimination of existence]]]. If there were proliferations on account of just this [[[on account of the mere elimination of the negandum by reasoning]]], then it would be the same [[[for you, Gangpa,]]] also [[[that proliferations would ensue]]] in the case of the “mere invalidation of existence” because positive determination is not asserted differently. [[[For two things that have the same definition, it is not reasonable for a fault to apply to one but not the other.]]]

ii-2-i.iv The fact that accords with conventions is attested

Objection [[[someone says]]]: If one calls the mere elimination of establishment [[[that is, existence]]] “realizing non-existence,” then this has the same meaning as not negating (/the fact that accords is not a negation).

Answer: It is not a mere name because the fact of realization is attested. This is because the very non-establishment of existence in this way [[[that is, in the way things are]]] is attested to have the definition of non-existence; and, the superimposition of it not being attested in that way (as non-existence) is eliminated [[[also by reasoning]]]. The very

⁹⁸ Thus rGya dmar ba agrees here with the proponent of 2.1, but holds this not to be just a convention.

elimination of the superimposition that is [[[apprehended to be]]] the opposite of something (x) is the definition of realizing that (x), just as [[[for example, in the context of affirmation,]]] the very elimination of the superimposition [[[as non-blue]]] that is the opposite of blue is the realization of blue. Therefore, valid cognition has the exclusion of what is other as its object:

- The elimination of the superimposition that is the opposite of, namely, what is other than, existence [[[just as yellow and so forth, (which is other than) blue]]] is the definition of realizing existence.
- The elimination of the superimposition [[[of existence, the negandum]]] as being other than non-existence is the definition of realizing non-existence.

Just as when a valid cognition [[[that realizes fire from smoke]]] positively determines a probandum [[[fire]]] there is realization by a positively determining valid cognition, when a valid cognition eliminates a negandum, why wouldn't there be realization by an eliminative valid cognition? The definition of non-existence is none other than mere elimination. Therefore, if one (still) maintains that it is not an object of realization in accordance with those facts [[[of the realization of non-existence and the realization of existence]]], this would apply the convention [[[saying that a non-entity is not an epistemic object of valid cognition]]] differently but the definition of [[[the eliminative]]] realization [[[of non-entity]]] is attested and so we have no fault.

ii-2-ii. That there is not something attested is to be negated

As for the negation of there not being something attested as the object of reasoning, we will state [[[two items:]]]

- [°i] the invalidating argument in four points
 - [°i-i] a reasoning consciousness would not be a consciousness
 - [°i-ii] it would be an invalid cognition;
 - [°i-iii] nature would be established;
 - [°i-iv] your thesis would contradict your own words
- [°ii] the negation of the proof for the statement of that not being attested.

ii-2-ii.i The invalidating arguments

ii-2-ii.i-i A reasoning consciousness would not be a consciousness

If the absence of nature is not accepted to be an epistemic object, is it [[[not being an epistemic object]]] due to [[[the absence of nature]]] not being an object of awareness although it is attested as non-existent or is it due to its non-existence not even being attested? In either case [[[that were considered]]], [[[we set forth the faults that]]] a reasoning consciousness would not be a consciousness [[[and it would not be a valid cognition]]] because it would not have an object of cognition, like [[[for example]]] a pot.

It is not the case that that [[[the reason]]] is not established because

- [[[if one thinks it would have an epistemic object]]] in relation to [[[investigating]]] conventional objects, [[[in relation to that]]] it is not a reasoning consciousness [[[for whom would there be a reasoning consciousness that lacked an epistemic object?]]]; and
- [[[according to what you assert]]] the ultimate is not an object of cognition or awareness; and

- there is no other [[[object of cognition apart from those two (conventional and ultimate)]]]; and
- even if there were, it [[[the cognition that investigates (that which is other than conventional and ultimate)]]] would not be a reasoning consciousness in relation to that [[[that is, that consciousness (would not be a reasoning consciousness in relation to) this other epistemic object]]].

1 (Gangpa)

[[[Gangpa's assertion indicates that there is no cognition without an object of cognition.]]]

[[[The answer to that is said to be the following: If one says that it exists in reality, it could not be a cognitive agent of something to be cognized because it does not have a present object of cognition. If one says that it has an object of cognition, we answer that a cognition that would be a basis is absolutely impossible. This is the genuine answer.]]]

If someone said [[[If someone answered]]] that appearances existing as the nature of dependent arisings (is the object of cognition), you would say that since it is a cognitive agent of something to be cognized [[[that is, (appearances) existing as the nature (of dependent arisings)]]], it [[[the reasoning consciousness]]] is a cognition.⁹⁹

[[[This is not correct; if it was like that (there would be the following consequence from the parallel argument):]]]

A visual cognition that apprehends a pot would be a cognition of everything possible [[[a pot, a blanket, and so forth]]] and impossible [[[self, primordial nature, and so forth]]] in the three realms; this is because if someone objected that a pot [[[apprehended by a visual cognition]]] exists in the nature of everything [[[possible and impossible]]], you would respond that it is a cognitive agent of something to be cognized [[[by visual cognition]]]. If you agree, [[[then self, primordial nature, and so forth would have the same nature as pot; if one accepts the existent of a knower without an object, we conclude]]] since all things—such as a stick-holder without a stick—would be possible, [[[in that case]]] absurdities would ensue.

Further (suppose the following argument:), regarding the claim that permanent things, such as space, exist as entities, suppose it was said that because they will become causally efficacious [[[which is the definition of entity]]] they [[[space and so forth]]] are called causally efficacious [[[and so exist as entities]]], we argue that it is not suitable for something [[[such as space]]] to be causally efficacious merely because they will become [[[causally efficacious]]].

(*Mutatis mutandis*,) that [[[reasoning consciousness]]] also is established not to be a cognition [[[because regarding the claim that appearances having the nature of dependent arisings serves as the object of cognition, the reasoning consciousness is not established to be a cognition merely because (appearances having the nature of dependent arisings) will be cognized]]].

99 The opponent wants a reasoning consciousness—which is held by this opponent to lack any object of cognition—to be counted as a cognition due to the subsequent cognition that appearances are of the nature of dependent arisings.

2 (Lotsawa)

[[[Lotsawa's assertion explained in the small commentary on *The Two Truths*]]]

Here [[suppose the following answer:]], reasoning consciousness is of two types:

[[utterly]] non-conceptual [[gnosis]] and inference [[that eliminates actual proliferations]].

- The first operates without distinction from the object of cognition [[their duality is utterly not established]], and so is like pouring water into water; it is just accepted [[in the small commentary on *The Two Truths*]] that it is not a cognition.

- Regarding the second [[that is, inference]], if one says that it is a cognition [[because it has an object of cognition]] in relation to the mistakenly assumed object of positive determination [[thinking, "I realize the absence of nature"]], [[even though in reality the ultimate surpasses objects of cognition]], is the mistakenly assumed object not an epistemic object of a valid cognition or is it?

- In the prior case [[if it is not]], the cognition would not be a valid cognition [[because the epistemic object is not that (mistakenly assumed object) and there is no other (object)]].
- In the latter case [[if it is]]¹⁰⁰,
 - If it [[the mistakenly assumed object]] is the object of a valid cognition that investigates the non-concordant ultimate, the ultimate would be established as an epistemic object.
 - [[Although the non-concordant ultimate is not the epistemic object of a reasoning consciousness,]] If (the mistakenly assumed object) is the object of a conventional valid cognition [[if one held that option, the epistemic object of a reasoning consciousness does not come to be established through establishing the epistemic object of a conventional valid cognition; what would be the benefit?]], then the latter just would not be a reasoning consciousness that investigates the ultimate.

Objection: The mistakenly assumed object of a reasoning [[consciousness]] of the ultimate (or, ultimate reasoning consciousness) is just conventional.

Answer: It is valid cognition with regard to just that, because inference engages just the object of thought.

Objection: When analyzed by another introspective awareness, since the conventional positive determination is attested as the mistakenly assumed object, it is a cognition in the perspective of that [[mistakenly assumed object]]. However, it itself [[inferential cognition]] is deluded by nature regarding its own engagement [[by way of thinking "I realize the absence of nature"]], and so the positive determination itself [[when directing the mind]] is conceived of as a mere elimination [[of the negandum]]; therefore, [[its being valid cognition comes from the elimination, but]] (inference) is not valid cognition in relation to the positive determination.

Answer: The elimination is established to be the epistemic object, just as, for example, a concept [[a fiery mountain pass]] that is just positively [[inferentially]] apprehended is

¹⁰⁰ The note mistakenly reads *ma yin ba*.

conceived of as a particular [[[the fire behind the mountain pass]]] and thereby, the particular is taken to be the epistemic object [[[of inference]]].

Although there are statements that non-conceptual gnosis [[[which is asserted to be like pouring water into water]]] has its continuum cut [[[since there is (this statement)]]], calling a brahmin's son "fire" does not give him a nature of fire. [[[Similarly, even if the convention "gnosis" is applied, it is not correct (that it is actually gnosis?) because (according to the previous statement) that does not exist.]]]

ii-2-ii.i-ii (A reasoning consciousness) would become an invalid cognition

A reasoning consciousness would become an invalid cognition because of not having an epistemic object, like a cognition arisen from words.

[[[This is established by reasoning.]]] The definition of valid cognition is attested in relation to an epistemic object: being non-delusive in relation to its determined object¹⁰¹ or illuminating a previously unknown object.¹⁰² [[[This being Lotsawa's system, we assert that (a valid cognition) not having an epistemic object is not established.]]] Thus, there is no denying the entailment. This is said to be correct [[[by followers(?) of Jotsunpa / the Honorable Jotsunpa]]] in other contexts also, as when establishing a convention [[[when establishing (something) as a synonym (of something else)]]]¹⁰³, [[[it is an invalid cognition]]] on account of its not having an epistemic object. There is absolutely no fault of the entailment not being established according to the position [[[asserted by Lotsawa]]] of (these two) not being logical reason and what possesses the logical reason (that is, the property to be proven) [[[in the proof] "because of not having an epistemic object, it is an invalid cognition"]]].

In the position asserting that the ultimate is not an epistemic object, one must accept that the logical reason [[[“because of not having an epistemic object”]]] is a property of the subject, as previously explained [[[there is nothing else apart from conventional truth¹⁰⁴ and ultimate truth]]].¹⁰⁵

If it is said, “the negandum itself is not an epistemic object,” [[[by way of saying, “This does not exist” when it does not exist,]]]¹⁰⁶ (what about the probandum?) The [[[direct]]] epistemic object of inference is the probandum of the logical reason [[[therefore, the logical reason negates that negandum]]]. Therefore, if one negated that [[[the probandum) asserted to be the epistemic object]]], (the logical reason) would become a contradictory (reason) turning around the probandum [[[and the negandum]]]. The negandum would become a similar instance because it is a probandum [[[this is because the epistemic object of inference is the probandum of the logical reason; that negandum

101 Per Dharmottara's definition.

102 Per Dharmakīrti's definition in PV II.5.

103 Perhaps referring to “being an invalid cognition” and “not having an epistemic object” being synonyms, this being reported as Lotsawa's position in the notes to V.1.2[3][a.2]4[d], folio 9b2.

104 Here, *tha snyad kyi*, rather than *kun rdzob*.

105 See section III.2.2.1.1.

106 The note might explain what a negandum is or might refer to the non-existence of a reasoning consciousness's epistemic object.

also would be the epistemic object of the inference]]]¹⁰⁷, just as fire is something to be proven by smoke.

If [[[one thinks that]]] the epistemic object of inference [[[that has come to be the negandum]]] is not the probandum of the reason [[[but is a convention consisting of a negation]]], [[[well then,]]] why would inference rely on the logical reason?

One might say, “[[[It relies on the logical reason in so far as]]] The logical reason negates that [[[negandum]]].”

Well then, the negation would be established as the epistemic object [[[of inference]]].

[[[Accepting that negation is established to be the epistemic object of inference,]]] One might say, “The negation is a property of the negandum [[[and so the negandum is an epistemic object]]].”

The negation and the negandum would not be contradictory [[[if these two are property and property possessor]]]. The negandum would also be a similar instance because it possesses the property to be proven [[[the negation]]]. If the negandum is a similar instance,]]] A similar instance is not also something to be negated.

ii-2-ii.i-iii Nature would be established

[[[In connection with the last of the two options given above,]]]¹⁰⁸

Objection: It is not just that it [[[the absence of nature]]] is not an object of investigation; it is not attested ultimately even as being non-existent. [[[If it is not attested even as being non-existent,]]]

Answer: Nature would be established, for it is said (in PV 4.221),

How would the negation of a negation be anything other than an affirmation.

Objection: Even though it is not attested as non-existent, it does not come to be existent because of being free from all extremes.

Answer: Could you negate both of two things [[[namely, the existence and non-existence of nature]]] that are mutually eliminative [[[in the sense that the affirmation of one eliminate the other]]]? In that case, even though one negates that the logical reason is found in dissimilar instances, it would not come to be found [[[in similar instances]]]; [[[since they are direct contradictories that affirm and eliminate each other, by negating that the reason is found in dissimilar instances it is established to be found in similar instances; this is the rule.]]] (If this could be so) it would not have been said [[[by Dharmakīrti (in PV 4.224ab)]]], [[[regarding the logical reason in dissimilar instances,]]]

107 The note here seems to take the argument in a different direction.

108 At the start of section III.ii-2-i-i.

If it is not excluded from that, does one accept that the logical reason applies [[[to dissimilar instances]]]?¹⁰⁹

Objection: It [[[what is said about (the rule of double negation)]]] is conventionally so.

Answer: If the negation of non-existence does not come to be [[[real]]] existence ultimately, it is the same conventionally, as well [[[that is, negating the presence (of the logical reason) in dissimilar instances would not establish its existence in similar instances]]].

ii-2-ii.i-iv Your thesis would contradict your own words

There would also be a contradiction with your own words: the thesis of non-existence—“it is not existent”—negates “it is not non-existent.” For instance, the statement “all inferences that establish epistemic objects are not valid cognitions” negates their having an epistemic object. On the other hand, the inference that negates that, which ascertains on the basis of one’s own words, establishes the possession of an epistemic object [[[that is ascertained by way of another (means)]]]. Since that very (inference) is included in the general negation of inference [[[that all (inferences) are not valid cognitions]]], its having an epistemic object has been negated; something else that establishes an epistemic object (would be required) to establish that (the inference) has an epistemic object.

ii.2.ii-ii The negation of the proof for the statement that this is not attested

Having stated in that way the invalidation of (the claim that the absence of nature) is not attested as non-existent (=ii-2-ii.i), we negate the proof [[[that establishes “non-existence is not attested”]]]. [[[The reason:]]] One or many, production from the four alternatives, and so forth, [[[being devoid of which (the opponent presents as) applying to non-entity not being attested]]] do not pervade non-entity; therefore, being devoid of those [[[being devoid of one and many and so forth]]] does not eliminate being attested as non-entity [[[which is the opposite position from your assertion that (the absence of nature) is not even attested as a non-entity]]] ultimately for form and so forth.¹¹⁰ And how would dependent arising and so forth, which also are not contradictory with being attested as a non-entity ultimately, negate non-entity? [[[It is not appropriate to state, “(the absence of nature) does not exist even as a non-entity because of being (a dependent arising).”]]] The means of proof for non-entity being not attested ultimately are not different from the means of negating that.

3 Explaining what is correct and faulty

In that way, through (the arguments that) there is something [[[a non-entity]]] attested as the object of ultimate reasoning and through negating that (even a non-entity) is not attested, we do not consider correct what the teachers [[[Gangpa]]] say, namely: the mere invalidation of existence, the negandum, by reasoning is just conventionally taken

109 Dharmakīrti seems to accept that the logical reason would apply, and so this statement supports rGya dmar pa’s claim of that one cannot negate both of two things that are mutually eliminative.

110 It would seem “form and so forth” is carried over from the usual subject of the “devoid of one and many” inference that establishes the absence of nature; the idea seems to be that the logical reasons would apply to form and so forth but would not apply to the absence of nature regarding form and so forth.

as true in the perspective of reasoning, but there is no epistemic object of reasoning (cf. III.ii-1 above).

Therefore, being true in the perspective of obscuring is merely grounded in the etymological explanation [[[but this is not the definition; this is correct]]]; however, there is no fault in taking “being true in the perspective of reasoning” as the definition [[[of ultimate truth]]].

This [[[accepting “true in the perspective of reasoning” to be the definition]]] is not invalidated either by the fact that reasoning [[[consciousness]]] is a concealing truth. Since reasoning is a goal to be sought by those who (want to) remove obscurations, it is an object (*don*); since it is superior as being characterized as non-delusive with regard to the ultimate, it is supreme (*dam pa*); and so it is asserted to be ultimate (*don dam*).¹¹¹ However, it is not asserted to be ultimate truth.

Thus, that [[[a reasoning consciousness]]] which is ultimate from the point of view of eliminating proliferations [[[but]]] is included among the concealed from the point of view of appearances [[[the nature of the awareness that is a reasoning consciousness]]]. [[[Since the awareness that is a reasoning consciousness eliminates proliferations, it is ultimate; in relation to its nature, since it is an appearance, it is concealed. Therefore, while engaging the same entity, truths are two: they are distinct in the sense of not being one because one is appearance and the other is emptiness.]]] However, when dividing the definition, being attested as the object of that which is ultimate from the point of view of reasoning [[[this]]] is held to be the definition [[[of ultimate truth]]]; it is absolutely not the case that the definition of ultimate truth is impossible and so forth.

ii-iii Summary

Thus,

[Verse 4]

We assert that the mere invalidation of existence, (existence being) the negandum, is the meaning of the non-establishment of existence [see ii-2-i.i]

Although just that is not an object of affirmation, it is attested as the object of a negating awareness.

Although it is not set forth as the object of a positive determination, one realizes the elimination of the negandum [see ii-2-i.ii].

[Verse 5]

It is not a proliferation just through this [see ii-2-i.iii].

It is not merely nominal [see ii-2-i.iv], because mere elimination is attested to be the definition of realization. Therefore, it (elimination of the negandum) is attested as the object of reasoning.

[[[These (verses) summarize the position of (elimination) being attested as the object of reasoning (=ii-2-i).]]]

¹¹¹ See above, n. 80.

(The following verse) summarize the meaning of [ii-2-ii,] the latter of the two sections, the explanation of the meaning of the terms [°i], and the refutation of part of the explanation [°ii].

[Verse 6]

If this was not the case, it would be difficult to posit reasoning as a consciousness [see ii-2-ii.i-i] or a valid cognition [see ii-2-ii.i-ii].

Because there would be the consequence that nature would be established [see ii-2-ii.i-iii], because this would contradict your own words [see ii-2-ii.i-iv].

Consequently, because there are invalidating arguments [ii-2-ii.i], and because there is no proof [see ii-2-ii.ii], (the absence of nature) is not non-attested as the object of reasoning.

IV. The specification of the number

[Verse 7]

Truths are asserted to be restricted to two because there isn't another (option) apart from the two (types of) consciousness [[[erroneous and non-erroneous]]].

A Lotsawa's position

A1 Lotsawa's assertion

[[[According to Lotsawa]]] the restriction of objects of cognition to two is due to the restriction (of consciousness) to exclusively two (types of) consciousness: erroneous and non-erroneous.

[[[Question: By how would one know oneself whether it is erroneous or non-erroneous?]]]

Because engaging the object mistakenly and engaging it non-mistakenly are mutually exclusive, the application of a single valid cognition ascertains that another [[[third option]]] is impossible.

[[[Object: Because the restriction of mind to two – erroneous and non-erroneous – depends on the establishment of the object to be two – veridical and falsidical – there is mutual dependence.]]]

There isn't mutual dependence either, because their understanding is simultaneous; indeed, the restriction of consciousness to two amounts to the restriction of objects to two [[[but one does not posit them as probandum and probans, by putting forward one of them as a logical reason]]].

In this regard, the object of non-erroneous (cognition) is not invalidated by the emergence of another cognition [[[that is a valid cognition]]], therefore it [[[this object]]] is called [[[referred to as]]] “enduring.”¹¹²

The object of erroneous (cognition) is invalidated [[[by the emergence of another cognition that is a valid cognition]]], thus it is conventionally referred to as “non-enduring.”

Because ‘enduring’ and ‘non-enduring’ are mutually exclusive, another option is eliminated. Therefore, the specification of the number is established.

[[[If one states this much, it is said to be correct]]]

A2 Rejection of objections with regard to that (i.e., Lotsawa's assertion)

Dispute with regard to that [[[Lotsa's (assertion)]]]:

Objection: Cognition that is non-erroneous and (something) that is veridical as its object are impossible for (the supporters of) the view that “a nature [[[that is ultimately true]]] is not established in any way” [[[the position of Utterly Non-abiding]]], because if they [[[non-erroneous (cognition) and veridical objects]]] were possible, a nature would be established [[[thereby invalidating its non-existence]]].

¹¹² Could the notions of *rtag/mi rtag* (translated here “enduring”/“non-enduring”) be a mistake (possibly even by the copyist) for *rtan/mi rtan* (“stable”/“not stable”) that Dharmakīrti uses?

Although they [[[non-erroneous (cognition) and veridical object in reality]]] are not possible, if one posits the truths to be two based on what is imagined [[[“if one says that (a cognition) exists as non-erroneous, something veridical as the nature of that also exists”]]], [[[then,]]] the specification of the number [[[of the truths as two]]] would be invalidated, because a third one also should be posited [[[“if one says a third cognition exists, a veridical object of that (cognition) also exists”]]].

[[[Extensive answer. If he had said it like this, this would be the case.]]]

Answer: If one asserts that, since non-erroneous cognition *is* possible, the truths [[[i.e., ultimate truth, which is the object of that, as well as conventional (truth)]]] are two, and one asserts that, since a third [[[type of) cognition]]] is impossible, a third truth [[[something veridical as the object of that consciousness]]] is not possible, [[[saying what precedes]]] destroys the truth(/gets rid of one truth); but it [[[the assertion of Lotsawa]]] is not like that.

Then what? [[[What is Lotsawa’s assertion?]]]

It is because something other than the two possibilities [[[to be accepted with regard to objects of knowledge]]] is not possible.

And how so?

[[[If one thinks: Since cognitive appearance is unrestricted, it is also possible to accept something that is both ‘analyzed and examined’ and ‘unanalyzed and unexamined’, and it is possible as well to accept something to be neither. Therefore, the specification of the number to two would be undermined.

It is not the case. If another cognition that reflects on the nature of these two (additional options) considers (them), if the object of the acceptance as both or as neither is found to be veridical, then, it (the cognition that accepts) comes to be examined and analyzed. And if the object is not veridical, it (the cognition that accepts) comes to be unexamined and unanalyzed. Therefore, the specification of the number is not undermined.]]]

[[[Explaining as follows: “because the cognitions that accept are restricted to two”]]]

A conventional valid cognition [[[i.e., reflexive awareness]]] determines [[[a second cognition, i.e.,]]] that there is nothing apart from the two: (i) the cognition “to be accepted after having analyzed and examined in reality” and (ii) the cognition “accepted without analyzing”.

Thus, in that way, the object—which is the alternative to be accepted—of these conceptual cognitions that accept [[[as (these cognitions) have been restricted to two, (the object) of these]]] is also established not to go beyond two.

Thus, one calls “object of non-erroneous (cognition)” the alternative to be accepted upon analysis, and the opposite is called “object of erroneous (cognition)”. Thereby, the specification of the number stands.

An alternative to be accepted that would be a reality beyond these two alternatives, is to be negated.

The preceding and other things have been explained [[[by Lotsa(ba)]]].

A' Reconsideration (of the above, i.e., A2)

This is to be reconsidered:

A negandum that is ultimate is the position of others¹¹³ in the contexts of the analyses in terms of

- (1) the meaning of the words for the two truths that we assert¹¹⁴ (cf. Chap. III),
- (2) considering their mutual distinction [[[whether they are 1 or (distinct)]]] (cf. Chap. II),
- (3) the specification of the number (cf. Chap. IV),
- (4) their definition (cf. Chap. V), and
- (5) the valid cognition that ascertains (the latter) (cf. Chap. VI).

Therefore, (this examination has two parts:)

[[[A'i]]] the specification of the number (of the two truths) based on the negandum is not correct, and

[[[A'ii]]] the presentation of the specification of the number based on the probandum (i.e., the absence of nature).

A'i Specification of the number based on the negandum is incorrect

According to the former point [[[A'i]]], there are two points:

- [°i] it is not correct in consideration of our own system and that of others, and
- [°ii] it is improper in a shared system.

A'i-i Incorrect in reliance on our system or that of others

As follows: It is because in the context of our own system of explaining the meaning of the words for the two truths, etc., teaching the specification of the number of our [[[the (supporters of) Utterly Non-abiding (Madhyamaka)]]] conventional or of the others' [[[the substantialists]]] ultimate does not come up as a topic.

And it is also because it is not necessary. If (this teaching) whose purpose [[[of presenting the specification of the number]]] is the realization of the specification of the number were necessary, realization would be impossible because there is no specification of the number (based on neganda), like (for) the two, the child of a barren woman and conventional [[[in these two examples, since there is no specification of the number in reality, there is also no condition of realization]]].

Objection: [[[Even though specification of the number beyond two¹¹⁵ is not possible in reality]]] It is possible in the perspective of the other [[[the substantialists]]].

Answer: This [[[specification of the number from (that) perspective]]] is what is to be negated.

Objection: It [[[the negation "this is incorrect"]]] is via the specification of the number [[[, from (that) perspective,]]] of what is to be negated.

¹¹³ These « others » would be the illusionists, who hold illusion to be ultimate and established by reasoning. This « other » is to be understood to be different from the « others » mentioned in A'i-i, whom two glosses identify as the « substantialists. »

¹¹⁴ Alternatively, "that we assert" could refer to all five contexts.

¹¹⁵ Alternatively, read *de 2 la*, "for the two".

Answer: Is it so that one is unable to negate if the specification of the number [[[from that perspective]]] is not established?

Retort: This is saying something that is accepted [[[by us, the substantialists, on account of the establishment of the specification of the number]]].

Answer: Because this [[[the assertion “we assert that”]]] is stated in accordance with the negandum being the [[[substantialist]]] ultimate, it is acceptable.

But what is the purpose of explaining the specification of the number together with the rejection of objections?

The other [[[the substantialist]]] asserts precisely a cognition that is non-erroneous and an object of that that is veridical [[[in reality]]]. Therefore, a specification of the number based on the consideration of two alternatives [[[to be accepted as examined and unexamined]]] is not a statement of what the others [[[the substantialists]]] assert.

A'i-ii Improper in a common system

Objection: All proponents of philosophical tenets accept that all objects of cognition (are encompassed) in the two truths: the objects of erroneous [[[conventional]]] and non-erroneous (cognition) [[[ultimate]]], because it is said [[[even by the Vaiśeṣika¹¹⁶]]]:

The nature (prakṛti) having the three qualities [[[energy, inertia, power]]] [[[which is the ultimate truth, this]]] is supreme.

This is not an object that is perceived.

Whatever is an object that is perceived

Is completely unreal, like a mirage. [[[This is what is asserted to be conventional]]]¹¹⁷

etc.. Thus, having made the specification of the number on the basis of a general system [[[common to) all proponents of philosophical tenets]]], an ultimate nature [[[of this one]]] is not contradictory in our own system [[[Madhyamaka]]], insofar as it is negated.

Answer: If we did not assert a non-erroneous awareness [[[an ultimate]]] and a veridical object [[[of that (awareness)]]], it (this way of specifying the number of the two truths) would only be on the part of the system of others [[[because it would not encompass our system]]], but how would it become a general system [[[common to) all proponents of philosophical tenets]]]?

[[[If one says, it is the general system of the substantialists]]]

[[[In the context of presenting the specification of the number of the two truths of our own system]]] A general system of the substantialists does not come up as a topic, and is also not necessary.

[[[Further]]] [[[the others assert that ultimate truth is established by valid cognition, but]]] Understanding the presentation (of the specification of the number) by considering the

116 The verse cited here refers, rather, to the Sāṃkhya model.

117 Aṭīṣa, *Dharmadhātudarśanagīti*.

alternatives is not something that is asserted by the other [[[the substantialist]]]. Therefore, it is not even a general system of the substantialists.

Therefore, a specification of the number [[[of the two truths]]] based on the negandum is incorrect. Otherwise, [[[if it was correct]]] the consideration of distinction [[[and unity]]], etc. [[[i.e., object of words, definition, etc.]]] also should be explained based on this [[[the ultimate that is the negandum]]].

A'ii Presenting the specification of the number based on the probandum

[[[The last of what was previously divided into two:]]] [[A'ii]]

It is presented based on the probandum [[[absence of nature]]] precisely. This is explained in three points:

[°i] Status of object and subject based on the probandum [[[by realizing a mere exclusion]]]

[°ii] No invalidation [[[for Madhyamaka]]] due to the absence of inference of the ultimate

[°iii] The negandum is not suitable as an object of reasoning

A'ii-i Status of object and subject based on the probandum

Thus, because there is a particular instance of non-erroneous cognition that eliminates proliferations, [[[actual]]] inference and so forth, [[[utterly non-conceptual gnosis]]], how would it [[[the existence of subject and object]]] not be possible?¹¹⁸ [[[It is possible.]]] As for [[[understanding the meaning of]]] non-erroneous, it is here asserted to be valid cognition; therefore, if this was not possible [[[If he were to think that it is not possible]]], would the extreme of ultimate proliferations be eliminated by mere words [[[namely, by saying “there are no proliferations”]]]?

[[[Thus, it is necessary that there is a valid cognition that eliminates proliferations.]]]

The very elimination of proliferations, [[[is]]] the epistemic object of reasoning [[[because it investigates it as a mere elimination]]], [[[and this epistemic object precisely]]] is the non-concordant ultimate truth of the Madhyamaka. Thus, there is such a thing as a non-erroneous cognition [[[reasoning that eliminates proliferations]]] and a veridical object [[[that exists as just the elimination of proliferations]]].

[[[If one thinks that there is no examination, in the sense of positive determination, of it]]] Because positive determination is impossible, the Madhyamaka's ultimate [[[reasoning consciousness of mere exclusion]]] and truth [[[the mere elimination that is the object realized by that (reasoning consciousness)]]] are not undermined.

[[[Substantialists, having accepted erroneous and non-erroneous cognitions, assert the object of these two to be ultimate and conventional.]]]

Objection: There is no such thing as calling “non-erroneous” the reasoning that investigates the absence of nature [[[having made it its epistemic object]]] [[[and (calling) the object “veridical”]]], owing to the mere negation of a nature.

118 See Chap. III, 2.2.2.1.1, [b] for the position of Lotsawa about there being 2 types of reasoning consciousness: non-conceptual gnosis and inference cutting actual proliferations.

Answer: The mere negation [[[of a nature]]] is the characteristic of non-entity, the object of elimination. And it has been explained [[[above]]] how this [[[non-entity]]] is attested as an epistemic object¹¹⁹ and how its [[[i.e., absence of nature]]] being non-attested is negated¹²⁰. Consider the reply in the following verses:

[=Verse 4a-d]

We assert that the mere invalidation of existence, (existence being) the negandum, is the meaning of the non-establishment of existence.

Although just that is not an object of affirmation, it is attested as the object of a negating awareness.

etc.

In such a way we are pleased.

A'ii-ii Not invalidated due to the lack of ultimate inference

Objection: [[[If everything is just without a nature]]] Since inference itself is not established ultimately, non-erroneous cognition cannot be conceived; thus, it is asserted that it is impossible for an object [[[of that]]] to be veridical [[[therefore, the specification of the number also is impossible]]].

Answer: Who are the Mādhyamikas who divide the states of the two truths ultimately [[[in any explanation]]]? If that was the case, nothing could be said concerning the meaning of the terms [[[of the two truths]]] and so forth [[[because all those would be unestablished in any explanation]]].

Furthermore, [[[as for inference]]] conventionally, there is an understanding by inference arisen from its own cause [[[the apprehension of the logical reason]]] having relied on taking as an object the non-concordant ultimate [[[having eliminated proliferations]]]; therefore, there is indeed non-erroneous (cognition) and a veridical object. By eliminating ultimate inference [[[a cognition]]], one does not eliminate ultimate truth.

Objection: If there is no ultimate [[[inference]]], a veridical object that depends on this [[[inference]]] is impossible.

Answer: [[[How would the latter be invalidated by the former?]]] It may be the case that because an ultimate son of a barren woman is impossible, being true as the object of that [[[ultimate son of the barren woman]]], i.e., an object relying on that, is impossible. However, [[[There is no invalidation for our ultimate and conventional]]] inference arisen from its own cause conventionally, whose nature is included among the conventional, is both the goal (*don*) [[[inasmuch as it is what people should seek]]] in consideration [[[from the perspective]]] of eliminating proliferations and supreme (*dam pa*) [[[because just that is non-delusive]]]. What is attested as what is to be examined by that, namely, as the mere elimination [[[of the negandum]]], is not undermined.

119 cf. Chap. III 2.2.1: rigs pa'i yul du gyur pa'i don gnyid gnyas pa

120 Chap. III, 2.2.2: mi gnas pa dgag par bya ba

A'ii-iii The negandum is not suitable as an object of reasoning

[[[The negandum is not suitable as an object of reasoning]]]

If one says: The reasoning that removes proliferations [[[as accepted by Lotsawa]]] takes as its epistemic object the negandum [[[by way of saying “it does not exist”]]]. But it is stated (in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 2.7):

The two means of valid cognition have an entity for their object.

and (in the *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.210)

Those who are not deceived by verbal objects...[consider exclusively entities].¹²¹

etc.

Thus, even though there is a reasoning [[[inference]]] arisen from a cause [[[the apprehension of the logical reason]]], there isn't something veridical as the probandum called “ultimate veridical [[[absence of nature]]].”

Answer: One should say, in summary:¹²²

[Verse 8]

What is to be inferred is the probandum of the logical reason

[[[Thus, this negation of the negandum by the logical reason comes to be the negation of the probandum, and so]]]

What negates this becomes a contradictory reason

And the negandum would become a similar instance.

[Verse 9]

If what is to be inferred [[[the epistemic object of inference]]] [[[this negandum]]] were not the probandum of [[[what is to be proven by]]] the logical reason

It would be difficult for what makes it inferred to rely on a logical reason [[[of inference]]] [[[what is the cause for it (relying on this)?]]].

If one says that [[[there is reliance on a logical reason]]] it is because it [[[the epistemic object of inference, the negandum]]] is negated by the logical reason,

(We answer) A negative would be established as the epistemic object [[[of inference]]]

[Verse 10]

And if [[[it is suggested that]]] the negative were a property of the negandum,

121 Kaṇakagomin glosses *śabdārthānapavādin* « not deceived by verbal objects » as *arthakrīyārthi*, i.e. « seeking causal efficacy. »

122 These verses are quoted again on f. 18b in the section on *bsgrub bya* in Chap. IV, 2.1 (iii). They constitute a versified version of the paragraph answering the objection that “the negandum is not an object of investigation”.

The negative would not be contradictory with the negandum [[[because they would be property and property possessor]]], and

Since the negandum is established to be a similar instance,

It would not be correct [[[for the logical reason]]] to negate (it) [[[the similar instance]]].

So, we do not consider correct what is stated when elaborating on the rejection of objections (i.e., A2).

V. Definitions

i. The actual definitions of the two truths

i-i The respective definitions of the two truths according to our own position

[[[(Finally, presentation of one's own position)¹²³]]]

[Verse 11]

**Objects of cognition that are non-veridical as an object that is explained¹²⁴
are the concealed (/conventional); the opposite is the other.**

i-i-A On the Definition of Concealed (/conventional)

Objects of cognition that do not withstand analysis are concealed (/conventional). This very meaning [[[that is, that objects of cognition that do not withstand analysis are concealed (/conventional)]]] is captured by the statement, [[[that is, the root text,]]] (of SDV 3cd):

Just that which is as it appears is concealed (/conventional)

in so far as it expresses the object of apprehension engaged in terms of unanalyzed appearances, because of the explanation [[[in the commentary]]] (SDVV ad 3cd), “concealed (/conventional) truth exists in that way, not genuinely. [[[If (it is not genuine), it is clear that it does not withstand analysis.]]]”

[[[If one takes ‘object of cognition without specification’ to be the definition of concealed (/conventional),]]] Object of cognition, that is, object of awareness, without specification [[[as Jotsūn said]]] is not accepted to be the definition [[[of concealed (/conventional)]]] because

- it [[[that is, object of cognition]]] is a distinct phenomenon [[[that is, it has a (distinct) intension]]]¹²⁵ from “concealed (/conventional)” and [[[or, alternatively,]]]
- the definition would be over-extensive, applying to the ultimate.

[a]

Objection [[[If one said that the definition (of “concealed (/conventional)”) consisting in object of cognition without specification is not over-extensive, applying to the ultimate]]]: Is not the ultimate beyond all cognition and expression?¹²⁶ [[[If, therefore, it is not an object of awareness, it is not correct that anything non-existent would be that; however, it is

¹²³ Alternatively, “*tha ma*” could be understood to mean “our inferior [own position]” as a humble way to present the author’s own position, before moving to that of his teachers.

¹²⁴ The expression used here is “*rnam bshad don du mi bden pa*”. Later in the text (prose, and verse 14), the author uses “*bshad na mi bden*”, i.e. “non veridical when explained”. In view of the discussion that follows, the notion of “explaining” may be similar to that of “analyzing”, as these objects are those that “do not withstand analysis”.

¹²⁵ *don ldog*

¹²⁶ As asserted, e.g., in Śāntideva’s BCA 9.2c cited below in i-i-B [a].

nowadays unanimously accepted that awareness takes as its object the horn of a rabbit covered in mud, although it is not existent when analyzed.]]]

Answer: We have already explained [[[in verse 4]]]¹²⁷ that (the ultimate) exists [[[and is established]]] as it is as an object of cognition; we negate that it does not exist as such.

[b]

Objection: It [[[that is, the definition of concealed (/conventional)]]] is empty [[[of truth]]] when analyzed [[[comment: shes bya mi dges par “if not satisfied (dgyes pa) with object of cognition” or “without bifurcating (dgas pa) object of cognition (into conventional and ultimate)”]]] without specification.

Answer: (No) because while (empty when analyzed without specification) can define ultimately void [[[of truth]]] without specification,

- it [[[that is, void of truth]]] is a distinct phenomenon [[[that is, it has a (distinct) extension]]]¹²⁸ from “concealed (/conventional)” and
- it is over-extensive, applying to the ultimate [[[truth]]].
- [[[It would follow that a sharp horn existing on the head of a rabbit, because of being empty when analyzed, would be concealed.]]]

[c]

Objection: The aggregate [[[of the two, ‘empty when analyzed’ and ‘being an object of cognition’]]] also would over extend, applying to the ultimate [[[because the two individual parts apply]]].

Answer: What is empty when analyzed, which itself is also an object of cognition, [[[that is, a common basis (of the two)]]] definitely over-extends.

Therefore, [[[the unspecified aggregate is not suitable and]]] we do not accept the above as definitions individually, but (we accept) the specified aggregate [[[namely, that object of cognition taken as a common basis that itself is not veridical when analyzed]]]: any object of cognition, not veridical, in that way, [[[namely, in the way that would be correct from the point of view of analysis]]] when explained.

[[[Nevertheless, [[[according to some, a restriction applied to object of cognition]]] ‘non-veridical when explained itself’ suffices (to define concealed). Indeed, the ultimate is true when analyzed; it is not established to be non-veridical. If that alone is not proper and ‘object of cognition’ is added, there still would be over-extension because it would be present in real phenomena.

Reply: Absurdities would ensue because phenomena are limitless.¹²⁹]]]

All proponents of tenet systems assert that as the definition of concealed (/conventional).

[[[**Objection:** Well then, what are the dissimilarities among tenet systems?]]]

The only dissimilarity [[[namely, (a dissimilarity) in the definitional basis]]] is due to Mādhyamikas asserting that it [[[the definiens of concealed (/conventional)]]] is also found in the dependent. [[[Idealists assert that it is found in the personal self and phenomenal self and

127 Reference to verse 4, first cited in Chapter III, 3, and cited again in Chapter IV, 2.2.1.

128 *don ldog*

129 Argument unclear. Possibly the opponent is arguing that the definition applies to real phenomena, that substantialists take to be ultimate (see below). It is unclear how the answer counters this objection.

the duality of subject and object. Vaibhāṣikas¹³⁰ assert that it is present in personal self as either of the two, (objects or minds).]]]¹³¹

Therefore, this agrees with what is said [[[by Lotsawa]]] about the valid cognition that determines the concealed (/conventional), namely that it consists in [[[or, established by]]] the operation of the two valid cognitions [[[as said) by the Lotsawa in his *Small commentary on the two truths*]]] that (respectively) negate veridical and determine on the level of appearance,¹³² because (the two aspects of concealed thus determined, ‘non-veridical’ and ‘object of cognition’) are precisely the epistemic object of the valid cognition that determines the definition. [[[Thus, their taking ‘object of cognition’ as the definiens (of conventional) is mistaken.]]]

i-i-B On the Definition of the Ultimate

(The definition of the ultimate is:) The opposite of an object of knowledge that does not exist in that way when analyzed. [[[The meaning of the root text’s (verse SDV 3cd) “what is different is the other of the pair” is just this.]]] It remains in reality when a mind [[[that is, a reasoning consciousness]]] analyzes it. It is said [[[by (Jñānagarbha) in his *Satyadvaya(vibhaṅga)*, when commenting on that]]]

What is ultimately veridical is ultimate truth; this means just truth that is concordant with reasoning.

That is the definition of the ultimate according to all proponents of tenet systems. [[[Indeed, Idealists assert that it applies to consciousness that is empty of the duality of object and subject. Vaibhāṣikas¹³³ assert that it is found in both object and mind empty of personal self.]]] The only dissimilarity [[[with Substantialists]]] is due to Mādhyamikas asserting that it [[[that is, the definition]]] is found in the absence of proliferations, whereas (the) others assert it [[[that is, the definiendum]]] for real phenomena. Thus, it is said to be attested by reasoning to be devoid of all extremes, such as non-existence, which are drawn from the pairs, permanence and annihilation, existence and non-existence [[[this is what is called ultimate truth]]].

[a]

Objection: How can the void of all extremes be the object of reasoning?

Answer: This is because reasoning eliminates all extremes [[[it (that is, devoid of all extremes) is attested (by reasoning to be the elimination of all extremes)]]]; this was already explained.

130 Text reads *bye brag pa* instead of the usual *bye brag du smra ba*.

131 Cf. 2.2.1, Table 1

132 Or, “that it consists in the negation of veridical and the operation of the two valid cognitions that determine appearances.” In either case, the two-part mental operation would encompass the two parts of the definition of concealed, non-veridical and object of cognition. See also Section VI.1.1. On these “two valid cognitions”, see in parallel Gro lung pa’s *bsTan rim chen po* 352b2-3: *kun rdzob kyi dngos po kun rdzob nyid du nges par byed pa ni dngos po yang dag pa ‘gog pa’i tshad ma de’i shugs kyis yin te, yang dag gi don bkag* 352b3 *pa na snang ba ni myong ba’i dbang gis nges pas, shes pa gnyis kyi byed pa las phyin ci log gi don brdzun par nges pa’i phyir ro* and 437b3: *des na tha snyad pa’i blo snga mas nges par dmigs pa dang, rigs pa’i shes pa phyi mas bden par btags pa bkag pa’i tshad ma gnyis kyis byed pa las brdzun pa’i tha snyad byed par zad do*

133 Text reads *bye brag pa* instead of the usual *bye brag du smra ba*.

[[[If one thinks, “Is it not this contradictory with the statement that objects of awareness are concealed (/conventional)?”]]] (Śāntideva, in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9.2cd) states,

The ultimate is not in the scope of awareness; awareness is asserted¹³⁴ to be concealed.

In as much as all objects of awareness that are referents are concealed (/conventional), and in as much as an entity of awareness that does not engage by way of feeling and positively determining is impossible, just so this [[["awareness is concealed (/conventional)"]]] is said because of the mind's mode of self-experiencing. In that way, all awareness is pervaded by being concealed (/conventional). However, some awarenesses, from the point of view of eliminating proliferations, are both “object” (*don*) and “supreme” (*dam pa*) and so there is a distinction of definition.¹³⁵ [[[The nature of an awareness that is a reasoned insight and concealed (/conventional) are of the same nature; therefore, ultimate and concealed (/conventional) are of the same nature. However, ultimate truth and concealed (/conventional) are not of the same nature because it would be contradictory for real and unreal to be of the same nature.]]]

i-ii Explaining the statements of the teachers

i-ii-1 Refuting others

[[[Refuting others (i.e., Gangpa); among the two points:]]]

i-ii-1.1 Stating (the view of others) (i.e., of Gangpa)

[[[Stating (others' view)]]]

[[[If one analyzes Gangpa's assertion, the definitions of the two truths are presented as follows in a way that would not align with the conventions of the text of the commentary.]]] Consider the following explanation [[[by She'u (?)]]] of the definitions in terms of “what accords with appearances and what accords with reasoning”:

- [[[As for “what accords with appearances”]]] the objects of the eye, and so forth, that are engaged without analysis, from cowherds to the omniscient.
- [[[As for “what accords with reasoning”]]] the objects of inference that eliminates actual proliferations or the object in the gnosis that does not conceive ever. [[[When speaking of what accords with reasoning]]] “Object of reasoning” amounts to merely the elimination of existence [[[the object of negation]]]. [[[In the case of reasoning]]]¹³⁶ there is nothing attested as an object.¹³⁷

134 Text reads *blo ni kun rdzob yin par 'dod* for *blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod*.

135 Namely, a distinction between the definitions of “ultimate” and “ultimate truth.” rGya dmar pa here plays with the etymology of *don dam pa*, “ultimate,” taking apart the two words, *don* and *dam pa*, to show that some awarenesses qualify as *don dam pa*. The annotation will show, however, that those awarenesses that qualify as ultimate still are not ultimate truths. On the threefold analysis of the compound *paramārtha* by Bhāviveka see Keira 2004: 28, n. 61.

136 The annotation reads only *rigs pa*, which might suggest that “reasoning” itself does not exist as an object.

137 This concords with the position ascribed to Gangs pa in Chap. III, 2.1.

i-ii-1.2 Refutation

i-ii-1.2A Definition of the ultimate (is accepted under some condition)

[[[Refutation of this]]]¹³⁸

We accept the definition of the ultimate in that way [[according to Gangpa]], providing the answer that explains [[as above]] that the mere elimination is attested as an object that accords with reasoning but negating that (an object) is not attested.¹³⁹

i-ii-1.2B Definition of the conventional (is refuted)

[[[Refutation (of the proposed definition of the concealed/conventional):]]]

As for what is concealed (/conventional) being “what accords with appearances,” [[the (proposed) definition of concealed (/conventional)]] that is, being an object of a non-analytical awareness, while this would amount to being non-erroneous, if non-erroneous without specification was the definition, it would be the case that ‘produced’ could be the definition of ‘impermanent.’ Thus, in the case of ‘appearance’ without specification and being concealed (/conventional), which are distinct [[intension]] exclusion properties [[(they) are (distinct exclusion properties), and (in the case of) distinct exclusion properties]], it is not suitable for one to define the other because [[if it was suitable, as in the case of ‘produced’ and ‘impermanent’]] absurdities would ensue.

[[[Furthermore,]]] If pleasure, form, and so forth were established as appearing [[without specification]] without analysis, then the meaning of concealed (/conventional) [[namely, appearance without specification]] would already be established [[without negating ‘veridical’ being necessary]]; [[one thinks, “What would be the need for a valid cognition that ascertains being concealed (/conventional), which consists in negating veracity?”]] therefore, an argument establishing that they are concealed, via negating their being ultimate, would be pointless. [[One thinks, “Without negating veracity, appearance without specification is not established as what it is.”]]

Objection: “Non-analytical appearance” or “appearance without specification” is indeed established [[without negating veracity]].

Answer: What is the meaning of “non-analytical”? If it is “in the perspective of erroneous,” [[because an object cannot be established as erroneous without negating veracity]] then you accept the invalidation of veracity. Similarly, if by merely saying “appearance without specification” you negate veracity, we agree. [[Insofar as you agree with the thought of tradition, we offer no refutation.]]

i-ii-2 The position of the teachers (on ultimate truth)

[[[Furthermore, completing (the discussion),]]] The teachers, spiritual friends, [[Khyung and Lotsawa]] state as follows:¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Possibly crossed out.

¹³⁹ This is clarified in section III, 221 and 2.2.2, in which rGya dmar ba presents his own position and refutes the position ascribed to Gangs pa.

¹⁴⁰ The view presented here finds an echo in Phya pa’s *sNying po* (T p. 18), where it is ascribed to « Some logicians » : *rigs par smra ba kha cig don dam pa'i mtshan nyid ni shes bya'i mtshan ma las 'das ste | yod pa dang med pa dang gnyi ga dang gyi ga ma yin pa ji ltar shes par byas kyang spros pa yin la spros pa yin la spros ma mtha' dag dang bral bas na shes bya'i mtshan ma las 'das pa'o ||...*

i-ii-2.A Setting forth Jotsünpa's system¹⁴¹

[[[Setting forth Jotsünpa's system:]]]

“The definition of ultimate truth surpasses even object of knowledge without specification; it is not an object of awareness in any way, such as ‘empty’ or ‘not empty.’ Thus, it is said (by Śāntideva, in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9.2c):

The ultimate is not in the scope of awareness. “

i-ii-2.B Refuting objections to one's (=Jotsün's) own system - (Geshepa's answers)

[a]

Objection: It is contradictory to set forth object of knowledge without specification as the basis of division (of the two truths)¹⁴² and [[[when explaining the meaning of the terms]]]¹⁴³ it is contradictory for reasoning (consciousness) to be ultimate and its object to be veridical.

Answer: This is like, for instance, the following: The inferential cognition (of fire from smoke) merely conceives as [[[the external]]] fire itself something superimposed [[[that is, a concept appearing to awareness itself]]] through the force of the ripening of tendencies of conceptual cognitions as fire and so forth from the beginningless past. However, it [[[inferential cognition]]] does not take as its object a particular [[[that is, an external fire]]]. This [[[that a particular is not the object of inferential cognition]]] is what is asserted when analyzing by introspection.¹⁴⁴ And yet it is asserted that, from the perspective of the [[[the inferential]]] awareness itself, [[[that is, since (this very cognition) wrongly assumes that it realizes a particular, based on that]]] it has a particular for its object. [[[Similarly, from the perspective of reasoning, the absence of nature is taken as an object. However, when analyzing by introspection (of the reasoning cognition), the ultimate is not set forth as an object once reasoning has completed the invalidation of existence, the negandum. Therefore, there is no contradiction in setting forth a division of objects of cognition based on this perspective.]]]

[b]

Objection [[[it is said]]]: By way of saying

When one sets forth (the ultimate) as an object from the perspective of what is asserted within a reasoning consciousness [[[that is, (reasoning) claiming “I take the absence of nature as an object”]]], then when analyzing by introspection [[[the setting forth of (the ultimate) as an object]]] reasoning [[[merely]]] invalidates existence [[[the negandum]]] but there is no such thing called “the ultimate” that is an epistemic object [[[of an inferential cognition]]], that would become an object [[[of a reasoning consciousness]]],

¹⁴¹ According to the annotator, this might count as i-ii-2.

¹⁴² Section I, “The basis of division”.

¹⁴³ Section III, “The meaning of the term”.

¹⁴⁴ *rang bzhin sems dpa'* (translated here as “introspection”) seems to be a variant of *rang bzhin sems pa*, the latter translating *svabhāvacintā*. The term could refer to a cognizer, rather than a cognition, and perhaps stems in part from the term, *byang chub sems dpa'*. *svabhāvacintā* occurs in *PV* III.350 and *PVin* I, p.37.7. Phya pa chos kyi seng ge's commentary to the latter cites the expression as *rang bzhin sems dpa'*.

[[[ultimate truth as]]] a division of objects of cognition from that perspective [[based on a reasoning consciousness thinking “I realize the absence of nature”]] is [[merely]] set forth. [[But you say that when analyzing by introspection, the ultimate is not set forth as an object]]. [[However,]] When introspection searches, it applies the convention “ultimate” to what is beyond all cognition and expression [[what is beyond the object of that reasoning consciousness]] and in doing so introspection takes as its object what is beyond all cognition and expression [[that is, the ultimate]]; (the latter) [[ultimate truth]] becomes its [[that is, introspection’s]] object of cognition.

Answer: Do the words [[that express]], “a particular is not a referent of words,” express [[that is, refer to]] that [[a particular]] which is not a referent? [[If someone answers, “This (statement) merely negates a particular being a referent of words; it is not the case that a particular is taken as an object by these words,” then by parallel reasoning,]] Thus, that [[introspection]] merely negates (ultimate truth) being attested as an object of cognition [[of a reasoning consciousness]] but [[introspection]] does not set forth (ultimate truth) as an object. In so far as it is merely a matter of negating its being established, the Conqueror’s sons remain silent.

This (i.e. the answers to [a] and [b]) is what is said [[by Geshepa]].

i-ii-2.B’ Reconsideration of Geshepa’s answers

[[Refutation:]] This is to be reconsidered. (There are five points):

- [°i] the example is not established;
- [°ii] since the object is not fitting, one cannot dispel objections;
- [°iii] there are errors regarding the very reasoning that dispels objections;
- [°iv] the meaning that is explained [[here]] contradicts other statements [[stated in epistemological treatises]]; and,
- [°v] this is invalidated by the previously explained reasoning.

i-ii-2.B’-i The example (in the Answer in i-ii-2.B [a]) is not established:

[[Thus, the meaning of saying “inferential cognition is both valid cognition and not valid cognition” is as follows:]]

- Since there is no experience of the particular fire, and so forth, (the latter) [[a particular fire]] does not come to be the apprehended object [[of the inferential cognition]]. Since it conceives of what is superimposed [[that is, the apprehended object]] as being external [[that is, as a particular fire]], (it) [[inferential cognition]] is erroneous concerning what is apprehended.
- On the other hand, [[inferential cognition is a valid cognition with regard to the intentional object, thus]] it cannot be negated that the particular is the very epistemic object that is conceived because the two valid cognitions are similar in having the definition of valid cognition with regard to the intentional object [[because these both have epistemic objects from their respective perspectives]].

[[Objection: this is because it is not the case that inference takes a particular as an object when introspectively analyzing,]]

We ask: is this introspective awareness valid cognition or not?

- If it is, how could inference whose object is negated by that be posited as valid cognition? [[[That is, since (inference's object is negated by that, how could it be posited as valid cognition?)]]] It could be (valid cognition) in relation to what is apprehended [[[if it is posited (in this way, inference would be) erroneous]]] or from the perspective of what is conceived [[[in relation to (what is conceived, inference) is posited as valid cognition because it has an epistemic object]]]. If it is [[[still]]] posited [[[to be valid cognition]]] from the latter perspective, even though introspection negates the intentional object, [[[the absurd consequence would ensue that]]] all awareness would be valid cognition.
- If it [[[that is, introspection]]] is not valid cognition, inference is established to just have a particular as its object [[[because what is not valid cognition cannot negate the epistemic object of the valid cognition, inferential cognition]]].

Therefore, the example is not established.

i-ii-2.B'-ii Since the object is not fitting, one cannot dispel objections

[[[Second. The object is not fitting]]] Similarly, if introspection negates [[[the intentional object,]]] the elimination that is mistakenly assumed [[[and conceived]]] to be realized from the perspective of what is asserted within a reasoning consciousness, then it is not proper for reasoning [[[consciousness]]] to be valid cognition [[[because the intentional object has been negated by another awareness (namely, introspection) and]]] there is no occasion for inference being a valid cognition regarding something [[[that is, the apprehended object]]] other than the object of thought [[[that is, the intentional object]]].

Objection: It is in regards to the mere elimination of existence [[[that inference is valid cognition]]].

Answer: Just that being the epistemic object has been explained many times already [[[for example, (1) the mere non-establishment of existence is the definition of non-existence and (2) the awareness that understands in that way is understanding non-existence]]].¹⁴⁵

Therefore [[[for this very reason]]], one cannot dispel objections.

i-ii-2.B'-iii There are errors regarding the very reasoning that dispels objections

[[[Third]]]

[[[°1] It would follow that this introspection would be the valid cognition that delineates the non-concordant ultimate, and

[°2] teaching the invalidation of asserting that.]]]

[[[With regard to the latter, there are four parts:

[°21] devoid of proliferations would be established to be the epistemic object of introspection;

[°22] it would become an affirming awareness;

[°23] there would be infinite regress;

[°24] and it would not be necessary.]]]

¹⁴⁵ See sections III.1.1 and III.1.2.

i-ii-2.B'-iii-1 It would follow that this introspection would be the valid cognition that delineates the non-concordant ultimate

Otherwise, if one conceives of (the ultimate) as the object of a reasoning consciousness, by saying that introspection surpasses even the object of that [[[that is, of a reasoning consciousness]]], this very introspection that eliminates all proliferations would be [[[it must be]]] the reasoning that delineates the non-concordant ultimate.

Objection: Why not?

Answer: Because (of the following):

i-ii-2.B'-iii-2 Teaching the invalidation of asserting that

i-ii-2.B'-iii-2.1 Devoid of proliferations would be established to be the epistemic object of introspection

- The very elimination of all proliferations, such as the object of reasoning and so forth [[[by way of saying that (introspection) surpasses even (the object of reasoning)]]], would be established as the epistemic object of that [[[that is, of this introspection]]]. Alternatively [[[while that might be the case]]],

i-ii-2.B'-iii-2.2 It would become an affirming awareness

- If [[[it were the case]]] that [[[introspection]]] negates what reasoning eliminatively takes as its object, it becomes an affirming awareness [[[because the negative of a negation is an affirmative]]].

(In the event that introspection has no object at all,)

- If it [[[that is, introspection]]] does not posit any object, it would not be suitable to be a consciousness [[[because it would not have an object of cognition]]] or a valid cognition [[[because it would not have an epistemic object]]].

It is also because (of the following):

i-ii-2.B'-iii-2.3 There would be infinite regress

- It is not suitable for just this [[[that is, introspection]]] to be perception [[[for those of limited vision]]] and so it must be inference. In so far as this is the case, what is wrongly assumed to be the object of that [[[introspection (which is an inference)]]] would need to be negated by another introspection, which is (also) an inferential cognition. Therefore, there would be no end [[[in so far as each wrongly assumed object of introspection would need to be negated by a second introspection (thinking), “it does not exist in that way”]]].

i-ii-2.B'-iii-2.4 It would not be necessary

- If it [[[that is, the mistakenly assumed) object of introspection]]] does not need [[[to be negated by a second (introspection)]]], then the object of the former [[[that is, of a reasoning consciousness]]] also does not need (to be negated) [[[by introspection]]], due to parity of reasoning.

Objection: The object that is mistakenly assumed by this very introspection is included among the objects of inference in general [[[since it is claimed that (introspection) is beyond all objects of inference in general]]]; therefore, there is no need for another negation [[[apart from (the negation) we set forth; therefore, it is not the case that there is no end]]].

Answer: If one applies the negation having included its own [[[that is, introspection’s]]] epistemic object [[[that is, the object that is mistakenly assumed]]] among the objects negated [[[thinking), “I am beyond even my own object”]]], it is possible that the unlearned could hold that it is not an inference, or that it is not the case that it is a valid cognition that has an epistemic object for its object, or that all statements are false [[[there is a contradiction between previous and subsequent words]]]. It is not possible that valid cognition itself could apply [[[that it could apply when its own object is negated]]]. All valid cognitions invalidate an opposing object [[[because they have an exclusion for their objects]]]; it is not possible that they would negate their own object.

i-ii-2.B’-iv The meaning that is explained [[[here]]] contradicts other statements [[[stated in epistemological treatises]]]

[[[Fourth.]]] Additionally, it would be contradictory [[[for yourself, Jotsün,]]] with the statements:

- [[[In the context of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* determining the number of valid cognitions]]] The fact that a consciousness that is different from perception and inference does not have an epistemic object serves as a valid reason to negate (that consciousness) being valid cognition.
- Since it is correct that the epistemic object of non-apprehension is a non-entity, reasoning that negates a cause, and so forth, does not invalidate [[[a non-entity being an epistemic object]]].¹⁴⁶

[[[These statements are contradictory with (your asserting) here a valid cognition that lacks an epistemic object and not stating that a non-entity can be an epistemic object of a valid cognition.]]]

[a]

Objection: [[[Even without an epistemic object,]]] The mere non-establishment of existence is taken conventionally to be the epistemic object.¹⁴⁷

Answer: If (a consciousness) lacking an actual epistemic object were a valid cognition, then testimony and comparison would be also [[[be valid cognitions in so far as they lack actual epistemic objects]]].¹⁴⁸

[b]

Objection: Since it [[[that is, a reasoning consciousness]]] mistakenly assumes that it cognizes an absence, it has an epistemic object.

Answer: [[[Does (what is mistakenly assumes) have or not have (the definition of epistemic object)?]]] If what is mistakenly assumed has the definition of epistemic object in that way, devoid of proliferations [[[such as the wrong assumption of realizing the absence of nature]]] also would be established as an epistemic object. If you accept that [[[to be valid cognition]], through taking it as an epistemic object from the perspective of thought even though it does

146 This second statement suggests Dharmottara’s position that a non-entity serves as the probandum of a non-apprehension inference.

147 This corresponds to the view defended earlier by Gangpa.

148 “Comparison” (Skt. *upamāna*) and “testimony” (Skt. *śabda*) are among the means of valid cognition accepted by the Naiyāyika along with perception and inference.

not have the definition (of epistemic object), then it would also be the case for testimony and comparison [[[that they are valid cognitions]]].

Therefore, we do not subscribe to positing a consciousness that does not cognize an object of cognition or a valid cognition that does not realize an object. [[[Since Lotsawa accepts that not being a valid cognition and not having an epistemic object are synonyms, this other case also is not valid cognition.]]]

i-ii-2.B'-v This is invalidated by the previously explained reasoning

[[[Fifth]]] Additionally, if devoid of proliferations is not an object of awareness, it would be difficult for you to provide an answer to the following:

[=Verse 4a-d]

We accept that the mere invalidation of existence, the negandum, is an object
[[[that is]]] not established to exist [[[to be an (existent) entity]]];
Even though it is not an object of an affirmation, it is found to be an object of an
awareness that negates [[[“it does not exist”]]].¹⁴⁹

Structural analysis of i

Thus, the actual definition of the two truths [i] has been explained by way of
[i-i] the respective definition of the two truths according to our own position and
[i-ii] explaining the statements of the teachers.

ii Respective division for those that have these definitions

What is the division for each of those that have these definitions?

These are the intermediate verses:

[Verse 12-13 – intermediate verses]

Concordant and non-concordant [[[truths]]] are distinctions of the conventional itself
and are merely *taken to be* divisions of the ultimate.

There is not even the slightest division [[[that could be identified, saying) “this is it”]]]
with regard to the ultimate [[[truth]]] of the Madhyamaka system.

[Verse 13]

The two of [[[i.e., asserted by]]] the substantialists [[[as the ultimate]]] – ‘dependent’
and ‘perfected’ – are asserted in the Madhyamaka system to be the twofold [[[divisions
pertaining to the]]] conventional: correct and incorrect.

The substantialists do not accept a correct [[[conventional]]].¹⁵⁰

149 This is verse 4 (chapter III), which is cited again in Chapter IV, 2.1.

150 Their conventional is the *parikalpita*, which is only incorrect.

[[[The idealist (only assert as conventional) what is ‘imagined’, i.e., what is superimposed as a personal self and as phenomenal self. Vaibhāṣika...personal self¹⁵¹]]]
[[[Nevertheless]]] [[[regarding the incorrect conventional]]] ‘Conceptual’ and ‘non-conceptual’ are mere divisions of error [[[into two]]].

Thus, what are the definitions of correct and incorrect conventionals in the Madhyamaka system? What are the things that have these definitions?¹⁵²

iii Definition of the respective kinds of conventional

[Verse 14]

Objects of cognition that are non-veridical when explained¹⁵³ that are causally and non-causally efficient as they appear, are the definitions of correct and incorrect (conventional). {=iii-1} [[[This is the definition of Gya(marwa)’s own system.]]]
The teachers explain differently {=iii-2}.

iii-i The definition of the respective kinds that I (i.e. Gyamarwa) assert

[[[The definition of correct conventional is:]]] an object of knowledge that is non-veridical when explained that is causally efficient as it appears.

And [[[the definition of incorrect conventional is:]]] an object of knowledge that is non-veridical when explained that is incapable of causal efficacy as such [[[as it appears]]].¹⁵⁴

iii-ii Analyzing the assertions of the teachers

A Jotsün

The teachers [[[Jotsün]]] say the following:

This¹⁵⁵ just in accordance with the statement [[[by Lotsawa]]] that “it [[[teaching these three]]] is in order to refute [[[three]]] wrong conceptions, namely:¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ See the note in 1.1[1] detailing the difference between the philosophical systems regarding the conventional. “Vaibhāṣikas assert that it (i.e., the definiens of conventional) is present in personal self as either of the to (objects or mind)”

¹⁵² These questions are answered, respectively, in §iii and §iv.

¹⁵³ On this expression see verse 11.

¹⁵⁴ rGya dmar ba is in agreement with the view of Gro lung pa in bsTan rim chen mo 361b5 : ‘di’i dbye ba ni yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun rdzob gnyis te, ji ltar snang ba’i don gyis snang ba nyid dang mthun pa me’i bsreg pa la sogs pa lta bu byed par nus pa dang mi nus pa’i mtshan nyid can no. The phrasing of the bsTan rim chen mo can be traced back to SDV 12; see also the presentation of rNgog’s view by Khyung..
¹⁵⁵ Jotsün might be referring to the definition of correct conventional in terms of causal efficacy, or, as the rest of the statement seems to imply, to three alternative definitions of correct conventional, namely “arising in dependence,” “causally active,” and “interdependent.”

¹⁵⁶ A parallel passage in Phyra pa’s commentary on the SDV (15b8-16a2) explains the necessity to formulate the three in order to refute three wrong understandings:

- (i) to counter the idealists who hold that the dependent void of the imagined is the ultimate
- (ii) to counter proponents of conventional means of valid cognition who hold that what is causally efficient is ultimate (the same passage of PV/PVin is cited)
- (iii) to counter Sthīramati who holds that ‘interdependent’ is pervaded by ‘ultimate entity’

To counter these three, ‘correct conventional’ (for the Madhyamaka, what was the ‘ultimate’ for these three) is identified as (i) void of imagined, (ii) causally efficient, (iii) arisen in dependence.

- (1) Asserting the void of the imagined (nature) that is the perfected to be the ultimate, according to [[[what is said in the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* (SDV 8ab)]]]:

A [[[causally active]]] mere thing that is void of an imagined object, which arises in dependence (is to be known as correct conventional)

- (2) Asserting [[[what is causally efficient) to be the ultimate]]] (as stated by Dharmakīrti, PV 1.166ab, PVin 2.56ab):

What is capable of causal efficacy, this, here, is what is ultimately existent.

- (3) Asserting, as Sthīramati, etc., that “because it is interdependent, it exists ultimately.”¹⁵⁷

[[[This is correct, but categorizing unilaterally is not correct:]]]

Thus, because it can be defined by either [[[individually]]] (i) ‘causally efficient’, which indicates as [[[as correct conventional consisting in]]] a *cause* or by (ii) ‘arising in dependence’, which indicates as [[[as correct conventional consisting in]]] an *effect*, (iii) the conjunction (of these two, i.e., ‘interdependent’) is not necessary. This being the case, a fourth option that the previous generations¹⁵⁸ assert, (iv) ‘commonly appearing’ in addition to these three, is absolutely not the case.

A’ Reconsideration of Jotsūn’s view / Refutation

[[[Refutation of that]]]

Reconsidering what precedes, ‘capable of causal efficacy’ (i) defines something as an ‘entity’, and ‘arising in dependence’ (ii) defines something as ‘produced’, but they do not define something as ‘correct conventional’, because these [[[what is defined as ‘entity’ or ‘produced’ and what is defined as ‘correct conventional’]]] are different concepts, like ‘produced’ and ‘impermanent’.

[[[If one thinks: correct conventional is defined by ‘non-erroneous’]]]

If the definiens is ‘non-erroneous’ without specification, there would be absurd consequences [[[that ‘produced’ (would define) ‘impermanent’]]]. Further, [[[‘entity’ and ‘correct conventional’ would not be distinct concepts, so]]] when establishing something [[[pleasure, form, etc.]]] to be an entity, that would already be established to be correct conventional. Therefore, the reasoning consisting in proving something [[[conventional]]] to be conventional by negating that it is ultimate [[[truth]]] would be pointless.¹⁵⁹

But it has also been stated [[[by Jotsūn]]] that the proof that something is conventional depends on (such) an argument [[[it is said that the negation of the four alternatives of arising, etc., establishes something to be conventional]]].

In the *Snying po* as well (T p. 23–24), the three options are described as “characterizations” meant to each eliminate one mistaken understanding of the ultimate (without text-passages being cited).

Phya pa can thus be understood to follow rNgog Lo’s interpretation on the interpretation of these three options.

157 Perhaps a reference to *Triṃśikāvijñāpti-bhāṣya*, 16.15–16: *vijñānam punaḥ pratīyasamutpannatvād dravyato ’stīty abhyupeyam*

158 Track source of this position.

159 A similar argument is made in i-ii-1.2 when discussing the definition of ‘conventional’ as ‘what accords with appearances’.

B. Gangpa

In this regard also, [[[Gangpa ('s position):]]], it is said [[[by Gangpa]]]:

It can be defined by either ‘void of an imagined (nature)’ taken as an implicative negation, ‘capable of causal efficacy’, or ‘arisen in dependence’. Thus, the teaching of the three is a ‘characterization’.¹⁶⁰ [[[He is not saying that ‘void of an imagined (nature)’ taken as a simple negation is the *definiens*.]]]

Thus, [[[the ancient generations]]] making ‘commonly appearing’ the definiens, having taken as a definitional basis what is endowed with these three properties, is [[[true, but]]] merely suitable to be found in Scriptures, but is like before [[[like) the three, ‘void of an imagined nature’ taken as an implicative negation, etc., by any of which it can be defined]]].

B’ Partial agreement of Gyamarwa with Gangpa

It is agreed [[[I agree with him]]] that the implicative negation of ‘imagined’ [[[having previously presented himself the so-called to be a “characterization”]]] amounts [[[to my]]] ‘causally efficient that is void when analyzed’ [[[this one is posited as the definiens]]]. But the last two [[[‘capable of causal efficacy’ and ‘arisen in dependence’]]] are definienda of other phenomena [[[than conventional, namely “produced” and “entity”, like said in the example]]].

C Lotsawa

Further [[[Lotsawa]]] ‘void of imagined (nature)’ etc. are *characterizations* of the nature of correct conventional [[[there is a single nature, in which one makes distinctions of correct and mistaken phenomena]]] [[[they are not definienda]]]¹⁶¹

- because what is established substantially does not depend on being posited by a definiens [[[the nature of correct conventional is established substantially, thus (it does not depend on) a definiens for that]]]
- and because ‘void of [[[conceptually]]] imagined (nature)’ [[[if taken to be the definiens of correct conventional]]] extends to objects of non-conceptual erroneous cognition.

Thus, [[[‘void of imagined (nature), etc.]]] are called individual “characterizations” of the nature itself.

What is stated (in SDV 12ab):

Because they are, although similar in appearance, capable and not capable of causal efficacy

[[[For this nature, which has many properties, there are the two properties one refers to conventionally as “correct” and “mistaken”]]]

160 The author opposes here *upalakṣaṇa* to *lakṣaṇa* - there can be only one *lakṣaṇa* per definiendum. *Upalakṣaṇa* could also be translated as “illustration.” In consideration of the conclusion (§4 below), Gangpa’s position would be that each of the three, individually, is a definiens, but that the three (together) are an “illustration.”

161 In Phya pa’s commentary on the SDV (16a2-16a5), the refutation of their being “definiens” relies on the rejection that each can be a definiens individually, that pairs of two of them cannot be a definiens, and that the association of the three cannot be a definiens. Similarly, in *sNying po* (T p. 23), Phya pa rejects these seven options.

are the definienda of the respective properties, correct and mistaken.

[a]

Objection: What is the difference [[[regarding what is capable and incapable of causal efficacy]]] between correct—mere entity, etc., that are properties characterizing correct conventional—and mistaken—the opposite of this, non-entity, etc. [[[‘completely imagined’ being the definiens of mistaken conventional is explained in the *Small Commentary*, but....]]]? Indeed, both [[[what is capable and incapable of causal efficacy, ultimately]]] are mistaken because they are inadmissible by valid cognition and because they [[[these two]]] are similarly the support of error.

Answer: In worldly conventions, it is said that ‘deceiving’ and ‘non-deceiving’ are the states of affairs that are (respectively) mistaken and correct and that their definienda are causally efficient and not causally efficient.

C’ Reconsideration of Lotsawa’s position

When one reflects upon this, it may be true that the nature [[[of correct conventional]]] established substantially does not depend on a definiens, but what fault is there for [[[the implicative negation ‘void of imagined nature’ etc.]]] to be the definiens that posits something as being taken conventionally as ‘correct conventional’?

[[[If it is the case that, because the nature (of) conventional is established substantially, a definiens is not necessary even for being taken conventionally (as ‘conventional’), it is contradictory? with saying that (correct conventional?) can be defined by either ‘capable of causally efficacy’ or ‘arisen in dependence’ individually error]]]

Otherwise, why would one need [[[as definiens]]] ‘generated by causes and conditions’ for what is produced, which is established substantially?

[[[Furthermore,]]] just like this, why would one need [[[as definiens]]] ‘capable of causal efficacy’ for entity without specification, which is established substantially?

Retort: It is the property [[[the definiens]]] for being taken conventionally as ‘existing entity’

Parallel: It would be the same as well [[[for being taken conventionally as ‘correct conventional’]]].

In the same way, positing something as ‘mistaken conventional’ also relies on a definiens.

*D. Conclusion*¹⁶²

Thus, either of the following is suitable [[[as definiens]]]

- Void of imagined nature and entity without specification [[[insofar as one defines as ‘correct conventional’ from the perspective of consisting as a cause]]]
- Void of imagined nature and arisen in dependence [[[thereby (from the perspective) of an effect]]]
- The implicative negation ‘void of imagined nature’

¹⁶² In view of what precedes and because Gyamarwa’s own position was presented in iii-i, this appears to be the conclusion to iii-ii, which is representative of the view of Gangpa.

Structural analysis of iii

Thus, I have explained [iii] the definiens of the varieties of conventional by
[iii-i] the respective definiens of varieties that I assert, and
[iii-ii] analyzing the position of the teachers.

iv. What has this definition

What has these definitions [[[that are asserted by the respective proponents among the tenet systems]]]?

[[[Among the two items: [°1] refutation of other positions by Gya(marwa) and [°2] presentation of his own position:]]]

iv-1 Refutation of other scholars (by Gyamarwa)

[[[Refutation]]]

If we explain some of the many systems of those (Mādhyamikas) who adopt a philosophical position,

iv-11 Jotsün's statements

[[[Regarding Jotsün's statements, among the two items (°1 and °2):]]]

iv-11.1 The presentation of his (Jotsün's) own position (=Mādhyamikas should not adopt any tenet system on the conventional level)

[[[The presentation of his own position]]]

The Teachers say as follows:

It is impossible to posit (i) the duality of object and mind or (ii) Yogācāra, or specifically, [[[for (i)]]] Sautrāntika or in agreement with Vaibhāṣika, or [[[for (ii)]]] True- or False-representationalism. When they are postulated, one refutes them.

iv-11.2 Refutation of other views (by Jotsün)

[[[Refutation (of other views)]]]

[[[Among the three refutations,

iv-11.21 Refutation of Lotsa(wa)'s non-representationalism

[[[Refutation of Lotsa(wa)]]].

iv-11.211 Presentation of Lotsa(w)'s view

Among the two points: presentation. (This is done) by the five:

[°1] The statements that/Which authoritative texts establish that correct conventionalities are just like they appear ↔ iv-11.211.1>

[°2] Establishment by reasoning ↔ iv-11.211.2>

[°3] Rejecting the objection that the apprehender is not established ↔ iv-11.211.3>

[°4] Otherwise it would be the same in the case of (asserting) aspects ↔ iv-11.211.4>

[°5] There is no means of proof for aspectualism¹⁶³ ↔ iv-11.211.5>]]]

As follows:

iv-11.211.1 The statements that/Which authoritative text establishes that correct conventionalities are just like they appear

Things that are distinct (from consciousness) are [[[established (as)]]] the object of respective determinations of the own continuum.

That it is “Just [[[mind itself]]] appearance as such” is said to be “rejected by the world itself” (in SDVV ad 24ab) [[[i.e., (they say: “this is incorrect thus”]]].¹⁶⁴

And in answer to [[[the objection]]] “There is vision in dreams and so forth [[[even though the object is non-existent]]]” (SDVV ad 24ab) [[[consequently, say the idealists, “external (reality) is not real”]]], it is said (in SDVV ad 24ab): “If it were true” that the [[[mere]]] vision [[[of an object in a dream]]] is an existent object, “for you, the wicked who cling [[[you became wicked because of clinging]]]” to the tenet system of Mind-only,¹⁶⁵ “[[in a dream, even though there is no object]]] mind itself appearing as such” is “a mistaken appearance.” [[[this object of dream is not mind and (it is a mistaken appearance) to¹⁶⁶ mind.]]] – The *Treatise on the Two Truths* is [[[being]]] clarified according to the [[[this]]] explanation of the *Commentary*.¹⁶⁷

iv-11.211.2 Establishment by reasoning

[[This is the (position) of Lotsa(wa)]]

In this case, this is precisely like this:

[[[Lotsa(wa) explains that dream objects also are true as external objects, conventionally.]]]

All things [[[whether mind or extra-mental objects]]] that are examined by reasoning are not found. However, as for “just as they appear,” since there is establishment as something causally efficient, etc., as precisely distinct [[[i.e., external from the mind]]], dreams etc. also are endowed with an [[[existent]]] object [[[insofar as it is distinct from the mind]]] – this is the Madhyamaka in agreement with Vaibhāṣika.

¹⁶³ Since the argument is about the inference refuting external reality, the most natural reading would be “rnam yod du bsgrub byed » (« proof of aspectualism »), although the faded note suggests rather « rnaM med du bsgrub byed ».

¹⁶⁴ In answer to the Yogācāra suggestion that the dualistic appearance is “only a cognition agitated by ignorance” (*ma rigs pas dkrugs pa'i rnam par shes pa nyid de ltar rtogs so*) – rephrase here in terms of “it is just appearance itself” –, Jñānagarbha answers that the world rejects this explanation, which contradicts what is generally accepted in the world (namely that there is a subject and an object).

¹⁶⁵ The original SDVV reading is « ngan pas khyod la » “It is a mistaken appearance for you (i.e., according to you as well), due to bad clinging.”

¹⁶⁶ Although the manuscript reads “dang”, we translate in the sense of “du”, i.e., “taking what is not mind to be mind”, as explaining what is wrong about the opponent’s position.

¹⁶⁷ rNgog wants this passage to mean that the idealist is mistaken in taking what appears in dreams to be mind itself, and that this mistake is caused by his clinging to the idealist tenet system that considers everything to be mind. It is unclear which « Commentary » supports this reading. It does not appear to be Śāntarakṣita’s SDV dka’ ‘grel, in which « mistaken appearance » is contrasted to « the context in which one is not mistaken by sleep » (*gnyid kyis ma log pa'i gnas skabs*), indicating that the « mistake » is tied to the context of sleep, and not to the idealist tenet system.

iv-11.211.3 Rejecting the objection that the apprehender is not established

[[[In this regard, there is [°1] the presentation of the objection and [°2] its rejection]]]

iv-11.211.31 Presentation of the objection (i.e., of standard objections against Vaibhāṣika)

This position [[[of Vaibhāṣika]]] [[[those who accept external objects conventionally]]] is not invalidated by [[[arguments]]] such as

(i) since they (object and cognition) are distinct and simultaneous, there can be no relation (between them); [[[since they are distinct, identity does not apply, and since they are simultaneous, there is no relation of causality either]]] hence they cannot be apprehender and apprehended, or

(ii) [[[for (a cognition) that apprehends without there being a relation (with an apprehended)]]] there is no imminent cause for the respective awareness of objects [[[visual cognition realizes form but does not realize sound]]], etc.¹⁶⁸

iv-11.211.32 Rejection of the objection

Ultimate apprehender and apprehended that are not invalidated when analyzing by such [[[arguments]]] [[[one that is not invalidated would be ultimate, but such one]]] is not asserted. Thus, it [[[the conventional]]] is like an illusion.

For this very reason, it is just like it is explained in the *Pañjika* (i.e., the SDV-dka' 'grel)¹⁶⁹ in answer to the objection that when one dreams of a big mountain in a small house, it is not correct that a big bodily thing [[[the mountain]]] fits in a small place [[[the house]]], namely, that if one explains thus [[[if one accepts an ultimate mountain, the invalidation would apply, however]]], there is no ultimate mountain, but it [[[the big mountain in the small house]]] is attested just as it appears.

iv-11.211.4 Otherwise it would be the same in the case of (asserting) aspects

[[[These arguments invalidate their acceptance and assertion ultimately]]] Otherwise,¹⁷⁰ for the one who accept aspects [[[like the Sautrāntikas]]], it would not be the case that there is no invalidation [[[(not the case that one is) liberated from the faults]]]. Indeed, it is refuted by the refutation stated for instance (in the SDV [[[aspect does not entail an extra-mental object]]]):

[A cognition that does not have the form of an object cannot cognize the object]. Neither can the opposite, because the aspect is not a valid cognition (of the object) and because it cannot be (the cognition of an object).

¹⁶⁸ See the argument in SDV dka' 'grel ad antaraśloka 7 (Akahane 94,8-10), that associates the presence of such cause with the identification as blue or as yellow..

¹⁶⁹ This is not a literal citation from the Panjika, and the discussion in this passage actually has another scope: refuting idealists who use the "dream argument" to refute external reality and argue in favor of false appearances being just the agitated mind.

¹⁷⁰ Alternatively, one could correct *khas blangs pas* to *khas blangs pa* and translate "those who assert aspects would not be free from invalidation"

iv-11.211.5 There is no means of proof for aspectualism

“Certitude of co-apprehension” etc. is not a correct logical reason (to prove idealism/to disprove external reality) because externality is established by perception [[[because (perception) eliminates the thesis that (the object) is not distinct from the mind]]].¹⁷¹

The above-stated position [[[of Lotsa(wa)]]] is extremely difficult to hold:

[[[This is because Jotsün says that ... he does not subscribe to the following three: (i) According to Lotsa(wa), everything up to the object of dreams is asserted to be ultimately a basis (/always asserted to be ultimate) [see iv-11.212]; (ii) according to the Sautrāntikas, aspects are accepted [see iv-11.22]; (iii) according to the idealists, one accepts (objects) to be the mind [see iv-11.23].]]]

iv-11.212 Refutation of Lotsa(wa) (by Jotsün)

[[[Regarding this refutation of Lotsa(wa), there are two rebuttals: [°1] it undermines the accepted presentation, and [°2] it follows that something that is not accepted is established.]]]

iv-11.212.1 (C1) It undermines the accepted presentation

This (dreams being true) is refuted by these explanations of Vinītadeva in the commentary on the *Sāntanāntarasiddhi*:

Thus [[[the object of dreams being true]]], when dreaming that one kills a man in a dream, it would be a capital offence, or [[[if one thinks that the factors are not complete, even in that case]]] there would be a fundamental sin [[[of taking a life]]], and [[[when sleeping here]]] when one dreams that one goes to another country, one would become two continua [[[one is in the bed, and one is walking elsewhere]]].

If being [[[the continuum that is]]] in another country was true because just what appears is true, [[[when one dreams of having gone somewhere else]]] even if the body inside the house is being cut and chopped up, it would not be a fundamental sin (for the killer) and the person [[[although killed]]] would [[[later]]] return from elsewhere [[[from the place where it had gone]]].

And further, the discreet results of actions would not be definite [[[saying that the result of virtue is happiness, etc.]]], because the dreamed obtaining of a bad rebirth as the result of virtue also would be true as such.

Similarly, the dreamed arising of something that has the characteristic of smoke from something that is not fire also would be true, therefore it would also be the end of logical reasons qua effect etc., conventionally.

¹⁷¹ See also Gro lung pa's argument against the idealist's position, arguing that external objects are part of correct conventionals, bsTan rim chen mo 352a3-352a5 : **kha cig** na re rnam par shes pa tsam ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob tu yod pa'o, , gzhan gzung 'dzin gnyis ni log pa'i kun rdzob tu zad kyi yang 352a4 dag pa'i kun rdzob ni ma yin no zhes zer ro // de ni mi 'thad de bde sogs ltar sngo sogs kyang mngon par 'dod pa'i 'bras bu'i sgrub byed du tha snyad pa'i mngon sum dang rjes dpag gis bsgrubs pas, de spong ba la mngon sum dang rjes dpag gis gnod do, , de lta 352a5 ma yin na rnam shes kyang yang dag gi kun rdzob tu yod pa ma yin no zhes zer na khyod la lan ci yod, de lta bas na rnam shes ltar phyi rol yang yang dag gi kun rdzob tu yod pa nyid do, ,

iv-11.212.2 (C2) It follows that something that is not accepted is established {Parallel argument between Dream-objects (D1) and God (D2)}

[[[Something that is not accepted is established]]]

Further, if one asserts [[Lotsa(wa), etc.'s (position)]] that “all appearances are true as such [[as they appear]], and all statements [[to non-aspectualists]] of refuting arguments merely negate ultimately [[because they invalidate something accepted to be ultimate]]”, [[it would follow that]] the doubt that all things such as God [[which you assert not to exist conventionally]], etc. [[a permanent entity asserted to be creator of sound etc.]] would also exist as correct conventionalities would not be removed. [[If it (God) is asserted to be the cause of sound etc.. does it generate it at once or sequentially?

- in the former case (i.e., at once), having generated all effects at one time, it does not generate later, thus previously it would be something that generates and subsequently, it would be something that does not generate, therefore it would follow that it is not permanent
- In the latter case (i.e., sequentially) also it would follow that it is not permanent.

Objection: [[If one negates (God) by saying:]] [[it does not exist conventionally]] because it is not the cause of sound at once (or sequentially either) [[(indeed), God, if it exists as a permanent singularity, is one (and being a cause invalidates singularity)]]].

Answer: This [[a refutation by this argument]] is merely a refutation of ultimate God. [[Just like for instance the above presentation by him [Jñānagarbha]] of a refutation against objects of dreams is a refutation of something ultimate.]]

Then, there is a contradiction between the teaching that even the object of dreams is true and the statement of the Teacher Jñānagarbha himself (in an intermediate verse of SDV following 34cd):

(Buddhas) see one thing [[an effect]] following from another [[a cause]]. [[This explains that the effect of actions is definite.]]

[[Thus, the explanation of the commentary that asserts that even the object of dreams is true is said (by Lotsawa) to be the intention of Jñānagarbha (but it is not).]]

iv-11.22 Refutation of Sautrāntika representationalism by Jotsūn

[[Regarding the refutation of the representationalist Sautrāntika, there are two points: [°1] (B1) there is no means of proof and [°2](B2) it follows that an object that is not asserted, such as God, etc., would be established]]

Objection: What about the apprehension of objects by means of aspects?

iv-11.221 (B1) There is no means of proof

Answer: [[Jotsūn said that this also is incorrect]] When everything that appears is mind, there is no means of proving an [[external]] object distinct (from the mind) [[that projects an aspect]].

[[**Objection:** External (objects) are established by contraposition.]]

Their having specificity of place and time [[appearing here/now, and not appearing elsewhere/at another (time)]], etc. (and other features that could be associated with

external objects projecting an aspect), is due to traces [[[that are stable or not stable]]], like it is asserted in the case of dreams [[[although there is no object it is asserted to appear]]].

Thus, saying “something external is established by contraposition” [[[according to the Sautrāntika, saying “if one excludes an external object, appearance of form, etc., is excluded; therefore, external objects exist”]]] is inconclusive [[[because it is uncertain whether (appearance) is excluded due to the exclusion of an external object or (due to the exclusion of traces)]]].¹⁷²

Therefore, this [[[external object]]] also lacks a means of proof, just like God.

iv-11.222 (B2) it follows that an object that is not asserted, such as God, etc., would be established {Parallel argument: External object (D1) is parallel to God (D2)}

[[[Second point]]]

[[[Further, if one accepts external objects in spite of there being no means of proof, one has to accept also God, etc.]]]

Objection (D2): Because it is not correct that a permanent God would be causally active sequentially or at once, it is refuted [[[there is a refuting argument against God]]]. Therefore, it [[[God]]] is determined to be non-existent. [[[Therefore, it is not similar to (external) objects]]]

Parallel (D1): An [[[external]]] object also [[[is accepted to be non-existent]]] because it is neither one nor many.

Answer to the parallel (D1): This [[[a logical reason such as “neither one nor many”]]] is an ultimate examination [[[therefore it refutes an ultimate external object; it does not invalidate something conventional]]].

Parallel answer (D2): This is the same [[[in the case of) God]]].

One has to state the difference pertaining to the characteristic of the examination [[[as having the aspect of ultimate or of conventional]]].

[[[Namely, (one has to state) the specificity of the distinction between arguments that concern the ultimate and those that concern the conventional - The invalidation of God is the invalidation of something conventional, but the invalidation of an (external) object is the invalidation of something ultimate.]]]

iv-11.23 Refutation of idealism (by Jotsün)

[[[Further, third point, (considering) idealism:]]]

Objection: [[[It is said:]]] [[[Because there is no difference between the arguments pertaining to (external) objects and to God, it is true that it is not possible to posit objects, nevertheless,]]] since it is established by experience, mere consciousness is accepted to exist as a correct conventional.¹⁷³

(A)

¹⁷² The proof referred to here corresponds to the one presented by Dharmakīrti in PVin 1, namely the argument that the external object is established as a cause of cognition from the fact that cognition (being the result) does not occur in the absence of the external object even though the other causes are present. PVin 1 Skt. 43, 7-12 (including PVin 1.58d), Tib. 100, 6-12 (including PVin 1.59d) (parallel in PV 3.390d-391).

¹⁷³ This corresponds to Gangpa’s own view presented below in iv-12.

Answer: [[[Given that the establishment of mere consciousness requires negating objects]]] Mere consciousness without negating (external) objects is not proper, therefore it is necessary to negate [[[objects]]]. Given that, [[[Objection: Objects are refuted by the neither-one-nor-many (argument), etc.]]] this [[[the argument refuting (external) objects]]] is the same for mind as well, [[[As follows, Objection: something external is not true, but consciousness is true. Answer: nevertheless]]], the difference between [[[logical]]] analysis concerning the conventional or the ultimate [[[in terms of “the logic of this argument is a logic that negates ultimately, but the logic of that is conventional”]]] is not found. This has already been said.

[No decision between realism/idealism, representationalism/non-representationalism is supported by logic]

Therefore, if one accepts that (things are) true as they appear [[[in the way it is asserted by Lotsa(wa), that things up to the object of dreams are true]]], there are major absurd consequences [[[due to dream objects]]] (C2). [[[If one thinks, “is it then consciousness”? It is not either.]]] The teaching of a means of refutation [[[namely, ‘neither one nor many’]]] for some things [[[God and (external) objects]]], is the same also for others [[[proponents of mind-only]]], [[[the cases of God and of (external) objects are the same, and the cases of objects and mind also are the same; thus in the end, the cases of God and mind also come to be the same]]] because a difference between arguments is not found (A).

Thus [[[according to Jotsün]]] one cannot posit [[[unilaterally]]] [[[whether for representationalism or non-representationalism]]] “it [[[the conventional]]] is just like that.”

[No decision between realism/idealism, representationalism/non-representationalism is supported by scriptures]

If one says: [[[Even though a difference between arguments is not found]]] Scriptures put forward [[[one of them as true]]].

Answer: [[[Because there is similar support for both in one scripture or another]]]

A (pro idealist scriptures)

According to the saying of the Protector Maitreya, etc., that the ‘vessel-like world’ conforms to pure mind (Ref.? Prob. sutralamkara). Yogācāra is true. Just like [[[for example]]] when one person cultivates the path it is not another that becomes liberated, [[[Are objects true? If they are true]]] those [objects] which are [true] as they are in the mind of one person also would not become objects for another. [[[Mind is true because of what precedes.]]]

In the same way, this [[[view of mind only]]] is also established by the saying that for hungry ghosts, water appears as pus and blood, etc. (ref? Jñānacatuṣkasūtra?)

B (pro realist scriptures)

[[[Scripture that concurs with the statement that external objects exist]]] But according to the statement that “the animate world having emptied gradually, the [[[empty]]] vessel is destroyed gradually by seven fires (/suns), one water, etc.” (ref. Sattasūriya sutta, Aṅguttara-

Nikāya 7.66?), an external object is attested, because a vessel in which something animate is not attested could not appear to mind [[[because it is contradictory for there to be appearance to mind in the absence of mind]]].

Therefore, a single [[[unilateral]]] presentation is not established [[[to be true]]] [[[by scriptures]]].

iv-11.3 Conclusion

Thus, when analyzing by these analyses [[[the above arguments]]] according to which none of these positions can be established, as for the division pertaining to the conventional for Madhyamaka, there is no decision.¹⁷⁴

[[[So says Jotsün.]]]

iv-11' Reconsideration of Jotsün's views (by Gyamarwa)

This is to be reconsidered:

iv-11'.i Summary (of Jotsün's arguments)

(i) (cf. iv-ii.21) Regarding the position [[[of Lotsa]]] that even the object of dreams is true,

- The (asserted) presentation would be destroyed (cf. iv-ii.212.1), because -presentations of the result of actions, etc., all of them would be destroyed. -and if all refutation-statements pertaining to the object of dreams merely refute an ultimate object, it would also be impossible to refute that God, etc., all of them, are correct conventionalities [[[because when refuting (God etc), one would (merely) refute an ultimate (God, etc.)]]].
- And there would be absurd consequences (cf. iv-ii.212.2) [[[because dreams – that are asserted to be correct conventionalities – and God – which is not asserted to be so – are similar]]].

Non-representationalism is refuted [[[by these two]]].

(ii) (cf. iv-ii.22)

- Representationalism [[[Sautrāntika]]] is refuted since there is no means of proving [[[external]]] objects (B1), and there is a refuting argument parallel to the one refuting God (B2).

(iii) (cf. iv-ii.23)

- Idealism is refuted because the refuting argument for objects is parallel [[[for those who accept mind]]] (A).

This is the summary of the statements as they are.

iv-11'.ii Refutation (of Jotsün)

[[[Regarding the refutation of Jotsün there are two points:

[°1] Brief presentation of the division between correct and incorrect (arguments) and [°2] extensive explanation of that.

¹⁷⁴ I.e., none of the tenet systems is elected.

iv-11'.ii-1 Brief explanation (= Examining which of Jotsün's arguments against philosophical systems are correct)

As for the first:]]]

Thus, (according to Jotsün), (B2) just like the refutation of an (external) object is parallel with that of God, the apprehension of an (external) object is to be refuted (by) what is said (in the SDV, intermediate verse 1f after k.13):

A cognition that does not have the aspect (of the object) cannot be the cognizer of the object.

Neither can the opposite, because the aspect is not a valid cognition (establishing the object) and because it cannot be (the cognition of an object).

The argument (refuting aspects) is parallel to the following one (refuting Space [or God] in the PV 4.141c, 4.144d:)

(Space, etc. do not have a novel nature unproduced by other conditions) because they (these other conditions) are not all at once causes of sound, etc.

because [[[In addition, as for the parallel with God, if one refutes God by this argument, then in parallel, for the aspectualists also (there would be the refutation by) "because aspects are not valid cognitions", etc.

And if one says that (the refutation of) God is a conventional argument and the refutation of aspects is ultimate, then also for these arguments,]]]

one does not find a distinction of analysis (between the two).

[[[Moreover]]] (A) the awareness of pleasure, etc. also is similar to the case of God [[[for both there is no means of proof and there is a refuting argument]]], because it is said that the refutation of God and external objects is parallel, and it is also said that (the cases of) external objects and consciousness [[[which is parallel to God]]] are parallel.

In this regard, the following is said:

[Verses 15–16]

(i) If dreams were true, the asserted presentations would be destroyed (1), and there would be overreaching consequences that are not accepted (2).

(ii) There is no means of proof for (external) objects (for) aspectualists (3).

(iii) The remainder (of the arguments) (invoke) the fault of not distinguishing between arguments, which is not clear (ma drugs?).

Therefore, the distinction is to be known.

This is the brief presentation of correct (arguments) [[[1-3]]] and incorrect ones [[[the remainder]]].

iv-11'.ii-2 Extensive explanation (= Refuting Jotsün's rejection of tenet systems)

[[[The second point, extensively:]]]

[[[If, like Jotsün, one does not accept a specific tenet system]]] [[[There are two options to investigate:]]] Is this [[[specific tenet system]]] not adopted ever? Or [[[although asserted in general in the context of epistemology]]] [[[just not accepted]]] in the Madhyamaka context?

iv-11'.ii-2i It is contradictory to reject holding a specific position of Madhyamaka if one does not reject the presentations of valid cognition, etc.

[[[If one does not accept ever a context in which there is a specific tenet system, there are four faults:

[°1] Something generic is not possible ↔ iv-11'.ii-2i.i>

[°2] If one accepts common appearance, non-aspectualism is established ↔ iv-11'.ii-2i.ii>

[°3] If one accepts that, it is contradictory with one's own statements ↔ iv-11'.ii-2i.iiib>

[°4] Common appearance that rejects particular (tenet systems) is not established.

For this there are three points:

[°41] The faults explained before are the same (here) ↔ iv-11'.ii-2i.iv.1>

[°42] Common appearance that rejects particular (tenet systems) is not possible ↔ iv-11'.ii-2i.4.2>

[°43] What establishes that ↔ iv-11'.ii-2i.4.3>]]]

The first (a specific tenet system is not adopted ever) is not the case,

iv-11'.ii-2i.i = iv-11'.ii-2i.1 Something generic is not possible

The presentation of means of valid cognition conventionally, in the case of proving fire via (the logical reason) smoke, and (perceiving) pleasure, and blue etc., (thinking) “A conventional one (i.e., a conventional valid cognition) is not to be suppressed!”¹⁷⁵ is actually maintained [[[by Jotsün himself]]].

At this time [[[when one maintains conventional means of valid cognition]]], does one infer the latencies of fire from the appearance as smoke, or does one infer fire itself from [[[external]]] smoke itself?

In the same way, in what system does one posit valid cognition and its result [[[one where what is external is taken as epistemic object, or one where mental appearance is taken as epistemic object]]]?

Something generic that does not reach one specific distinction is not possible.

175 We reading the text as expressing the same idea as *tha snyad du tshad ma chad par ma gyur cig in 11b1* “Let us not get rid of valid cognition conventionally”.

[[[Thus, if one infers fire from smoke itself, or if one infers the appearance as fire from the appearance as smoke, then, respectively, the tenet systems of realists and those of idealists apply.]]]

Objection: [[[If one said]]] In the case of reality, not touching the specific is not possible, but since we do not decide as to a specific [[[tenet system]]], we do not accept [[[any specific one]]].

Answer: If this [[[not deciding as to a specific]]] comes from having precedingly stated the refutation of all positions [[[specific tenet systems]]], then [[[given the refutation of all specific tenet systems]]] an investigation of (valid cognition and its) effect¹⁷⁶, etc. is not to be accepted at all, just like [[[it would be contradictory for]]] a genus [[[of man]]] [[[to be possible]]] that cannot exist in all the instances [[[of the genus of man, such as merchants, etc.]]]. [[[Just like it is contradictory to have ‘tree’ without specification when all the specific trees have been negated.]]]

Objection: It is not the case [[[that something generic is negated]]] by refuting specific (tenets). Rather, because a specific (tenet) is not established. [[[We do not accept (a specific) because it is not possible to establish, but we accept something generic.]]]

Answer: [[[Asserting that fire in general is inferred from smoke would be discarded]]] if no specific ‘being non-delusive with regard to real [[[external]]] fire (inferred) from smoke’ or ‘being non-delusive with regard to the latency (of fire)’ is established, a generic [[[‘non-delusive with regard to fire’]]] cannot be accepted, because [[[the generic]]] ‘non-delusive’ itself exists as an object of mind in dependence upon the specifics [[[non-delusive with regard to what is external or with regard to latencies]]].

iv-11'.ii-2i.ii = iv-11'.ii-2i.2 If one accepts common appearance, non-aspectualism is established

Objection: [[[If one said, without accepting any tenet system whatsoever]]] Whichever tenet system one agrees with, a logical reason qua effect [[[that is decided]]] that is commonly established down to the cowherds is asserted. Therefore, even without adopting any particular tenet system, the generic itself is correct.

Answer: Then, an extra-mental object is established [[[in accordance with Vaibhāṣika]]]: Those [[[worldly people]]] know that because smoke exists in [[[some]]] particular external place, fire exists there; thus, from a smoke distinct (from cognition), a fire distinct (from cognition) is understood.

If they [[[the worldly people]]] are not influenced by a tenet system, there would be no understanding of objects being apprehended via aspects. Rather, what appears as distinct (from cognition) itself [[[an extramental object]]] is understood to be the object.

Therefore, valid cognition and its result, etc., all of them, are to be asserted in this (system) that is in agreement with the Vaibhāṣika, which apprehends the object without aspects.

What comes from that? [[[What if that is so?]]]

¹⁷⁶ Alternatively, read 'bras rtags: "logical reasons qua effects", etc. (as in iv-11'.ii-2i.ii below) rather than 'bras bu brtags.

Because the following is accepted [[[by Jotsün himself]]]:

- Thinking “Let us not get rid of valid cognition conventionally”¹⁷⁷, what is established thus [[[as extramental object, etc.]]] by a conventional valid cognition cannot be invalidated by another valid cognition, therefore external objects are established [[[to be apprehended]]] without aspects conventionally, and
- void of truth as an object of ultimate analysis

Madhyamaka in agreement with Vaibhāṣika is asserted. This is because there is no definition of Madhyamaka in agreement with Vaibhāṣika other than [[[apart from presented in agreement with what is commonly recognized/with what is accepted for (the Madhyamaka in agreement with Vaibhāṣika)]]] the two truths being: conventionally, objects are established without aspect; ultimately, emptiness. [[[Thus it is contradictory with saying that no particular tenet system whatsoever is elected conventionally.]]]¹⁷⁸

iv-11'.ii-2i.iii = iv-11'.ii-2i.3 If one accepts that, it is contradictory with one's own statements¹⁷⁹

Then he would have to account for not electing any system, and, in addition, for (the view) that one does not find a distinction between mistaken and correct for God and other things [[[external objects, etc.]]].¹⁸⁰

Indeed,

- if one has tamed the doubt ‘is God refuted conventionally [[[by this logical refutation]]] or refuted ultimately?’, one nevertheless cannot apply a refutation to an extramental object that is established conventionally by a valid cognition.

- And given that there is a qualm with regard to God [[[because there is no distinction between arguments, it is refuted by logic conventionally]]], there is also a qualm with regard to that [[[with regard to external objects]]], consequently establishment by valid cognition [[[of blue, pleasure, etc.]]] would be impaired.

[[[God and this (external objects) are similar, and this (i.e. external object) and cognition are similar, therefore, finally, cognition and God are similar]]].

For this very reason, finally, teaching that consciousness is similar to God¹⁸¹ is contradictory with saying that consciousness is established conventionally by a valid cognition [[[whereas there is no valid cognition for God]]].

¹⁷⁷ Alternatively: “Let us not decide on (a system for) valid cognition conventionally”, but less likely in view of the previous passage (f. 11a5-6) that explicitly refers to the “presentation of means of valid cognition conventionally” (tha snyad du tshad ma'i rnam par gzhaḡ pa).

¹⁷⁸ The expression « ma chod pa » (translated here « not elected ») refers to Jotsün's claim reported in iv-11.3 : « the division pertaining to the conventional for Madhyamaka is not settled” (dbu ma'i kun rdzob kyi rnam par dbye [11a2] ba ni chod pa med do zhes).

¹⁷⁹ The argument seems to play on the absence of distinction between *refutations* (conventional/ultimate) in Jotsün's argument, the absence of distinction regarding *establishment* (conventionally/ultimately) by valid cognition.

¹⁸⁰ (i) « not electing any system » corresponds to Jotsün's claim reported in iv-11.i (see also n. 178). (ii) is part of Jotsün's reported arguments against idealism (iv-11.23).

¹⁸¹ Which Jotsün did on account of both being subject to the same refutation.

iv-11'.ii-2i.iv = iv-11'.ii-2i.4 Common appearance that rejects particular (tenet systems) is not established
iv-11'.ii-2i.iv1 Same fault as stated before (cf. iv-11'.ii-2i.ii)¹⁸²

Objection: How is not electing [[[a specific (system)]]] with respect to philosophical tenet systems while accepting worldly common appearance [[[common appearance is not subsumed in any particular tenet system, therefore (how are) accepting worldly common appearance and (not electing)]]], contradictory with teaching similarity with God [[[of objects, etc.]]] (on account of the refutation applying similarly to both)?

Answer: Common appearance of the worldly who are not influenced by a tenet system, which is understood as the apprehension of objects without aspects [[[this worldly common appearance]]], is undeniable. And if this [[[this common appearance]]] is attested as valid cognition conventionally [[[it is established by valid cognition]]], it cannot be invalidated [[[by another valid cognition]]], therefore, conventionally, external objects are established and ultimately, there is emptiness. Other than these (two), what would be the definiens for those who elect the [[[particular]]] tenet system of Madhyamaka in agreement with Vaibhāṣika?

iv-11'.ii-2i.iv2 Common appearance that rejects tenets is not possible

Further, if this “worldly common appearance” [[[is not..., but]]] is a common understanding of each and everyone [[[among) sentient beings; if this is called common appearance]]], one does not go beyond saying that it [[[what they understand/this understanding/the ones who understand?]]] is established in common in reality [[[as an existing object]]] or is established in common in [[[as being]]] consciousness.

Therefore, there is no common appearance that does not embrace a position [[[of a tenet system]]], either [[[in the case of establishment (as common) in reality, it would come to]]] duality of mind and object, or [[[in the case of establishment (as common) in the mind, it would come to]]] Yogācāra. This is because there is no other definiens for these (i.e., dualist-Madhyamaka and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka) [[[i.e., ultimate and conventional]]] apart from [[[calling “conventional”]]] the establishment of (, respectively,) object or cognition conventionally, and ultimately, emptiness.

iv-11'.ii-2i.iv3 What establishes that

Otherwise, this (person) would accept a [[[another]]] Madhyamaka that is not [[[that is not holding]]] a position among the tenet systems of Madhyamaka, because he does not accept holding a position [[[realism or idealism]]] because they have faults and accepts the division of the conventional based on common appearance [[[because they accept a conventional different from realism or idealism]]] and, ultimately, emptiness.

But it has also been said that on the conventional level the adoption of (one of) these (two) Madhyamaka tenet systems [[[realism or idealism]]] exhausts (all possibilities) [[[because it boils down to this indirectly]]]. Therefore, it is difficult to present a conventional consisting in common appearance that rejects these positions [[[realism or idealism]]].

iv-11'.ii-2ii The refutation that there is establishment (of a particular tenet system) in general but rejection in the Madhyamaka context
[[[Second option]]]

¹⁸² The answer repeats the answer in ii. above.

Objection: In general, we assert on the basis of common appearance [[[in the context of]]] the presentation of valid cognition, etc. based on the particular (systems of) realism or idealism. But in the context of endorsing Madhyamaka, we do not take side in positing a tenet system of Madhyamaka [[[namely, accepting realism or idealism]]].

Answer: It may well be the case¹⁸³ that the position of the two truths is established as follows:

- the division of correct [[[conventional]]] and mistaken [[[conventional]]] – the objects of determination and superimpositions– with regard to what is established to be an object or a cognition by a valid cognition of common appearance [[[what is established by a valid cognition of common appearance is determined; what is not established by a valid cognition is superimposed]]]
- the ultimate – emptiness when one explains.

Would the establishment as object or mind, in general, by a conventional valid cognition¹⁸⁴ in another context [[[would this establishment by a conventional valid cognition]]] be undermined by the acceptance of a tenet system of Madhyamaka?¹⁸⁵

If this is not undermined¹⁸⁶, just this (conventional valid cognition) establishes the position setting forth the conventional as object or mind; if [[[one asserts that]]] smoke proves fire in another context [[[i.e., valid cognition]]], one should accept that it does so as well in the Madhyamaka context.

And when something is not established [[[at all]]] by a valid cognition in other contexts [[[i.e., valid cognition]]], it would not be suitable to apply to that [[[the proof of fire by smoke, etc.]]] the convention of [[[accepted for]]] common appearance in terms of “common understanding”. The inference that eliminates proliferations also would not apply because its basis [[[i.e., the inferential subject]]], etc., are not established.¹⁸⁷

Objection: Thus, it appears necessary to accept something in general [[[in the context of?] conventional valid cognition]]]. But it is difficult to uphold it, because of similarity with

¹⁸³ The expression « mod » might indicate that this is one possible way to answer to the claim of not subscribing to a tenet system in the Madhyamaka context, namely, to point out that the division of correct-incorrect conventionals does rely on a conventional valid cognition that establishes as object or consciousness. rGya dmar ba's own argument would rather be what comes next, namely to point out that something established by valid cognition remains established, no matter which is the context.

¹⁸⁴ We disregard the note "tshad ma'i", which would generate the translation "established by a valid cognition of the convention of valid cognition". Alternatively, the note could be read with "other context", which would match the presentation of the second option at the beginning of the section iv-11'.ii-2.

¹⁸⁵ The idea in this argument would be that the very position established by conventional valid cognition (i.e., that there is external reality, or only mind) will be the one adopted in the Madhyamaka context – it cannot be invalidated by adopting another system tenet in the Madhyamaka context. Alternatively, one could correct the text to read « would it be undermined by the **non-acceptance** of a tenet system of Madhyamaka?»

¹⁸⁶ If the text is corrected to ma nyes na : « if this is unjustified ».

¹⁸⁷ The subject is supposed to be what is « commonly appearing » to both proponents and opponents.

(the case of) God [[[in which there is invalidation of establishment conventionally]]]. Therefore, one does not elect [[[a tenet system]]].

Answer: How is an object that is *established* in general by valid cognition [[[fire established via smoke, or blue, etc.]]] similar to God?

If one comes to say:

Just like there is the doubt whether [[[the reasoning]]] “because God, etc., ‘is not a cause of sound at once’” (in PV 4.141c, 4.144d) applies (to refute God) conventionally, there is the doubt whether “neither one nor many,” etc. is a refuting argument conventionally [[[for (extramental) objects and mind]]], because one does not find a difference (between refutation conventionally and ultimately), a thesis established by valid cognition [[[the proof of fire, etc.]]] would be undermined, and therefore nothing at all is accepted to be established by valid cognition [[[conventionally]]].

Structural analysis of iv-11'.ii-2 (the extensive explanation) / Summary

This was explained by the two points:

[iv-11'.ii-2i] It is contradictory to reject holding a specific position [[[also in the context of]]] of Madhyamaka if one does not reject the presentations of valid cognition, etc.

There are four points:

[iv-11'.ii-2i.i] Something generic [[[that does not touch the specific]]] [[[in that case, coming to be a valid cognition]]] is not possible

[iv-11'.ii-2i.ii] [[[If one accepts common worldly appearance]]] A particular (tenet), non-aspectualism, is established

[iv-11'.ii-2i.iii] [[[If one says that this might be the case,]]] It is contradictory with what you state [[[namely, that “no particular tenet is elected”¹⁸⁸]]]

[iv-11'.ii-2i.iv] [[[If one says that even though one accepts common appearance, one does not elect (a specific system) with respect to philosophical tenet-systems]]] Common appearance that rejects tenets is not possible

[iv-11'.ii-2ii] [[[If one thinks that it is established in general but rejected in the Madhyamaka context]]] The refutation that there is establishment (of a particular tenet) in general but rejection in the Madhyamaka context

Versified summary

[[[Summarizing by way of verses]]]

[Verses 17–23]

If perception – of blue, etc. - and inference – (based on) smoke, etc. are necessary, one has to opt for some particular (tenet). If not, something general [[[that rejects the particular]]] is impossible. (=iv-11'.ii-2i.i)

If one asserts agreement with what the world - not influenced by tenet systems - understands, the apprehension of (external) objects without aspects is established,

¹⁸⁸ See Jotsün’s claim in iv-11.3.

therefore a particular Madhyamaka taking sides is established [[[namely, non-aspectualism]]]. (=iv-11'.ii-2i.ii)

[[[Thereby]]] One also rejects

(a) absence of decision in general (as to a tenet) and

(b) absence of distinction [[[i.e., is this refuting argument ultimate or conventional?]]] as actually mistaken – in the case of God, etc. - and correct – in the case of other things [[[the proof of fire via smoke, etc.]]]. (=iv-11'.ii-2i-iii)

If there is no contradiction (with [b]) in accepting [[[worldly]]] common appearance [[[conventionally]]] even though faults are stated with regard to [[[at the time of accepting]]] tenet systems [[[i.e., the particular tenets of aspectualism and non-aspectualism]]], since the apprehension of (external) objects without aspects is the common understanding [[[common with the world]]], taking a side [[[i.e., non-aspectualism]]] as explained before is established. (=iv-11'.ii-2i.iv1)

And since a worldly [[[i.e., in the world]]] common appearance apart from [[[other than]]] object and consciousness is impossible, it is not suitable that it rejects some tenet system – (either) the adoption of an external object or Yogācāra. (=iv-11'.ii-2i.iv2)

An object established by a valid cognition consisting in common appearance is not rejected [[[is accepted]]] in all cases. Also, if it were difficult to uphold [[[if it is not accepted]]] it in the Madhyamaka context, if an object established by valid cognition elsewhere [[[conventionally]]] came to be rejected in the Madhyamaka context, then would the tenet system of ‘elimination of appearance’ come about? (=iv-11'.ii-2ii)

Thus, the conventional must be posited when the object is established by a [[[conventional]]] valid cognition. As an object of elimination, it is established as empty. This is the definition of Madhyamaka that takes sides.

iv-12 Presentation of Gangpa's position

[[[For Gangpa, there are two points: [°1] (his) refutation of other views and [°2] presentation of one's own view.]]]

iv-12.1 Gangpa's refutation of other views

[[[Regarding the refutation, there are three points]]]

iv-12.11 Gangpa's refutation of non-representationalism akin to Lotsa's position

[[[The first: Non-aspectualism in accordance with Lotsa(wa). Here there are two points, among them:]]]

iv-12.111 Presentation (of Lotsawa etc.'s position)

[[[Presentation]]]

In this regard, [[[Lotsa etc.]]]:

A) takes as an authentic source for non-aspectualism the statement of Master Jñānagarbha (ad SDV 3)

*Vision is of two kinds: with conceptualization and without
conceptualization,*

having subscribed to the interpretation of the commentary (Śāntarakṣita's *ṭīkā*) according to which it posits a division between correct [[[having taken all objects of non-conceptual (cognition) to be correct conventionals]]] and mistaken.¹⁸⁹

And,

B) holds that by stating, that

Similarly (to pots, etc.) {addition from SDV dka' 'grel}, *the double moon etc., also, being simply like it appears [[[while it is true]]], is not accepted as such by the world – blinded by ignorance {addition from SDV dka' 'grel} – therefore it will be explained below that it [[[this appearance of a double moon]]] is an incorrect (conventionality)*

(SDVV) taught that (appearances such as a double moon), even though they *are* in reality perfectly correct, are not accepted by the world and explained not to be correct.¹⁹⁰

iv-12.112 Refutation (of Lotsa etc.'s position)

[[[Refutation]]] Asserting what precedes is not seen as correct.

(i)

It [[[asserting that all appearances to non-conceptual cognition are true]]] is contradictory with what is explained [[[below (in SDV 12ab)]]]:

*Because they are, although similar in appearance, capable and not capable of
causal efficacy.*

(ii)

And, if error is not possible for the non-conceptual, all [[[even the cognition in which two (moons) appear]]] would become perceptions [[[because (the defining criterion) 'devoid of conceptualization and non-erroneous' is fulfilled]]].

(iii)

[[[Moreover,]]]

189 Śāntarakṣita's dKa' gnas 17b-18a1 explains the statement "there are two kinds of 'vision'" as indicative of the sorts of conventionals, namely correct and incorrect. In this reading, 'non conceptual' is paired with 'correct conventional', hence justifying rNgog Lo's position. Note that on D 27a7, Śāntarakṣita concludes by saying that there are 3 kinds of conventional: 1 kind of correct conventional, and 2 kinds of incorrect ones – conceptual and non-conceptual, which goes against the 1 to 1 mapping suggested in the earlier passage. (Eckel p.111, n. 8: "the puzzling comment on this sentence by the subcommentator: "'Appearances are of two kinds ...' shows that relative truth consists of correct and so forth"). Against rNgog Lo's interpretation of this passage, see Gangpa's objection below (iv-12.11.112 (iv)).

¹⁹⁰ What the text actually might say here might rather be that both pot and double moons actually lack a nature (?) disscussion on rnam grangs ma yin pa'i don dam pa), but similarly « appear » ; still, the latter is not accepted in the world, and hence considered « incorrect ».

[[[The definiens of existence is causal efficacy,]]] because it [[[the dual moon]]] is devoid of activities exceeding shining white and cooling, it [[[the object of the dual appearance]]] is not suitable [[[true]]] as an object.

(iv)

And because there is no denying that, on the basis of the appearance as an object the appearance of attainment (of the effect) arises [[[because it is correct]]] and does not arise [[[if it is mistaken]]]. [[[Even in cognition, all appearances are not suitable to be true]]]

(v)

And it is because even if one allows apprehension of objects without aspects, there is no means to prove that all appearances [[[to cognition]]] are non-erroneous.

(vi)

And this is for the following reason:

The world – blinded by ignorance

(in SDV-*pañjikā*) means, [[[the world]]] blinded by ignorance with regard to reality [[[is called “the experts” with regard to the conventional, but]]]; because if they were actually deluded with regard to the division of the conventional, there would be absurd consequences when dividing between correct and mistaken in accord to them.

(vii)

[[[If one thinks that, by saying “Vision is of two kinds: with conceptualization and without conceptualization” one divides between correct and mistaken respectively¹⁹¹, therefore all appearances to non-conceptual cognition are established to be true.]]]

In the context of (the verse) “Vision is of two kinds,” the commentary (Śāntarakṣita’s *pañjikā*) explains that [[[the objects of]]] ‘with conceptualization’ and ‘without conceptualization’ are merely included [[[are]]] in general among [[[the two]]] correct and incorrect [[[, but it is not assigning them individually]]].¹⁹²

(viii)

[[[If one said]]] “Given that the conventional of the Madhyamaka exists as an entity, it must depend on a true basis, but since the convention of the idealist does not exist [[[as an entity]]], it does not depend [[[on entities]]].”

In answer to that, the explanation that it [[[your assertion that, for idealists, there is no (conventional as entity)]]] is contradictory with establishment by perception *as an entity* of apprehender and apprehended that appear as distinct is an error of the commentary (Śāntarakṣita’s *pañjikā*).

The passage (of SDV ad 24ab)

is the appearance of apprehended and apprehender dependent nature?

is an explanation [[[by Jñānagarbha himself]]] that (their) *appearance* is established by perception. Hence the false-aspectualist (objection that) “Since it (the conventional) does not

191 Lit. “in that order”, which is actually not the case, as the first (rtog bcas) is linked to “mistaken.”

192 See above n. 189.

exist (as an entity), it does not depend [[[on a true basis]]]” is explained to be contradictory with vivid experience.

Thus, it is refuted by Scriptures and reasoning that all appearances have an object.

iv-12.12 Refutation of the position of Jotsün (=Gangpa’s refutation of Jotsün’s adoption of worldly conventions and rejection of all philosophical systems)

[[[Second, refutation of the position of Jotsün. There are two points, (the first being) presentation:]]]

iv-12.121 Presentation (of Jotsün’s system)

Some say:

The division between correct and mistaken (conventional) is just accepted in accordance with the world’s presentation. This is because it is not found when considered by reasoning.

iv-12.122 Refutation (of Jotsün’s system)

[[[Refutation]]]

If one does not determine this (division) oneself, the convention that follows the world is not proper either:

When something posited to be true by a non-expert in the world [[[e.g.,] that mountains, etc. are permanent]]] is asserted not to be true by another [[an expert in the world]], who should one follow?

[[[If one thinks: one should follow the most expert in the world]]]

If one does not have reasoning oneself, the distinction of experts and non-experts in the world is unestablished (for oneself).

If there is [[[the establishment by one’s own reasoning, of the difference between experts and non-experts]]], the division between correct and mistaken (conventionals) is established from that precisely. Therefore, the intermediate process of analyzing [[[involving]]] the distinction between experts and non-experts in the world would be useless and the claim that there is no distinction as an object of reasoning would be undermined.

iv-12.13 (Gangpa’s refutation) of the non-assertion of a division (between correct and incorrect conventional)

[[[Third, regarding the non-assertion of a division, there are two points, of which (the first is) presentation]]]

iv-12.131 Presentation

Further, some say:

Since there is no establishment whatsoever when one considers by reasoning, there is no division between correct and mistaken. And from the point of view of error, God, etc. also are true, hence we do not accept a division.

iv-12.132 Refutation

[[[Refutation]]]

Here, who does assert a division [[[between correct and mistaken conventionals]]] from the point of view of final reasoning?

From the point of view of error, one must assert causal efficacy and non-efficacy among appearances themselves. Otherwise, the objects of the apprehension as water in the case of water [[[being apprehended as water]]] and in the case of a mirage would be similar in performing the function of quenching thirst or not.

Or, [[[even in that case]]] if in conventional usage, there were no engagement [[[of a person searching for a burning fire]]] towards an object [[[fire, etc]]] after having rejected another [[[water, etc.]]], this is the operation of this (object) itself (?rang nyid byed pa yang yin no) //

iv-12.2 Presentation of one's own views / Presentation of the own view of Gangpa

[[[Presentation of Gangpa's own position]]]

Question: So, how is it?

(Gangpa's) **Answer:** We assert that “appearance as it is” is true as consciousness, but what projects an aspect [[[the external object]]] is a ground for doubt.

Thus, the experience as satisfactory or clear is correct. And the apprehension of this as “not consciousness” or “permanent”, etc. are incorrect determinations. Hence, the fixed conventions [[[of correct and incorrect]]] boil down to this.

This is for the following reasons:

a) Appearances are precisely consciousness because they have the definiens [[[clear and knowing]]]. Satisfactory and tormented, etc. [[[are not general characteristics of consciousness, but]]] are particulars (of consciousness), and since (the designation) “apprehender” depends on an apprehended, it does not pervade reflexive [[[perceptual]]] awareness. Therefore, the quality that makes something “consciousness”, without specification, is none other than clarity without specification.

b) [[[Thus,]]] Since every appearance is consciousness [[[due to having the definiens of consciousness]]], there is no means of proving [[[an external object]]] in reality, therefore doubt remains.

[[[Objection: there is no means of proof, but there is a means of refutation, therefore it is determined not to exist.]]]

(Answer:) If there was a means of refutation [[[of (external) objects]]], they would be determined to be non-existent. However, it may be the case that when analyzing as an aggregate or coarse object [[[since such object does not exist]]] there is a refutation, but one does not distinguish whether [[[the reasoning that refutes]]] refutes conventionally or refutes ultimately [[[the distinction is not made nor found]]].

Thus, it is explained [[[by Gangpa She'u]]] that we accept the fixed conventions consisting of what is established by valid cognition (and what is not) to boil down to this.

iv-12' Reconsideration (of Gangpa by Gyamarwa) / Refutation of Gangpa

This must be reconsidered.

It should be known that:

[Verse 24]

There are many refutations of the non-aspectualist position (according to which) all non-conceptual cognitions have a true object (see iv-12.11).

To follow the world (see iv-12.12) or not to accept it (i.e., a distinction) (see iv-12.13) are also completely stupid.

The (own) position stated [[[by Gangpa]]] (see iv-12.2) also is difficult to justify.

Therefore, one should assert differently.

[[[Regarding the refutation of Gangpa there are two points:

[°1] the actual contradiction, and [°2] rejection of a contradiction with scriptures regarding what is negated]]]

iv-12'.1 Actual contradiction

[[[Regarding the first, there are two points: [°1] doubt is not correct and [°2] there is no means of proof]]]

iv-12'.1-i *Rejection of doubt regarding (external) objects / Doubt is not correct*

[[[For the first, there are two incorrect points, the first [°1] being that it is not correct that there is doubt regarding reality grounded in not finding a distinction]]]

iv-12'.1-i-i *It is not correct that there is doubt chiefly regarding reality grounded in not finding a distinction*

The position stated is difficult to justify:

If the non-distinction between conventional refutation and ultimate refutation pertaining to the refutation of external objects that are coarse objects and aggregates is due to not obtaining a distinction between a conventional or an ultimate reasoning, then, in that case

[[[one does not obtain a distinction between negating ultimately and conventionally for this reasoning that negates external objects]]] one does not obtain [[[either]]] a distinction regarding the reasonings that refute external objects and those that refute God, etc.; therefore, God being similar to external objects, there would be the doubt that (God) exists as a correct conventional.

Thus, since there would also be the qualm that the apprehension of consciousness as “permanent”, etc., would be correct conventionals, this would undermine [[[all]]] the fixed conventions [[[such as) that it is impermanent]]].

Objection: These [[[qualms that consciousness is permanent]]] are refuted by a conventional reasoning.

Answer: If one obtains a characteristic that distinguishes [[[reasonings]]], this characteristic should also be accepted in the case of the refutation of an external object. And it would undermine the claim that one does not distinguish [[[some specificity of conventional refutation or ultimate refutation]]].

iv-12'.1-i-ii *(Doubt) is not correct, because there is establishment by perception / Doubt is incorrect with regard to what is established by perception*

[[[Doubt is incorrect with regard to what is established by perception]]]

Further, if there is doubt regarding an extramental object established by perception, one should teach that pleasure, etc. [[[suffering]]] also is not established to exist.

iv-12'.1-ii That what appears is mind is incorrect / There is no means of proof (for idealism/against external reality)

[[[That what appears is mind is incorrect; there are two points.]]]

iv-12'.1-ii-i Statement that the logical reason is faulty

[[[The logical reason has a fault]]]

[[[Even in the case that one says, "Because it [appears] clearly [proves] true as cognition"]]]¹⁹³ Is (the logical reason) "Because it appears clearly" asserted to be (i) "clear appearance as the support object", (ii) "clear appearance as experience", or simply (iii) "clear appearance without specification"?

[[[Questions: If 'clear appearance without specification' is the special definiens of cognition, thus why would 'clear appearance without specification' be inconclusive (to prove cognition)? If it is not, then what is the definiens of cognition?

Answer: Here, the definiens of cognition is 'clear appearance from the perspective of experience', but this (definiens) is not established with regard to the grasped factor.]]] (These options) do not go beyond "contradictory," "unestablished," and "inconclusive" but one should state the case of inconclusive [[[the first (i) and the last (iii)]]] and unestablished [[[the intermediate (ii)]]].

[[[The first (i) is contradictory for entities, but in the context of debate one might think that, when positing this contradictory (reason) one is teaching the pervasion consisting in 'clear appearance as support object' being pervaded by '(external) object.']]]¹⁹⁴

(a) Inconclusive

[[[As for the ones that generate doubt, these ones would be (as shown) above (cf. 414.112) contradictory with establishment by perception.]]]

We do not assert that "inconclusive" is about generating doubt with regard to the basis of debate; it is taken to be about the absence of pervasion.

If this (i.e., clear appearance (i) or (iii)) is a logical reason, if it is just a matter of applying the convention consisting in the definiendum ("consciousness") from a definiens [[[it would be a (valid) logical reason (to establish idealism) for non-experts]]], why wouldn't experts [[[who grasp the motive]]] not attach the convention ("consciousness") by direct perception, since they are not ignorant of the motive (for applying the convention)?

(b) Unestablished

[[[For someone who asserts (appearances) to be mind, since the basis for which an elimination arises – due to his explaining to someone¹⁹⁵ (what amounts to a reason proving) '(external) reality' - lacks the (cognizer's) desire to know, there is no 'qualification of the subject'.]]]

193 This corresponds to what modern scholars have termed the « awareness-inference » in favor of (epistemic) anti-realism, that can be traced to PVin Skt. p. 42,3-8, Tib. 98,7-13. It is ascribed to Gangs pa in *Tshad bsdu* 15,2. See Hugon 2016: 55, n. 8.

194 Presumably, since the property to be proven is not stated in debate, but only the logical reason, the opponent might think that the proponent intends to prove external reality with this logical reason.

195 We read the Tibetan *chad* as '*chad*'.

Since an elimination of the thesis occurs, the 'qualification of the subject' cannot be established.

How so?

iv-12'.1-ii-ii Elimination of the thesis

When blue is apprehended [[[in consciousness]]], there is no denying the experience of *consciousness* as pleasant, etc. Then, (that blue is not consciousness) is to be established as a convention (by the argument that) “(if blue were consciousness) blue (would be) suitable to appear as having the nature of pleasure (etc.); but it is not apprehended (as having the nature of pleasure)”. The state of affairs (that blue is extra-mental) is established by perception.¹⁹⁶

[[[Suppose some people (say): ‘Clear and knowing’ is the definition of cognition, and a particular instance of that, such as blue that is pleasant, is that (i.e., ‘clear and knowing’).

Because it is not apprehended as that nature (‘pleasant’), does this imply that one does not establish it as cognition without specification?

This is going too far!¹⁹⁷ Just like by negating *śimśapā*, one does not negate tree without specification.

We answer: This also is wrong. At the very moment blue appears, there is no denying of internal identity with ‘pleasant’, but is this blue also true as cognition?

If one says it is true (as cognition), (we answer: Then,) it (i.e., blue) is true as the nature of that, i.e. ‘pleasant’, but cannot be true as another nature (because the premise is here that it is true as cognition, and that cognition is one with ‘pleasant’). Therefore, by negating it (i.e., pleasant), one negates that it (blue) is cognition.]]]

If one says that this reason is unestablished, etc., it would also difficult to posit [[[as correct logical reason]]] pleasure not being perceived as [[[having the nature of]]] suffering, etc. (because they appear as distinct)

Thus, one states these very statements,

“it is not one, because no (completely identical) entity is perceived” (PVin Skt 1.49)

and [[[proving the pervasion]]]

“because the otherness of what is other would be undermined” (PVin Skt 1.49).

The following idea also is rejected:

[[[At the time one doubts]]] If the statement of elimination [[[of abiding in]]] of the thesis is [[[an elimination via]]] the mere statement of one’s own tenets [[[one’s intended thesis]]], because [[[Gangpa’s]]] [[[thesis that]]] what is identical is

196 According to *Tshad bsdus* 20,12-14, this argument reflects PVin 1.50bd. For the same argument (with the color « white ») used by Phya pa. The argument is also found in Gro lung pa’s *bsTan rim chen mo*. See Hugon 2016: 124 and n. 257 and 258, and p. 133.

197 Reading *par song* as *phar song*

established not to be other **[[[than cognition]]]**, the **[[[your]]]** thesis asserting it **[[[the object]]]** to be other (than cognition) is eliminated.”
 This is because ‘non-apprehension of the perceptible’ is indeed a valid cognition **[[[because we do not advance an elimination that is a mere thesis, but we advance an elimination by means of invalidation by valid cognition]]]**, and **[[[if one denies the (characteristics of) ‘property of the subject’ or pervasion of non-apprehension of the perceptible]]]** it is similar with (the case of) pleasure and **[[[not being perceived to be of the nature of]]]** suffering.

For this very reason, for (the logical reason) “co-apprehension,”¹⁹⁸ (i) **[[[it is indeed the case that]]]** the thesis is eliminated; (ii) moreover, one does not find “this is the valid cognition that establishes the pervasion for the logical reason”; and (iii) if one rejects the fault of non-establishment **[[[of the logical reason “co-apprehension”]]]** there would be the fault of it being inconclusive, etc. (Faults) being too numerous, we don’t state them.

Structural analysis of section iv-12'.1

[iv-12'.1-i] Rejection of doubt regarding (external) objects

[iv-12'.1-i-i] It is not correct that (doubt applies) only to (external) objects due to the method of not finding a difference **[[[whereas there is no doubt with regard to (the refutation of) God]]]** **[[[because one doubts with regard to God to the extent one doubts about (external) objects]]]**

[iv-12'.1-i-ii] (Doubt) is not correct because of the establishment by perception **[[[of (external) objects, as in the case of cognition]]]**

[iv-12'.1-ii] It is not correct that what appears is mind **[[[invalidation of what is asserted]]]**

[iv-12'.1-ii-i] Stating the faults with regard to the logical reason itself

[iv-12'.1-ii-ii] Elimination of the thesis

iv-12'.22 Rejecting contradiction of this refutation with Scriptures

Objection: Aren’t “co-apprehension” and “awareness” (correct) logical reasons (to prove idealism)? **[[[(Your refutation) is contradictory with what Dharmakīrti teaches!]]]**

Answer: These are logical reasons for the simple negation, *on the ultimate level*, of the apprehended factor being different from the apprehending factor. The pervasion is as presented in the explanation of dependent arising, following the *Madhyamakāloka*. Also, since he **[[[the teacher Dharmakīrti does not state his own (position), but]]]** is merely explaining the views of the philosophical positions, the teacher (Dharmakīrti) has explained (these reasons) to be correct **[[[against an upholder aspectualism]]]**, and so there is no refutation pertaining to me.

iv-2 Presentation of one’s (i.e., Gyamarwa’s) own position

What is our own **[[[Gyamar(’s)]]]** position?

We assert the duality of object and mind in agreement with the Vaibhāṣika.

¹⁹⁸ « Certitude of co-apprehension » is, beside the awareness-inference (see n. 143), another famous inference in favor of epistemic anti-realism. It can be found in PVin 1.55ab. See Iwata 1991 : 15–18. On Phya pa’s refutation of these two proofs see Hugon 2016.

[Verse 25]

First positing the distinction of reasoning, the adoption of the position one asserts \leftrightarrow iv-2-i

And, the objection that (the duality of) object and apprehender is not established together with the rejection \leftrightarrow iv-2-ii,

By means of a general presentation (iv-2-iii.i), and of specific explanations (iv-2-iii.ii), one has to accept **[[[it to be]]]** a non-conceptual cognition that is erroneous \leftrightarrow iv-2-iii

iv-2-i Distinction of levels of reasoning / The position that one asserts

[a]

[[[Conventional negandum]]]

In the case of an unanalyzed object in the perspective of cognition, namely the object of observation, etc.,¹⁹⁹ when something that is established elsewhere **[[[(e.g.,) the existence as a pot in the potter's house, etc.,]]]**, is negated somewhere **[[[in that given place]]]** **[[["it does not exist as such (as a pot)"]]]]**, it is non-existent just conventionally.

‘**[[[Pot]]]** Existing as causally efficient’, and the pervader of that **[[[causally efficient]]]** ‘producing an effect suddenly or gradually’, established **[[[established in general]]]** in **[[[for example]]]** fire, etc., producing smoke, are unanalyzed objects called “conventional.” On the other hand, **[[[And]]]** by negating the conventional pervader itself **[[[gradual or sudden itself]]]**, what is pervaded **[[[by sudden or gradual]]]**, i.e., mere existence as causally efficient itself **[[[what is negated by ‘gradual and sudden’, which is the pervader]]]** is negated for an asserted subject that is permanent, such as god, etc.

[[[Ultimate negandum]]]

Something that is not the object of (a cognition) that merely applies without analysis, that is found when analyzing as being non-contradictory even when broken down into parts, etc. is called “ultimate”.

And this is pervaded by one or many **[[[the pervader]]]**, which are not contradictory even when broken down into parts, etc.

When there occurs a negation (of one or many) by breaking down temporally or spatially, the moments or atoms are said to be “non-existent ultimately”.

Thus, since the **[[[conventional and ultimate]]]** neganda are distinct, a distinction of the arguments that negate (them) is attested.

[[[If one posits the distinction of arguments based on the negandum

In this regard, the conventional negandum (is as follows:)

Existence without depending on breaking down into parts, etc., and analyzing, is conventional.

Conventionally, the pervader of this causally efficient (existent) is ‘suddenly or gradually causally efficient’, and one negates this pervader with regard to something permanent such as God, etc.

199 Alternatively, one can correct dmigs to mig: visual cognition.

Thus, on the basis of ‘pot’ etc., a conventional valid cognition establishes ‘existence’ without specification. And since this (‘existence’) is negated on the basis of something permanent, the (argument) that negates that (existence of a permanent god) is a conventional argument.

What is established without contradiction even when burned down by fire etc., this is ultimately existent.

And its pervader is true oneness or manyness.

Thus, having taken as the negandum this very ‘ultimate existent’, the argument that negates true existent by negating true oneness or manyness that pervades it, is an ultimate investigator

Therefore, the distinction of arguments is established.

Thus, the valid cognition that takes as its negandum this object established by a non-analyzing mind is conventional,

And the object of an analyzing (mind) is ultimate,²⁰⁰ and when, having taken it (this ultimate object) as the negandum, one negates it via a valid cognition, one speaks of “ultimate valid cognition”.]]]

[b]

Objection: A conventional atom cannot be negated [[[this may be the case but]]], and there is no establishment of it as an unanalyzed object. [[[something established as an unanalyzed object by a conventional valid cognition could be negated, but, this (being established as unanalyzed object) does not pervade that (i.e., atoms)]]]

Answer: If one says that a partless atom exists [[[having form, devoid of parts]]] it would be precisely ultimate. Its truth [[[as being the very existing atom]]] could not be negated by anything [[[any argument]]] whatsoever.

But although pots, etc., exist, one can negate their being true [[[really, in reality]]] by an argument.

[[[If one says that atoms exist partlessly one wouldn’t be able to negate them, therefore they would become ultimate. If this is the case,]]]

Objection (parallel): If one says that something permanent exists as causally efficient, one could not negate (it), therefore it would become causally efficient.

[[[Therefore, one would not be able either to negate that something permanent exists ultimately]]]

Answer: It has already been explained that because the pervader [[[suddenly or gradually causally efficient]]], which is established to exist elsewhere [[[suddenly or gradually efficient (is established to exist) on the basis of (for example) smoke]]], is not apprehended for what is permanent [[[this permanent]]] is negated [[[conventionally]]]. [[[If the combination of permanent and existent was established by valid cognition elsewhere, it is true that it could not be negated, but]]] it is not the case that, having established elsewhere the

200 Reading ”rnam par dpyad ba’i yul de’i don dam yin” as ”rnam par dpyad ba’i yul de ni don dam yin”

combination of permanent and existent, one negates [[[this established (combination)]]] here.

As for atoms, if [[[it was argued that]]] they are established [[[as having form and being devoid of parts]]] elsewhere, since they would be true (in/as) that [[[since (they would be true) in the very place where they were established]]], it is taught that their being true precisely there (or, "as precisely that") would not be negated [[[because it could not be negated]]].²⁰¹

The combination of permanent and existent can be negated everywhere by this very argument explained previously, that negates conventionally.

[[[The negation is: by negating a part – existent – one negates the combination (of permanent and existent). Thus, when negating 'existent' for what is permanent by negating 'suddenly or gradually' which is the pervader of 'existent', one negates the combination (of permanent and existent).]]]

[c]

Thus, negation does not apply to the very establishment [[[by conventional valid cognition]]] of the extramental object as existing as a non-analyzed object [[[appearances are not eliminated]]] [[[a negation in the form) "there is not even an object of a non-analyzing cognition"]]], therefore, the two, mind and object, exist as correct conventionalities.

Also, what appears as distinct (from mind) in a way [[[external...(oak stake?)]]] might be established to be causally efficient [[[as distinct from mind]]] in the same way (in terms of appearance). Nevertheless, (saying it is *just* appearance) amounts to the assertion that there is nothing [[[distinct objects that project an aspect]]] apart from appearance made by those who are influenced by the philosophical tenets of the representationalists. But this [[[assertion that it is an aspect of mind]]] is not correct, because [[[if all that appears was established to be mind, an object distinct from that]]] would not be established by perception, and [[[since it is not established either by inference]]] the logical reason of [[[that establishes (external reality) from]]] the absence of the effect (in the absence of the cause) would be inconclusive.

[d]

Thus, what the teacher(s) [[[Me tig/stan]]] said is seen to be correct:

If one posits, conventionally, as the probandum of (the inference based on the logical reason) 'certitude of co-apprehension'

- the simple negation [[[if one proves the mere negation of an object distinct (from mind)]]], what is established is eliminated by the causal efficacy (of external objects)

- an implicative negation [[[if one proves (external objects) to have the nature of cognition]]], the elimination is set forth in these terms [[[by Lotsa]]]: "it is not one, because it is not perceived directly"

201 It is unclear whether the main text agrees with the commentary: the commentator reads *de nyid* as referring to the place where atoms would be established, whereas rGya dmar ba may understand instead that the atoms would be true "as such."

Objection (D1): How would you refute that although there is no **[[[extramental]]]** pot, there is just appearance as that **[[[i.e., as pot, through mistake]]]**?

Parallel objection (D2): How would you refute that although pleasure does not exist as blissful, it merely appears as that **[[[through mistake]]]**?

Answer (D2): How could something that has the causal efficacy of bliss be nonexistent **[[[it would be contradictory]]]**?

Parallel answer (D1): How could something **[[[a pot]]]** that has the causal efficacy of scooping up water be nonexistent?

Objection (D1): The very perception (of the pot) as causally efficient is merely mistaken. **[[[It is an appearance as if it was causally efficient, but it is not true as causally efficient.]]]**

Parallel objection (D2): The experience (of pleasure) **[[[as having the causal efficacy of bliss]]]** is merely mistaken – it is the same!

(Answer (D2): No!)

(Answer (D1): No also!) Therefore, it is not the case that there is no pot.

Objection (D1): **[[[Pots, etc.]]]** exist as having the causally efficiency **[[[of holding water]]]**, but **[[[they do not exist (as) extramental objects) but]]]** they exist as mental appearances.

Parallel objection (D2): Then one should say that (pleasure) exists as causally efficient, but exists as **[[[having the causal efficiency of]]]** suffering.

Answer (D2): If (pleasure) is experienced as suffering, how can it be experienced as blissful?

Parallel answer (D1): If (pots) exists precisely as cognition, how can they be cognized to be distinct?

(Objections) that (pots are understood) *as if* they were distinct, etc., all of them, are matched by similar arguments (regarding pleasure) **[[[namely, (pleasure) is experienced as if it was blissful (, etc.)]]]**.

iv-2-ii The objection that the duality of object and apprehender is not established, together with its rejection

[iv-2-ii.i]

Objection: **[[[A cognition]]]** without aspects **[[[of the object in cognition]]]** cannot be the apprehender of objects. **[[[One objects: For apprehending an object, it is necessary that the aspect of the object would arise in cognition, and since it does not (the cognition is not an apprehender of the object).]]]**

Answer: The teacher(s) **[[[Lotsa(wa)]]]** answer that “We do not accept the apprehension **[[[of an external object]]]** that is not invalidated by ultimate analysis”²⁰². **[[[So said Metikpa.]]]**

(I, myself) **[[[Gya(marwa)]]]** accept the following:

²⁰² See above iv-11.211.31, Lotsawa’s rejection of objections as reported by Jotsün.

If one asserts [[[like) the Sautrāntika]]], that:

having distinguished the characteristics, without confusing them, for the effect [[[the imprint]]] (of) [[[when an effect is generated by]]] the action of causes and conditions, one establishes by way of co-absence and co-presence [[[for instance, for eye cognition]]] (a) the nature of cognition [[[because it precedes immediately]]], (b) the aspect of the object [[[generated) by the state of affairs]]], (c) and [[[the faculty's]]] apprehension of the form, [[[in terms of the imprint that is the effect of the sense cognition]]], the apprehension of form by the eye, [[[without depending on an ultimate explanation, conventionally the characteristic of this is necessary, just like the characteristic of cow is necessary conventionally]]] the apprehension of sound by the ear [[[faculty]]], etc. - the very effects of the faculty that generates it [[[the capacity of apprehending form]]] is asserted, even according to the representationalists [[[Sautrāntika]]] to be [[[the single effect of the sense faculty that is]]] a phenomenon distinct from the aspect.

form		Eye	Form-apprehension		
sound		Ear	Ear-apprehension		
<i>yul</i>	<i>Rnam pa</i>	<i>dbang po --></i>	<i>'dzin</i>	<i>>-<</i>	<i>rnam pa</i>

Further, given that everyone [[[every holder of philosophical tenets system]]] accepts, in accordance with experience, that the faculties [[[eye, ear, etc.]]] [[[which are the causes]]] that make the apprehensions [[[of) form and sound]]] distinct are distinct, the very distinction of apprehensions [[[of) form and sound]]] [[[namely, the form-apprehension and the sound-apprehension]]] is the ground for positing the convention of distinct understandings [[[of form and sound]]] [[[that are asserted to have the characteristic of form-understanding and sound-understanding]]].

If the apprehensions were not distinct, there wouldn't be something [[[distinct effects of "form-apprehension and sound-apprehension"]]] to be generated by [[[an effect of]]] distinct faculties [[[e.g., the eye and the ear, etc.]]].

		(// generated by causes and conditions)	(// produced)
		state of affairs	convention
Experience of	Faculty	apprehension ('dzin pa) ground for:	the convention 'understanding of' (rtog pa)
form	Eye	apprehension of form	understanding of form
sound	Ear	apprehension of sound	understanding of sound
<i>don</i>	<i>dbang po</i>	<i>'dzin pa</i>	<i>rtogs pa</i>

Objection (D1): [[[If he said:]]] 'Apprehension' and 'understanding' are synonyms [[[synonymous) terms]]] [[[therefore they cannot be definiens and definiendum]]].

Parallel objection (D2): [[[Then (one would retort)]]] 'produced' and 'generated by causes and conditions' also would be synonyms [[[for you]]].

Answer (D2'): The property conventionally designated as 'produced', and the state of affairs 'generated by causes and conditions' are distinct.

Parallel answer (D1’): This is the same. [[[The property conventionally designated as ‘form-understanding’ and the state of affairs consisting in form-apprehension are distinct.]]]

Experience of	sense (dbang po) causes:	apprehension (*dzin pa) ground for:	the convention ‘understanding of’ (rtog pa)
form	eye	apprehension of form	understanding of form
white	eye	apprehension of white	understanding of white
yellow	eye	apprehension of yellow	understanding of yellow

Objection: If it is established that this form-apprehension being distinct from sound-apprehension is a phenomenon that is the effect of the faculty, [[[since the faculties are not distinct, in the case of a single (cognition) such as eye cognition]]], what is the specificity according to which the apprehension of white is distinct from the apprehension of yellow?

Answer: It is [[[here also]]] a specificity pertaining to the apprehending factor: apprehension of white and apprehension of yellow.

Objection: Isn’t it the [[[understanding of the]]]²⁰³ apprehension of white a specific understanding?

Answer: It has already been explained that although the form-apprehension is a state of affairs that is a specific [[[form-]]] understanding, it is fit [[[it is suitable]]] to be a definiens [[[for form-understanding]]] for the phenomenon to be conventionally designated [[[as form-understanding]]], like [[[for instance]]] the definiens of the phenomenon conventionally designated as ‘produced’.

In the same way, the state of affairs ‘apprehension of white’ is the definiens of the phenomenon to be conventionally designated as the specific understanding of white [[[having posited the apprehension of white as definiens]]]. Therefore, they are distinct phenomena with regard to the ascertained object (namely: one is a state of affairs, the other a convention).

Objection: Due to what causal specificity is there the very entity consisting in the apprehension of white?

Answer: It comes from the specificity of the faculty that is connected with the object [[[white]]], the agent of contact, etc.

Just like the form-apprehension without specification (of white or yellow) is the effect of the eye (faculty), the specific apprehension also is due to a specific faculty, that has arisen from a specific connection.²⁰⁴ [[[One speaks of “apprehension of white” due to the context in which the sense faculty is connected with white]]].

Thus, if one considers the Vaibhāṣika assertion that the very faculty is what sees, this [[[also]]] is correct.²⁰⁵

[[[Gangpa himself (says)]]]

203 This should read: “Isn’t the apprehension of white a difference of the understanding of white”

204 Probably by the sannipātaḥ. In the Vaibhāṣika model of cognition.

205 View attested in AK 1.42 and AKBh 30,4-12.

If one says (D1): The *apprehension of white* is not established by experience apart from the appearance [[[of white]]],

Parallel objection (D2): You would have to deny that [[[in the case of your own position as well,]]] there is no *apprehension of form* (established by experience) apart from appearance [[[to consciousness of the aspect of form]]].

Answer (D2): One does not deny this, because [[[if there is no apprehension of form apart from aspects]]] there wouldn't be an effect of the (eye) faculty [[[on the contrary) there is apprehension distinct from appearance]]].

Parallel answer (D1): In the same way [[[if there is no apprehension of white apart from the appearance as white]]] there wouldn't be an effect of something specific (i.e., a specific connection) [[[in the context of a faculty that is in conjunction with white]]] Further, [[[even for you]]] the specificity of the apprehension also is established [[[as distinct from the specificity of the aspect]]] insofar as the effect of the faculty, called "apprehension of form," is established as a phenomenon distinct from the aspect [[[of the object]]].

Therefore, even without aspects, the specificity of the apprehension of an object is established.

If were not like that [[[in accordance with Lotsawa etc.]]], one would come to say "it is an ultimate analysis" (the refutation of external objects concerns the ultimate), because conventionally, an understanding [[[of an object that is simultaneous]]] without a ground for positing understanding [[[of an object that is simultaneous]]] would not be correct. [[[If it were correct, then God, which has the specificity of acting eternally, would be existent. If he is active, when examining whether he acts suddenly or gradually, it would follow that this is an ultimate examination (i.e., that God will be refuted only on the ultimate level but not conventionally).]]]

Thus, one should also posit the presentation of the result of valid cognition in this way (i.e., without aspects). In contrast, the tenet system of the Sautrāntika is refuted (in the PVin) by saying

It is not one, because there is no perception of a 'form',²⁰⁶

etc..

The Teacher [[[Jotsün]]] states that there is no fault in holding the Sautrāntika (model of the result of valid cognition and that the logical reason "co-apprehension" is correct for (i.e., proving) false-aspectualism, and does not adopt anything at all (as a position) in the Madhyamaka context [[[this is) Jotsün's (position)]]] - this is something that I [[[Gyamar(wa)]]] do not subscribe to!

[iv-2-ii.ii]

Alternatively/in summary (rnam pa gcig du na), the appearance as blue that is understood as a common appearance - this is not denied [[[by anyone]]]. And by teaching that this

206 Vetter: (Andererseits hat man auch) keine Einheit, da ein (vollkommen einheitliches) Wesen nicht gesehen wird.

[[[aspect]]] is established to be existent because it is causally efficient, just like pleasure, and that negating its being consciousness itself is similar to negating pleasure in the case of suffering, the understanding as a distinct entity [[[i.e., external object]]] [[[without relying on aspects]]] has been established. Consequently, the statement [[[the reasoning of those who assert]]] “understanding without aspects is incorrect” does not stand [[[(their reasoning) does not stand]]], because it (understanding without aspects) is established similarly to (the case of) pleasure.

Also [[[further]]], if apprehending [[[an object]]] without an aspect [[[of the object in consciousness]]] were not correct, one would have to say [[[in parallel]]] that the experience of pleasure also is incorrect [[[because (mind) is devoid of its own aspect in itself]]].

Objection: [[[If one says]]] Apprehending [[[something distinct]]] entails an aspect, but (mind) experiencing [[[itself by itself]]] does not entail [[[an aspect]]].

Answer: [[[It is said:]]] Let’s allow that an earlier [[[form]]] and later [[[in time]]] [[[apprehension]]] entail the arising as (having) an aspect [[[of this (form)]]], but an apprehension [[[of something distinct]]] simultaneous (to it) does not entail an aspect.

[iv-2-ii.iii]

Objection (D1): The very apprehension [[[of a distinct (object)]]] that is simultaneous (to it) is incorrect.

Parallel objection (D2): [[[In parallel,]]] a very reflexive awareness is incorrect.

Objection (D1) continued: [[[The apprehension (of a distinct object that is simultaneous) is incorrect]]] This is because something that is simultaneous [[[lacks causality]]] and distinct [[[what is distinct lacks identity]]] lacks a relation.

Parallel objection (D2) continued: This (reflexive awareness is incorrect) is because something cannot be doer and deed.

Answer (D2): We do not hold (reflexive) awareness in dependence on a doer and a deed [[[we hold (something) to be reflexive awareness owing to the mere arising of the nature of experience]]].

Parallel answer (D1): We do not hold an apprehender and an apprehended [[[that are simultaneous]]] in dependence on a relation.

Objection (D1): It is not correct for (something) to be an apprehender [[[if there is no relation with an apprehended]]]

Parallel objection (D2): It is not correct for (something) to be awareness [[[if there is no doer and deed]]]

Answer (D2): (It is correct) because of [[[reflexive awareness]]] being the very nature of awareness.

Parallel answer (D1): (It is correct) because it arises as the nature of a comprehender [[[it is a comprehender of something distinct and simultaneous]]].

(D2) Thus, like it is said (in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* k. 17 and 16):

However, its *[[[reflexive awareness]]]* self-awareness is not (admitted) on the basis of the relationship of deed and doer, since it is not correct for a single thing whose nature is devoid of parts *[[[mind]]]* to have three natures *[[[that is, for the activity of knowing, something to be known, by way of a knower]]]*²⁰⁷

Consciousness arises *[[[as cognition]]]* as distinct from (those things that are) endowed with a material nature. Its being endowed with a non-material nature is precisely its self-awareness (*ātmasaṃvitti*).²⁰⁸ *[[[This is to say: The very arising as the nature of consciousness is the meaning of self-awareness]]]*

(D1) One should say (with regard to the apprehension of a distinct and simultaneous object):²⁰⁹

[Verses 26–27?]

[[[Here also, it is heard:]]] Its *[[[consciousness]]]* very comprehension of a distinct *[[[simultaneous object]]]* does not have the nature of projection of an aspect, because entities *[[[consciousness and the object]]]* that are distinct and simultaneous cannot be *[[[cause and effect]]]* producer and produced.

Consciousness arises *[[[as comprehender]]]* excluded from the nature of non-comprehender *[[[of the present form]]]*.

The nature of comprehender *[[[of a present object (by) consciousness]]]* is precisely its being the apprehender of something distinct from it.

Objection (D1): *[[[In the case that (consciousness and object) are distinct and simultaneous,]]]* if there is comprehension without relation, every (consciousness) would come to comprehend *[[[everything]]]*. *[[[One might think that (all consciousnesses and objects) are similar in having no connection because there is no cause of comprehension.]]]*

Parallel objection (D2): If there is reflexive awareness without doer and deed, everything would be awareness and generated by itself *[[[If reflexive awareness is merely a matter of having the nature of experience, then it would follow that the cognition of other continua, etc. also would be (reflexive) awareness, because*

207 Tr. adapted from Tr. Saccone 2018: 258. Blumenthal 2004:84–86 translates: “Self-cognizing cognition is not an entity which [exists as] agent and action [with its object] because it would be incorrect for consciousness, which is of a single, partless nature, to be three (i.e., knower, knowing, and known).”

208 Tr. adapted from tr. Saccone 2018: 257-8. Blumenthal 2004:83 translates: “Consciousness is produced in the opposite way from that which is of an inanimate nature. That which is not the nature of being inanimate is the self-knowledge of this [consciousness].”

209 It is unclear at this point whether these verses should be considered just to be a parallel to MA, or are part of the verses of the dBu ma de kho na nyid.

even based on that (other continua [and not itself?]) these exist as mere experience]]] – this answer that there is an absurd consequence (for you) is not eaten by crows.

Further [[as analyzed by Jñānagarbha]], since (what defines) [[reflexive awareness]] is either the nature of awareness in general or (what defines) [[reflexive awareness]] is the nature of reflexive awareness, [[in the first case,]] since it is the nature [[of awareness]] in general, everything would become [[reflexive]] awareness.

(In the latter case,) by coming to say precisely “nature of reflexive awareness” when (something) is the nature of awareness that is based on itself, there would be no difference with the definiendum [[because one would come to posit (something) as reflexive awareness because it is reflexive awareness]].

If applying the convention “reflexive awareness” is due to (something being) established as a substance that is the nature of awareness that is based on itself [[this being the definiens]], then our previously explained application of the convention “understanding of this (i.e., of white)” due to the apprehension as white being established as a substance [[having posited this as the definiens]] is established.

[iv-2-ii.iv]

Further, just like [[like it is said in the (commentary of) Dharmottara]] a simultaneous stick characterizes a person, but the latter is not modified by the aspect of the stick [[it (i.e., the stick) is suitable to be a characteristic, without depending on this (aspect), that has been generated, characterizing the person]],²¹⁰ [[it is suitable for the characteristic to modify (the person, but not for the aspect)]] similarly, there is no contradiction in the (simultaneous) object characterizing cognition [[without depending on an aspect]].

The controversies multiply, therefore I will not expand on them.

These are the summarizing verses of the rejection of the objection that apprehension is not established (without aspects) (=iv-2-ii):

[Verse 28 – summarizing verse of iv-2-ii]

Because the specificity of apprehension is established \leftrightarrow [a], or because one proves the understanding (of objects) as distinct (from cognition) \leftrightarrow [b], or because of the parallel with the establishment of reflexive awareness \leftrightarrow [c], or it is proper that (cognition) is characterized by the object \leftrightarrow [d].

iv-2-iii Non-conceptual mistaken (cognition) has to be accepted

iv-2-iii.1 General presentation of the distinction between mistaken and non-mistaken

Objection: If there are appearances without an aspect in consciousness [[one considers this because they are established as external objects]], the double moon, etc., all of these [[non-conceptual mistaken cognitions]], wouldn't they exist as correct conventionalities?

Answer: [[No, they would not]] because [[however one conceives of the meaning of existing as correct conventional]] if one asserts (something) to be existent [[as a correct

210 Possibly a reference to PvInT 1 53b-54a, the discussion on khyad par/khyad par can.

conventionality]]] owing to it being established as causally efficient and to the absence of invalidation [[[by a conventional valid cognition]]], [[[for the appearance of the double moon]]] the causal efficacy of being white and cool that exceeds [[[the efficacy of a single moon]]] is not established, and it [[[the apprehension as two]]] is invalidated by a valid cognition [[[i.e., a non-mistaken cognition that apprehends one]]].

Thus, in general, the reasonings²¹¹ are that a pot, etc., that is established as causally efficient while one observes that it is not invalidated [[[by another valid cognition]]] is asserted to be existent [[[as correct conventionalities]]], and the opposite [[[what is observed to be causally efficient but invalidated by reasoning]]] is asserted to be non-existent, because there is no other ground (to distinguish what is) true or false [[[than establishment and non-establishment by reasoning]]].

[[[This is the same for you as well]]]

[[[Metik is stating (that it is) a parallel argument]]]

In the same vein, it is the same for what the Sautrāntika assert, or for the Yogācāra: [[[for both]]] if all appearances are true as the aspect of cognition, how would they [[[and you also]]] posit the appearance of a double moon as a mistaken aspect?

If it is [[[as according to the Sautrāntika]]] due to the non-existence of an [[[external]]] object that projects an aspect [[[because of this, the appearance of the double moon is mistaken]]], or [[[as according to the Idealists]]] due to the traces not being stable [[[that it is mistaken]]], [[[according to the Vaibhāṣika as well]]] [[[it is established to be mistaken]]] due to the refutation of an exceeding causal efficacy [[[for the appearance of the dual moon]]].

Objection: [[[If one says]]] [[[for you who assert the absence of aspects]]] from the point of view of that cognition [[[to which a double moon appear]]], there is the causal efficacy of “two” [[[because there is (this efficacy producing the appearance), the appearance as two would come to be true]]].

Answer: From the point of view of this [[[cognition to which two appear]]] there is clear appearance as the aspect of “two” [[[thereby it would be true; therefore, this would follow for you as well]]] [[[for you) who assert aspects to be substantial]]].

In the same way, if it is [[[mistaken]]] due to the absence of a projector of an aspect [[[in accordance with Sautrāntika]]] or due to unstable traces [[[in accordance with Idealists]]], the establishment of this [[[the presence or absence of an external object projecting an aspect or the stability or instability of traces]]] by any probans is more or less (nyi che) difficult [[[because traces and objects themselves are hidden objects]]]. Here [[[in accordance with Non-aspectualists]]], it is (mistaken) because the very nature of ‘two’ [[[moons]]] is refuted by another valid cognition [[[that is, a valid cognition apprehending ‘genuinely one’]]].

²¹¹ We initially understood « rigs pa nams » to refer to « rational people » (=rtogs ldan), but given the note « rigs pas grub ma grub », it is more likely that it refers to the method of distinction relying on reasoning (*rigs pa*).

In the same way, the objects of dreams and so forth are refuted by conventional valid cognition itself, therefore (such awareness is mistaken). They are refuted by the statement (in PV 3.16bc)

[They {i.e., things appearing in dreams} are] cognitions because [the dreamer] himself cognizes what is not cognized by those whose location [ought to] enable [them to perceive] (i.e., those who are in vicinity to the dreamer).²¹²

This was the general presentation of the distinction between mistaken and non-mistaken.

iv-2-iii.2 Specific explanation of the distinction between mistaken and non-mistaken

Therefore, the image of the moon in water and mirages, etc., also are mistaken conventionalities, because they are refuted by the valid cognition consisting in the experience, by a person located in a proper place, of the void of moon in water and (the void) of a mirage.

[[[When the moon arises, with its ten characterizing properties, on water that is ascertained to be endowed with a continuum of arising and setting, when a person is there before and after the arising, the subsequent one determines the existence of the moon in water in the earlier cognition. But the direct perception, by this very person, **consisting in awareness** apprehending genuine water negates the moon in water that is the object of the preceding (cognition), thereby it is understood via perception that the object of the preceding (cognition) is not true, thereby it is not just a matter **of mere conformity**. Thus it is said.]]]²¹³

Objection: [[[Moon in water and mirage are real, but]]] they [[[the moon in water and the mirage]]] are not fit to appear to the persons located nearby.²¹⁴

Parallel objection: [[If one objects with a parallel accepted to be mistaken]] One would say: In the case of sheep and goat, a big one that appears with the size of black female yak [[[although this big thing in itself is true]]] is not fit to appear (as big) (to the persons) located nearby. [[[What would be the answer to that?]]]²¹⁵

Objection: It would follow that the apprehension [[[of a goat in a far-away location]]] as big is not mistaken.

Answer: An invalidation [[[i.e., elimination]]] of the conclusion of the consequence [[[“it would follow that the apprehension of something small as big also is a valid cognition”]]] [[[says Gya(marwa)]]] is necessary [[[i.e., is accepted]]] regarding the object in our context.

(Namely, the conclusion “it would follow that the apprehension of the moon in water as existent is not mistaken” should be eliminated by the same argument)

212 Tr. Rranco and Notake 2014 : 67.

213 (the moon rises, X sees ‘moon in water’ at T1, then X sees ‘only water’ at T2)

214 This objection goes against the (intuitive) idea that a person in vicinity of the cognizer is also in a location that ought to enable them to perceive the object.

²¹⁵ This discussion about mistaken cognitions in which small things appearing as big is related to the example in PV 3.355/PVin 1.46 in view of the process described in what follows for establishing the mistake.

Retort: If they **[[[sheep and goats]]]** exist as big, they must be fit to appear as such **[[[as big]]]** to the cognition **[[[of a person who is nearby]]]** that apprehends that place **[[[that's how it is]]]** because **[[[otherwise]]]** the convention of non-apprehension of something (fit to be) perceived would be destroyed.

Answer: **[[Here also it is the same]]** In the case of the apprehension as pure water **[[[by a person whose mind is not mistaken]]]** and a pure place **[[[by a person who is nearby (and focused?)]]]**, **[[[moon in the water and mirage, if they truly exist]]]** should likewise be fit to appear, because there is no difference.

Objection: Mirage and moon in the water commonly appear in such a place **[[[i.e., far away]]]** **[[[just for this reason, they are correct conventionals]]]**.

Parallel: Big (animals) also commonly appears **[[[as big]]]** in such a place **[[[in a far-away place]]]**. Similarly, to people with eye-disease, two moons commonly appear. **[[[As this follows, it would merrily follow (that they are correct conventionals).]]]**

[[[If he said: this is not the same; (a conventionality) is correct due to dependent origination being complete]]]

Objection: Since it **[[[the appearance as moon (in water)]]]** does not arise in the absence of a moon in the sky and clear water, it is established as “dependent” **[[[because its dependent origination is complete]]]**.

Parallel: Since they **[[[the appearance as big and the appearance of the moon as duplicated/split into two]]]** do not arise in the absence of sheep and goats and, respectively, of one moon, they would be dependent.

Answer: They do not exist as dependent. It is the case that, in the absence of the cause of error **[[[the moon, etc. (sheep and goats)]]]**, the appearance **[[[of two moons, etc. (as big)]]]** does not arise in that mistaken cognition, but even though there is the appearance as if a second moon expanded from a single moon-object **[[[this is not true]]]**, this is invalidated by valid cognition.

Parallel answer: **[[[Even for the position of the non-aspectualist]]]**, a mistaken cognition that apprehends as that **[[[as two moons > read “as moon in water”]]]** does not arise in the absence of the causes of error **[[[water and moon]]]**, **[[[the non-existent moon in water, etc. is an appearance, here it is the same (namely, since it is refuted by valid cognition, it is not dependent)]]]** therefore, one answers well.

Thus I **[[[Gya(marwa)]]]** adopt the intention of

a) Master Vasubandhu’s explanation negating the entity of form within the color in a mirror, as said (in the AK)

*Because there are not two **[[[forms of the same kind]]]** together in a single **[[[place]]]***

b) Master Dharmakīrti’s explanation of the negation of the observed object of one **[[[apprehending moon in water and mirage, etc.]]]** by a valid cognition of another **[[[apprehending as pure water and as pure (place)]]]**

[They {i.e., things appearing in dreams} are] cognitions because [the dreamer] himself cognizes what is] not cognized by those whose location [ought to] enable [them to perceive] (i.e., those who are in vicinity to the dreamer)

- c) Masters Candrakīrti and Dipaṃkara's explanation that the moon in the water is a mistaken conventionality and
- d) Master Jñānagarbha's explanation that mirages are mistaken conventionalities.

Further, the moon in water is not fit to be an object because it changes when the person moves, *[[[when the person moves backwards it goes away, or when they lean forward, it comes back]]]* etc., and does not appear *[[[as such]]]* to another person. Indeed, it is said (in PVin 1 ad I.12):

*Objects do not *[[[come to]]]* have distinct natures in relation to particular people.*

and (in PVin 1 ad I.41ab)

Because with regard to a single nature, (one observes) that it is attractive to one but not to another.²¹⁶

Thus, the moon in the water, to which a refutation by a conventional valid cognition applies, is not like an object such as a horse in a drawing, etc. that is established to be conventionally causally efficient and is not invalidated by a valid cognition *[[[the drawing exists as a correct conventionality]]]*

Similarly, another valid cognition that apprehends a thin mirror *[[[when one looks from the side]]]* to be without depth and being empty of (anything) behind (it) negates the object - the appearance of a face, etc. - having depth, apprehended as thick.

[[[The perception that apprehends a mountain ridge in the distance as clear also: from the perceptive of some children/infantile, sees a shining hawk (?), but most children/infantile do not see it, therefore it is mistaken. This is not the case: it is not established to be mistaken by someone located in a faraway place on account of not existing when pursued, just like a faraway appearance of a plain is not established to be non-existent when pursued]]]]²¹⁷

[[[It is said that the echo is mistaken: there is no cause for knowing it as a valid cognition.]]]

Rainbows, etc. also are reflections, therefore all of those are asserted to be non-conceptual mistaken cognitions.

Therefore, those who do not accept non-conceptual mistaken cognition when objects are apprehended *[[[by cognition]]]* without aspects are ignorant of *[[[the position of the Vaibhāṣika]]]* *[[[in spite of taking up]]]* the position of the Vaibhāṣika, because they are in disagreement with what Master Vasubandhu has explained in the (*Abhidharma*)*Kośa*.

²¹⁶ Maybe taken here out of context? To emphasize different cognitions by different people, while in PVin it is an argument to show that it is not the nature of the entity that is known, but aspects.

²¹⁷ Illustration unclear.

Thus:

These are the intermediate verses:

[Verses 29–31 – intermediate verses]²¹⁸

Although explaining most things differently from what was stated by the Reverend
Supreme Scholars **[[[Lotsa, etc.]]]**,²¹⁹

(It is) the way of the analytical logicians,²²⁰

Like following pure words is the practice of the **[[[bad]]]** Brahmins

[[[(This is) the cause for absence of discontent]]]

Thus, there is no discontent for scholars.

From the specifics of the kindness of the Bla ma himself **[[[i.e., many texts]]]**

And purifying the nature (of the lama's teaching)

There is dawning of analytical logic in the mind **[[[by the force of these causes]]]**

Just like a horse galloping on ground it already knows.²²¹

The ones who do not master the object of analytical logic,

Although their attention (gzhungs) expands/although their textual tradition (gzhung)
expands **[[[via wisdom]]]**, are not masters of themselves.

Beings whose minds are mistaken,

Analyze with a mind that rejects the adoption of a position.

May supreme delight be generated in these fortunate ones!/this blessed one (i.e., the Bla
ma)²²²

²¹⁸ Some lines of these verses are re-used in one of the conclusive verse.

²¹⁹ Alternative: Although **I do not explain (ma bshad) differently** than what the teachers said, Just like the practice of “pure words” of the Brahmins,
(I follow) the way of the analytical logicians

²²⁰ Or : **Analysis is the way of the logicians**

²²¹ See this expression in MAVT, translated in Japanese by Kitayama.

²²² If “skal ldan 'di” refers to the persons referred to in the previous lines, it is to be understood ironically. It could also refer to the “Bla ma”.

VI. The valid cognition

A [The valid cognition determining the definiens of conventional truth]

[[[There are four points:

[°1] the valid cognition determining the definiens of the conventional,
[°2] rejection of the similarity between the teaching of the illusionists and ourselves,
[°3] establishing that another argument of that type is negated by this very
(argument),
[°4] rejecting the consequence that appearance would be ultimate]]]

[Verse 32]

(A cognition) that understands appearances (establishes) every conventional in reliance upon the reasoning consciousness that negates truth.

A-i The actual valid cognition determining the definiens of the conventional

=A1 the valid cognition determining the definiens of the conventional

[[[By establishing that the object is mistaken, the cognition that apprehends as such also is established conventionally as mistaken.]]]

Cognition is established to be conventional and the object is established to be conventional [[[this establishment is one (for both)]]] (thus everything is established to be conventional).

The perception that apprehends form etc., or the inference [[[that understands fire]]] establish a mere conventional nature. However, cognition being mistaken and the object being like a mirage [[[is not a matter of the mere establishment of a conventional nature, but]]] is established indirectly [[[conventionally]]] (by) the operation of the two valid cognitions(/the dual operation of valid cognition)²²³ in reliance upon the negation of truth [[[and examination of appearance]]]. But [[[for the ones of limited vision]]] a valid cognition that directly understands falsity is not possible.

A-ii Rejecting the rejoinder that there is the same fault as the one posited with regard to illusion²²⁴

=A2 Rejection of the similarity between the teaching of the illusionists and ourselves

If (as proponents of non-abiding object) it is contradictory for illusion to be established by reasoning, it is further answered [[[by all those who assert that illusion is

223 The "two" are not to be understood as perception and inference, but rather as two aspects of the operation of valid cognition, namely, understanding appearance and negating truth. See also the parallel passage in 8b1 that draws the same distinction.

224 We understand the "parallel" to be that involving "reasoning" in the establishment that the conventional is illusory would be as problematic for the proponent of non-abiding as for the illusionists. The non-abiding answer to that is that "reasoning" is only involved in negation, with another cognition bringing about establishment.

established by reasoning]]] “would one [[[according to you, proponents of non-abiding]]] establish the conventional as illusion by mere words?”
 [[[According to the illusionists, it is asserted to be established as illusion by final reasoning.]]] [[[But) this proponent of non-abiding (answers:)]]]
 It is contradictory that final reasoning understands illusion itself directly [[[positively]]] [[[Reasoning understands as the mere elimination of a negandum]]]. Rather, after invalidation by reasoning, it is [[[conventionally]]] established as false indirectly, in reliance upon another [[[conventional]]] cognition [[[this is a non-analytical awareness]]] that comprehends appearance [[[form, etc.]]].
 Therefore, [[[due to the reliance upon two understandings: the understanding as mere elimination by reasoning, and the understanding of appearance]]] it [[[conventional appearance]]] does not come to be established by [[[final]]] reasoning, because this other cognition that understands appearance [[[a conventional valid cognition]]] is not reasoning properly speaking in that context [[[of understanding the ultimate]]].

A-iii Rejecting the rejoinder that a (mistaken) awareness is not established to be mistaken

=A3 Establishing that another argument of that type is negated by this very (argument)

[[[Presentation of the rejoinder:]]]

For the very same reason,

[[[The argument by parallel:]]]

“An object that appears just as it is [[[form, etc., on the conventional level]]] is not negated, and as an ultimate entity, there is not even an appearance.

[[[Although truth (as ultimate entity) is negated, (appearance itself) to a conventional cognition (is not)]]]

Therefore, by negating this [[[when) reasoning (negates) ultimate truth]]], this cognition [[[that understands appearance]]] is not established to be mistaken, just like by negating sound being permanent, auditory consciousness [[[to which sound appears as being heard]]] is not established to be mistaken.”

(a)

This (argument) also is rejected, [[[the way of rejecting is as follows:]]] because beside [[[apart from]]] negating the truth [[[i.e., true existence]]] of the object that appears [[[to a conventional cognition]]], there is no other ground for positing a cognition [[[that understands this (object)]]] to be mistaken.

(b)

[[[The parallel does not apply:]]] In the case of the *appearance of sound as ‘just permanent’* to an auditory consciousness, (it) [[[this auditory consciousness (to which permanent sound would appear)]]] would become mistaken when *permanence* is negated by inference [[[when the combination of ‘sound’ and ‘permanent’ is destroyed by negating the permanence of sound]]], because the mere *appearance* [[[of sound to the ear]]] *as permanent* also does not exist. [[[but) by negating *permanent*, auditory (consciousness) is not established to be mistaken with regard to *sound* (itself)]]].

(On the other hand) here [[[in the context of establishing the conventional (i.e., of negating truth)]]], it is negated [[[by reasoning]]] that the mere *appearance as form* [[[to) conventional cognition]]] is *true as form*.²²⁵

(c)

[[[In the context of sound also it would have to go like this:]]] In view of the concept of what is apprehended as sound itself, awareness is established to be mistaken in one way or another, namely:

- When there is falsity in the measure of appearance from the concept sound - [[[sound) being false (conventionally), (awareness of sound) is conventionally mistaken]]], or
- When there is falsity ultimately from the concept of sound [[[sound) being false ultimately, (awareness of sound) is ultimately mistaken]]]

The falsity regarding permanence is from another concept [[[than the apprehension of sound]]], therefore it (awareness) is not mistaken from the perspective of the apprehension of sound.

(d)

[[[If the (awareness of) sound were to be mistaken, it would have to go like this:]]]

If one analyses [[[if one analyses by reasoning]]] the appearance as mere [[[conventional]]] sound, awareness [[[that apprehends it]]] is [[[said to be]]] mistaken, because one asserts “sound is false” [[[even]]] with regard to mere sound in relation to the conjunction (of sound) with non-existence [[[i.e. “not true”]]].

But when one analyses [[[by reasoning]]] the appearance as mere sound [[[to the ear]]], [[[a mistaken state of affairs is not attested for sound, nevertheless]]] one does not negate [[[applying]]] the **appellation** “false” in relation to the conjunction (of sound) with non-existence as permanent.

(e)

Suppose the following:

[[[According to you]]] [[[the appearance of form, etc. is posited as mistaken, and]]]

When [[[form etc.]]] appears [[[to eye-consciousness]]] as resisting analysis [[[???]]] but does not exist as resisting analysis, it is established as mistaken from the beginning, but it is not (established as mistaken) otherwise [[[namely, (established as) mistaken (by) negating truth with regard to the appearance of form, etc.]]], [[[according to you]]].

(Our answer: Consider the following two cases:)

- [[[In the case of positing the appearance of two moons as mistaken also]]] If there appear two entities that have the characteristics of the moon, but [[[when analyzing this appearance]]] there do not exist two, then the awareness of the person with the eye-disease [[[an awareness to which two moons appear]]] is established to be mistaken from the beginning
- [[[In the case of positing the apprehended object of conceptual cognition as mistaken also]]] When something appears as an entity to conceptual thought,

²²⁵ There is no parallel because in the case of appearance, the corresponding elements are “appearance as form” / “true as form”, but in the case of sound, the are “appearance as (heard) sound” / “true as permanent”. For a parallel, we would need the elements “appearance as permanent sound” / “true as permanent (sound)”, or the elements “appearance as heard sound” / “true as heard (sound)”.

but there is not that very entity [[[in the appearance]]], it [[[the apprehended object of conceptual cognition]]] is established [[[has to come to be (established) from the beginning]]] to be mistaken from the beginning
 These cases also would not be mistaken [[[on account of there not being the appearance of a real particular, but, the appearance of two moons and the apprehended object of conceptual cognition (would be mistaken) only (on account of) appearing as two and being conceived of as an external object (respectively)]]].²²⁶

Thus, in the case of appearance as an entity, since there is *no truth* as that [[[as an entity]]], [[[the consciousness to which these two (the two moons and the apprehended object of conceptual cognition) appear]]] are asserted to be mistaken, but as for asserting (consciousness) to be mistaken by negating *the appearing object*, this [[[negating the appearing object]]] is not possible.

A-iv Rejecting the rejoinder that appearance would become ultimate

=A4 Rejecting the consequence that appearance would be ultimate

Thus, [[[the (following) objection also is rejected]]] the following also is rejected:
 Since (a) appearance is not the negandum, it [[[appearance]]] is not invalidated by reasoning and (b) (it) is established [[[as true as mere appearance]]] by the [[[conventional]]] reasoning that comprehends this very appearance [[[of itself to itself?]]], (it) [[[this appearance]]] becomes ultimate (in the sense of being) established by reasoning and not invalidated by reasoning.
 Indeed (this is to be rejected because), (appearance) is not established by reasoning in the context of the awareness that comprehends appearance, because it (i.e., this awareness) is established to be mistaken through the negation of (its) object being true.

[[[Up to the objection that all objects being non-true, all cognitions are asserted to be mistaken, together with its rejection,]]]
 [[[this is the statement of Zangpa Jotsün].²²⁷

With regard to this, if the object is not veridical, because non-veridical form etc. appear to the wisdom subsequent to the attainment of Buddhahood, it would follow that it (this wisdom) is mistaken.

226 rGya dmar ba contrasts his criterion of "mistaken," namely, that an appearance is not true when analyzed, with a conception that appearances themselves are mistaken. In the latter perspective, an appearance would be mistaken "from the beginning" rather than being recognized to be mistaken only upon analysis. However, the annotator in this paragraph notes that for the opponent, appearances would be recognized as mistaken "when analyzing" them. As rGya dmar ba's conclusion to this section directs, the problem with the opponent's view is that analysis would negate the appearing object itself, not just the truth of the appearing object.

²²⁷ Unclear where the position of Jotsün starts – either from 1.1 or only 1.4? / of Jotsün states that up to there it is good. ??

Thus, there is an internal contradiction between asserting the cessation of the continuum of wisdom²²⁸ and asserting that these objects such as form etc., are false.]]]]²²⁹

[[[(Note on top:) In this (view) of Jotsün, one cannot reject the previous parallel (between perception of sound and cognition of appearances)].²³⁰

Because the truth of resisting analysis is negated, appearances are established to be mistaken²³¹

(In parallel) because the permanent sound is negated, a mere heard sound itself becomes conventionally false.

If he said that since “heard” is a different concept than “permanent”, it is not the case that it is mistaken with regard to sound.

(In parallel) for appearance also, since “appearing” is a different concept than “true”, mere appearance would not be established to be mistaken.

Thus, insofar as there is appearance of a nature without parts to non-conceptual (cognition), it would not be the case that this appearance is a false appearance.

This was said by Gya(marwa)²³².]]]]

[[[(Bottom note:) Here, what Geshe Gangpa says is correct, namely: the awareness that comprehends appearance is not attested (as) a mistaken state of affairs even in reliance on a reasoning consciousness, but it is merely the convention (‘mistaken’) that is applied.²³³

Objection: Then even the object of the appearance as the (double) moon also would not be mistaken even conventionally.

Answer: A particular that is the object of the dual appearance does not itself appear. There is the appearance as a particular but one negates being true as a particular; therefore, (the appearance of a double moon) is established to be mistaken.

Objection: Blue appears, but being true in reality is negated, therefore, it would also be established to be mistaken.

²²⁸ See the position on “cessation” discussed below.

²²⁹ Unclear where the internal contradiction is. Emend to “ye shes rgyun **mi** chad pa”? What is understood by “cessation of continuum of wisdom”? No more appearances? Or “appearances recognized to be false”? A previous passage using this expression would hint to Gyamarwa understanding it as the latter. Or understand that there are two contradictions (with established Buddhist positions).

²³⁰ This makes sense if the idea is that Jotün cannot reject the conclusion of the parallel, namely that auditory perception of sound would become mistaken when negating sound’s permanence. Not to be understood as “rejection of the parallellism between the two cases”.

²³¹ This seems to correspond to the answer to the rejoinder in 1.4.

²³² We understand that the “Gyamarwa said” is the objection that Jotsün would not be able to answer to the parallel in 3.1, which is rephrased here somewhat differently.

²³³ This matches the view of “the Teachers” (identified as “Gangpa”) at the end of the section. See also Gyamarwa’s answer to the “cessation” view in BCA-ṭikā 63b6: don dam par blo thams cad kyi yul bden par ma grub pas <blo> ‘khrul zhes tha snyad du byas la

Answer: If blue appeared as real and one negated being true as real, it would indeed be established to be mistaken. But there is no such ‘appearance as real’ to conventional awareness.

Further, if the conventional awareness consisting in the appearance of blue as blue was attested as a mistaken state of affairs, it would follow that the wisdom attained subsequently (to buddhahood) also would be mistaken, because the singular appearing object itself is engaged.

Some say: Thus, if one possesses wisdom, it would come to be mistaken, and thus the continuum of wisdom is cut.²³⁴

This is refuted by the very fact that appearance is not asserted to be mistaken.²³⁵

Further, since non-invalidated scripture establishes the existence of wisdom, it is correct.

Further: if there were no wisdom, is it because its cause has been eliminated (/is wrong)²³⁶ or because it has been eliminated by its antidote?

Both are incorrect, because the cause of wisdom is not mistaken²³⁷ and there can be no antidote (to wisdom). This is stated later.²³⁸]]]

Further, the Teachers [[[Gangpa]]]²³⁹ explained that insofar as they are mistaken in terms of there being an invalidation of ‘withstanding analysis’, the convention (‘mistaken’) is applied [[[but) a mistaken state of affairs is not attested]]]. Thus, rejecting this rejoinder is not necessary [[[it is not asserted that (appearance) is mistaken]]].

Structural analysis of A

This (the valid cognition establishing the definiens) was explained via four points:

[A-i] The actual valid cognition determining the definiens of conventional

²³⁴ This corresponds to the Madhyamaka position presented in the BCA-ṭīkā 63b6: *’on kyang blo thams cad ’khrul pa yin pas ’khrul pa zad pa’i tshe blo nyid med pas ye shes rgyun chad do zhes kun rdzob du yang ye shes med do zhes dbu’ ma pa kha cig ’dod pa ni*

Vose 2009: “Some Mādhyamikas assert that since all awareness is mistaken, when mistake is extinguished awareness itself does not exist and thus wisdom has its continuum cut; “even conventionally” wisdom does not exist.”

²³⁵ Alternatively:

Some say: Thus, if one possesses wisdom, it would come to be mistaken, and so we say that “the continuum of wisdom is cut”, but we do not assert the appearance to be mistaken.

This is refuted by the very same (argument).

²³⁶ On the impossibility of wisdom to arise if the continuum of causes is cut, see Gyamarwa’s BCA-ṭīkā 63a7-8: *sangs rgyas pa’i tshe’ ’khor bas bsdus pa’i rkyen rnams rgyun ni chad pas na / ’khor bas bsdus pa kun rdzob du yang mi ’byung ngo /*

²³⁷ The notion of “cause not being mistaken” is unclear as answer to the option “the cause has been eliminated”. It would match better “the cause is wrong”, but the idea remains unclear.

²³⁸ This could refer to the discussion on rjes thob toward the end of the text (fol. 29a1-5)

²³⁹ Compare with the view ascribed to Gangpa in the note above.

[A-ii] Rejecting the rejoinder that the fault put forward to the illusion(ist-view) would be the same (for us)

[A-iii] Rejecting the rejoinder that a (mistaken) awareness is not established to be mistaken

[A-iv] Rejecting the rejoinder that appearance would become ultimate

Thus, it (conventional) must be understood to be established from the action of the two means of valid cognition of those of limited vision²⁴⁰.

B [The valid cognition determining the ultimate]

The very reasoning that negates truth (see §A above) is what determines the ultimate. And it is itself **[[[to be understood by]]]** the inference of those **[[[people]]]** of limited vision.²⁴¹ Therefore, it will be presented based on the convention of other teachers **[[[She'u]]]** (who state):

[2.1] The identification of the five members: subject, etc.

[2.2] How inference sees based on those

[2.3] The way of meditatively cultivating, having become certain by the inferential vision

[2.4] The result of cultivation: the non-conceptual wisdom that corresponds to appearance **[[[as reality]]]**

B-i The identification of the five elements: subject, etc.²⁴²

A The subject

The subject can be either what is termed (in Śrīgupta's *Tattvāvatāravṛtti*) “internal or external” or what is termed (in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṅkāra*) “stated by ourselves or others,” namely, it is just what appears **[[[not characterized by something else]]]**.

[[[Jotsün:]]] It is the mere appearance (i.e., appearance without specification), not characterized as being true or false. Due to not being characterized as true or false, common appearance **[[[for both the proponent and the opponent]]]** is established. Since it is posited **[[[as the subject]]]** from the perspective of the general concept of mere appearance, the doubt will be eliminated in general for everything.

The following explanation **[[[by previous Tibetans and even Gangpa]]]** has the same meaning:

Appearance and imputation **[[[as true]]]**, taken together, is not established for us **[[[Buddhists]]]**; and **[[[mere appearance]]]** distinguished from imputation **[[[as true]]]**

²⁴⁰ Literally, of “those who look on this side”.

²⁴¹ In comparison, Gro lung pa states two valid cognitions for determining the ultimate : for people of limited vision, inference (neither-one-nor many, etc.), and for advanced practitioners (pha rol gzigs pa rnam) yogic perception. (bsTan rim chen mon 361a2-3 : **mtshan nyid de dag nges par byed pa'i tshad ma la don dam pa rtog par byed pa** ni pha rol gzigs pa rnam kyis snang ba med pa'i ye shes rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum dang, tshu rol mthong ba rnam kyis sgro 'dogs 361a3 'gog par byed pa gcig dang du ma dang bral ba la sogs pa'i rtags las 'jug pa'i rjes dpag gi tshad ma dag go //). This echoes *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* 75.

²⁴² This section was referred to in the discussion in Chap. II, B'B.

is not established for the opponent **[[[the Tīrthika]]]**, and at the time one oneself sets forth that very thing **[[[appearance distinguished from imputation]]]** for the first time, it is not established for oneself.²⁴³

Therefore, neither appearance and imputation taken together or **[[[appearance]]]** distinguished **[[[from imputation]]]** is the subject, but one posits as subject appearance **[[[without specification]]]** **[[[to the Buddhist]]]**²⁴⁴ without distinguishing appearance and imputation.

However, the above-stated convention **[[[that of Jotsün]]]** is the correct one.

In this regard it is advocated **[[[by previous (scholars)]]]**:

First, one posits as subject without distinguishing appearance and imputation. Then, having negated truth **[[[for this subject]]]**, subsequently one negates (its) existence in the appearance itself that is distinguished (from imputation).

[[[Consider whether truth is negated initially or is not negated:]]]

If truth is initially negated, the subsequent **[[[negation of existence]]]** is pointless, and if **[[[truth]]]** is not negated **[[[initially]]]**, **[[[subsequently]]]** a subject that is appearance alone is not established.

If **[[[suppose that]]]** although truth is initially negated, there is a point **[[[subsequently]]]** **[[[there is no determination that it is subsequently pointless]]]**, because, subsequently the existence of appearance itself is negated, then what is the meaning of ‘existence’ **[[[which is to be negated subsequently]]]**?

If one says that it is causal efficacy, is it causal efficacy found by reasoning **[[[when negating truth]]]**? Or is it causal efficacy without specification?

In the first case **[[[(causal efficacy found) when negating truth]]]**, the negation is (already) established, and (in the second case) it cannot (be negated) **[[[because causal efficacy without specification exists even on top of appearance]]]**.

Thus, it is explained (by Gangpa) that “(That) **[[[appearance without specification]]]** which is without distinction **[[[between appearance and imputation]]]** is the subject.”

B The negandum

B1 Khyung rin chen grags: The negandum is what is imputed

The negandum **[[[according to Rin (chen) grags, is what is imputed. And it is imputed as follows:]]]** is what is accepted by those who conceive something to be real to have a nature that is found to resist analysis.

If one analyses **[[[this negandum]]]**,

- it is not an awareness **[[[the latter is established by reflexive awareness, therefore it cannot be negated]]]**

²⁴³ I.e., before the Buddhist has understood that appearances are not true, the “appearance distinguished from what is imputed” is not established for them either. Keeping the reading “rang las ma grub” would give the sense “it is not established intrinsically.” We deem the correction to “rang la” preferable in view of the previous sentence “pha rol la grub”.

²⁴⁴ Unclear why “to the Buddhist” is added there. Possibly because the Buddhist is not making the distinction between the two to allow the opponent’s acceptance of the subject.

- it is not what appears to it (i.e., to awareness) [[[this also cannot be negated]]]
- it is not external [[[because what is established as a particular also cannot be negated]]]
- It is not what is superimposed [[[because it exists insofar as it is superimposed, it is not to be negated either]]]

[[[Then what is it?]]]

It is what is determined to be [[[a particular]]] external to the superimposition. It is thus characterized as ‘imputed’ [[[insofar as it is determined to be an object external to superimposition]]].

Thus, here [[[in the context of the negandum]]], it is correct to negate just what is imputed in this way [[[the determination of something superimposed to be external]]]. (SDV 30ab)²⁴⁵

The negation of imputation is characterized by the negation as “genuine.” (SDV, intermediate verse following v. 30)²⁴⁶

[[[In this way,]]] These (verses), etc. explain that what is imputed is the negandum. It is what one oneself superimposes as being veridical in the sense of resisting analysis, and has the characteristic of being determined to be external [[[without knowing it to be superimposed]]].

[a] (Khyung’s) criticism of Śaṅkara(nandana)’s position: the negandum is what is real [[[Analysis of Shankaranandana’s position]]] Thus, the Brahmin Śaṅkara(nandana) explains that the entity itself is the negandum, because it is said [[[in this way]]] (in PV 1.210/PVin 3.57):

Those who do not deny the verbal object consider only the entity by way of the distinction between the options: existent or non-existent, for the emergence of an effect is dependent on this.

[[[If what is intended is like this, it is correct.]]] If (this explanation amounts to) “the negation of determining as an entity when determining as anything,” that is not correct.²⁴⁷ Moreover, in the context of negating the object of superimposition [[[while not asserting (awareness) to be determining as an entity, since it is superimposed, (one asserts) it (the object of the superimposing awareness) to be an entity that is the negandum]]], if one asserts this [[[the negandum]]] to be just the entity, it is extremely unfortunate because (1) if the object [[[of awareness]]] is an entity, the awareness cannot be superimposing [[[because it cognizes it as an entity]]], and (2) [[[if awareness were superimposing, it would be correct that its object, which is imputed, is negated, however]]] it is not proper for what is not the object of a superimposing [[[awareness]]] [[[i.e., an entity]]] to be negated. [[[because through this (negation of an

²⁴⁵ Eckel translates: It is right to use [reason] to deny just what is imagined.

²⁴⁶ Eckel translates: When we negate [the things] that [others] imagine, [the qualification] “in a real sense” does not qualify the negation.

²⁴⁷ We understand this to mean that when determining something as an entity in the case where a real entity exists, there is no ground for negating the determination as an entity.

entity which is not the object of the superimposing awareness) the superimposition is not eliminated.]]]

Thus, what is imputed [[[by mind]]] through superimposition [[[upon the object of the superimposing (awareness)]]] to be existing as resisting analysis, [[[this, which exists as resisting analysis,]]] this, which is imputed as an external particular, precisely is the negandum.

B2 Rejection of a rejoinder against Jotsün (=Khyung) himself, by Geshe

[[[Rejection of rejoinders against Jotsün himself]]]

Objection: If this imputation [[[that is (according to you) the negandum]]] is devoid of one or many, since the logical reason (‘neither one nor many’) would occur in the negandum, it would be inconclusive. And if it [[[the negandum]]] is not devoid of [[[one or many]]] it would become an entity [[[which is one or many]]]. [[[This is the rejoinder.]]]

Answer [[[of Geshe: “]]] (a) It is not inconclusive, because when considering its nature [[[or mode of existence]]], in reality, (what is imputed) is neither one nor many. In reality, it is grouped with the *similar instances*, what is devoid of nature.²⁴⁸ (b) As for (what is imputed) being the negandum from the point of view of being apprehended as real by a superimposing (awareness), since it is thus understood to be one or many [[[to the extent that it is imputed as an entity]]], the logical reason (‘neither one nor many’) does not occur (in it).[[[“”]]]²⁴⁹

B3 Reconsideration / Refutation of Jotsün (by Gangpa?)

Let us consider this (what preceded); what is imputed is not the negandum. [[[Here, there are seven points:]]]

B3i The logical reason (‘neither one nor many’) would be inconclusive in reality

Otherwise [[[if what is imputed were the negandum]]]:

If (according to your answer to the objection in §2 above) what is [[[asserted to be]]] the negandum from the perspective of being apprehended as real by a superimposing (awareness) (cf. option b), this precisely, from that perspective, is one or many, and

[[[Considering this idea: In reality, something is either devoid of one and many, or not devoid. If it is devoid (of one and many) the logical reason applies (to the negandum), therefore, the reason is inconclusive. If it is not devoid (of one and many), (the negandum, what is imputed) becomes an entity.]]]²⁵⁰

it is in reality devoid of one and many (cf. option a), since the logical reason is in reality inconclusive, what help would there be from the fact that it is not inconclusive [[[in general]]] from the perspective of superimposition?

248 The logical reason qualifies the subject, and is present in similar instances. It would have been inconclusive if it were present in **dissimilar instances**.

249 Therefore, the logical reason does not occur in it; it does not even satisfy the characteristic of *pakṣadharmatā*. A fortiori, it cannot be inconclusive.

250 This gloss rephrases the objection against Khyung formulated in (2).

B3ii The logical reason ('neither one nor many') would be inconclusive from the perspective of superimposition

[[[Further,]]] It is also possible that a superimposing (awareness) itself [[—since conceptual appearance is not fixed, one can conceive in any way whatsoever; therefore, sometimes]] would impute [[as devoid (of one and many)]] as an entity that is neither one nor many. Therefore, from this perspective (cf. b) also, (the logical reason) would be on occasion inconclusive.

B3iii A third alternative beside affirmation and negation would not be eliminated

[[[Moreover]]], if

- the subject 'imputed' alone itself is, from the perspective of being apprehended as real by a superimposing (awareness) (cf. b), a *dissimilar instance* because it is a negandum (from that perspective).

- and [[this (subject,) 'imputed']], in reality (cf. a), is a *similar instance* given that it is grouped with what lacks a nature,

[[[i.e., if it was both the negandum, and a similar instance]]], there would be a third option which would be a class that is both²⁵¹, therefore, one could not eliminate a third alternative by these two [[affirmation and negation (of the property to be proven)]]].

B3iv The negandum would not be eliminated when the probandum is established

For this very reason [[that there is no excluded middle]], it is not contradictory for probandum and negandum to be co-referential. Therefore, even when the probandum [[lacking a nature]] is established, the negandum would not be eliminated [[because it is not contradictory for the two to be found in one basis]].

[[Furthermore, when one negates smoke via negating fire, is real smoke negated or is imputed smoke negated?

- In the first case (negating real smoke), here also it would be the same, namely, the negandum would be real.
- In the second case (negating imputed smoke), in what would one establish that imputed smoke entails imputed fire?

Thus, one negates real smoke via the absence of real fire on the basis of establishing that real smoke entails real fire.

Similarly, in the case of existence entailing one or many, in conformity with the establishment of the entailments 'real existence entails a real one or many', the negandum is a real entity.

Furthermore, there is no fault that when the negandum is an entity, it follows that (the awareness that perceives it) is not a superimposing awareness²⁵², like in the case of a perceptible (negandum).²⁵³]]

B3v The negandum is not a similar instance

Further yet, it is not proper (as you suggest above in option a) that [[the negandum]] would be a similar instance [[in reality]] even though it is in reality devoid of nature, because

251 Literally, a "positive class."

252 This fault was pointed out by Khyung above in (1).

253 For instance when negating smoke, the negandum is an entity, but that the awareness is not superimposing is not problematic.

since [[[according to you]]] a real entity is not the negandum, by being devoid of that [[[real (nature) that is not the negandum]]] (something) cannot be a phenomenon to be proven.²⁵⁴ And as for the imputed negandum [[[that you assert]]], since then it [[[real (nature) that is superimposed]]] would not be negated, from what perspective would it be included in similar instances?²⁵⁵

Therefore, it [[[the negandum]]] is found in dissimilar instances exclusively; and since the logical reason occurs in it (i.e., the negandum), it (the logical reason) is just inconclusive.

B3vi If the negandum ('one or many') in the logical reason ('neither one nor many') is real, the negandum in the thesis ('devoid of nature') would also be real

Furthermore, [[[considering] the object that is the logical reason for you]]] the logical reason is either (i) “devoid of a [[[true]]] real entity that is one and many” or (ii) “devoid of the imputation as one and many.”

- i In the first case, if the one [[[i.e., the negandum]]] of the valid cognition grasping the logical reason [[[devoid of true one and many]]] is a real entity, then what fault is there if the negandum of the inference [[[also]]] is precisely a real entity? [[[If one makes this parallel, it is the same.]]]
- ii In the second case, since ‘imputed one and many’ does not pervade either ‘imputed entity’ or ‘[[[true as]]] entity itself’, how would (entity) be what is to be negated by (the logical reason) devoid of that [[[‘imputed one or many’ which is not the pervader (of entity)]]] [[[because it cannot negate the two – imputed (entity) or entity (itself) – which are not pervaded (by it)]]].

B3vii (a) Something imputed cannot be the negandum of perception, but (b) if the negandum of perception is real, the negandum of inference also would be real

Furthermore,

(a) when one negates a pot in a certain place via perception, if something imputed were the negandum of perception, then since it [[[what is imputed]]] is not suitable to appear to perception, how could it be negated?

[Opponent’s answer:] “It is because it [[[the pot]]] is imputed as indistinguishable from the place.”

[Answer:] While it is imputed as the nature of the place [[[or imputed as apprehended]]] because they are indistinguishable, it is not suitable to appear to perception [[[as long as the characteristic of being imputed is not lost]]].

(b) In this case [[[i.e., negating pot]]], if the entity itself [[[a pot]]] were the negandum, what fault would there be in accepting that in all cases [[[i.e., in the context of negating via a logical reason]]]?

[Verses 33-35 – summarizing verses]

Therefore, these are the summarizing verses:

The logical reason would occur in just this that is the negandum,

²⁵⁴ Being a phenomenon to be *proven* presupposes being devoid of the negandum.

²⁵⁵ Because it would not be established to be devoid of reality.

(and hence) would be inconclusive in reality. (=B3i)

Even from the point of view of superimposing awareness it would be that **[[[i.e., inconclusive]]]** on occasion. (=B3ii)

A third option beside negation and affirmation would not be eliminated. (=B3iii)

Even if it **[[[the probandum]]]** is established, the negandum would not be negated. (=B3iv)

Furthermore, it (the negandum) would not be a similar instance whatsoever. (=B3v)

If the negandum of (the valid cognition) apprehending the logical reason is a real entity, (=B3vi)

The negandum of the thesis is established to be a real entity.

If it is not (a real entity), it (the logical reason) would be inconclusive.

If the negandum of perception is a real entity –

Because something imputed is not suitable to appear –

One should accept that the other also **[[[the negandum of inference]]]** is a real entity. (=B3vii)

B4 (4) Own (=Gangpa's) position = The correct position stated by other scholars (=Gangpa)
Then what is it?

B4A Summarized report of Gangpa's position (?)

What is called “negandum” is not asserted to exist **[[[as something established in reality]]]**. If it existed, it would not be suitable to be negated.

It is not what is imputed, because it (the latter) is a similar instance.

Thus, what is called “negation” is the identification of non-existence for what is non-existent. Then, when something/someone is non-existent, there is no entity. Therefore, it is said that “entity is the negandum”.

Thus, saying

“when taking entity is the negandum, if it is established it cannot be negated; if it is not established, why would one need to negate it?”

is ignorance of the way valid cognition negates; it is understood as the destruction of something established.

Thus what other scholars **[[[Gangpa]]]** state is to be known to be correct:

“The negandum is the intentional object accepted to be established by reasoning and not invalidated, whose nature resists analysis”.

The intentional object that is asserted **[[[in terms of “the place is with a pot; appearance has a nature”]]]** is not established as a real entity, therefore since one identifies the non-existence

for this very entity that is non-existent, one speaks of “negating the intentional object of this.”

This is because all imputed things are the apprehended objects of [[[conceptual cognitions that are]]] assertions.

[[[**Objection:** This is contradictory with the explanation (of Jñānagarbha’s verse)¹²⁸ that something imputed is the negandum.

Answer: This is the signified of the word that expresses the negandum.]]]

Thus, [[[our own position:]]] The explanation (of Jñānagarbha) that what is imputed is the negandum is done in consideration of the intentional object of the superimposing cognition [[[being the negandum]]], and in consideration that when a determining cognition [[[by a cognition of non-existence]]] arises [[[having identified the negandum which is a non-entity, as non-existent]]], the superimposing (cognition) [[[“there exists something that is a veridical ultimate nature”]]] ceases [[[having considered this, he explained what is superimposed to be the negandum]]].

B4B²⁵⁶ Rejection of other positions

In this regard,

[[[Gangpa she’u ‘s (rejection of other positions)]]]

B4B.A Rejection of illusion established by reasoning

The assertion that illusion is established by reasoning also is refuted by (the argument that) when identifying the negandum, there is overextension (to illusion), etc. [[[He says that the statement “because the definition of illusion applies to the negandum, there is overextension” is a refutation discarding illusion.]]]¹³⁰

B4B.B Rejection of the position that subject and negandum are one nature without conceptual distinctions

Also, in addition, the following [[[assertion]]] is also refuted:

Some [[[supporters of ‘elimination of appearance’, etc.]]] say:

The subject is asserted to be without conceptual distinction from the negandum. If this [[[subject]]] is not negated, the appearance as subject does not cease, therefore [[[when the appearance does not cease]]], the proliferation of characteristics is not suppressed, therefore [[[when they are not suppressed]]] one is not liberated from the bondage of obtaining a bad state. For this reason, this very [[[subject]]] is what is to be negated.

Namely, when the logical reason is established for this [[[subject]]] it would be inconclusive [[[because, since the subject is the negandum, the logical reason would occur in the negandum]]]. And if it were not inconclusive [[[the logical reason does not occur in the subject]]], the logical reason would not be established for this [[[subject that is the]]] negandum.

²⁵⁶ It seems that the options refuted below correspond to the options adopted when discussing the nature of the division between the two truths in Chap. 2. Check this previous discussion for parallel arguments.

Therefore, if one accepts the method of negating the pervader in the case of the subject that is what is to be negated [[[the negandum]]] [[[i.e., (negating what is pervaded by one or many,) the mere existence as true nature via (the reason) neither one nor many]]], it becomes inconclusive [[[because the logical reason occurs in the negandum that is the subject]]]. And [[[for those who assert the subject to be the negandum]]] if one accepts the method of absence [[[of the logical reason]]] in dissimilar instances, it [[[the logical reason]]] would be unestablished [[[in the subject]]]. Therefore, these would be contradictory assertions. [[[It comes to be that the logical reason must be established for the subject, and also must be unestablished (for the subject), because what is the subject is also the negandum.]]]

Objection: [[[If he says:]]] From the perspective of the subject the logical reason is established [[[therefore there is no fault of being unestablished]]]; but from the perspective of the negandum, [[[the logical reason]]] does not occur [[[thus there is no fault of being inconclusive]]].

Answer: If they are conceptually non-distinct [[[in the case no conceptual distinction whatsoever is accepted]]], this is unsuitable!

If [[[Objection:]]] it is suitable [[[that the logical reason occurs and does not occur]]] in reliance upon two cognitive perspectives [[[cognizing appearances and reasoning consciousness]]],

[[[Answer:]]] Because the ‘relying phenomena’ [[[that rely on two ‘bases of reliance’]]] would need to be two, it would infirm their being conceptually non-distinct [[[because they would come to be distinct]]].

Objection: [[[Again he objects:]]] It is the same [[[the faults presented with regard to the negation of the subject]]] for the things that are both imagined and the negandum, because the logical reason ‘absence of tree’ occurs on a stone cliff that is imputed to be endowed with a śimśapa.

Answer: Because this [[[what is imputed, is empty and]]] is a similar instance, how would (the logical reason) be inconclusive?

[[[Objection: This would be contradictory with the explanation that what is imputed is the negandum]]]

[[[Answer:]]] The explanation that what is imputed is the negandum is made from the conviction that that which the superimposing cognition apprehends something to be, this [[[superimposition]]] precisely is eliminated by an ascertainment [[[when the true intentional object is negated]]] [[[according to Gangpa]]].

Thus (tenets) such as “if appearance itself [[[the subject]]] is not negated, the proliferation of characteristics is not suppressed” are also discarded:

Since [[[appearance that is]]] something [[[accepted to be]]] veridical [[[i.e., accepted to be established]]] is not negated, [[[if one says that]]] it [[[the logical reason]]] is not established.

And since (appearance) as a mere appearance is not negated [[[if one says that the proliferation of characteristics is not suppressed]]], it (the logical reason) is inconclusive. This is because if attachment to something veridical is eliminated by negating “veridical,” [[[apprehension as veridical with regard to the eliminated “veridical” (is eliminated)]]] it is impossible that love and hate, etc. would not be eliminated. [[[This is because love and hate arise on account of the apprehension as veridical.]]]

B4B.C Rejection of the view that subject and negandum are one nature but conceptually distinct from the perspective of appearance

Also, some assert that it [[[the negandum]]] is one nature with the subject, but they are conceptually distinct. Since [[[veridical]]] is negated from the perspective of reasoning, the nature of appearance is negated [[[as well]]].

As for this also, since not existing from the perspective of reasoning and [[[being merely]]] the nature of appearance are not contradictory, negation [[[of appearance]]] is not established [[[by negation from the perspective of reasoning]]]. Not only this, but if [[[the subject]]] is one nature with the negandum, [[[The logical reason either is established or is not established for a subject which is one nature with the negandum. If it is established]]] because the logical reason occurs in what has the negandum it is inconclusive. And if it does not occur [[[in the subject which is one nature with the negandum]]], it [[[the logical reason]]] is [[[would come to be]]] unestablished.

Objection [[[by the same]]]: [[[In a dispute about the proof such as “sound is impermanent because it is produced”]]] When ‘produced’ is to be established to be a (proper) logical reason due to its being endowed with the three characteristics, [[[for you also, as it would be the same,]]] since (the logical reason) ‘endowed with three characteristics’ occurs in ‘what has impermanence’ that is not a (proper) logical reason, it is inconclusive.¹²⁹

Answer [[[Gangpa’s answer is the following]]]: “Endowed with three characteristics” is put forward in relation to what is to be proven. How would ‘endowed with three characteristics in relation to impermanence’ occur in ‘impermanent’? Because, pervasion by ‘impermanent’, etc., exist only for ‘produced’ [[[since it is contradictory that ‘impermanent’ itself is pervaded by itself]]].

There is no occurring of “endowed with three characteristics in relation to impermanence [[[that is pervaded by ‘produced’¹³⁰]]]” in another subject (than ‘produced’) that is not a logical reason (such as ‘endowed with impermanence’), etc.. [[[such as ‘cognizing objects of cognition’]]]¹³¹

B4B.D Rejection of the position that subject is and is not the negandum entirely, depending on perspective

Further, some assert that the subject is twofold [[[in its entirety on both sides]]], i.e. “only being (the negandum) and only not being (the negandum)”, [[[they assert (the subject) to be twofold in relation with the context]]] saying that “this very subject is exclusively [[[entirely]]] a negandum from the perspective of reasoning, and is exclusively [[[entirely]]] not negated as a mere appearance.”

[[[Answer:]]] If that is the case, it would follow from the negation “the pot of the potter’s house is absent here [[[on this spot]]]” that the pot of this [[[of the potter’s]]] house does not exist.

Because it is not contradictory not to be in this place and to be in this house, it [[[the pot of the (potter’s) house]]] would not be negated.

[[[Answer:]]] Because it is not contradictory for a conventional appearance to be non-existent from the perspective of reasoning and to be existent in general [[[as a mere conventional appearance]]], it is the same [[[appearance would also not be negated]]].

Objection: By the negation “This conventional (appearance) is non-existent from the perspective of reasoning,” it (the conventional appearance) is a negandum in this way.

Answer: [[[By the negation]]] “This very pot of this house is absent here”, it [[[the pot of the house]]] would be negated in this way.

Objection: When saying “This is absent here”, (a pot) characterized by ‘presence here’ is negated, but the pot of this house is not [[[negated]]].

Answer: [[[Appearance]]] characterized by ‘existence from the perspective of reasoning’ is negated [[[This negation is a negation of existence from the perspective of reasoning]]], but a [[[mere]]] conventional [[[appearance]]] in general is not the negandum.

The unlearned’s statement that “The pot of this house is exclusively a negandum” is invalidated by [[[valid cognition consisting in]]] perception in this house.

B4B.E Rejection of the position that the negandum is what is called “ultimate”, the object that is not incompatible when analyzed

Some [[['Phur ston (?))]] assert the following:

The negandum is the object that is not incompatible when analyzed, what is called “ultimate”.

The assembly of incompatible items coming from the negation of that (negandum), is what is to be proven.¹²⁹

For instance, the following contradiction: on the one hand, because ‘many’, such as parts, etc., are observed it is necessary that ‘one,’ which is the pervader of the former [[[i.e., ‘many’]]], exists;¹³⁰ on the other, because ‘one’ is incompatible with [[[the observed]]] ‘many’, it is necessary that it [[[one]]] does not exist.

Or: Whereas it is useless for something existent to arise, insofar as what is non-existent must arise, ‘non-existence’ and ‘arising’ would be co-referential.¹³¹

This completely incorrect: if (two items) are incompatible, they cannot be assembled in a single subject, and if they are assembled then they are not incompatible.

In general, it is as follows:

If wise people assert that “insofar as (two items) are incompatible, (assembly) is not possible”, what a well-spoken statement it would be to say “insofar as (two items) are incompatible, (even still) they exist as assembled”!

[[[According to those who assert that the assembly of incompatible items is ultimate, ‘what is incompatible’ must be the negandum.]]]²⁵⁷

Further, according to you, what is not-incompatible could not be negated: ‘not-incompatible’ and ‘incompatible’ also would be assembled, because the assembly of incompatible items is the nature of knowables.

B4C Gangpa’s own assertion

Thus, it is explained [[[Gangpa’s own assertion]]]:

The negandum is the very entity that is the intentional object that is accepted to have a nature that is obtained when analyzed by reasoning.

{If one says that it exists}¹³⁰

Since it is pervaded by one or many, this is precisely what is to be negated by the inference (that infers) the non-conception as that which is the pervaded (property) [[[i.e., as a true nature]]] from the non-conception as that which is the pervading (property) [[[i.e., as one or many]]].

B5 Reconsideration / partial refutation of Gangpa’s explanation (by Gyamarwa)

Considering what precedes, if negandum and subject are conceptually distinct but one nature, since the logical reason occurs in [[[the subject]]] what has the negandum, it would [[[according to Gangpa]]] become inconclusive [[[this may be true]]].²⁵⁸

However [[[when rejecting the fault]]]²⁵⁹, in the context of proving that ‘produced’ is a proper logical reason (to infer ‘impermanent’), the position [[[of Gangpa]]] that the logical reason (‘three characteristics’) does not occur in something impermanent that is not a proper reason does not appear among the words of logicians.²⁶⁰

Indeed, could a person be a Brahmin because of being endowed with the properties that makes one a Brahmin, and also not be a Brahmin because of having some other property [[[such as being an object of cognition]]]?

[[[It is as follows:]]] If something is void of the property to be proven, it is a dissimilar instance. It does not become a dissimilar instance because of being a phenomenon different [[[from what is to be proven]]].

Otherwise, try to get rid of the fault that [[[the reason]]] ‘smoke’ would be inconclusive when it occurs (on the fiery mountain) [[[in the kitchen]]]²⁶¹, because it (the fiery mountain) is a phenomenon different from the concept ‘kitchen’ [[[from the similar instances]]] [[[because ‘fiery mountain’ and ‘kitchen’ are conceptually distinct]]]

[[[Further, (as in) the context of the proof that ‘produced’ is a proper reason]]] in this case precisely also, if [[[it is argued that]]] for the other [[[those who assert (that subject and negandum are) one nature and distinct concepts]]] the logical reason is inconclusive because

257 This comment seems to belong to the next argument, hinting at the parallel idea that: “According to you, who assert that what is not-incompatible when analyzed is ultimate, non-incompatible is what is to be negated.”

258 Cf. The argument in (3) above.

259 This refers to Gangs pa’s answer to the objection of “khong”.

260 Alternatively, this could be an ironic remark: “does not appear to be the speech of a logician!”

261 This note is misleading. For the sake of logic one should read, as indicated in the preceding parentheses “on the fiery mountain”.

it occurs in the subject that is one nature *[[[with the negandum]]]*, which is endowed with the negandum,
(in parallel)

[[[For Gangpa himself]]], for those who accept *[[[that impermanent]]]* is a dissimilar instance, *[[[the logical reason]]]* ‘endowed with three characteristics’ *[[[to prove that ‘produced’ is a proper reason]]]* occurs *[[[in the subject]]]* in that which has the same nature *[[[i.e., the subject has the same nature as impermanent (but is conceptually distinct)]]]* as ‘that which has impermanence’: it would be exactly the same *[[[hence, here, it would be inconclusive]]]*.

C The probandum

Ci Gangpa

Ci-i Putting forth (Gangpa’s position)

[[[According to) Gangpa]]] the probandum is a simple negation, the mere elimination of a veridical entity. The assertion that an implicative negation – such as ‘illusion’ or ‘paradox’²⁶² – is the probandum has already been refuted.²⁶³

In this regard, taking as probandum the positive determination of non-existence by negating entity is similar to the case of illusion, etc., therefore it would be *[[[taken to be]]]* real (ultimately).

Objection: The simple negation consisting in mere elimination also is taken (to be what is proven) by reasoning, therefore, it *[[[mere elimination]]]* would be real.

[[[The idea is the following: “negation” is general, but “negation of the negandum by reasoning” is specific, therefore they are conceptually distinct.]]]

Answer: If you say that negation becomes ultimate because the negandum is negated by reasoning, (this logical reason) is inconclusive.

If you say (negation becomes ultimate) because negation is established by reasoning, (this logical reason) is unestablished.

Further, some *[[[who hold the absence to be established by reasoning]]]*²⁶⁴ say:

If (negation) is not established positively, the mere elimination *[[[of the negandum]]]* itself is not suitable. It is the same as there being no positive determination *[[[of blue]]]* without elimination *[[[of yellow, etc.]]]*

[[[This is not the same. The idea is the following: In the case of a valid cognition that proves, positive determination depends on elimination, and elimination depends on positive determination. Nevertheless, the application of negation in general is not similar to that.]]]

²⁶² These were the three options for distinguishing Madhyamaka branches regarding the ultimate ascribed to “previous scholars” at the beginning of the work.

²⁶³ Ref?

²⁶⁴ Or could Bral rigs grub pa be a personal name? It is marked as such by a reader.

An entity is such that its own nature is a nature excluded from what is other, therefore it is not established [[[positively]]] without excluding what is other. However, why would an elimination that is not established as an entity rely on a positive determination, apart from the mere negation of establishment [[[of a negandum]]]? [[[Elimination is understood by being the mere elimination of being established; why would it rely on positive determination?]]] Thus, this is nonsense.

Thus, the mere invalidation of existence is what is taken to be “the probandum”, but “mere elimination” is not the epistemic object of reasoning: [[[If mere elimination is known by reasoning,]]] it [[[this elimination]]] would become real. This was explained [[[by Gangpa]]].²⁶⁵

Ci-ii Analysis (i.e., refutation, of Gangpa’s position)

[[[Gya(marwa) (says):]]]

Here, this is incorrect in view of the many statements such as “without an epistemic object, mind would not be a cognition and would not be a valid cognition”, etc.

Ci-ii.i)

If (one argues that) the negation would become ultimate because the negandum is negated by reasoning, we do accept this; it is not inconclusive.

Ci-ii.i It is not the case that the argument by consequence of the opponent is inconclusive

Negation of the negandum and negation are the same. The specification “negation by reasoning” is not mistaken with regard to [[[negation as]]] ultimate (i.e., it is not inconclusive), because here [[[ultimately]]] there is invalidation of the reasoning that analyses [[[truth and falsity]]] and

266Ci-ii.ii For us, there is nothing incorrect about the epistemic object

Because even though negation is not positive determination [[[it is not an epistemic object as (positive determination)]]], it is an epistemic object [[[it is an epistemic object because of being cognized as an elimination]]].

[[[If you say that it would follow that there would be proliferation, (we answer)]]] It has already been explained that there is no proliferation by merely that [[[cognizing as elimination]]], etc.

Cii. Lotsawa

Cii-i Putting forth (Lotsawa’s position)

[[[The system of Lotsa(wa), explained in the “Small commentary on the Two Truths”]]]

²⁶⁵ See the report of Gangpa’s position on fol. 5b8-6a1: Madhyamaka analyses that refute nature “merely invalidate its existence; if a reasoning consciousness realizes ‘non-establishment’ or ‘mere elimination,’ there would be the proliferation of non-existence.”

²⁶⁶ The marker in the notes to the sa bead points to the beginning of section ci-ii, but the first sentence hints at the non-acceptance of an epistemic object being incorrect rather than to the acceptance of an epistemic object not being problematic.

[[[In general, a proof is of two types: affirmation and negation. As for negation (?), there are two: simple negation and implicative negation. Among them]]]

Here (in this proof), the probandum is a simple negation, but it is not an implicative negation.

And [[[the difference between]]] the two is to imply something else [[[for implicative negation]]] and not implying (something else) [[[for simple negation]]] after [[[following]]] eliminating what is not desired.

This is because both [[[simple negation and implicative negation]]] are to be taken as a direct elimination of what is not desired, whereas an implicit [[[indirect]]] mere negation [[[does not become a negating mind]]] is something that a proving mind also does.

And the elimination, among either the property, or the property possessor, or both, eliminates [[[here]]] the property to be negated. And through this [[[insofar as by negating the property to be negated, the combination is destroyed]]] the combination also is negated; therefore, inference also has a combination as its object.

Objection: If positive determination is not performed [[[by reasoning consciousness]]], how could [[[mere]]] elimination itself be performed? [[[In general,]]] the operation of conceptual thought entails the positive determination of its own object and the elimination of what is other.

Answer: This is because the performance of a positive determination [[[of absence of nature]]] is mistakenly assumed to be a positive determination.

Objection: If (reasoning consciousness) is a valid cognition with regard to the mistakenly assumed object, it would not be [[[a valid cognition with regard to]]] mere elimination. If it is not (a valid cognition) with regard to positive determination, it is also not with regard to elimination itself.

Otherwise [[[if it is correct to be a valid cognition with regard to the mere elimination without being a valid cognition with regard to the positive determination]]], even the conception of a self [[[it is not a valid cognition with regard to the self that is a positive determination]]] would become a valid cognition with regard to the elimination of the proliferation consisting in the absence of a self.

Answer: A conception of self mistakenly assumes that it establishes [[[“There is”]]] a self [[[“”]]], but it does not mistakenly assume that the absence of self is eliminated.

Therefore, if it is not a valid cognition with regard to the mistakenly assumed object [[[with regard to self]]], it does not become a valid cognition with regard to the other [[[the elimination of the proliferation consisting in the absence of self]]].

Here, while there is the very positive determination of the absence of nature [[[by way of the concept, absence of nature, appearing to cognition]]], because of the mistaken assumption “I am realizing a mere elimination” [[[with regard to precisely this]]], the mistakenly assumed object itself is believed to be a mere elimination, therefore it is correct that it is a valid cognition with regard to that [[[elimination]]].

Thus, when considering nature [[[when analyzing by an awareness considering nature]]], a positive determination [[[of absence of nature]]] is performed. And because

it is itself deluded by nature about its own operation it mistakenly assumes that it is an elimination [[[“an ultimate nature is eliminated”]]]. Therefore, it has as its object an elimination. Like for instance, a universal [[[object]]], which is positively determined [[[by inference]]], is mistakenly assumed to be a particular, whereby (inference) is asserted to have a particular as its object.

What precedes is asserted [[[by Lotsa(wa)]]].

Cii-ii Analysis (i.e., refutation)

This needs to be reconsidered.

Cii-ii.i It is not correct that simple and implicative negations are divisions of negation

Cii-ii.i-i **General refutation by scriptures and reasoning**

The distinction between simple negation and implicative negation [[[explained by Lotsa(wa)]]] is good. However, while it is accepted that both are also directly eliminations, (the view) [[[of Lotsa(wa)]]] that an establishing awareness also performs it [[[mere elimination]]] indirectly is not understood to be correct because [[[even (in the perspective of) Lotsa(wa)’s assertion that simple negation and implicative negation result from dividing negation/ although Lotsa(wa)’s assertion that simple negation and implicative negation result from dividing negation is accepted²⁶⁷]]] an implicative negation is only an establishing awareness.

(a) Refutation by scriptures

Thus it is said [[[in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*]]]²⁶⁸ [[[scripture]]]

By this one [[[i.e., (logical reason qua) non-apprehension]]], a negation consisting in not accepting the real portion is proven for an entity.

By the previous ones [[[i.e., (logical reason) qua essential property and effect]]] an implicative negation is established positively.²⁶⁹

[[[Some assert the following:

Having taken as basis the negation of the opposite, one divides it into the two, simple negation and implicative negation. Since these two are mutually contradictory, they are mutually exclusive: simple negation is the mere negation of entity and implicative negation is the implicit positing of a positive determination, having negated the opposite.

These two pervade the negation of the opposite, and that (the negation of the opposite) pervades these two.

Therefore, implicative negation is not pervaded by simple negation.

It is said that this is not correct, because since the Teacher said that what proves an implicative negation is a proving logical reason by stating “the previous ones prove an implicative negation”, it is not a type of negation, and the negation of a negation is an affirmation.

²⁶⁷ The latter reading would not match the title of the sa bead, that claims that this view is not correct.

²⁶⁸ Actually, the citation is from the *Pramanavarttika* (PV 4.262), a verse that does not have a parallel in the *Pvin*.

²⁶⁹ **Check if existing translation**

Further, since these two (simple negation and implicative negation) are contradictory in terms of being distinct in the sense of the negation of being one, they are not pervader and pervaded in terms of a single nature, but there is no contradiction for implicative negation to be pervaded by simple negation. For example, the subject “form”, etc. and the property “absence of nature”, these two, are contradictory in terms of the negation of being one; nevertheless, they are pervaded and pervader. Thus, it is correct for implicative negation to be pervaded by the existence of the mere property of simple negation.]]]

(b) Refutation by logic

[[[By logic]]]

(Logical reasons qua) essential property and effect are logical reasons that prove. And with regard to (logical reasons qua) non-apprehension, there aren't the two - simple negation and implicative negation; therefore, how could one divide negation into these two?

[[[If implicative negation was possible in the case of non-apprehension, a relation would be needed. Whether the original (logical reason) has a relation of identity or causality, it would come to be (a logical reason qua) effect or essential property. Consequently, he has said that a negating logical reason in which the negation is an implicative negation is not possible.]]]

Cii-ii.i-ii Considering this idea (?), specific refutation

Objection: [[[If he says:]]] [[[A negating logical reason in which the negation is an implicative negation is as follows:]]] By eliminating directly ‘produced’ for what is permanent, indirectly one accepts ‘produced’ for what is impermanent. [[[This is a negating logical reason in which the negation is an implicative negation]]]

Answer: This [[[logical reason]]] achieves a mere elimination [[[of ‘produced’]]] in the subject [[[what is permanent]]], therefore it achieves a simple negation.

[D1] If one were to apply the convention “implicative negation” in reliance on the force of that [[[in the proof that ‘produced’ is pervaded by ‘impermanent’]]],

[D2] here also [[[in the context in which you yourself assert the probandum to be a simple negation]]] (the probandum) would become an implicative negation because, indirectly, [[[by the force of a reasoning consciousness negating truth]]] the conventional is established to be an illusion.

[[[If one puts forth this answer in these terms]]]

Cii-ii.i-ii-i The answer is the same

[[[The answer is the same]]]

[D2' Retort]: Because [[[establishing the conventional to be an illusion]]] depends on another cognition that cognizes appearances, this is not the activity of just that [[[the reasoning consciousness]]] [[[, thus it does not become something that implicatively negates]]].

[D1' Parallel answer]: There also, there is dependence on another cognition²⁷⁰ [[[i.e., (other) than the invalidating valid cognition]]] [[[that negates product for what is permanent]]] [[[(another cognition) that apprehends directly]]] that apprehends a pot. [[[Thus, it is not the case that the invalidating valid cognition would become something that implicatively negates.]]]

Cii-ii.i-ii-ii Rejection of rejoinders with regard to this, together with elaborations

[[[Rejection of rejoinders with regard to this, together with elaborations]]]

Objection: Does one realize that **what is a pot and is produced**²⁷¹ is pervaded by 'impermanent' from the action of the two awarenesses, namely (1) the awareness that apprehends 'produced' in a pot and (2) the awareness that negates 'produced' for what is permanent, ? [[[If one says "we do accept (that)"]]] In that case, the invalidating (valid cognition) *itself* (=2) would not be what proves the pervasion (of produced by impermanent) [[[because it relies on perception apprehending 'produced' in a pot]]]. And [[[If pot also – for which 'produced' is identified - is established to be impermanent via the two awarenesses,]]] from the action of the two awareness, namely (1) the awareness apprehending smoke behind the pass and (2) the awareness apprehending the connection (of smoke and fire) in the kitchen, indirectly, the pervasion of 'the back of the pass' by 'fire' also would be established. [[[This is the objection.]]]

Answer: [[[Answer]]] If it is the awareness that identifies ('produced') [[[by perception]]] in the pot – which is the example – which, itself, [[[having understood and not forgotten (that)]]] having apprehended ('produced') as a negandum, merely negates ('produced') [[[without depending on something else]]] in 'permanent' - which is the basis of debate - [[[“the productness of the pot is not found in what is permanent”]]], then that for which the pervasion is established (i.e., the pot perceived as produced/the perception of a produced pot) itself is asserted (absurdly) to be the establisher of pervasion.

[[[Thus, the invalidating valid cognition comes to be the establisher of pervasion, but since it relies on the action of another cognition, it does not become something that implicatively negates.]]] But this is not the case [[[that an invalidating valid cognition operates]]] in the absence of [[[the cause]]] the activity of a valid cognition apprehending 'produced', which is pervaded by 'gradual or sudden', in an example.

[[[In the case of the kitchen, this is not the same, as follows:]]] It is not the case that the perception that apprehends the relation (between smoke and fire) in the kitchen engages [[[the relation in the kitchen]]] having taken as object-support an object seen elsewhere [[[the property of the subject on the pass]]].

²⁷⁰ We consider the gloss "(las)" between 'blo' and 'gzhan' to be a mistake and do not translate it.

²⁷¹ In view of the fact that what is at stake is "proving the pervasion of produced by impermanent", one could emend "what is a pot and is produced" to just "what is produced". However, the gloss reading "the pot determined to be produced" would support the reading "what is a pot and is produced".

Thus, the inference [[[having taken (produced) as object by way of remembering this 'produced' that was pervaded by 'gradual or sudden', (the reasoning) "what is permanent," etc. (is not produced)]]] operates by way of something general in terms of having a similar nature [[[therefore, it does not come to be the cognition that apprehends the pervasion]]].

But since the [[[perception]]] that realizes the object by itself is not like that [[[perception does not apprehend 'produced', having taken as object the previous ('produced' that is a) property of the subject, because it lacks memory]]], it is not the same [[[the two, namely, the invalidating (argument) and the (cognition) that apprehends the relation of smoke and fire of the kitchen (are not parallel cases)]]]. And what apprehends the pervasion [[[of 'produced' by 'impermanent' indirectly]]], [[[the invalidating valid cognition]]], by relying on the 'produced' that was established [[[by perception]]] elsewhere [[[in the pot]]] [[[namely, by way of eliminating this superimposition ('produced', in what is permanent)]]], *does depend* on the activity of the cognition that apprehends that [[['produced' that was established elsewhere]]].

Further, when one sees the smoke at the back of the pass by (a cognition) that has not forgotten the activity of (the cognition) apprehending the relation (of smoke and fire) in the kitchen, the mere activity of this cognition itself does not establish the smoke of the pass to be the effect of fire or that the pass has fire. Indeed, the previous cognition [[[that apprehends the relation]]] does not operate having relied on the subsequent object, the object of (the cognition) apprehending the logical reason [[[I.e., the property of the subject]]], and the subsequent one [[[that apprehends the qualification of the subject]]] does not rely on the object of the previous one [[[that apprehends the relation (of smoke and fire) in the kitchen]]] (, something general) in terms of having a similar nature, because it [[[perception]]] realizes the object [[[i.e., there is smoke in the mountain]]] by itself [[[this is because perception is empty of the activity of remembering]]].

[[[Further]]] Precisely when there is perception of smoke [[[on the pass]]], without having forgotten the relation [[[in the kitchen]]], (there is) the determination that apprehends the similarity [[[between the example and the basis of debate]]] - "this [[[smoke of the pass]]] also is [[[realized to be]]] an effect of fire, like the preceding one [[[in the kitchen]]]" - this constitutes an adventitious inference.

It is explained [[[by Lotsa(wa)]]] [[[in the explanation in the Small commentary on the logical reason qua effect in the PVin]]] that it is established by an aspect of the realization by the subsequent perception itself [[[which apprehends the qualification of the subject]]]

"It (the subsequent 'smoke') has the nature of the previously seen one ('smoke in the kitchen') that what was established to be an effect of fire"

[[[Having established, in the kitchen, that if there is no smoke, there is no fire, when subsequently seeing smoke in another location, (it is understood) to be such that if there were no fire, it would not have arisen.]]]

This is not correct, because

- the back of the pass would be established as having fire, and

[[[When it is established by perception on the basis of the smoke of the pass that it is such that it would have arisen without fire, the pass must be established as well to have fire; like it is stated: “if the pervasion of the nature of the pass itself by fire is established, it follows that the probandum is established.”]]]

- this is contradictory to what is stated [[[by Lotsa(wa) himself]]], namely, that the explanation of Dharmottara, who explains it (the establishment of the pass having fire) to be an inference that apprehends the pervasion in a particular, is correct.

Thus, if the object for which the pervasion [[[of a perceived ‘produced’ by ‘impermanent’]]] is established indirectly [[[by the force of) the invalidating valid cognition that negates product among the permanent]]] on a basis of an object seen in [[[another, i.e.]]] the subject is an implicative negation [[[which is what Lotsa(wa) (holds)]]],

here also, it is absolutely the case that it would follow that the simple negation [[[which exclusively is asserted to be the probandum]]] – would not be the probandum because appearance would be established to be illusion indirectly [[[by the force of) the negation of a true nature by reasoning consciousness]]].

Therefore, (those) inducing or not inducing another state of affairs from the mere elimination of one’s own negandum with regard to the subject are [[[in general(?))]]] divisions consisting in ‘negation’ and ‘affirmation’, but they [[[those inducing or not inducing another state of affairs]]] are not distinctions which are divisions of negation [[[namely, into the two, simple negation and implicative negation]]].

Cii-ii.ii It is not suitable (that inference) has an aggregate as its object

Furthermore, it may well be the case that by negating the property to be negated, the aggregate (of the subject and the property to be negated) is indeed negated [[[although Lotsa(wa) asserts that the aggregate is negated]]], but it is not the case that inference has [[[is established to have]]] an aggregate as its object on account of the aggregate having become the negandum.

As it has already been said (in Verses 8ab, 9 and 10):

[=Verses 8ab, 9 and 10]

[=Verse 8ab]

[[[Because the probandum of the logical reason and the epistemic object of inference, these two, are one thing]]] What is to be inferred is the probandum of the logical reason What [[[the logical reason that]]] negates this [[[the epistemic object of inference]]] becomes a contradictory reason [[[, which establishes the inverse of the property to be proven]]]

[=Verse 9]

If what is to be inferred [[[the epistemic object of inference]]] [[[this negandum]]] were not the probandum of [[[what is to be proven by]]] the logical reason

It would be difficult for [[[the inference that]]] makes it inferred to rely on a logical reason.

If one says [[[It is said]]] that (there is reliance on a logical reason) because it (the epistemic object of inference, the negandum) is negated by the logical reason, (We answer:) A negative would be established as the epistemic object.

[=Verse 10]

And if the negative were a property of the negandum,
The negative would not be contradictory with the negandum, therefore²⁷²
Since the negandum is established to be a similar instance,
It would not be correct (for the logical reason) to negate (it).

Thus, the very negation of the aggregate consisting in appearance [[[dependent arising]]] and [[[intrinsically]]] true phenomenon being possessed in terms of being the very nature [[[of appearance]]] is the epistemic object [[[of inference]]], but having an aggregate as its object is actually posited for [[[on account of its being]]] a valid cognition that prove (, which is not the case here).

Structural analysis of C

Here, in this context of identifying the probandum [=C], having distinguished two positions [[[those of Gangpa and Lotsawa]]] [=Ci/Cii], (each) is presented [=Ci-i/Cii-i] and analysed [=Ci-ii/Cii-ii].

For the former [=Ci-ii] [[[in the context of refuting the explanation of Gangpa]]], this (analysis) is done by the two:

[Ci-ii.i] It is not the case that the argument by consequence (put forth by) the other is inconclusive \leftrightarrow Ci-ii.i \leftrightarrow [[[we do accept it]]]

[Ci-ii.ii] For us, there is nothing incorrect about the epistemic object \leftrightarrow Ci-ii.i

For the latter [=Cii-ii] [[[in the context of refuting Lotsa(wa)]]]

[Cii-ii.i] It is not the case that simple and implicative negations are divisions of negation

[Cii-ii.ii] It is not suitable (for this inference) to have an aggregate as its object \leftrightarrow Cii-ii.ii

As for the first of those [=Cii-ii.i]

[Cii-ii.i-i] General refutation by scriptures and reasoning \leftrightarrow Cii-ii.i-i

[Cii-ii.i-ii] Considering this idea, specific refutation \leftrightarrow Cii-ii.i-ii

For the latter, it is explained by:

[Cii-ii.i-ii-i] The answer is the same \leftrightarrow Cii-ii.i-ii-i

[Cii-ii.i-ii-ii] Rejection of rejoinders with regard to this, together with elaborations \leftrightarrow Cii-ii.i-ii-ii

²⁷² The version of the verse cited earlier reads here "and" instead of "therefore".

D The element “logical reason”

As for the element consisting in the logical reason, in general, one puts forth a positive or one puts forth a negative.

The former is, for instance ‘dependent arising’. The latter are

- the Diamond-slivers, a negation via a discussion of the cause [[[“arising from oneself, from something else, from both, or without a cause”]]]
- the negation of arising of something existent or non-existent, a negation via a discussion of the effect
- the negation of the four possibilities of arising, a negation via the analysis of both cause and effect
- the neither-one-nor-many argument, a negation via the analysis of the intrinsic nature (of an entity).

They are innumerable.

Since an analysis of which valid cognition establishes pervasion and qualification of the subject for each of these would take too much space, it will not be stated.

In brief, because the neither-one-nor-many (logical reason) has the unobstructed power of the Diamond-slivers that destroy all the rocks that are proliferations, this one will be analyzed.

Among the two (points): qualification of the subject and pervasion (of the neither-one-nor many logical reason).

Di Qualification of the subject

DiA. Khyung Rinchendrak on the qualification of the subject

[[[The position of Khyung]]]

DiA.i Refutation of the position of others (i.e., of Gangpa)

In the *Madhyamakāloka*, two ways (to establish the qualification of the subject) are explained [[[perception and inference]]], [[[Gangpa asserts that it is established by perception]]] but the position of establishing by perception is not the case [[[says Jotsün(/the followers of Jotsün)²⁷³]]]: this (i.e., what establishes the qualification of the subject) is a logical reason that establishes a convention[[[since for the logical reason ‘neither one nor many’, the state of affairs is already established]]].

This being the case, if [[[the absence of one or many is ultimate]]] it were an ultimate state of affairs that is established by perception, [[[there would be five faults:]]]

(1)

One would be a Superior one.

(2)

[[[2]]] If it is the very perception that apprehends something as having parts that negates its being true as a partless unity, the non-aspectualists’ assertion that what is manifold is true as a unity [[[they assert that appearance is true as the appearance as manifold (and) cognition is true as a unique nature]]] would be abolished.

²⁷³ The expression ”jo btsun pa” occurs two other times, once as ”jo btsun pa dag”; other occurrences read ”jo btsun”.

(3)

[[[3]]] If the mere establishment of appearances as many negated truth as a unity, the thesis of the (argument based on the reason) 'certitude of co-apprehension' would be eliminated [[truth as a unity would be negated for the thesis of the proof that, from the perspective of apprehending them as associated, the entity that is the apprehended factor is true as cognition, but is not different (from cognition)]]]

(4)

[[[4]]] If truth as unity is eliminated by the mere appearance, positively, as many, the negation [[i.e., elimination]] of permanence [[of sound]] would already be established by the mere positive determination of sound as produced.²⁷⁴

(5)

[[[Five,]]] For a perception that apprehends [[as two]] appearances as many, beyond the mere negation of 'non-appearance as many' that is the opposite of its own object ('appearance as many') [[which is established]], truth [[as a unity]] cannot be negated from [[from the appearance as many]].

Gangpa	P= Perception Apprehension as having parts	→	N= Negation of partless unity / negation of truth as unity	
Jotsün's objections:				
1) ordinary person	P	→	N (which is an ultimate meaning)	Person is Superior
2) non- aspectualist	Appearance as many	But	True as one (no negation of truth as unity)	How can they hold a view contrary to N?
3) 'certitude of co- apprehension'- thesis	Appearance of blue as distinct from mind		Blue, etc. is not different from the mind = true as one	Thesis eliminated by N
4)	Positive determination of produced	→	Negation of permanence	Thesis established when establishing pakṣadharmā
5)	Appearance as many	→	Negation of non- appearance as many (but no → negation of truth as unity)	Not the case that P-- >N

(Jotsün's own position)

1) Inference	Subject	Logical reason	Probandum
		Apprehension as many	Negation of truth as unity
2) Inference (khyab byed mi dmigs pa)		Negation of one	Negation of many

²⁷⁴ Consequently, the thesis « sound is impermanent » would already be established at the time of establishing the qualification of the subject.

(a)

[[[Since this (Gangpa's position) is not correct, it is as follows:]]] Truth as a unity is negated from a logical reason consisting in 'apprehension as having parts' [[by two combined inferences / by a succession of two inferences]], and by that (logical reason) also, the negation of many is to be inferred [[["Since there is no unity – the pervader – there is no multiplicity"]]].

(b)

And here, [[the position is that]] a mere convention is established (by the argument that establishes 'neither one nor many'). The state of affairs is (already) established indeed, because: [[taking an ultimate nature as the basis]] a nature does not surpass a unitary nature and a multiple nature, and when unity is negated as well as multiplicity [[by the concept put forth as logical reason (i.e., 'neither one nor many')]], a nature is negated without a remainder.

DiA.ii Our own position is faultless

[[[He (Khyung's opponent, Gangpa) argues:]]]

"If the apprehension [[by perception]] of many parts does not negate truth as unity, the [[positive]] determination²⁷⁵ of blue would not eliminate doubts concerning yellow."

This refutation [[by Gangpa]] does not stand, [[as follows:]] By apprehending blue, one negates non-blue. And one also negates yellow, etc. which is pervaded by that (i.e., non-blue).

In the same way, the apprehension as many parts negates (a) *non-appearance as many* and also negates (b) particulars that are pervaded by that (by 'non-appearance as many'), such as *appearance as one*, etc. [[insofar as 'appearance as one' is pervaded by 'non-appearance as many']] [[This way is somewhat similar (to the case of blue, so that (parallel) is not invalidated)].

However, truth as a unity [[is not negated by the apprehension as many]] is a concept other than these things to be eliminated [[by appearance as many]] (i.e., (a) and (b) above), therefore its negation [[(the negation) of truth as a unity]] is not established [[by the apprehension as many]].²⁷⁶

DiA.iii Presentation via objections and answers

[[[Setting forth two objections by Gangpa:]]]

DiA.iii-i Objection and answer regarding whether one and many are directly incompatible or not

Objection: Here, are 'one' and 'many' directly incompatible, i.e., mutually excluding, or not?

(a) If they are (directly incompatible), since their nature is such that the negation of 'one' establishes the other [[many]], neither [[one nor many]] is not established [[therefore the qualification of the subject is not established]].

²⁷⁵ A gloss inserted here reads [[non-appearance as many in the case of non-appearance as many]] - which we cannot make sense of.

²⁷⁶ This argument echoes (5) above, which however only considered negation (a).

(b) If they are not (directly incompatible), a nature that is a third possibility would be possible [[[just as blue and yellow, the two, do not eliminate a third (possibility)]]], therefore [[[the logical reason ‘neither one nor many’]]] would be inconclusive to negate [[[a nature]]].

Answer: Because [[[the negandum (is)]]] an absolute [[[taking an absolute entity as the basis of one or many]]] is eliminated [[[a nature that is devoid of these two is negated, because they are incompatible in the sense of (elimination)]]], there is no inconclusiveness (i.e., (b) is rejected). And there is neither (one nor many for the subject), because appearance [[[set forth as what has the property ‘one or many’]]] is not encompassed by an absolute one or many (I.e., (a) is rejected). [[[While it is the case that the subject, appearance, is one or many, since it is lacking *absolute* one or many, which is what is set forth as the logical reason, there is no fault that the qualification of the subject is not established.]]]

DiA.iii-ii Objection and answer regarding whether they are incompatible or not incompatible

DiA.iii-ii-i Setting forth the objection

[[[Further]]]

Objection: Are ‘apprehension as many parts’ and ‘truth as unity’ compatible or incompatible?

- If they are compatible, (it) [[[the first formal proof]]] would not be suitable as an argument that negates [[[truth as unity by the apprehension of many]]] [[[because, by establishing something compatible, what is compatible (with it) does not come to be negated]]]
- If they are incompatible, since they are not related, it is mistaken that by negating [[[the pervader]]] ‘one’ which is not a relatum, [[[the pervaded]]] ‘many’ which is not a related nature would be negated, therefore the subsequent argument [[[that negates ‘many’ by negating one]]] is inconclusive.

DiA.iii-ii-ii Refuting the answer of others

Some [[[Gangpa, etc.]]] say:

It is ‘yin pa incompatible’ and ‘yod pa related’:

[[[‘Apprehension as many parts’ is incompatible with being one (yin-‘one’) and it is related with presence of ones (yod-‘one’) among those (parts)]]]

[[[Thus ‘being one’ comes to be negated, and by negating ‘one’, ‘many’ comes to be negated as well]]]

Here, although being (‘yin’) is negated [[[by the logical reason ‘apprehension as many’]]], presence (‘yod’) is established [[[among the ones that are connected with it in terms of being present]]].

And as for the latter [[[presence of ones]]], if being (‘yin’) (one) is negated by its parts being [[[apprehended as]]] many, a time when the logical reason (‘apprehending many’) is established never comes, just like when a unity such as a pot is being divided gradually into finer and finer parts, namely the belly, the neck, the mouth and the base, etc. (namely, one never reaches the apprehension of many?)

And [[[as a refuting answer, insofar as the many (ones) that are present as many also have a relation to one]]] whenever the logical reason ‘apprehending as many’ that negates ‘one’ is established, **presence** of ones is (still) established’ [[[because ‘apprehending as many’ is related to the presence of ones]]] [[[because it is not possible to negate the one that is present (i.e., the pot)/the ones that are present (i.e., the many parts of the pot)?]]]

This [[[i.e., what is stated by Gangpa]]] is not the case.

DiA.iii-ii-iii Presenting one’s own answer

Then how is it?

[[[According to Jotsün, it is as follows:]]]

‘Truth as a unity’ is negated by the logical reason ‘[[[conventional]]] appearance as many’, because they [[[apprehension as many parts from the perspective of appearance and absolute unity]]] are incompatible.

[[[Conventional]]] Appearance as many is not pervaded by **existence** as true as an [[[absolute]]] unity, therefore it [[[absolute one]]] is not established [[[by apprehension as many]]].

[[[Insofar as true as many is related to true as one,]]] By negating true as a unity – the pervader of true as many – one negates a relatum (of appearing as many), and through this one does negate a related nature (a true many), hence there is absolutely no fault [[[of true as many]]].

DiA.iii-ii-iv Rejecting rejoinders to that

Objection: If appearance as many is not pervaded by **existence** [[[true as one]]] because it [[[appearance as many]]] is not determined to be true as one,

Then it would not be established that it [[[true as one]]] is negated [[[by appearance as many]]] because it is not determined that appearance as many and true as a unity are incompatible.

Just as appearance as many is not pervaded by existence as true unity,

The incompatibility of [[[this]]] appearance as many and true as one also is not established.

Answer: If the appearing object of the appearance of the moon as many is true [[[is it true? If one says that it is true]]], it must be true as two, therefore it is incompatible with being true as one. [[[One also learns, with the similar meaning, the example of the floaters for a sick person]]]. However, this mistaken apprehension [[[because what is utterly non-existent is not incompatible???]]] is not pervaded by **existence** of one [[[moon]]]. Thus, as thereby exemplified, even though something is not pervaded by existence [[[e.g., conventional appearance as many (is not pervaded by **existence** as) true unity]]], there is absolutely establishment [[[of appearance as many and true as one]]] as incompatible, therefore, it [[[the parallel]]] is not the same.

DiA.iv Summary of this section / statement of one’s (=Khyung’s) own position

Thus, by apprehending pleasure and suffering as many parts, it is contradictory to establish them [[[the two, pleasure and suffering]]] to be a true unity, therefore the negation [[[of being both pleasure and suffering]]] is established. In conformity with

this pervasion, the logical reason ‘appearance as many parts’ establishes simultaneously the negation of every unity – subtle or gross – for the subject, mere appearance. But this does not depend on taking (them) gradually [[[part by part]]].²⁷⁷

This is the complete teaching [[[of Jotsün]]].

Example	Pleasure and suffering	Apprehension as many (2?)	→	Negation of unity
			Because Contrary to establishment as true unity	
1) Inference	Subject	Logical reason	→	Probandum
	Mere appearance	Appearance as many		Negation of truth as unity

Structural analysis of DiA

As for these (what precedes):

[DiA.i] Refutation of the position of others <→DiA.i>

[DiA.ii] Our own position is faultless <→DiA.ii>

[DiA.iii] Presentation via objections and answers

[DiA.iv] Summary of this section [[[by way of this, statement of one’s own position (=Khyung’s)]]] <→DiAiv>

As for “objection and answer” [=DiA.iii]: <→DiAiii>

[DiA.iii-i] Objection and answer regarding whether one and many are directly incompatible or not

[DiA.iii-ii] Objection and answer regarding whether they are incompatible or not incompatible

As for the last one [=DiA.iii-ii] [[[there are four points:]]]

[DiA.iii-ii-i] Setting forth the objection <→DiAiii-ii.i>

[DiA.iii-ii-ii] Refuting the answer of others <→DiAiii-ii.ii>

[DiA.iii-ii-iii] Presenting one’s own answer <→DiAiii-ii.iii>

[DiA.iii-ii-iv] Rejecting rejoinders to that <→DiAiii-ii.iv>

DiA’. Reconsideration of Khyung’s position (by Gyamarwa)

[[[Gya(marwa):]]] This is to be reconsidered.

²⁷⁷ A possible reading of this discussion: there are two contexts: A: proving the pakṣadharmā by an inference, in which the logical reason “apprehending many” negates “unity”. B: going from “not one” to “not many” via negation of the pervader. Both A and B involve “one” and “many”, but in A the two are incompatible, and in B one is pervaded by the other, because the “many” in A is appearance, and the “many” in B is a “true many” (a collection of true unities). This might be what Gangpa implies by distinguishing “yin ’gal” (=A) and “yod ’brel” (=B).

(1')

The perception of the magician understands the [[[magical]]] horse and elephant to be without nature, and the perception of (a person) whose eyes are not faulty understands the strands of hair to be without nature; however, these two do not become Superior ones, therefore (your argument) is inconclusive [[[when (arguing against) the establishment of 'neither one nor many' (for the subject) by perception]]].

And even if one objects:

These two cases are just petty emptiness (this is why we do not consider that they become Superior by knowing it by perception).

It is suitable to consider the answer [[[of Gangpa]]]: "The subject being perceivable in general (as) lacking nature is similar to those (cases of absence of horse and absence of hair). (i.e., one does not become Superior by perceiving them)"

[[[Thus, the first fault does not apply.]]]

(2')

Just like it follows (according to Jotsün, from the elimination of 'one or many' by perception) that the non-aspectualists' assertion that what appears as manifold is true as a unity would be abolished, if a pot is negated by the perception that apprehends a lump of clay, the Sāṃkhya assertion that the effect exists in the cause [[[saying "the pot exists in the clay"]]]] would be abolished, [[[If one says that the perception that apprehends the clay establishes the fact that there is no pot, but does not prevent that there would be superimpositions owing to the bad treatises of those who are influenced by the Samkhya tenets, then this is also the same for the true-aspectualists²⁷⁸]]]

[[[The second fault does not apply either.]]]

(3')

As for the elimination of the thesis of the (argument based on the reason) 'certitude of co-apprehension' we [[[Gya(marwa)]]] perfectly agree. [[[This fault does apply to Gangpa.]]]

(4')

We do accept that by positively determining that sound is produced [[[insofar as it is newly made by causes and conditions]]], one eliminates permanence in the sense of already existing and enduring from the beginning. However, even while it [[[sound]]] is established to be produced, because the doubt that it would not be momentary is not [[[yet]]] eliminated, inference [[[that infers that sound is momentary]]] does apply.

[[[The fourth fault does not apply.]]]

(5')

When, by determining [[[positively]]] appearance as many, the non-appearance as many, which is the opposite of that, is negated, it is possible as well to negate [[[i.e.,

²⁷⁸ It would make more sense to conclude here that the same would apply to the non-aspectualists, with whom the comparison is made in the first place. The reading "true-aspectualist" could be understood to say that the true aspectualists still have the 'superimposition' that there is only mind even though they perceive external objects.

eliminate]]] truth as one [[[by way of appearance as many]]], because an ultimate partless unity, which has (many) aspects, existing as a nature suitable to appear, entails its being apprehended [[[as being of that nature]]] (but there is no such apprehension).

Gangpa	P= Perception Apprehension as having parts	→	N= Negation of partless unity / negation of truth as unity		
Jotsün's objections:					Gyamarwa's reconsideration
1) ordinary person	P	→	N (which is an ultimate meaning)	Person is Superior	Not necessarily, e.g., magician
2) non- aspectualist	Appearance as many	But	True as one (no negation of truth as unity)	How can they hold a view contrary to N?	Because one can hold any view when influenced by bad treatises (like the Sāmkhya)
3) 'certitude of co- apprehension'- thesis	Appearance of blue as distinct from mind		Blue, etc. is not different from the mind = true as one	Thesis eliminated by N	Agree
4)	Positive determination of produced	→	Negation of permanence	Thesis 'sound is impermanent' established when establishing pakṣadharmā	Only gross permanence is negated, not non- momentariness
5)	Appearance as many	→	Negation of non- appearance as many (but no → negation of truth as unity)	Not the case that also P-->N	Yes also → N - P=non- apprehension of unity suitable to appear → N

Thus, refuting the other position [[[i.e., (Jotsün's) objections against Gangpa]]] (=DiA.i) is difficult.

DiA'.ii Reconsideration of the claim that Jotsün's own position is faultless (=DiA.ii)

1) Reconsidering DiA.i (b)

The system [[[that Jotsün himself asserts]]] according to which the state of affairs 'naturelessness' is (already) established when establishing 'neither one nor many', [[[a convention is therefore established]]]²⁷⁹ (=b in DiA.i, Jotsün's own position) is completely incorrect, for the following reason:

²⁷⁹ This refers to the paragraph which represents Jotsün's own position, which just precedes DiA.ii.

[[[By examining the meaning of]]] (When saying) “When one and many are negated, nature is negated without a remainder,” [[[do you assert that]]] is it [[[a nature]]] [[[negated]]] [[[without a remainder]]] in reality, or negated as an object of mind?

- [[[In the first case]]], (among) all [[[without remainder]]] the (logical reasons qua) non-apprehension of the pervader that negate [[[the pervaded when negating the pervader]]] in reality [[[it would follow that all of them would establish a convention, but it is not the case that all of them establish a convention]]], there is also the proof of a state of affairs.
- [[[If one says it is (negated) as an object of mind]]] the reason for the negation as an object of mind is analyzed [[[now]]].

If one says: (A nature is negated as an object of mind) Because [[[a nature]]] does not surpass unitary and multiple, and both are negated.²⁸⁰

Answer: [[[This “not surpassing one or many”]]] Is it [[[asserted]]] that it does not surpass [[[these two]]] in reality, or is it a cognition as [[[the object of mind]]] not surpassing [[[these two]]]?

- In the former case, all (logical reasons) qua non-apprehension of the pervader would establish a convention [[[because (considering) the pervader of every pervaded, (such logical reasons) negate the pervader that does not surpass in reality]]].
- In the latter case, is the qualification of the subject apprehended by this valid cognition together with the pervasion? [[[saying “a nature does not surpass one or many, and it is devoid of both one and many”]]]

Thus this one [[[the process of the system of establishing the convention ‘neither one nor many’]]] is for what is suitable to appear as one or many.

But [[[the system in which it comes to establishing a state of affairs (applies in the following case):]]]

Establishment of the state of affairs is possible in case the subject, although existing as (having) a nature, is not suitable to appear, just like one establishes the state of affairs “absence of smoke” via the non-apprehension of a fire that is suitable to appear, in the case of a large fire (producing) smoke that is not suitable to appear.²⁸¹

Here if one asserts [[[(as) Gya(marwa)]]] that establishment of a state of affairs is not possible, because among either (nature as) absolute or mere appearance, a specific (subject) is suitable to appear as one or many (and hence there would be establishment of a convention) and there cannot be a generic subject ‘mere nature’ that is not suitable to appear, this is set forth later on.

²⁸⁰ This amounts to a reformulation of Jotsün’s argument that « [[[taking an ultimate nature as the basis]]] a nature does not go beyond a unitary nature and a multiple nature, and when unity is negated as well as multiplicity [[[by the concept put forth as logical reason (i.e., ‘neither one nor many’)]], a nature is negated without a remainder. « (DiA.i, (b)). Jotsün’s statement connected the two sentences with « ‘i » ; they are here conneced with « las ». Both are unusual, and can be interpreted in the sense of « and. »

²⁸¹ The example could be that the fire is so fierce that the smoke, although it would be present, could not be seen.

[[[This is to be reconsidered.

(A) It is possible to have a subject (such that the generic/pervader is) suitable to appear – e.g. “tree” – and (the specific/pervaded) – e.g. “śiṃśapa” – is not suitable to appear, therefore even when negating “tree,” śiṃśapa is not negated. Therefore it is not correct to say that “the establishment of a state of affairs is not possible.”

-

(B) (Objection): if the qualification of the subject “there is no tree” is established although there is a doubt about the presence of a śiṃśapa, then

(in parallel): mere smoke would be established to be the effect of fire although there is a doubt that the smoke on the pass might not be an effect of fire

(C) (Answer): How is this parallel?

Thus, one considers that the proof of a state of affairs is not possible regarding the absence of the pervaded (“śiṃśapa”) when negating (the pervade) “tree”.²⁸²

And also when stating our own position

What would be the answer/One would answer that it is the establishment of a convention only.

When the negandum of the logical reason as well as the negandum to be established for a subject that is suitable to appear are suitable to appear to the (cognition that) apprehends the logical reason, this very valid cognition also negates the root negandum

rtags kyi dgag bya snang du rung ba'i chos can la sgrub bya'i dgag bya yang rtags 'dzin la snang du rung ba'i tshe tshad ma des rtsa ba'i dgag bya yang [khegs] pas tha snyad tsaM sgrub pa *i* lan? /

Thus saying “establishment of a state of affairs for what is not suitable to appear” is not correct:

it would absurdly follow that establishing the convention of absence when negating by (the cognition) apprehending the logical reason, on account of the negandum – what is to be established by (the cognition) apprehending the logical reason – being suitable to appear, would not be possible, because the very negation of the negandum to be established amounts to the establishment of the probandum.

(Example: the pass has no smoke, because it has no fire.

negandum of the logical reason: no smoke

negandum to be established for the subject by the cognition apprehending the logical reason: no fire)

It would not be possible to establish the convention of absence in the following way:

Because the negandum to be established by the (cognition) apprehending the logical reason is suitable to appear, the convention of its absence is established when it is negated by the (cognition) apprehending the logical reason

Because the very negation of the negandum to be established is establishing the probandum.

²⁸² It seems that speaker A holds don sgrub to be possible ; speaker B objects to the example with a parallel ; speaker C disagrees with the parallel, but considers don sgrub to be impossible.

]]]

2) Reconsidering DiA.ii

Further, it may well be that the appearance as many (a) eliminates non-appearance as many and (b) eliminates appearance as one, which is pervaded by that (i.e., by non-appearance as many).

But even though the concept ‘true as a unity’ is different from those, it *does* get negated [[[because we do not accept (that it would not be negated) just on account of being a different concept]]]:

Consider a negandum that is *manifest*²⁸³, (such as) a color that is true as partless: if the color having parts perceived by visual cognition were true as (having) the nature of that (i.e., of one), since it (this nature of one) is suitable to appear [[[yod dgos]]], it entails that it would be perceived [[[as having the nature of that (i.e., of one)]]].

If this were not the case, the [[[positive]]] determination as blue would (a) eliminate [[[negatively]]] non-blue and (b) eliminate [[[negatively the appearance as]]] yellow that is pervaded by that [[[by non-blue²⁸⁴]]], but it could not (c) eliminate the manifest particulars of yellow gold, (and its) being good or not good, which are a concept different from these [[[i.e., from yellow]]] [[[because they are a different concept]]]²⁸⁵. Thus, for these neganda that are manifest that have a nature [[[of having the property (of being)]]] suitable to appear, there is (a) direct elimination [[[of non-appearance as many or of non-blue]]], and (b) the negation of what is pervaded by that [[[i.e., what is negated (directly)]]], and (c) (the negation) of what is pervaded by what is pervaded (by that), etc. [[[truth as one, and gold jewelry]]] also is established.

When (the negandum) is *not manifest*, (it is not eliminated indirectly), just like the determination as blue (a) eliminates [[[negatively]]] non-blue, but, for example, does not (b) eliminate non-momentary, which is pervaded by that [[[by non-blue]]]²⁸⁶.

While [[[if one objects that]]] there is no existence as color that is a partless unity [[[the negandum]]], because of (the negandum) [[[being characterized by]]] existence *as true* (as partless unity), (the negandum) being manifest is not eliminated.²⁸⁷

²⁸³ We translate here as “manifest” the Tibetan expression “*rnam pa dang ldan pa*” (lit. “endowed with a form/aspect”) and as “non-manifest” the expression “*rnam pa dang mi ldan pa*” (lit. “not endowed with a form/aspect”). On rNgog Lo and Phya pa’s use of these terms – alternatively, for other scholars, the terms “*rnam pa gsal ba/mi gsal ba*” (lit. “whose form/aspect is clear or unclear” – to distinguish properties of an object that can be intrinsically ascertained by perception (such as ‘blue’) or not (such as ‘impermanent’), see Hugon 2011: 168–170.

²⁸⁴ The note reads “by blue”, which is logically incorrect.

²⁸⁵ In the light of the next paragraph that speaks of “golden jewelry,” the particular pervaded by the pervaded is here a particular type of yellow consisting in gold. “Good and not good” can be understood as other particular types of yellow, or as particulars of yellow gold.

²⁸⁶ “Non-momentary” is here set forth as an instance of a “non-manifest negandum.” See n. 283 on “momentary” as a typical example of a non-manifest property.

²⁸⁷ Although the expression “*rnam pa mi ldog*” is unclear, the objection seems to attempt to argue that the disputed negandum “truth as unity” is not manifest, and hence does not indirectly get negated, hence our translation “its being manifest is not eliminated.” The objection attacks the example of manifest negandum “color that is true as partless” (*cha med cig du bden ba’i kha dog*), but omits in the reformulation “color that is a partless unity” (*cha med cig po kha dog*) the expression “true as” (*bden pa*).

Thus, that one's own position [[[i.e., Jotsün's]]] (see DiA.ii) is faultless is difficult.

DiA'.iii Reconsideration of Jotsün's explanation by way of objection and answer (=DiA.iii)

The explanation by way of objection and answer is correct in general.

(But,) specifically, (the notion of) "finer and finer parts" is explained in many texts, (such as:)

Because the body is a collection of hands (, etc.)

And a hand is a collection of fingers

And the finger is a collection of joints

And a joint is divided in parts...²⁸⁸

By negating without remainder, the atom at the end of (the process of finer and finer division starting) for instance with the finger, one eliminates the doubt (of being a unity) in general with regard to other things that are apprehended as having parts, thus it [[[the finer and finer division]]] does not have to be presented; consequently, there is absolutely no fault that "a time when the logical reason ('apprehending many') is established never comes."²⁸⁹

DiA'.iv Reconsideration of Jotsün's summary (=DiA.iv)

The summary of the context (by Jotsün, see DiA.iv) is not good, for the following reasons:

The answer points out this characterization, which presumably constitutes the "form/aspect" (*rnam pa*) of the negandum, such that the negandum is "endowed with a form."

²⁸⁸ {Dunhuang Tibetan VIII.65cd-67 (Saito 1993: 22): *de bzhin ci srid lag stsogs tshogs || de srid 'di la lus su snang || 66: de bzhin sor mo'i tshogs rnams las || rkang pa yang ni gang zhig yod || de yang tshig gi tshogs yin la || tshig kyang rang gi cha shas dbye' || 67: cha shas kyang ni rdul phye nas || de yang de 'drar rnam par gzhi || phyogs cha rnams kyang cha myed pas || nam mkha' dang mtshugs des rdul myed ||*

Saito relates Bu ston's discussion that the bstan 'gyur version of rNgog blo ldan shes rab's translation of the longer version of BCA was tampered with by gTsang nag pa using the older translations of dPal brtsegs and Rin chen bzang po; dPal brtsegs's translation was the shorter text, preserved in the Dunhuang version. So, rNgog's translation could be different from both the Dunhuang and the bstan 'gyur.}

²⁸⁹ This was a fault pointed out by Gangpa in DiA.iii-ii-ii « And as for the latter [[[presence of ones]]], if being ('yin') (one) is negated by its parts being [[[apprehended as]]] many, a time when the logical reason ('apprehending many') is established never comes, just like when a unity such as a pot is being divided gradually into finer and finer parts, namely the belly, the neck, the mouth and the base, etc. (namely, one never reaches the apprehension of many?)« . The argument here seems to refer to the negation of the atom via the analysis of its parts, which constitutes a final step (the parts of the atom are not further divided). Thus one does not need to go into further analyses, and maybe also one does not need to specify the steps of division between the unity under consideration (e.g., the finger) and the atom.

- It [[[the assertion that unity is negated by the logical reason ‘apprehension as having parts’]]] is invalidated by teaching [[[incorrectly]]]²⁹⁰ the system according to which the existence of this appearance as a true partless unity is negated by the perception that positively determines that it has parts.
- If for the example ‘pleasure and suffering’ existing as having the nature of a true unity is negated by a logical reason [[[without being negated by perception]]] on account of being apprehended as many, there would be infinite regress pertaining to the example. [[[Here also, an example is needed. And even though perception apprehends it as having parts, since (you say) it does not negate truth as a unity, one relies on a logical reason and in that case, for this also one would need an example.]]] And if the very perception [[[that apprehends the example as many parts]]] establishes (its not being true as one), this would also be established [[[by that very perception]]] for the subject of debate, because [[[the two, the example and the basis of debate]]] are similar in that a negandum that is manifest is being negated for a basis suitable to appear.

DiB. Gangpa on the qualification of the subject

[[[Gangpa’s system according to which the qualification of the subject is established by perception]]]

DiB.i The system for establishing the logical reason (neither-one-nor-many) for a perceptible (subject)

DiB.i-i The way it is established by perception

If one determines positively that a subject that is perceptible - form etc. - has parts, one eliminates a partless unity and multiplicity, because while being suitable to appear, it [[[a partless unity]]] is not apprehended.

The negation of ‘partless’ alone is the very negation of ‘ultimate one’, for the following reasons:

- An entity empty of many, which has a nature incompatible with [[[apprehension as having]]] parts etc., [[[such thing that is like this]]] is true as having the characteristic of ‘one’
- And this [[[unity]]] [[[true as unity]]] is eliminated by determining positively that [[[apprehension as many]]], which is incompatible (to it), (namely) the apprehension as many parts.

Empty of many = partless	<-Incompatible - >	Apprehension of/as many parts = negation of partless	a) positive determination of many parts
=		=	Perception as having many parts
One		Negation of one	b) negative elimination of one

Thus, it is not the case that it is the logical reason that negates one that negates many [[[that is pervaded by it (by one)]]]. It is always the apprehension as exclusively various parts that eliminates [[[both]]] partless one and many, because the application of the same valid cognition positively determines one thing and eliminates others.

²⁹⁰ Check: This could be that this system is that of Gangpa, which is to be examined next, or that Jotsün himself made this contradictory claim in the course of the discussion.

DiB.i-ii Refutation of establishment by inference

If [[[true unity]]] is negated by a logical reason consisting in ‘apprehension as many,’ all negations (such as) of yellow on account of apprehending as blue, etc. would be performed by [[[an inference by way of]]] a logical reason.

DiB.i-iii Rejection of refutation regarding our own position

[[[If one says that it follows]]] That perception establishes the state of affairs consisting in absence of nature [[[this is]]] is something we perfectly agree with. But as for (the absurd consequence) that one would become a Superior one, it is not entailed, because (the logical reason) is inconclusive, because the perception of magicians realizes (illusory) horse and elephant to be without nature [[[however, (the magician) is not a Superior one]]].²⁹¹

DiB.ii The system for establishing (the logical reason) for a concealed (subject)

For concealed subjects, such as the self, an atom, or a moment of cognition, etc., they are established (not to be one) by inference, awareness having taken them as subject from the perspective of appearance, in the same way they are explained in the treatises [[[to lack truth]]].

DiB.iii Objections together with answers

The following analysis is suitable:

Are ‘one’ and ‘many’ contradictory or connected?

- [[[If they are contradictory]]], one would not be able to negate ‘many’ by negating ‘one’, or
- [[[If they are connected]]] It is not correct to negate ‘one’ by apprehending ‘many’ [[[insofar as ‘many’ is pervaded by ‘one’]]]

[[[Apprehension as many]]] is incompatible [[[with ‘one’]]] in terms of *being* (i.e., being one and being many [namely, what *is* ‘one’ cannot *be* ‘many’]), therefore it (apprehension as many) does negate it [[[‘being one’]]].

And [[[a ‘one’ among ‘many’]]] (they are) connected in terms of *existing* (i.e., the *existence* of ‘one’ is connected with the *existence* of ‘many’), therefore, it is correct as well that by negating one, many is negated.

Objection: [[[Since they are connected in terms of existing, ‘one’ being the pervader of ‘many’]]] What negates this [[[existence as one]]] in terms of existing?

Answer:

[[[The apprehension as many negates that many being one. But it does not negate existence (of one) among that (many). The nature of what exists (as) one is precisely being one, therefore, it is not negated.]]]

It is not [[[possible to negate (existence as ‘one’)]]] by the apprehension as many, because *existing* [[[existing) as one, that is the pervader of many]]] entails *being* (one).

²⁹¹ Compare with rGya dmar ba’s argument against Khyung’s objection that “one would become a Superior one” in DiA’.i.

Objection: It (i.e., existence as 'one') is not negated [[[because it is not possible to negate (it)]]] by 'many', the pervaded of the pervader.

[[[Considering: Existing (as) one is (the pervader) of many, and the pervader of that, further, is being one, therefore, the pervader of the pervader (=being one, the pervader of existing as one, which is the pervader of many) is not negated by the pervaded of the pervaded (=many, which is pervaded by existing as one, which is pervaded by being one)]]]]

Answer: When the apprehension as many [[[of a unity such as a fist]]] negates *being* one, something like the thumb that *exists* in that (fist), which is attested as many in dependence on its companions [[[the index finger, etc.]]], might well be pervaded by *being* a single nature, however

[[[if one thinks that the pervader of the pervader cannot be negated by the pervaded of the pervaded]]]

[[[Because (something) is apprehended as various colors in dependence on some companion, it is incompatible with unity, and because the white that is among that (i.e., those many colors) also is apprehended as many parts, it is not one.]]]

, this very thing that is presented as one (i.e., the thumb) does not go beyond many on account of the joints, etc. [[[the small parts]]], therefore (its) [[[existing (as) one]]] has to be negated: because one and many are incompatible, the negation of the pervader of the pervader itself is established.

Thus, since precisely that which is presented as being one [[[e.g., a joint]]] is perceived as many, [[[this unity]]] is established to be non-existent, because incompatible states of affairs [[[being one and being many]]] are not attested in reality [[[as joined in a single entity]]]. For instance: [[[if a permanent object is postulated]]] what exists in all the past and future moments is a permanent object, but if it has the nature of past and future [[[insofar as it is connected with many moments]]] it is incompatible with permanence²⁹²; and a permanent thing itself [[[i.e., a single moment]]] not depending on a past and/or future is not attested. Therefore, since there is incompatibility, it is not existent [[[Thus, something permanent (is not existent) in reality]]].

Structural analysis of DiB (Gang pa)

Regarding this [[[Gangpa's (position)]]], [[[Gangpa's]]] explanation (has the following points:

With the three:

[DiB.i-i] The way it (the qualification of the subject) is established by perception

↔DiBi-i>

[DiB.i-ii] Refutation of establishment by inference ↔DiBi-i>

[DiB.i-iii] Rejection of refutation regarding our own position ↔DiBi-i>

²⁹² maybe because what has a past nature and what has a future nature do not exist? The past one no longer exists, the future does not exist yet, so one cannot speak of permanence.

[DiB.i] The system for establishing the logical reason for a perceptible (subject)
 [DiB.ii] The system for establishing (the logical reason) for a concealed (subject)
 ↔DiBii;
 [DiB.iii] Objection together with answer ↔DiBiii

DiB'. Reconsideration of Gangpa's position (by Gyamarwa)

This also has to be reconsidered [[[by) Gya(marwa)]]].

DiB'.i The position according to which it (qualification of the subject) is established by perception (=DiB.i) is not suitable

DiB'.i-i The negation of an object known to be one or many is not established

In this regard, it may well be the case that the appearance of something manifest that is apprehended as having parts

- Negates unity as the nature of something manifest that is a partless one and
- Negates also many such [[[partless]]] unities.

However,

This (i.e., appearance) establishes only that a substance that is a whole [[[asserted by non-Buddhists]]] is devoid of absolute one and many, therefore it establishes that (neither absolute one nor many) in appearance. But on the other hand, the very perceptible subject [[[form, etc.]]] is asserted by learned ones - Sautrāntika, etc. - to have the nature of a conglomeration of [[[many partless]]] atoms. And [[[if one distinguishes among positions]]] if it is correct that it exists externally, depending on the position that it [[[atoms]]] must exist, the logical reason [[[‘apprehension as many’]]] is not established by perception, therefore its [[[atoms]]] being without a nature is not established either. As [[[for example]]] the argument proving that “A pot does not have a nature, because it lacks one or many as the nature of a blanket,” is ineffective.

DiB'.i-ii An answer that supplements the intention is refuted

Some [[[Takpa, etc., who supplement the explanation of Gangpa]]] say:

By apprehending as many parts, such as eastern and western, etc., one negates [[[by the very perception that apprehends the coarse thing]]] a coarse unity consisting in the conglomeration of the two parts, eastern and western, and one also negates existence as a subtle unity – the very eastern part [[[for example, alone]]] would be of the nature of that, i.e., (having) a western part (and an eastern part) [[[and vice versa]]]. Thereby, every unity, coarse or subtle, is established to be negated. Therefore, in general, it is established that there is no unity at all.

When one establishes, in general, that there is no (unity) at all, it also eliminates, in particular, the doubt that there could be a singular atom that is not visible.

Like [[[for example]]] when one establishes, in general, that there is no pot at all in a given place, it must eliminate also the doubt that the pots of gods and demons could exist (there).

What saddens the scholars delights the gods!

[[[rGya teaches that this is incorrect]]] It may well be the case that, for instance, the perception that apprehends a rosary [[[... (rtag ma)]]] as many parts eliminates its being a unity in terms of having the nature of a unity: a whole unity that is the conglomeration of all (parts) [[[of a long rosary]]] [[[is negated]]], [[[also, it is said that when one splits it, a subtle unity consisting in the arrangement in two chains, such as the string of the counter beads that exists, also is negated]]] the top (part) that has the nature of the bottom [[[He said that unity is established to be negated also for the two pairs of arrangements (top/bottom, bottom/top)]]], the bottom that has the nature of the top, etc.. [[[by the mere establishment of the negation of unity for an existing singular long rosary and also for the two arrangements when one splits (? Tib. kla)]]]

However, are the respective singular natures established to be non-existent?

[[[And]]] If [[[this]]] is established, what are the things [[[the cause for setting forth as many]]] apprehended to be many? [[[A rosary would be directly apprehended as many, and one would also assert that it is not apprehended]]]

Thus, while being contradictory with what is perceived, (for) all the things established to have parts, such as form etc., it is established that there is no unity consisting either in the large thing [[[a unity that is the large thing]]] or something else, a small thing [[[the many (small things)]]] that has the nature of unity, but the doubt that it [[[this multiplicity]]] might be a case of a collection of many ones is not eliminated [[[by negating (the former)]]].

[[[Furthermore, if one applies that to consciousness as well]]] Also, the experiences of pleasure and suffering, etc. as many successions are established to lack unity in terms of a nature that is a [[[large]]] unity or mutual unity [[[in relation to two or three]]]²⁹³ but the negation of the unities in [[[existing amidst]]] each moment is not established.

If it was not the case, the unities in each (of the parts of) the rosary or the moments (of consciousness) would be negated by perception even conventionally.

This statement would have to be repeated mutatis mutandis (in the case of East-West division).

We only answer because they (i.e., Takpa) fancy themselves to be scholars; otherwise, since this is not seen to be the words of logicians, one [[[Gya(marwa) himself]]] should not even answer.

DiB'-i-iii The way negation is not established (by perception)

When the (lower) schools assert that because the atoms, individually, are extremely subtle, they are not visible, but when covering a large space, at the occasion of being aggregated, they become appearing objects, (some say) “(the aggregate is not visible) like before [[[the atoms do not appear]]] because there is no difference”, etc. (and) others say “if one does not realize them individually previously, when they are not aggregated, they would not be realized either when aggregated with partners, because it is not different than before”.

In answer to that, insofar as it is said in the Commentary (PV?) “That there is no difference is not established” [[[in the way of the yak tail and the meadow]]], etc., the existence as a conglomerate of atoms that are not visible (individually) is not negated

²⁹³ Maybe the idea is of a unity in terms of one small part being of the nature of another small part, which is not the case.

[[[on account of the perception that apprehends the coarse object]]]. Therefore, (the absence of unity) is not established by perception.

DiB'.i-iv Invalidation of another tenet system

Furthermore, if appearance as many negates ultimate unity, then in the case of the thesis of the proof that [[the apprehended part]] pleasure and blue are not different [[from consciousness]] by means of the logical reason of (their) awareness [[‘co-apprehension’]], (this thesis) [[their being one]] is negated completely by the apprehension [[of the apprehended part, blue, etc., by perception]] as many, because being one is easy to negate [[because existing as one is negated]].

DiB'.ii The position according to which it is established by inference (DiB.ii) is not correct

As for applying [[inference]] to a concealed subject [[it is not correct:]], it is contradictory to posit [[the subject]] from the perspective of the mental appearance, because [[from the perspective of appearance]] a verbal object is the object of reflexive awareness (and so you could establish that it is not one by perception). And also, because when negating atoms etc., a perceptible particular such as form etc. is the subject, this [[that awareness is the subject]] is not correct.

DiB'.iii The presentation consisting in objection and answer (DiB.iii) is not correct

The negation of the pervader of the pervader is not correct at all either: If it is a pervader, how is it negated? If it is negated, how is it a pervader?

[[Just like the fault that Gangpa himself stated for the assemblage of contradictories]]

Like it is said: if it is contradictory, how is it assembled? If it is assembled, how is it contradictory?

[[It also ‘diminishes’ Gangpa’s explanation that ‘ultimate unity’ is the pervader of ‘appearance as many’:]] Because the pervader of the pervader of appearance as many is not ultimate unity [[which is asserted to be the negandum]], and because conventional unity is not the negandum, this [[the pervader of conventional many being taken to be ultimate unity]] is not seen in the speech of the wise.

For the very same reason, the explanation by way of presenting ‘permanent’ as the example also appears in the tenet system of the elimination of appearance [[because permanent is negated also conventionally]].

Structural analysis of DiB’

As for these (i.e., what precedes, there were the following points):

By the four:

[DiB'.i-i] The negation of an object known to be one or many [[(e.g.) an atom asserted by the Sautrantika, etc.]] is not established \leftrightarrow DiB'.i.i

[DiB'.i-ii] An answer that supplements the intention [[of him]] is refuted \leftrightarrow DiB'.i.ii

[DiB'.i-iii] The way negation is not established (by perception) \leftrightarrow DiB'.i.iii

[DiB'.i-iv] Invalidation of [[what is stated in]] another tenet system \leftrightarrow DiB'.i.iv

[DiB'.i] The position according to which it is established by perception is not suitable

And

[DiB'.ii] The position according to which it is established by inference is not correct

\leftrightarrow DiB'.ii

And

[DiB'.iii] The presentation consisting in objection and answer is not correct \leftrightarrow DiB'.iii

DiC Gyamarwa on the qualification of the subject

Then what is it? [[[What is the valid cognition that determines the qualification of the subject of the neither-one-nor-many (argument) according to our own position?]]]

Ultimate one or many is: an entity that is not incompatible with parts, etc. - this being the definition of one, and the collection of those [[are (respectively) absolute one and many]].

(A: Argument 'collection')

Here, [[[the subject]]] form etc. does not have the nature of a collection which is a partless unity, because it is apprehended to have various spatial parts, just like a reflection, etc.

(In this argument), the qualification of the subject is established by perception.

If it [[[the subject, form, etc.]]] has (the nature of) a collection that is a partless unity, it would not have distinct spatial parts.

'Being the support for seeing a single side' is pervaded by 'being attested exclusively in a spatial single side [[[having rejected other sides]]]', just like [[[establishment in an example by perception]]] that which is the support for seeing the single east spatial side of Devadatta's house is attested exclusively in the east side, having rejected other houses and other sides [[[west, etc. of that (house)]]].

This pervasion is conventionally established by perception in a coarse object, because the perception that apprehends something [[[the house in the East]]] as 'being the support for seeing [[[that house]]] as east' positively determines that it must be attested only in the eastern part, and establishes the elimination of being attested elsewhere [[[another place]]].

(B: Argument 'collection of atoms')

If this [[[coarse]]] form, etc. existed as a collection of atoms,

every support for seeing a single side - the atom in the middle - [[[also) the atoms existing in other directions]]] also would come to be absorbed in the area that is in the Eastern direction, because it is not different as the support for seeing a single side as east [[[for the (eastern) atoms]]], just like a house.

The qualification of the subject is accepted because one (i.e., the opponent) asserts a partless collection.

[[[If the side that is seen for the eastern atom was not seen for other atoms, the parts would be distinct, therefore being partless would be impaired.]]]

The pervasion [[[The pervasion of 'being the support for seeing one side' by 'extending to other directions also']]] is established by perception [[[in the house]]].

(C: Single place argument)

Similarly, from this very argument [[[i.e., that they are the support for seeing one side]]] it follows that all atoms would have a single place.

(D)

It follows from these (arguments) that [[[now]]]

the root logical reason [[[“because of the appearance as coarse”]]] is established, because the thesis [[[of (the argument) “It follows that appearance as coarse does not exist, because it is a collection of many partless (ones)”]]] is eliminated by valid cognition for the basis [[[of debate]]] in this context, since it is apprehended as having distinct spatial parts, and

- the pervasion is established [[[by perception in the house]]] in the contraposition in the context of the argument by consequence.

Therefore “it cannot be a collection (consisting of) agents of collection that are unities”

[[[because it is apprehended as having parts]]].

If one holds to be clever the consequence (relying on apprehension of) what is pervaded by what is incompatible (with the negandum) and (relying on the apprehension of) what is incompatible with the pervader (of the negandum) and their contraposition, the (proof) of one’s own (position), it is to be done thus [[[by pressing forward the intermediate consequence]]].

The (proof) of one’s own (position) itself - [[[the subject] does not exist as a partless one or many, because (it is)]]] “apprehended as many parts” - is also suitable [[[proper]]] for the learned ones who have established the reverse pervasion in e.g., a house [[[without relying on (the argument) induced by the consequence]]].

Insofar as pleasure and suffering etc. are accepted to be similar examples [[[by Jotsün]]], the negation of a coarse unity is established [[[for the example]]], but since it [[[coarse]]] is established [[[by perception]]] also for the subject [[[form, etc.]], [[a logical reason]]] is pointless. As for a collection consisting in subtle agents of collection that are unities, its negation is not established in this very example [[[insofar as one doubts that pleasure and suffering themselves also could be collections of subtle (unities)]]].

It may be the case that in the texts, the (proof) of one’s own (position) from a – mutually - contrapositive consequence is not explained, but one should consider in parallel that there is no difference between our own (proof) of one’s own (position) “Since there is smoke, fire is established” and (the argument by consequence) “Because there is no fire, there would be no smoke”.

Thus, from the negation of a collection which consists of agents of collection which is an ultimate unity, [[[the logical reason]]] ‘neither one nor many’ is established.

The negation of unity-with-parts/unity consisting in a whole or many is established by the perception [[[that apprehends it as having parts]]]: [[A long series of]] previous and subsequent moments [[[this is] the subject]] are apprehended as many parts [[[this is] the logical reason]], therefore a nature consisting in a series of partless instants is negated [[[this is] the probandum]] - this is very easy. [[[The pervasion of that argument] is established as follows:]] The side that something faces, this is pervaded by existing exclusively on the side of that [[what faces]], just like a house. [[A house situated on the East side of that which faces the East side of the house of Devadatta, is situated exclusively eastward, having excluded other locations.]] {see above in (A: Argument ‘collection’) }

“The previous [[[instant]]] that is the proximate ‘phyogs sa’ of the intermediate moment, becomes the ground of negation [[vanishing]] of the subsequent one, because it is the same thing [[the intermediate instant]] that is the ‘phyogs byed’ of the subsequent [[[instant]]] that is its phyogs sa’ [[the latter’s] preceding]] also. - - is the proximate ‘phyogs sa’ of that also” -

This is enough to teach the pervasion in general, just like (for) neither-one-nor-many.

[[[Just like establishing the pervasion of ‘mere existent’ by one or many eliminates the doubt that when there is ‘existence as absolute nature’ it might not be pervaded by ‘one or many’]]]

Further [[this pervasion is quickly established:]], taking as an example the arising of many sparkles at one time in a place, from a single intermediate sparkle [[***]]. Something that is the ‘nye sa’ of a ‘nyed byed’, this is pervaded by (being) simultaneous [[***]], just like the ones generated [[at the same time from ‘ko btsa’]] by the intermediate [[sparkle]]

“The first and the last instants also would become simultaneous, because they [[both instants]] would be ‘nye sa’ of the partless middle [[instant]]” - this establishes the pervasion in a coarse object.

An argument in one’s own continuum is made by applying the elimination of the conclusion, as before.

[[[From “it would follow that the instants become simultaneous” - (the conclusion) being eliminated by the perception of successive moments, “it is not a partless agglomerate, either subtle or coarse, because one apprehends successive moments.”]]]

Objects, down to subtle atoms and instants of consciousness, are neither one nor many, therefore, this logical method establishes the qualification of the subject.

Thus, as for the subject, the meaning of the words is not that just form and pleasure, etc., is posited.

/ it is form and pleasure, etc. themselves that are posited; it is not a verbal object

/ The meaning of the words that posit ‘form and pleasure, etc.’ as the subject is not that

The subject is not what is indicated by the words ‘form and pleasure, etc.’.

Dii Pervasion

DiiA Jotsün

[[Jotsün:]] As for the pervasion:

That ‘something existing as the nature of x’ is pervaded by ‘being one or many of x’ is established by perception [[(as perception establishes) elimination and positive determination]] because conventionally, based on something like a pot that is not characterized as true or false or in terms of time and location, etc., the mere elimination as many determines ‘one’ positively, or the mere elimination of one determines ‘many’ positively. Thereby (the generic pervasion being established), the doubt that if something exists as absolute, it could not be pervaded by one or many of that (i.e., absolute) is eliminated - (the pervasion) is established by this method.

generic	Anything that exists as nature of X	-->	is one-X or many-X
specific	What exists as absolute	-->	Is one-absolute or many-absolute

(Objection)

Objection: [[[Dispute in this regard:]]] If pervasion is established for the specific on account of being established for the generic, then because the pervasion of ‘presence of the [[[mere]]] smoke of x’ being pervaded by ‘fire of x’ is established in general, the pervasion of ‘smoke of the pass’ [[[by fire]]] would also be established [[[indirectly]]].

generic	Presence of smoke of X	-->	Fire of X
specific	Smoke of the pass	-->	fire

Answer:

[a]

[[[One explanation in answer to that:]]]

This is one answer: It is not similar, because here (a) “because it does not exist as absolute one or many” [[[by which the pervasion is indirectly established]]] is a context of negating, and (b) [[[when]]] “the smoke of the pass” [[[is pervaded by fire, it]]] is a context of proving [[[the pervasion of smoke of the pass by fire is *not* indirectly established]]].

[b]

Also, [[[This answer is the serious one:]]]

If it is established that ‘just existence’ (is pervaded) by ‘one or many’, the doubt that ‘absolute existence’ is not pervaded [[[by ‘absolute one or many’, if one says “existing as an absolute nature”]]] is indeed eliminated, because there is no distinct aspect constituting a hair-splitting difference, but in the case of the smoke of the pass or the sandalwood smoke, [[[indirectly, from the apprehension of the generic pervasion]]] a distinct aspect constituting a hair-splitting difference is established [[[apart from mere smoke]]], thereby [[[at the time the pervasion of mere smoke by mere fire is established,]]] pervasion [[[of sandalwood smoke by the fire of that (i.e., sandalwood)]]] is not established.

By establishing for one [[[the pervasion of mere smoke by mere fire in the kitchen]]], establishment [[[of pervasion]]] for another aspect [[[smoke of the pass, etc.]]] is not similar [[[because it is not possible]]].

[[[So said Jotsün.]]]

DiiA’ Reconsideration of Jotsün

This is to be reconsidered [[[by Gya(Marwa)]]]:

[a]

[[[The first answer to the objection is not a suitable reply]]]

(a) negating ‘one or many’ for the basis of debate and (b) establishing ‘smoke’ on the pass are indeed not similar, nevertheless [...]]

given that (a’) the contraposition of the pervasion of ‘neither one nor many’ is asserted to be established by an establishing valid cognition [[[“mere existence is pervaded by one or many”]]] and (b’) the fire-smoke pervasion is the work of two [[[by of way]]] establishing valid cognitions are similar, the answer to the parallel does not apply.



...is asserted to be established by an establishing valid cognition, and the fire-smoke pervasion (is established) [[[by way of]]] an establishing (valid cognition); the work of both valid cognitions being similar, the answer to the parallel [[[that at the time the pervasion of mere smoke by mere fire is established, the doubt that smoke on the pass is not pervaded is eliminated]]] is not suitable.

[b]

The latter [[[answer]]] is not the case [[[because it is not a suitable answer]]]: 'something being suitable to appear somewhere' is pervaded by 'being apprehended', just like a present location, [[[this is the basic]]]

[[[The pervasion – namely, 'suitable to appear' is pervaded by 'being apprehended' - is established in general, but]]]

[[[according to you]]] it would not be possible to negate pot, or a tame tiger (?) etc., saying “[[[they are absent]]] because they are not apprehended here [[[in the present location]]]”, because since the tame tiger, etc. existing as suitable to appear exists as a distinct aspect (from 'suitable to appear' in general), the pervasion (by 'apprehended') is not established.

[[[Although the pervasion of mere smoke by mere fire is established, because the specific, smoke of the pass, is established to be a hair-splitting different aspect from mere smoke, pervasion (by fire) is not established for it.

In the same way, although the pervasion of 'suitable to appear' by 'being apprehended' is established in general, since the specific cases such as a tame tiger or a pot, etc. have a hair-splitting different aspect from 'suitable to appear', etc. (?), although 'being apprehended' is negated, they would not be negated.]]]

Thus the [[[proof of a]]] convention negating such a negandum that is suitable to appear in the present place would never be established by [[[a logical reason qua]]] non-apprehension.

Furthermore, if, by establishing the pervasion [[[fire-smoke, for instance]]] in general, the doubt regarding another specific concept [[[whether the smoke of the pass is pervaded by fire]]] is not eliminated, it would also not be eliminated for a specific aspect, by parity of reasoning [[[namely, 'presence of hair-splitting difference' for smoke on the pass, and presence of 'ldog pa' (exclusion-difference?) etc. (for 'ultimate nature')]]].

[[[By establishing the pervasion of 'mere existence' by 'one or many', it would not be correct that the doubt whether 'existence as an ultimate nature' might not be pervaded is eliminated, because (compared to) 'mere existence', 'existence as an ultimate nature' has a 'ldog pa', (exclusion-difference?) etc.]]]

[Note: the main text seems to qualify the difference between smoke and pass-smoke in terms of “aspect” (hair-splitting difference) and that between ‘existence’ and ‘absolute existence’ in terms of “exclusion”, the notes do the reverse]

One cannot say “because a difference consisting in the exclusion-property ‘absolute’ is not established separately [[[from mere existence]]]”: since what is to be proven would

be already proven [[[indeed, if one negated that ‘absolute existence’ exists as a separate exclusion-property from mere existence, then what is to be proven is already proven]]], if it (the generic) is posited as **back-support** for the pervasion, they would be interdependent.

Given that it is established *for an entity* [[[that ‘absolute existence’ (exists separately) from ‘mere existence’]]] [[[but an exclusion is not (established to exist) separately]]], since there is doubt [[[that the exclusion exists separately]]], it is not suitable as a reason for establishing the pervasion. [[[If one doubts whether the exclusion ‘absolute’ exists separately, one would also doubt that it is pervaded by ‘one or many.’]]]

DiiB Gangpa

In this regard also [[[Gangpa asserts as follows:]]]

Having established the pervasion of “whatever is just the nature of X” by “just one or many of X”, (it is established even for/in terms of appearance, as Gangpa says) “because even for the subject ‘appearance’, when one analyses with reasoning there is no apprehension as mere one or many.”

[[[If one posits ‘mere one or many’ as the logical reason, if one wonders, doesn’t the logical reason come to be unestablished in relation to appearance, one posits this ‘mere’ (one or many) “from the perspective of reasoning consciousness.”]]]

[[[The pervasion of ‘mere existent’ by ‘one or many’ is established, (and as for) the logical reason of this, ‘endowed with one or many’ is posited, one does not posit (it) as pervaded in terms of ‘neither absolute one or many’ because pervasion in that is not established – this is the idea. Thus, there is no point for the debate below.]]]²⁹⁴

That [[[‘mere one or many’]]] for which the pervasion is established, this itself [[[‘mere’ itself]]] is posited as logical reason for the basis of debate, but it is not the case that, having established the pervasion in some other exclusion [[[‘mere existence’, which is other than the exclusions that are the (other exclusions)]]]{alternatively, emend dag to yang dag: ‘mere existence’, which is different from the exclusion ‘absolute’}, another exclusion is applied as logical reason [[[in terms of ‘because it is neither absolute one or many’]]].

Objection: [[[And this ‘neither just one or many’]]] From the perspective of considering [[[neither one nor many]]] by reasoning, the specific ‘ultimate one or many’ would be negated. [[[The dispute is made in consideration that thereby in reality, there would come to be in itself ‘neither absolute one nor many’]]].

Answer: [[[Answer:]]] [[[Also in the case of the proof of fire on the pass because of mere smoke, by positing as logical reason]]] “because there is smoke on the pass”

²⁹⁴ Possibly this annotation is making a point about the difference between “ldan pa” (in the establishment of pervasion) and “bral ba” (in the application), rather than (as the text that follows) between the generic case (‘tsam’) and the specific one (‘yang dag gi’).

[[[also]]], from the perspective of the pass it would also come to be a specific [[smoke, and not come to be mere smoke]].

Retort: 'Mere smoke' itself [[to be posited as the reason]] is precisely a 'mere' [[smoke]] itself in terms of elimination of non-connection from the perspective of the pass [[(non-connection) of 'mere smoke' with that (i.e., the pass)]].

Parallel retort: It is the same [[for neither mere or or many as well]]: from the perspective of reasoning, 'neither mere [[one or many]]' is the logical reason [[and a specific one does not come to be (the logical reason)]].

Objection: Because [[mere absence of one or many]] depends on reasoning - the basis of dependence - the thing that is dependent [[the mere absence of one or many]] comes to be specific [[absence of absolute one or many]].

Answer: This is also the same. [[Due to depending on a basis of dependence, the thing that is dependent – mere smoke - would come to be the specific 'smoke of the pass.']]

...

Thus, it is explained [[by Gangpa]] that 'mere one or many' which is the pervader in the pervasion of 'x merely existing as x' by 'mere one or many', if eliminated based on appearance, is established to be non-existent only from the perspective of appearance, and if this mere [[lack of one or many]] is established to exist as absolute from the perspective of reasoning.

DiiB' Reconsideration of Gangpa

This is to be reconsidered [[by Gya(Marwa)]]:

DiiB'.i

DiiB'.ii

DiiB'.iii

DiiB'.iv

Thus [[the position of Gangpa]] is incorrect in view of the four points (discussed above):

°i

°ii

°iii

°iv

DiiC Our own position

[DiiC.i] Exposition of the meaning of the section

[DiiC.i-i] Our own answer

Then how is it? [[our own position]]

The pervasion of something existing as the nature of x by its being just one or many is directly established based on something like a pot; thereby, indirectly, the doubt that if something exists as absolute, it could not be pervaded by one or many is eliminated by way of the determination of the characteristic.

We perfectly accept that the doubt “although smoke is positively determined as existing on the hill, it could not be pervaded [[[by fire in general]]]” is eliminated by way of determining the characteristic. As follows: When, in the kitchen, one determines the characteristic of smoke in general to be such that it cannot arise when fire in general is eliminated, if a mere smoke that is apprehended as present in some remote location is seen to remain once fire is eliminated, it would be contradictory to the arising of this valid cognition in the kitchen.

...

[DiiC.i-i-i] How the overreaching absurd consequence in the case of ‘smoke’ is accepted

[DiiC.i-i-ii] The fault that it follows that the logical reason is pointless does not apply here

[DiiC.i-i-iii] Presentation of the division of valid cognition on account of the ground for this

[DiiC.i-i-iv] Refutation of the non-acceptance that the pervasion is established for a particular case

[DiiC.i-ii] The answer of the Teachers is not correct

[DiiC.ii] Presentation by way of objection and answer

[DiiC.ii-i] There is no fault for a definitional basis that is characterized

[DiiC.ii-i-i] Rejecting the objection that there is no difference with the definiens

Objection: Smoke that is grasped as present on the pass would be the definitional basis.

Answer: We do accept this.

Objection: How is this different from ‘being a property of the subject’?

Answer: ‘Being a property of the subject’ is a characterizing property, namely “the elimination of non-connection”. What is characterized by this is the definitional basis.

There is no fault that this characterizing property is subsumed withing what is characterized [[[the definitional basis]]], just like the property ‘having horns’ that characterizes a heap is the logical reason but is not subsumed under the subject [[[in the argument “this heap with horns is not a horse, because it has horns”]]].

...

[DiiC.ii-i-ii] Rejecting the objection that there is no positive concomitance

Objection: Since this smoke [[[the smoke of the pass – a characterized logical reason]]] does not have positive concomitance with the example, it is not suitable as a logical reason.

Answer: Because it *is characterized* by the elimination of non-connection [[[with the pass]]] it is a definitional basis, and there is not fault [[[that it lacks concomitance]]] because what *is to be characterized* [[[by the example]]] [[[i.e., the mere smoke on the water?]]] is positively concomitant with the example. Otherwise, when establishing pervasion by ‘one or many’ for a nature seized to be negatively concomitant with ‘ultimate’, since these properties [[[ultimate one or many]]] are not positively concomitant with the basis, a pot, negative entailment [[[of the proof of absence of essence]]] would not be fulfilled for the example [[[the pot]]], therefore the example also [[[lacking positive concomitance]]] would become faulty.

And other logical reasons [[[qua non-apprehension]]] such “The demon cannot have the convention ‘existent’ because there is no valid cognition that apprehends it here” as also would be lacking positive concomitance with the example (?)

Thus, since the one which is to be characterized [[[‘mere smoke’]]] – which is the property that induces pervasion of what is characterized [[[the smoke of the pass]]] by the probandum [[[fire]]] - is positively concomitant with the example [[[the kitchen]]], in all cases there is no case of the logical reason being too specific.

[DiiC.ii-ii] A definitional basis that is to be characterized is not suitable

[DiiC.ii-ii-i] It is not established as basis from the mere fact that it is to be characterized

[DiiC.ii-ii-ii] If it is posited as basis there is the fault of non-pervasion

{Objection: What fault is there if one posits as definitional basis the universal [[[‘mere smoke’]]] which is to be characterized, which (?) induces [[[on account of the universal]]] the pervasion of is characterized [[[by pass]]]?

Answer: It [[[the mere one]]] is not suitable as a basis for the collection of the three characteristics because it [[[‘mere smoke’]]] is not pervaded by ‘being a property of the subject’ [[[on account of being linked with the pass]]]

Objection: There is no fault [[[that it is not pervaded by the collection (of the three characteristics)]]] because it [[[even the mere one]]] is pervaded by positive and negative concomitance.

Answer: Then there would be no fault that even when one posits ‘devoid of conceptualization and non-delusive’ as definition of perception, it does not pervade non-ascertained appearance and perception whose object has already been determined, because it is pervaded by ‘devoid of conceptualization’.

}

[DiiC.ii-ii-iii] Refuting that non-pervasion is not a fault

{Objection: Non-pervasion of the definitional basis is not a fault.

Answer: There would be no fault either from the perspective of ‘impossible’, etc., all of them, because the analysis and argument is the same. Thus, the distinction ‘this is a definitional basis, but the other is not’ is not established.}

[DiiC.ii-ii-iv] Refutation of the assertion of pervasion

{Objection: There is no fault that ‘mere smoke’ itself is not pervaded by ‘being a property of the subject’

Answer: There would be no ‘mere smoke’ in the example, because of the way it is related to the basis of debate [[[namely, a property of the subject posited as a pervade (of the subject)]]].

The wise ones [[[Tak]]] say:

There is no fault, because since this very example [[[the kitchen]]] is the basis to which the desire to know of other people applies, it is pervaded by what is connected with it.

Those whose wisdom is worthy of praise rejoice the gods! When the definitional basis of the three characteristics to prove that the pass is endowed of fire is not a sort of smoke but is posited to be ‘mere smoke’, [[[it is not pervaded by ‘being a property of the

subject' connected with the pass (?)]]) who is one who teaches that it is [[[pervaded by]]] a property of the subject connected with the kitchen?

Answer: Since there are ten who do so, the result of a tired reasoning is perfected! Alas! The following reasoning would be correct: "When, having taken a mere heap as a definitional basis, one defines it as a cow on account of the collection of udder and hump, there is no fault that it does not pervade a heap that is a horse, because it has a mane and ?

[[[Our own position:]]] On the one hand, a specific smoke [[the mere smoke of the pass]] is suitable as logical reason. Since there is an increasing number of arguments such as "Even though 'mere smoke' is not pervaded by 'being a property of the subject' there is no fault" etc., they are not presented here.}

Structural analysis of DiiC "our own position"

[DiiC.i] Exposition of the meaning of the section

[DiiC.ii] Presentation by way of objection and answer

As for the first (=DiiC.i) [[[the meaning of the section]]]

[DiiC.i-i] Our own answer

[DiiC.i-i-i] How the overreaching absurd consequence in the case of 'smoke' is accepted \leftrightarrow DiiC.i-i-ii

[DiiC.i-i-ii] The fault that it follows that the logical reason is pointless does not apply here \leftrightarrow DiiC.i-i-ii

[DiiC.i-i-iii] Presentation of the division of valid cognition on account of the ground for this \leftrightarrow DiiC.i-i-iii

[DiiC.i-i-iv] Refutation of the non-acceptance that the pervasion is established for a particular case \leftrightarrow DiiC.i-i-iv

[DiiC.i-ii] The answer of the Teachers is not correct \leftrightarrow DiiC.i-ii

As for the second (=DiiC.ii),

[DiiC.ii-i] There is no fault for [[[setting]]] a definitional basis that is characterized

[DiiC.ii-i-i] Rejecting the objection that there is no difference with the definiens \leftrightarrow DiiC.ii-i-i

[DiiC.ii-i-ii] Rejecting the objection that there is no positive concomitance \leftrightarrow DiiC.ii-i-ii

[DiiC.ii-ii] A definitional basis that is to be characterized is not suitable

[DiiC.ii-ii-i] It is not established as basis from the mere fact that it is to be characterized \leftrightarrow DiiC.ii-ii-i

[DiiC.ii-ii-ii] If it is posited as basis there is the fault of non-pervasion \leftrightarrow DiiC.ii-ii-ii

[DiiC.ii-ii-iii] Refuting that non-pervasion is not a fault \leftrightarrow DiiC.ii-ii-iii

[DiiC.ii-ii-iv] Refutation of the assertion of pervasion \leftrightarrow DiiC.ii-ii-iv

[Verse 36]

The viles, gone to the bottom of the ocean

Sink in the...

Having rejected the excellent good sayings,
Understand powerless explanations as such,
Even when their presentations are incorrect elsewhere,
Because they do not generate trust in the perfectly correct ones,

ma rabs mtho sar phyin pa dag //
gzhang yis byas la skyor 'bying bzhin //
dam pa'i legs bshad spangs nas ni //
gzhan du rnam 'jog mi rigs kyang //
rnam dag yid ches ma skyes pas //
dbang med rnaM bshad 'di ltar rig //

E The example

The object consisting in the example is, for instance, a reflection, etc. Is the way to establish it like it is explained in the *Ornament* (i.e., *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*), or is it due to being posited as an example from the perspective of being void of the nature of face, etc., that it is established as an example, without it to be necessary to negate its being true as a reflection

When x lacks the nature of one or many of x, x is empty of the nature of x, like a reflection

Because it lacks one or many, it is empty of that nature, like what is empty of a face?:
although it appears as similar, it is posited as an example of what is empty of that.

To sum up/alternatively

In the case of the mere appearance of reflection mirror, etc. itself, the establishment as being empty of every nature by a conventional means of valid cognition follows what was explained earlier. Since it is established as mistaken for everyone in the world, this precisely is correct.

B-ii How inference relies (on these 5 items)

{The way inference relies (on these 5 items): the analysis of whether the subject appears or does not appears.

Saying [[[as some do]]] “For the illusionists, appearance is not eliminated, for the proponents of non-abiding, appearance is eliminated” is an unanalyzed presentation.

...

B-ii-A Jotsün

Thus, in the (system) of non-abiding itself, these methods [[[whether appearance is eliminated or not eliminated]]] must be analyzed. The non-appearance of the subject does not go beyond the elimination of appearance.

For them, among (the two options): it does not appear due to its being the negandum and it does not appear due to its not being an object,

B-ii-A.i Refutation (by Jotsün) that it does not appear due to being the negandum
The refutation of the former (by Jo btsun) (is as follows)

B-ii-A.i-i There is a means of refutation

...

[B-ii-A.i-i-i] There is no application of valid cognition

[B-ii-A.i-i-ii] Limited emptiness would become ultimate

[B-ii-A.i-i-iii] ...The thesis

Structural analysis of B-ii-A.i-i

There is a means of refutation on account of (the three points:)

[B-ii-A.i-i-i] There is no application of valid cognition \leftrightarrow B-ii-A.i-i-i

[B-ii-A.i-i-ii] Limited emptiness would become ultimate \leftrightarrow B-ii-A.i-i-ii

[B-ii-A.i-i-iii] ...The thesis \leftrightarrow B-ii-A.i-i-iii

B-ii-A.i-ii There is no means of proof

...

B-ii-A.i-ii-i Four deliberations

B-ii-A.i-ii-i.i Is it compatible or incompatible with the logical reason

B-ii-A.i-ii-i.ii Since it is distinct from the logical reason, does it pervade it or not?

B-ii-A.i-ii-i.iii Do these exclusions reject each other or not?

B-ii-A.i-ii-i.iv Does the logical reason occur in it or not?

B-ii-A.i-ii-ii This would be the end of the continuum of pseudo-logical reason qua contradictory

Structural analysis of B-ii-A.i-ii

[B-ii-A.i-ii-i] Four deliberations: this subject that appears as such

[B-ii-A.i-ii-i.i] Is it compatible or incompatible with the logical reason \leftrightarrow B-ii-A.i-ii-i.i

[B-ii-A.i-ii-i.ii] Since it is distinct from the logical reason, does it pervade it or not? \leftrightarrow B-ii-A.i-ii-i.ii

[B-ii-A.i-ii-i.iii] Do these exclusions reject each other or not? \leftrightarrow B-ii-A.i-ii-i.iii

[B-ii-A.i-ii-i.iv] Does the logical reason occur in it or not? \leftrightarrow B-ii-A.i-ii-i.iv

[B-ii-A.i-ii-ii] This would be the end of the continuum of pseudo-logical reason qua contradictory \leftrightarrow B-ii-A.i-ii-ii

[[[By these two]]] there is no means proof

Therefore, if one follows these reasonings, something else will be understood as well.

B-ii-A.ii Refutation (by Jotsün) that it does not appear due to not being an object

B-ii-A.ii-A Opponent's (=Gangs pa) position

The position of some people (stated by Gangs pa) is the following:

... because it is not the object of this it does not appear, just like sound to the eye...

Thus it might well be the case that it is not the negandum, but it (still) does not appear due to not being an object.

B-ii-A.ii-B Statement of the refutation

B-ii-A.ii-B-i It undermines not being the negandum

B-ii-A.ii-B-ii If it is not a proliferation, it does not become that due to appearing

B-ii-A.ii-B-iii Mere appearance to reasoning is not pervaded by a nature

B-ii-A.ii-B-iv Analysis does not apply

B-ii-A.ii-B-v Superimpositions are not eliminated

B-ii-A.ii-B-vi It would not rely on the first characteristic (of the logical reason)

Structural analysis of B-ii-A.ii-B

It is refuted by the six :

[B-ii-A.ii-B-i] It undermines not being the negandum <-->

[B-ii-A.ii-B-ii] If it is not a proliferation, it does not become that due to appearing

<-->

[B-ii-A.ii-B-iii] Mere appearance to reasoning is not pervaded by a nature <-->

[B-ii-A.ii-B-iv] Analysis does not apply <-->

[B-ii-A.ii-B-v] Superimpositions are not eliminated <-->

[B-ii-A.ii-B-vi] It would not rely on the first characteristic (of the logical reason) <-->

B-ii-A.iii Common (refutation) of the two (explanations for non-appearance)

Thus, having stated the respective refutations, in common also, there are the following five:

[B-ii-A.iii-i] Apprehension of pervasion and inference are not different

[B-ii-A.iii-ii] The subject would not appear to the cognition apprehending the qualification for the subject

[B-ii-A.iii-iii] The qualification of the subject would be established by the apprehension of the pervasion

[B-ii-A.iii-iv] The general model of inference is undermined

[B-ii-A.iii-v] This subject would become a proliferation ? of its own property

[B-ii-A.iii-i] Apprehension of pervasion and inference are not different

[B-ii-A.iii-ii] The subject would not appear to the cognition apprehending the qualification for the subject

[B-ii-A.iii-iii] The qualification of the subject would be established by the apprehension of the pervasion

[B-ii-A.iii-iv] The general model of inference is undermined

[B-ii-A.iii-v] This subject would become a proliferation ? of its own property

B-ii-B The position of Gangs pa according to which it does not appear

B-ii-B.i Rejection of the faults (by Gangs pa)

2.2.2.1.1 Rejection of the faults in general

(5 points)

2.2.2.1.2 Rejection (of the faults) via analysis

...

[[[according to rGya]]] Thus the answer given by explaining that the subject appears is, in general, correct.

B-iiB Gangs pa – rang lugs

...

[2.2.2.2.i] Presentation of our own position

[2.2.2.2.ii] Rejecting the refutation of others

[2.2.2.2.iii] Refuting the other position itself

[2.2.2.2.iv] The same faults do not apply to us

[2.2.2.2.v] Rejecting objections in this regard

Structural analysis of 222.2

[2.2.2.2.i] Presentation of our own position

[2.2.2.2.ii] Rejecting the refutation of others

[2.2.2.2.iii] Refuting the other position itself

[2.2.2.2.iv] The same faults do not apply to us

[2.2.2.2.v] Rejecting objections in this regard

B-ii-C Refutation of Gangpa by Gyamarwa

[[[Refutation of this (position) of Gangpa by Gya(Marwa)]]]

[B-ii-C.i] Invalidation by the fault previously stated

Here,...

In that case, one must/doubts that the answer of those who say:

[=Verses 4–6]

[=Verse 4]

We assert that the mere invalidation of existence, (existence being) the negandum, is the meaning of the non-establishment of existence [see ii-2-i.i]

Although just that is not an object of affirmation, it is attested as the object of a negating awareness.

Although it is not set forth as the object of a positive determination, one realizes the elimination of the negandum [see ii-2-i.ii].

[=Verse 5]

It is not a proliferation just through this [see ii-2-i.iii].

It is not merely nominal [see ii-2-i.iv], because mere elimination is attested to be the definition of realization. Therefore, it (elimination of the negandum) is attested as the object of reasoning.

[=verse 6]

If this was not the case, it would be difficult to posit reasoning as a consciousness [see ii-2-ii.i-i] or a valid cognition [see ii-2-ii.i-ii].

Because there would be the consequence that nature would be established [see ii-2-ii.i-iii], because this would contradict your own words [see ii-2-ii.i-iv].

Consequently, because there are invalidating arguments [ii-2-ii.i], and because there is no proof [see ii-2-ii.ii], (the absence of nature) is not non-attested as the object of reasoning.

[B-ii-C.i] For the position according to which qualification of the subject is established by perception, it is not established that the negandum is suitable to appear
Further,

[B-ii-C.ii] For the inference that is the ground for eliminating superimpositions, it is not established that the negandum is suitable to appear

[B-ii-C.iii] The definiens of object of valid cognition is attested in the subject
Further, what is the meaning (of “appearance”) of the statement “appearance to reasoning consciousness” is asserted to the object of reasoning consciousness”? (i) Appearance as the aspect of an [[[extra-mental]]] object? Or (ii) what is established positively? or (iii) elimination of superimposition?

(i) In the first case, all inferences would have no object. [[[because aspects do not appear directly to any inference]]]

(ii) In the second case, all negating awarenesses would have no object.

And [[[If they have no object]]] these would not be cognition and valid cognition – this has already been said..

(iii) In the third case, in this context the subject, superimpositions, would not be eliminated (for?) the subject, because it is not an object.

Thus, what is called “object” is exclusively the object for which superimpositions are eliminated, therefor, the subject also is established as an object.

Further,

[B-ii-C.iv] Rejection of objections to this

Objection : The negandum also would be an object, because of the elimination of superimposition.

Answer : Superimpositions are not established to be eliminated with respect to the negandum. What is apprehended as the opposite of that, this is asserted to be « a superimposition of that ».

[B-ii-C.vi] Identification of what is to be eliminated

...

Thus, truth as a nature exclusively is the negandum.

Thus, since the subject also is not apprehended, we assert inferences that do not have an object.

Structural analysis of B-ii-C

[B-ii-C.i] Invalidation by the fault previously stated \leftrightarrow B-ii-C.i

[B-ii-C.ii] For the position according to which qualification of the subject is established by perception, it is not established that the negandum is suitable to appear \leftrightarrow B-ii-C.ii

[B-ii-C.iii] For the inference that is the ground for eliminating superimpositions, it is not established that the negandum is suitable to appear \leftrightarrow B-ii-C.iii

[B-ii-C.iv] The definiens of object of valid cognition is attested in the subject \leftrightarrow B-ii-C.iv

[B-ii-C.v] Rejection of objections to this \leftrightarrow B-ii-C.v

[B-ii-C.vi] Identification of what is to be eliminated \leftrightarrow B-ii-C.vi

Thus, the method of how inference is apprehended (B-ii) has been analyzed.

X [Against “prāsaṅgikas”]²⁹⁵

(i) Since autonomous (arguments) is well established, its non-acceptance is rejected

Because based on the five elements – logical reason, etc. – the absence of intrinsic nature is established by inference, (the claim) “One merely negate what others accepts via a mere argument by consequence, but since they do not have a thesis of one’s own, an autonomous argument that proves it is not possible for Mādhyamikas” is also rejected.

(ii) Refutation that its negation is incorrect

...

The claim “Because the subject, etc. are not established, an autonomous argument is not possible” also (is rejected), because

- if one says that it is “because the subject etc. are not established ultimately,” this (logical reason) is not established

- if you say that it is “because they are not determined conventionally,” this is not established.

The refutation, by representationalists, of the establishment of a subject imagined by the non-representationalists, etc., is not correct: although (a subject) is not established

²⁹⁵ Gro lung pa also mentions this « prāsaṅgika » option, see Cabezon 2010 : 49, n. 85. bsTan rim chen mo 390a2ff. : sngon gyi slob dpon kha cig kyang tshad mas dpyad bya dngos po nyid yin pas na brtags pa’i chos can la ni thal ‘gyur la sogs pa tshad ma’i rjes su mthun pa tsam ‘jug par zad kyi/ dgag sgrub kyi tshad ma dngos rang rgyud pa ni mi ‘jug ste/ don byed nus pa kho na yod med kyi chos bsam pa’i gzhi yin pa’i phyir dang/ de ‘dra ba’i rtags kyi khyab pa’ang tshad ma’i yul du mi rung ba’i phyir ro zhes ‘dzer to/ .

by a valid cognition that is found by an analysis as representationalist, non representationalist, etc., one cannot deny the conventional establishment of blue, etc. as a non-analyzed object from the perspective of appearance. Otherwise, a consequence statement also would not be established as the object of audition, thereby what others accept would not be negated.

In a nutshell: although common appearance carried to the limit of representationalist, non representationalists, etc., is not possible, it is established conventionally similarly to pleasure and suffering, as being positively determined without aspects. Therefore we reply “how is the subject not established?”

(iii) If there is no autonomous (argument), the very absence of acceptance of a thesis is incorrect

(iv) What others assert is not negated

(v) It is not suitable that consequence itself is correct

(vi) Only the object of an autonomous means of valid cognition is established to be the support for the path to be meditated on

Structural analysis of X

(i) Since autonomous (arguments) is well established, its non-acceptance is rejected

(ii) Refutation that its negation is incorrect

(iii) If there is no autonomous (argument), the very absence of acceptance of a thesis is incorrect

(iv) What others assert is not negated

(v) It is not suitable that consequence itself is correct

(vi) Only the object of an autonomous means of valid cognition is established to be the support for the path to be meditated on

By teaching positively how the inference is apprehended by way of the five (elements), one negates eliminatively the non-acceptance of autonomous arguments.

B-iii The way of meditatively cultivating, having become certain by the inferential vision

The way of meditatively cultivating.

[[[Among four, the first: how to cultivate]]]

B-iii-1 How to cultivate

B-iii-2

[[[Second, it is not contradictory for a non-conceptual cognition to arise from a conceptual one]]]

B-iii-3

B-iii-4

B-iv The result of cultivation: the non-conceptual wisdom that corresponds to appearance [[[as reality]]]

B-iv-1

The result – the non-conceptual appearance: from equipoise, knowledge of all phenomena being like the vault of the sky, and by the (cognition) subsequent to obtaining (enlightenment), seeing all phenomena as being like a mirage.²⁹⁶ These are reached (lit. “entered”) successively in the Bodhisattva context, but in Buddhahood, the meditational equipoise that is the non-conceptual knowledge of all phenomena, is always attested, and it is made visible (phyogs pa?) for the vision of all objects of knowledge as devoid of defilements by the (cognition) subsequent to obtaining (enlightenment).

...

...

B-iv-2

Refutation of the others’ assertion

Dispute

Some say: The equipoise has the void conceptualization, because it is void of all mistake /or the equipoints has the void of mistake, because it is devoid of all conceptualization,
but the rjes thob is not (void of conceptualisation): it is with-mistake

This is ‘unanalyzed’ (i.e., wrong)

Answer

²⁹⁶ Cf. the citation on f. 3b2-3 of the *Spell for Entering into the Non-Conceptual* [[[If illusion existed ultimately, it would be correct that it is known by the wisdom of meditative equipoise; but this is not the case.]]]

E.

= C22.34 (*Negating attachment to entities*)

(29a5)

1 In general, showing what has already been refuted regarding what is refuted

11 In general, showing what has already been refuted

Thus, by explaining our own [[[Gangpa('s')]]] position on the two truths, it is established that all idealist positions are refuted, because the neither-one-nor-many (argument) negates, in general, all would-be natures.

This is for the following reason:

Thus, since 'entity' is pervaded by 'causally active' and the latter is incompatible with 'permanent', it is pervaded by 'impermanent'.

If it was true as resisting analysis as impermanent, when analyzing a partless instant, being without contradictory properties, it would need to exist as 'many' – i.e. an assemblage of that, therefore it would be pervaded by one or many. Hence the reasoning that negates this pervade has already be explained.

12 In particular, application

121 Showing how the non-Buddhists have already be refuted

The cārvaka accept:

The vaiśeṣika accept:

The nirgrantha accept:

The mīmāṃsaka accept:

All of these, etc., are refuted [[[in general; this is enough]]] without the need for specific analysis, because these extremist bad views are without end.

122

[[[Second]]] The two groups and the Yogācāra also [[[have already been refuted]]] asserting the assemblage of moments and atoms to be ultimate entities are refuted specifically.

There is no other reasoning to be presented than the one that negates the atoms of the Vaibhāṣika and the moments of consciousness.

...

2 In particular, refuting idealism

21

If one asserts that variegated appearance is one...

F

= C22.35 (*The effects of cultivating emptiness*)
(30b1)

G.

H. Colophon

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