

# PHYA PA CHOS KYI SENG GE ON THE INVALIDATING ARGUMENT IN THE PROOF OF MOMENTARINESS\*

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## ABSTRACT

This paper introduces the Tibetan Buddhist thinker Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's (1109–1169) discussion of the invalidating argument in the proof of momentariness. Our goal is both to supply direct evidence for Phya pa's views on this important topic in the Buddhist philosophical landscape and, through the translation of the relevant passage, to showcase Phya pa's style of discourse and argumentation.

The introduction (§1) will first recall some important features of the proof of momentariness and milestones in its development in the works of Dharmakīrti (7<sup>th</sup> c.). This section will consider how Indian and Tibetan exegetes understood the role of the subsidiary arguments involved in Dharmakīrti's discussion, in particular that of the inference invoking the causelessness of cessation, and that of the invalidating argument. We shall examine the articulation of these subsidiary arguments in the works of Dharmottara and Phya pa. We shall then present the position of several other Tibetan commentators, offering insights from Kyeongjin Choi's 2016 doctoral thesis (in Japanese), which deals with the proof of momentariness in the works of bKa' gdams pa and dGe lugs pa scholars. The second part of the introduction (§1.2) is meant to facilitate the understanding of the passage translated in §2. We present some of the methods Phya pa applies in his discussion of the invalidating argument and provide a summary of the passage.

The second part of this paper (§2) offers an English translation of Phya pa's discussion. This translation was prepared by Kyeongjin Choi and Pascale Hugon on the occasion of a joint reading session held in February 2019 at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna. The collated edition of the Tibetan text – available in two nearly identical versions in 'Od zer 126a4–130a1 and *Mun sel* 62b5–66b2 – can be accessed online at the website “Materials for the Study of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169).”<sup>1</sup>

\* We thank Kristen de Joseph for proofreading the introduction and are grateful to Masamichi Sakai for his comments, especially in relation to Dharmottara's views. We assume responsibility for any remaining errors.

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.oeaw.ac.at/ikga/forschung/tibetologie/materialien/phyapa>

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 *The proof of momentariness: Opening remarks*

The proof of momentariness is a key element in Buddhist philosophy. It has been treated in detail by numerous scholars of the Indian logico-epistemological school, from Vasubandhu (ca. 400–480) onward, in their works on valid cognition. It has also been the focus of independent treatises, such as the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* of Dharmottara (8<sup>th</sup> c.).

This topic has received its share of attention in modern scholarship: Steinkellner (1968) has dealt with the development of the proof of momentariness in the works of Dharmakīrti; Mimaki (1976) has examined the contributions of Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Ratnakīrti on the refutation of permanence, the counterpart and complement of the proof of momentariness. More recently, Sakai (2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012) has addressed the contributions of Dharmottara, Śākyabuddhi, Arcaṭa, and Durvekamiśra.<sup>2</sup> In her doctoral thesis (Choi 2016), Kyeongjin Choi studied how Tibetan scholars approached the proof of momentariness in their commentaries on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (hereafter PVin). In particular, she examined the following seven early commentaries, two of which (ii and iv) have only recently become available in the *bKa' gdams gsung 'bum*:<sup>3</sup>

- i. the *dKa' gnas*, by rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109) (hereafter “rNgog Lo”)
- ii. the *'Od zer*, by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) (hereafter “Phya pa”)
- iii. the *Legs bshad bsdus pa*, by gTsang nag pa brTson 'grus seng ge (?–after 1195)
- iv. the *rNam nges kyi ti ka*, by Chu mig pa Seng ge dpal (ca. 1200–1270)
- v. the *rGyan gyi me tog*, by bCom ldan ral gri (1227–1305)
- vi. the *Nyi ma'i snying po*, by Bo dong 'Jam pa'i dbyangs Sho re ba (13<sup>th</sup> c.)
- vii. the *Tshig don rab gsal*, by Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290–1364)

<sup>2</sup> See also Yoshimizu 1999 and, in n. 2 of her article, further references to studies on the proof of momentariness.

<sup>3</sup> This series of 120 *dpe cha*-format volumes, published in Chengdu, contains facsimiles of manuscripts of more than 500 works by bKa' gdams pa scholars, most of which were not previously available. The greatest part of the material stems from a vast manuscript collection that was discovered in the gNas bcu temple at 'Bras spungs monastery (see *'Bras spungs dkar chag*).

Choi points out that even though they belong to a common scholastic lineage, the authors of these works do not follow their forebears uncritically, but each adopt individual positions.

One of the Tibetan thinkers whose views Choi examines is the famous Phya pa, who is held to be one of the most influential scholars in the epistemological tradition (van der Kuijp 1983: chapter 2). Phya pa discusses the proof of momentariness in his commentary on Dharmakīrti's PVin, the *'Od zer* (122a5–131a8), as well as in his epistemological summary, the *Mun sel* (62a9–66b2). In both works, this proof is the case on the basis of which logical reasons qua essential properties (Tib. *rang bzhin gyi rtags*, Skt. *svabhāvahetu*) are discussed. In the *'Od zer*, the discussion of this proof constitutes the commentary on PVin 2.53–57 and the corresponding prose passage (PVin 2 Tib. 24,12–32,29). Before turning to Phya pa, it may be useful to recall some key features in the development of the proof of momentariness.

### 1.1.1 Dharmakīrti on the proof of momentariness

The abovementioned studies by Steinkellner and Sakai highlight two points:

(a) Dharmakīrti initially based his proof of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) or impermanence (*anityatva*) on the property of “being produced”<sup>4</sup> (*kṛtakatva*). This reasoning is often referred to in secondary literature as the *vināśītvānumāna* (see, however, the remarks in Sakai 2011: 407, n. 2), because it relies on the idea that the cessation of a produced thing takes place independently, without the intervention of causes of destruction. Dharmakīrti later developed a proof based on the property of “being existent” (*sattva*), referred to as the *sattvānumāna*.

(b) Dharmakīrti introduced a method involving a “valid cognition that invalidates (the occurrence of) the logical reason in the opposite of what is to be proven” (*sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇam*). This method, referred to in the present paper as the “invalidating argument,” became the key method for ascertaining pervasion (*khyab pa*) in the

<sup>4</sup> In the introduction and the translation, expressions referring to subject, logical reason, and property to be proven, have been placed within quotation marks.

*sattvānumāna*. It invokes the impossibility, for what is permanent, of generating an effect either gradually or suddenly.

According to Sakai (2012), the invalidating argument can already be traced to Dharmakīrti's treatment of the earlier proof based on the property of "being produced" in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (PVSV), where it is also applied to ascertaining pervasion.<sup>5</sup> The specific expression *sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇam*, however, first occurs in the *Hetubindu* (Sakai 2012: 1261).

Dharmakīrti's discussion of the proof of momentariness in the PVI stands as a pivotal stage in the development of this argument: the author, still dealing with the older version of the proof of momentariness based on the property of "being produced," justifies the pervasion in this proof by appealing to the causelessness of cessation. In the same discussion, he also introduces the structure of the proof based on the property of "existent" and the invalidating argument.

In Steinkellner's analysis (Steinkellner 1968: 370; 1979: 147), the relevant PVI excursus deals primarily with the proof based on the reason "being produced." The establishment of pervasion is articulated in two parts:

Part 1. Grounds for the causelessness of cessation (*vināśasya ahetutvam*), namely, its independence (*vināśasya nirapekṣatā*).

This part involves the refutation of the objection that the reason "independence" is inconclusive to establish "causelessness of cessation." An opponent raises the issue of the relation between independence and necessity with regard to a complex of causes (based on the example of the emergence of a sprout). The discussion continues with a further objection considering the continuum (from seed to sprout).

Part 2. Grounds for the general validity of the pervasion.

Here, Dharmakīrti relies on the notions of "thing" (*bhāva*), "produced" (*kṛtaka*), and "existent" (*sat*) being coextensive to move from the logical reason "being produced" to the logical reason "existent." He then applies the invalidating argument to establish the pervasion of "existent" by "momentary."

<sup>5</sup> According to Sakai (2012: 1260), in both proofs, an invalidating argument eliminates a doubt pertaining to the negative concomitance: in the *sattvānumāna*, the doubt that something existent might not be momentary; in the *kṛtakatvānumāna*, the doubt that something produced and independent with respect to its cessation would not cease immediately after its origination.

One could summarize this as follows:<sup>6</sup>

Part 1			Part 2		
<b>A1</b> ( <i>kṛtakatvānumāna</i> )			<b>A1'</b> ( <i>sattvānumāna</i> )		
sound is impermanent because it is produced			sound is impermanent because it is existent		
D	H	S	D	H	S
sound	produced	impermanent	sound	existent	impermanent
	V			V	
	↑			↑	
<b>A2</b> ( <i>vināśītvānumāna</i> )			<b>A3</b> ( <i>bādhakapramāṇa</i> )		
what is produced is impermanent (= necessarily ceases) because its cessation is independent (of other causes)			what is permanent is not existent, because it is incapable of producing an effect either gradually or suddenly		
D	H	S	D	H	S
what is produced	ceasing independently	impermanent	what is permanent	non-efficient	non-existent

Table 1: Role of the respective arguments in the PVin

In this analysis, A2 is a subsidiary argument to establish pervasion in A1, and A3 a subsidiary argument to establish pervasion in A1'. A1' stands as an alternative formulation of A1.

### 1.1.2 Dharmottara on the subsidiary arguments

According to Sakai's interpretation (Sakai 2010b: 159–163 and 2011), Dharmottara considers that the role of the argument invoking the causelessness of cessation (A2) can be apprehended in two ways, depending on how one interprets the notion of “being without a cause (for its cessation)” (*ahetutva*):

<sup>6</sup> In this table and the following ones, A stands for “argument” (*prayoga*), D for “subject” (*dharmin*), H for “logical reason” (*hetu*), S for “property to be proven” (*sādhya*), and V for “pervasion” (*vyāpti*). The arrows indicate which of the characteristics of an argument the subsidiary argument proves.

**(Dh-a)** “Absence of (another) cause” equates to “absence of a cooperating cause making *anything* non-momentary cease.” In this regard, the logical reason “cessation without a cause” is subsidiary – or, in Dharmottara’s words, an “assistant” (*parikara*) – to the invalidating argument (*bādhakapramāṇa*) that ascertains the pervasion of “existent” by “momentary” (A3).

**(Dh-b)** “Absence of cause” means “absence of a cause that is restricted with regard to cessation” (*vināśasya aniyatahetutvam*), i.e., absence of a cause that would be such that it generates some produced things that are impermanent, but also some produced things that are permanent. The absence of a cause restricted in that way entails that *every cause* brings about results that are impermanent, without exception. This is tantamount to saying that everything that is produced is impermanent. Thus, under this interpretation, invoking the reason “being without a cause” amounts to directly presenting the pervasion of A1 itself. Dharmottara says here that the *vināśitvānumāna* (A2) equates to the “presentation” (*upanyāsa*) of an invalidating argument. In Sakai’s interpretation, Dharmottara does not mean by this “*the* invalidating argument A3,” but “*an* argument that invalidates that there are any produced things that are permanent.”

In short, A2 is either a subsidiary of A3 (Dh-a), or amounts to expressing the pervasion of A1 (Dh-b). Dh-a seems to reflect Dharmottara’s attempt to make sense of the difference between Dharmakīrti’s proof of impermanence in his various works, and in particular to find a place for A2 in the framework of the new proof A1’ (Sakai 2010a).

### 1.1.3 Phya pa on the role of the invalidating argument in the proof of momentariness

The passage of Phya pa’s commentary translated in §2 of this paper, which deals with the invalidating argument (Tib. *gnod pa can*, from the Sanskrit [*sādhya viparyaye*] *bādhaka[pramāṇa]*),<sup>7</sup> is a specific part of the

<sup>7</sup> Note, however, that Phya pa does not use the expression “in the opposite of the property to be proved” (Skt. *sādhya viparyaye*). He does mention that A3 relieves one of the doubts pertaining to the negative entailment “in part” – one must understand, “in part of the dissimilar instances.” Namely, there is the doubt that the logical reason might be present in some of the dissimilar instances.

general discussion of the proof of momentariness. This passage occurs in two identical versions in *Mun sel* (62b5–66b2) and *'Od zer* (126a4–131a8).<sup>8</sup> In both texts, the general framework of the discussion is the same: namely, the discussion of logical reasons qua essential properties and the ascertainment of pervasion in arguments that rely on them. However, the place of the passage on the invalidating argument in the respective structures of the two works differs.

■ In the *Mun sel*, the pervasion in the case of logical reasons qua essential properties (242.324.122 in the table below)<sup>9</sup> is discussed on the basis of the proof of momentariness, the logical reason being either “produced” or “existent” (A1 or A1’). Two options are distinguished to establish pervasion by an inference.<sup>10</sup> The first option consists in the refutation of permanent entities via an inference that establishes that “what exists in several instants is void of a singular nature, because it has contradictory properties.” The second option is the “negation of ‘produced’ or ‘existent,’ by the invalidating argument, for ‘what is permanent’.” This way of dealing with the invalidating argument corresponds to the latest stage of Dharmakīrti’s proof of momentariness, namely, that A3 establishes the pervasion of A1’. This is referred to as “Option 1” in Table 4 below.

242.324.1	The valid cognition that ascertains the qualification of the subject by the logical reason and the pervasion in the case of logical reasons qua essential properties ( <i>rang bzhin gi phyogs kyi chos dang khyab pa nges par byed pa'i tshad ma</i> )	62a9–66b2
242.324.11	What determines the qualification of the subject by the logical reason ( <i>phyogs chos nges par byed pa</i> )	62a9

<sup>8</sup> The phrasing in the *Mun sel* and *'Od zer* differs significantly only in one paragraph reporting what was “said by the Teacher (i.e., Dharmakīrti)” (*'Od zer* 128b8–129a8; *Mun sel* 65b1–65b8, cf. °33 (b)). There, one finds a general paraphrase in the *Mun sel*, whereas in the *'Od zer*, the passages of the PVin being explained are explicitly referred to.

<sup>9</sup> The complete *sa bcad* outline of the *Mun sel* is available at <https://www.oew.ac.at/fileadmin/Institute/IKGA/PDF/forschung/tibetologie/Sabcadmunsel.pdf>, accessed June 26, 2021.

<sup>10</sup> An inference is explained to be required because momentariness cannot be ascertained via perception by “those of limited vision,” i.e., ordinary beings.

242.324.12	What determines pervasion ( <i>khyab pa nges par byed pa</i> )	62a9–63b4
242.324.121	Negating a singular nature for many moments ( <i>du du ma la rang bzhin cig dgag pa</i> )	62b2–62b5
<b>242.324.122</b>	<b>Negating “produced” for “what is permanent”/ Determination (of pervasion) by the invalidating argument that negates “existent,” etc. for “what is permanent”</b> ( <i>rtag pa la byas pa dgag pa / rtag pa la yod pa lasogs pa 'gog pa'i gnod pa can gyis nges pa</i> )	62b5–63b4

Table 2: Place of the discussion of the invalidating argument in the *Mun sel*

■ **In the 'Od zer**, the very same passage dealing with the invalidating argument is included in the commentary on Dharmakīrti's discussion of the proof of momentariness in the PVin, under the general heading of the examination of logical reasons qua essential properties (III.125.222), more specifically the detailed explanation pertaining to the establishment of positive entailment (III.125.222.42).<sup>11</sup> The passage on the invalidating argument constitutes an excursus related to the passage PVin 2 Tib. 29,14–29.<sup>12</sup> Its place in the overall structure of the discussion of the proof of momentariness (III.125.222.422.44 in the table below) reflects Phya pa's interpretation of how the discussion unfolds in the PVin. The structure of the discussion in the 'Od zer matches the structure that Phya pa superimposes on the PVin in his topical outline *rNam nges bsdus don* (on which see Hugon 2009). This topical outline has additional subdivisions – not reported in Table 3 below – but lacks the subdivisions corresponding to III.125.222.422.441–443 in the 'Od zer (in bold in the table). The phrasing of the section titles differs slightly on occasion. The structure of subsection °422.42 parallels the fivefold division set forth in rNgog Lo's *dKa' gnas* at the beginning of the discussion of the proof of momentariness.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The overarching section titles are: III *bstan bcos kyi rang bzhin*; III.1 *rang gis gzhal bya nges pa'i thabs*; III.12 *lkog gyur rtogs pa'i thabs = rang don rjes dpag*; III.125 *shes par byed pa'i rgyu mtshan*; III.125.2 *rtags kyi so so'i mtshan nyid*; III.125.22 *so so'i mtshan nyid*.

<sup>12</sup> On this passage, see Steinkellner 1968: 369–374 and Mimaki 1976: 270–271, n. 253.

<sup>13</sup> *dKa' gnas* 307: *de nyid rgyas par 'chad pa ni de'i phyir* (PVin 2 Tib. 27,7) *zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o // 'di ni rjes su 'gro ba'i sgo nas khyab pa sgrub pa yin no // 'di la lnga*



	<i>'Od zer</i>	<i>rNam nges bsdus don</i>	<b>PVin (Tib.)</b>
III.125.222	rang bzhin	rang bzhin	
III.125.222.1	mtshan nyid	mtshan nyid	Verse 2.53
III.125.222.2	sbyor ba'i dbye ba	dbye ba	24,19
III.125.222.3	go byed kyi nus pa	go byed kyi nus pa	25,4
III.125.222.4	nus pa'i tshad ma de nyid bsgrub pa	nus pa'i tshad ma de nyid sgrub pa	
III.125.222.41	rjes 'gro nges byed kyi tshad ma mdor bstan pa	khyab pa nges byed mdor bstan pa	26,14
III.125.222.42	rjes 'gro nges byed kyi tshad ma rgyas par bshad pa	rgyas par bshad pa	
III.125.222.421	gtan tshigs dgod pa	gtan tshigs dgod pa	27,7
III.125.222.422	khyab pa bsgrub pa	khyab pa sgrub pa	
III.125.222.422.1	rang gi tshogs pas 'khrul pa spang pa	rang gi tshogs pas 'khrul pa spang pa	27,12
III.125.222.422.2	gzhan gyi tshogs pa tha mas 'khrul pa spang pa	gzhan gyi tshogs pa tha mas 'khrul pa spang pa	27,23
III.125.222.422.3	de'i rang bzhin can mtha' dag 'jig pa'i ngo bor grub pa	rtags chos can gyi khyab byed du ma grub pa dgag pa	27,29
III.125.222.422.4	gzhan gyi rang bzhin gnod pa can gyis khyab pa nges pa	gnod pa can gyis dngos po rtag pa la khyegs pas mthong pa las rigs pa gzhan la 'ang ma khyab pa'i dogs pa med pa	28,19
III.125.222.422.41	rgol ba	–	
III.125.222.422.42	dngos po'i mtshan nyid	dngos po'i mtshan nyid	28,19
III.125.222.422.43	ma khyab pa spang pa	de la ma khyab pa spang	28,28

*ste / rtsa ba'i gtan tshigs kyi khyab pa sgrub pa'i gtan tshigs dgod pa dang / de nyid kyi khyab pa bsgrub pa dang / gtan tshigs bsgrub pa dang / tshad ma'i don bsdus pa dang / rjes su 'gro ba grub pas ldog pa nyid grub pa'o //* The discussion that follows (*dKa' gnas* 307–320) is not structured according to this fivefold division. rNgog Lo proceeds to refute Dharmottara's interpretation and focuses on A2.

III.125.222.422.44	de gnod pa can gyis rtag pa la dgag pa / de rtag pa la bkag pas khyab pa bsgrub pa	de rtag pa dgag pa	29,14
III.125.222.422.441	rtags dgod pa	–	
III.125.222.422.442	chos can gyi ngo bo dang de nges byed	–	
III.125.222.422.443	phyogs kyi chos nges par byed pa'i tshad ma	–	
III.125.222.422.45	don bsdu ba	don bsdu ba	Verse 2.56
III.125.222.422.5	de'i rang bzhin can gyi rnam pa mtha' dag mthar 'jig pa'i ngo bos khyab par grub pa	de'i rigs can thams cad 'jug par grub pa	29,30
III.125.222.422.6	ltos pa bkag pa'i 'bras bu	ltos pa bkag pa'i 'bras bu	30,20
III.125.222.423	phyogs chos bsgrub pa	phyogs chos sgrub pa	31,1
III.125.222.424	don bsdu ba	don bsdu ba	Verse 2.57
III.125.222.425	rjes 'gro dngos su nges na ldog pa shugs la nges pa	rjes 'gro dngos su nges na ldog pa shugs la nges pa	32,25

Table 3: Place of the discussion of the invalidating argument in the 'Od zer and rNam nges bsdus don

There is a certain ambiguity here in the formulation of III.125.222.422.4 in terms of “ascertainment of pervasion” (*khyab pa nges pa*). Namely, is Phya pa referring here to pervasion *in the proof of impermanence* (A1/A1') – i.e., what he refers to in III.125.222.41 and °42 as “positive entailment” (*rjes 'gro*), but in the corresponding subdivision of his outline of the PVin as “pervasion” (*khyab pa*)? Or is he referring to the pervasion referred to in III.125.222.422, namely pervasion *in the subsidiary argument* (A2)?

The hierarchical structure adopted by Phya pa in the 'Od zer and rNam nges bsdus don suggests the latter, namely, that A3 establishes the pervasion of A2, while A2 establishes the pervasion of A1/A1': this is Option 2 in Table 4. However, the wording used in the passage (in particular, the phrasing of the elements of the inference that constitutes the invalidating argument) speaks in favor of the former. Namely, A3 (like A2)

establishes the pervasion of A1/A1'. Such an interpretation matches the role ascribed to the invalidating argument in the *Mun sel* (Option 1 in Table 4).<sup>14</sup>

OPTION 1			OPTION 2		
<b>A1/A1'</b>			<b>A1/A1'</b>		
sound is impermanent because it is produced/existent			sound is impermanent because it is produced/existent		
D	H	S	D	H	S
sound	produced/ existent	impermanent	sound	produced/ existent	impermanent
V			V		
↑		↑	↑		
<b>A2</b>		<b>A3</b>	<b>A2</b>		
what is produced/existent is impermanent, because it does not depend on other causes		what is permanent/non-momentary is non-produced/non-existent, because it is neither gradually nor suddenly efficient	what is produced/existent is impermanent, because it does not depend on other causes		
			D	H	S
			what is produced/ existent	not dependent on causes	impermanent
			V		
			↑		
<b>A3 (invalidating argument)</b>			<b>A3 (invalidating argument)</b>		
what is permanent/non-momentary is non-produced/non-existent, because it is neither gradually nor suddenly efficient		what is permanent/non-momentary is non-produced/non-existent, because it is neither gradually nor suddenly efficient			
		D	H	S	
		what is permanent/ non-momentary	non- efficient	non-produced/ non-existent	

Table 4: Role of the subsidiary arguments in Phya pa's works

<sup>14</sup> This interpretation corresponds to Steinkellner's analysis of this passage of the PVin (see Table 1 above).

Phya pa does not appear to have been influenced by Dharmottara's interpretation. He neither mentions it, nor refers to the interpretations of other Indian commentators. In one place, however, Phya pa introduces some subsidiary arguments he ascribes to Ratnākaraśānti (see A4a and A4b in Table 6).<sup>15</sup> Phya pa deals with a number of opposite positions, but he does not identify by name either the authors of the views he refutes (cf. §2, sections °21 and °22) or the authors of the objections against his own views (°34). Parallel passages in later works that identify upholders of the same views – in particular, the *Tshad bsdus*<sup>16</sup> – partly clarify the intellectual milieu in which the discussion unfolds: Phya pa is reacting to the positions of rNgog Lo and rNgog Lo's student Gangs pa she'u, as well as to the views of his own teacher, rGya dmar ba. The debate also involves Phya pa's student Byang chub skyabs.

#### 1.1.4 Tibetan commentators on the subsidiary arguments

##### Three main models

In her dissertation, Choi distinguishes three main models used in Tibetan commentaries to account for the relationship between A2 (the inference based on the causelessness of cessation) and A3 (the invalidating argument):

- (T1) A2 is a supporting inference for A3
- (T2) A3 contributes to the establishment of the pervasion of A2
- (T3) A2 and A3 both establish the pervasion of A1/A1': A2 establishes the positive entailment of A1/A1', and A3 establishes the negative entailment of A1/A1'

T1 corresponds to the first interpretation of Dharmottara (Dh-a). This model was criticized by rNgog Lo, gTsang nag pa, and Bo dong Sho re ba; in particular, rNgog Lo pointed out the lack of grounding for it in Dharmakīrti's texts. Still, this interpretation found support in Tibet in the person of bCom ldan ral gri and later scholars such as rGyal tshab Dar

<sup>15</sup> This is the only place in the *Mun sel* and *'Od zer* where Ratnākaraśānti's name appears. Phya pa's definition of similar and dissimilar instances has been shown to match Ratnākaraśānti's definition. The specific source of this definition (the *Antarvyāptisamarthana*) is explicit in gTsang nag pa and mTshur ston's epistemological works (Hugon 2004: 100 and n. 15), as well as Chu mig pa's *rNam rgyal* (A38a6, B43a5), but not in those of Phya pa.

<sup>16</sup> On which see van der Kuijp 2003 and Stoltz 2020.

ma rin chen (1364–1432). For these authors, however, T1 coexists with other possible interpretations (see below).

T2, a model already found in Jñānaśrībhadrā’s commentary, is the one adopted by rNgog Lo, Phya pa (most visibly in the *’Od zer*; see Table 4, Option 2), gTsang nag pa (who also explicitly rejects Dharmottara’s interpretation), and Chu mig pa. According to this model, the passage dealing with the invalidating argument (A3) is subordinate to the discussion of A2. According to Choi, strictly speaking, the role of A3 in this model is not to directly establish pervasion in A2, but to eliminate the fault of the reason of A2 being inconclusive.<sup>17</sup>

Model T3 appears to be of Tibetan origin. It is supported by bCom ldan ral gri and Bu ston<sup>18</sup> (along with T1). bCom ldan ral gri also refers to A2 as what “directly establishes” (*dn̄gos su sgrub pa*) pervasion in A1/A1’ and A3 as what “indirectly establishes” (*shugs la sgrub pa*) it.<sup>19</sup> The role ascribed to A2 is akin to the second interpretation of Dharmottara (Dh-b), but bCom ldan ral gri does not mention Dharmottara in this context.

### bCom ldan ral gri

Choi identifies bCom ldan ral gri as a turning point in the commentarial tradition as far as the question of momentariness is concerned. His adoption of both models T1 and T3 had an impact that extended to dGe lugs pa’s scholars (see below). bCom ldan justifies Dharmottara’s interpretation Dh-a (= T1), arguing as follows in his commentary on the PVin:

As observed above, when “permanent” is negated, (the object of the inference) turns out to be impermanent. Having cleared the road [of A3] by (the

<sup>17</sup> Chu mig pa, when commenting on the PVin (*rNam nges kyi ti ka* 63b6), adds an additional layer, as he ascribes to the invalidating argument the role of establishing the qualification of the subject in a subsidiary argument advocated to avoid the fault of the reason of A2 being inconclusive. In his *rNam rgyal*, he clearly states that there are two means of establishing pervasion in the proof of momentariness (A1): A2 and A3 (*rNam rgyal* A52b3, B58/59b5). He notes, however, that Dharmakīrti advocates A3 to establish the pervasion of A2, but criticizes those who hold that Dharmakīrti uses A3 to establish the qualification of the subject in A2 (*rNam rgyal* A53a7, B60b1–3).

<sup>18</sup> See, respectively, *rGyan gyi me tog*, 321ff., and *Tshigs don rab gsal*, 126a7ff.

<sup>19</sup> On the notions of direct and indirect establishment in bCom ldan ral gri’s works, see Schwabland 1994 and 1995.

reason) “absence of cause of cessation” (i.e., A2), one establishes the pervasion by the invalidating argument (A3), as taught [by Dharmakīrti] in the *Vādanyāya*: “In the case of this (essential property as a logical reason), a proof of pervasion is the demonstration of a valid cognition that invalidates (the occurrence of the logical reason) in the opposite (of what is to be proven).”<sup>20</sup>

If he supports T1/Dh-a when commenting on the PVin, in his earlier logico-epistemological summary, the *sDe bdun rgyan gyi me tog*, bCom ldan ral gri upholds model T3.<sup>21</sup>

Sa skya Paṇḍita and Bo dong Sho re ba

Bo dong’s commentary does not follow any of these three models. In his commentary (see *Nyi ma’i snying po* 71b2–4), he first refutes the claim, corresponding to T1/Dh-a, that A2 purifies A3 (and thus that neither of them is superfluous), and the claim, corresponding to T3, that A3 is an alternative inference (to A2) for proving that a produced thing or an existent thing necessarily ceases (i.e., pervasion in A1/A1’) (and is thus not superfluous). Bo dong presents T3 in terms that match bCom ldan ral gri and Bu ston’s, and comments that if this interpretation were correct, it would have been well known to scholars throughout Tibetan philosophical history! (In return, bCom ldan ral gri criticizes a model that seems to correspond to Bo dong’s.)<sup>22</sup> Bo dong does not mention T2. He himself embraces an alternative model (T4) that he ascribes to Sa skya paṇḍita (1182–1251, hereafter “Sa paṇ”).<sup>23</sup> According to this model (which is actually a variant of T3), A2 and A3 are aimed at two opponents with different fallacious understandings of cessation. A2 is addressed to those

<sup>20</sup> *rGyan gyi me tog* 327f.: *de ltar rtag pa la khags pa na mi rtag par ’gyur bas na ’jig pa rgyu med pas ni lam sbyangs nas gnod pa can gyis ni khyab pa sgrub pa yin te rtsod pa’i rigs pa las ’dir khyab pa sgrub par byed pa ni bsgrub par bya ba bzlog pa la gnod pa can gyi tshad ma nye bar bstan pa ste zhes gang bshad pa yin no //* The passage cited is VN 6,5–6: *atra vyāptisādhanaṃ viparyaye bādhakapramāṇopadarśanaṃ*.

<sup>21</sup> Bu ston follows bCom ldan ral gri in adopting T3, but is not explicit regarding the value of T1/Dh-a.

<sup>22</sup> See *rGyan gyi me tog* 323.

<sup>23</sup> Bo dong refers to Sa paṇ as “chos rje.” He does not mention a particular work of Sa paṇ, but one can identify the source of his reference as *Rigs gter rang ’grel* 158,15–159,1. Before presenting his own position, Sa paṇ mentions Dharmottara’s first interpretation (Dh-a) and refutes it (*Rigs gter rang ’grel* 158,10–12).

who subscribe to the notion of the impermanence of everything that exists, but insist that there is an external cause that leads things to cease. A3 is for those who reject the notion that all that exists is impermanent.

Choi notes in Sa paṅ's discussion of the proof of momentariness the idea that A3's role is to refute the idea that God (*īśvara*), the Vedas, etc., are real entities and are not perishable, even in the presence of causes of destruction.<sup>24</sup> As such, Sa paṅ associates A3 with the refutation of a permanently existent entity (*sthīrabhāva*). In her article on the development of the proof of impermanence based on the reason "existent" (Yoshimizu 1999), Yoshimizu argues that Dharmakīrti's proof (A1') evolved precisely from the refutation of a permanently existent entity, pointing out in particular that the argument invoking the absence of gradual and sudden efficacy was familiar to the Abhidharma tradition of Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas, as well as to the Yogācāra tradition. Yoshimizu highlights the fact that, in the PVSV, Dharmakīrti not only discusses the proof of impermanence based on the *vināśītvānumāna* when presenting logical reasons qua essential nature (*svabhāvahetu*), but also in a later passage, where he engages in the refutation of the authority of the Vedas (PVSV 141,17–150,5 ad PV 1.269–282). Yoshimizu identifies in the former passage a precedent for the *sattvānumāna* and the invalidating argument, which Dharmakīrti later develops in his PVin (see also Sakai 2012). According to her, the latter passage, in which Dharmakīrti's purpose is to disprove the Mīmāṃsaka's assertion that words are permanent and to demonstrate that all real entities are impermanent, echoes the use of the *vināśītvānumāna* by Dharmakīrti's predecessors to refute a permanently existent entity. Choi suggests that Sa paṅ's understanding of the role of A3 could have been inspired by this later passage in Dharmakīrti's PVSV, although Sa paṅ does not quote it.

Later dGe lugs pa scholars

Later dGe lugs pa scholars adopted the model of bCom ldan ral gri and Bu ston – namely, that A2 establishes the positive entailment of the proof

<sup>24</sup> *Rigs gter rang 'grel* 158,19–21: *gnod pa can ni / dbang phyugs dang rig byed la sogs pa dngos po ni yin la 'jig pa'i rkyen dang phrad kyang mi 'jig par 'dod pa la ...*

of impermanence, and A3 establishes its negative entailment – and generalized their understanding of A2 and A3 in the proof of momentariness to logical reasons qua essential properties in general. Such an understanding became the standard view of the role of A2 and A3 in the dGe lugs pa tradition.

Dar ma rin chen added a further specification (T5): A2 establishes the *rang ldog* of an essential connection, and A3 establishes its *don ldog*.<sup>25</sup> In the dGe lugs pa tradition, the *don ldog* equals the definiens (*mtshan nyid*) of a thing. In the case of an essential connection between X and Y, the *don ldog* is characterized by two conditions:

- (1) X is different from Y; and
- (2) when Y is negated, X must be negated.

According to Dar ma rin chen, when something (X) is related to another thing (Y), the first condition of their connection is established by perception, and the second condition is proven by means of the invalidating cognition. Dar ma rin chen's statement draws from his understanding of essential connections, which he bases on the following statement of Dharmakīrti, taken to express the definition of an essential connection:

Therefore, one admitting the ruling out of one thing through the ruling out of another must also admit some natural connection between them. Otherwise, evidence would not lead to knowledge. (PVSV 10,23–25 ad PV 1.14)<sup>26</sup>

<sup>25</sup> On these notions, see Onoda 1980, who examines the threefold typology of *ldog pa* in a *bsDus grwa* text that introduces it in terms of *spyi ldog*, *gzhi ldog*, and *don ldog*. *Spyi ldog* is a synonym of *rang ldog*. It is the concept that is the referent of a word. *Don ldog* amounts to the definition of a thing. For example, the *rang ldog* of “pot” is the concept “pot” (conceived of as the exclusion of what is not a pot, hence the notion of “*ldog pa*”), while the *don ldog* of “pot” is “bulbous, flat bottomed, and able to perform the function of holding water.”

<sup>26</sup> PVSV 10,23–25, Skt.: *tasmād ekanivṛtṭyā'nyanivṛttim icchatā tayoh kaścit svabhāvapratibandho 'py eṣṭavyaḥ | anyathā'gamako hetuḥ syāt*, trans. Gillon and Hayes 2008: 341. On this passage, see also Steinkellner 2013: 28 (“Daher muß jemand, der aufgrund des Fehlens des einen das Fehlen des anderen vertritt, für diese beiden auch irgendeine Verbindung durch das Wesen (*svabhāvapratibandha*) annehmen”) and Fukuda 1987 (in Japanese). Fukuda understands that “*ekaniṣṭṭyānyanivṛtti*” here stipulates the definition of the essential relationship, and terms it “interlocking elimination” (無化の連動性). On Dar ma rin chen's interpretation, see *Thar lam gsal byed* 21b2f.: [...] *zhes sogs gsungs pa'i dgongs pa cung zad bshad na | de la spyir 'brel pa gtan la phab pa las | rtags gsum*



The dGe lugs pa tradition thus illustrates the coexistence of models T1 (= Dh-a), T3 (in which the role ascribed to A2 roughly corresponds to Dh-b), and T5.

Sharpening the picture of dGe lugs pa positions on the subject, in her dissertation, Choi also considered the following works:

- i. the *Don gnyer yid kyi mun sel*, ascribed to Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357–1419)
- ii. the *Tshad ma'i brjed byang*, by Tsong kha pa/Dar ma rin chen
- iii. the *sDe bdun yid kyi mun sel*, by mKhas grub rje dGe legs dpal bzang (1385–1438)
- iv. the *Rigs pa'i rgyan*, by dGe 'dun grub pa (1391–1474)
- v. the *dGongs pa rab gsal gyi dka' gnas dogs gcod*, by Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469–1544/46)
- vi. the *Chos kyi grags pa'i dgongs rgyan*, by the second gTang Paṇḍita Blo bzang bstan pa rgya mtsho (1738–1780)

While (i) does not mention the proof of momentariness at all, (ii), which is actually a memorandum of Tsong kha pa's lecture written by Dar ma rin chen, refers partially to T3 and T5. Work (iii) follows (ii) in discussing the topic. Work (iv) refers only to T5, while (v) and (vi) mention all three interpretations, T1, T3, and T5.

In contrast, T2 (the model according to which A3 is subsidiary to A2), which is found in earlier Tibetan commentaries, such as those of rNgog Lo and Phya pa, is no longer supported in the later dGe lugs pa tradition. Choi suggests that this might be because the dGe lugs pa monastic educational system does not rely primarily on the PVin (which was the main text of Dharmakīrti considered in the works of rNgog Lo and Phya pa), but rather on the PV, making these earlier commentaries, if not obsolete, at least secondary to more recent works supporting different interpretative models.

*gyi rnam dbye mi 'dod bzhin du khas blang dgos te / du ba me dang 'brel pa de dang tha dad de log pa'i stobs kyis ldog pa'i phyir / ces pa'i rgyu mtshan las 'grub la /* “If I explain a little about the real intention [of Dharmakīrti's statement]: in that case, in general, having ascertained the relation (*'brel ba*), one has to accept it without making a distinction between the three types of logical reason. Namely, the relation between smoke and fire is established on the following grounds, namely, that (1) [smoke] is different from it (i.e., fire), and that (2) [smoke] is eliminated by the force of the elimination of it (i.e., fire).”

## 1.2 *Phya pa's discussion of the invalidating argument: Some key features*

To better delineate Phya pa's discussion of the invalidating argument translated in §2, some preliminary remarks are in order.

### 1.2.1 Phya pa on direct and indirect establishment

As noted by Schwabland (1994: 305–316 and 1995), the distinction between direct and indirect cognition is abundantly discussed in the early Tibetan epistemological tradition. The distinction is already made by rNgog Lo in his *dKa' gnas*, and the identification of what is indirectly (*shugs*) ascertained when something else is directly (*dnegos*) ascertained is frequently advocated by Phya pa. A short excursus featuring the definition of direct and indirect understanding (*dnegos rtogs/shugs rtogs*) is found in Phya pa's works when discussing the intrinsic/extrinsic ascertainment of validity (*Mun sel* 36a8–36b6 = 'Od zer 31b5–32a4).<sup>27</sup> This discussion covers many of the cases Sa skya Paṇḍita lists in his account of the views of his Tibetan predecessors (Schwabland 1995: Appendix E).

In the passage translated in §2, the idea of direct/indirect understanding is mainly used to derive, from a determination pertaining to a *cognition* (*blo, yul can*), a determination pertaining to the *object* (*yul*) apprehended by this cognition. In Phya pa's philosophy of mind, each of the three types of cognitions he distinguishes are associated with an object that is their apprehended object (*gzung yul*). Cognitions and objects are associated with various sets of properties (see Hugon and Stoltz 2019: 311, Table A), some of which are related. For instance, there is a correspondence between cognition being non-erroneous (*ma 'khrul pa*) and its object being real (*dnegos po*) and veridical (*bden pa*), and between cognition being erroneous and its object being superimposed. Here, however, Phya pa is mostly interested in the identification of the object in terms of an “aspect” or “feature” (*rnam pa*) appearing to this cognition.<sup>28</sup> The idea

<sup>27</sup> Phya pa claims that his presentation relies on the system of other (anonymous) scholars, but it is not clear to what extent the wording of the presentation reflects this earlier system or Phya pa's own framework.

<sup>28</sup> What appears to cognition is discussed literally in terms of *being feature* “x” (... *kyi rnam pa yin*), although it might be easier to think of it in terms of *having the aspect* “x.”

is that a determination pertaining to a cognition is brought by reflexive awareness (*rang rig*).<sup>29</sup> Reflexive awareness does not merely ascertain that some cognition is taking place; it also ascertains what it is a cognition of, i.e., what this cognition apprehends. For instance, when perceiving a blue object, reflexive awareness ascertains that cognition *apprehends blue*. This is directly ascertained. From this direct ascertainment pertaining to the cognition, one can derive an ascertainment about the apprehended object; in the previous example, that the apprehended object is the feature “blue.” There is no determination, however, about this object being real. Such an indirect determination would require the direct determination that the cognition is non-erroneous, which reflexive awareness is unable to provide. Reflexive awareness is also unable to ascertain that cognition apprehends something impermanent, even though the blue thing is actually impermanent. Phya pa distinguishes among properties of an object between those that are “manifest” (*rnam ldan*) (such as “blue”) and those that are “non-manifest” (*rnam med/rnam pa ma gsal ba*) (such as “impermanent”); all properties appear to cognition, but only what is manifest can be ascertained to appear to cognition (see Hugon and Stoltz 2019: 13–16 and 72, n. 74)

The same method of direct/indirect ascertainment applies in the case of the conceptual cognition of “blue;” there, the apprehended object is not a particular, but the concept (*don spyi*) “blue.” For concepts such as “blue,” “cow,” or “pot,” one might conceive of the notion of “feature” (*rnam pa*) in terms of a mental image. But this becomes difficult when dealing with concepts of broader extension, such as “color,” “animal,” “what is produced,” or concepts such as “what is void of causal efficacy” or “demon’s pot.” It might be more useful here to approach the notion of “feature” in relation to the generic word (or expression) associated with a particular concept (“associated” in the sense that upon hearing this word, the corresponding concept arises in conceptual cognition).

<sup>29</sup> Phya pa adopts a “directly active” model of perceptual knowledge, according to which some types of perceptions ascertain the object themselves in the sense that they remove opposite superimpositions. They do not, however, provide a conceptual determination of the object; this is the task of a subsequently arising conceptual cognition (*nges shes*), but is not a necessary condition for the preceding cognition to have the status of a valid cognition. See Hugon and Stoltz 2019: 92–99.

Importantly, in the case of conceptual cognition, it is only what is *explicit* as a feature that is liable to be ascertained; its being explicit or not is discernable in the expression used to refer to the concept. For instance, the feature “permanent” is explicit when one considers the concept “demon’s permanent pot,” but not if one considers the concept “demon’s pot.” Although Phya pa does not express this principle by using a specific Tibetan expression corresponding to what is termed “explicit” here,<sup>30</sup> the application of this principle stands out clearly when he discusses which features reflexive awareness is liable to ascertain or not.

### 1.2.2 Phya pa’s “method of conceptual appearance”

The use of the distinction between direct and indirect ascertainment becomes especially handy when the concept being apprehended does not relate to anything established in reality. Here, “relate” refers to the process of concept formation involving the perception of discrete real entities, conceptually regrouped under a common category, as is the case for the concepts “blue” and “pot.” Namely, even if a concept is not formed in such a way – as is the case for concepts such as “permanent” or “demon’s pot” – the corresponding feature nevertheless qualifies as *established* insofar as it is indirectly ascertained by the reflexive awareness of the conceptual cognition of which such a concept is the apprehended object.

In another paper (Hugon 2020), Hugon has discussed how Phya pa invokes this method, which she terms the “method of conceptual appearance,” to avoid the logical fault of “non-establishment of the basis” (*āśrayāsiddha*) in the case of inferences whose subject is not existent – an issue shared by all proofs of non-existence as well as by the invalidating argument in the proof of impermanence, given that its subject is “what is not momentary” or “what is permanent.” Buddhist logicians indeed invoke the “non-establishment of the basis” as legitimate grounds for rejecting an argument. This can be considered to constitute a fallacy of the thesis (regardless of the logical reason) or a fallacy of the logical reason, as the non-existence of the subject prevents the fulfillment of the

<sup>30</sup> In one case, he uses for something non-explicit an expression equivalent to the one designating non-manifest features in the case of particulars appearing to non-erroneous non-conceptual cognition (see §2, 2.4).

requirement of the logical reason being a property of the subject (*pakṣa-dharmatva*); in other words, the logical reason would be unestablished (Skt. *asiddha*; Tib. *ma grub pa*). To avoid incurring this very fault in their own proofs of non-existence (when they refute entities that their opponents accept as existent), Buddhist logicians have come up with various solutions. Some of the most well-known are: the “method of conceptual subject” (i.e., taking the conceptual representation of the entity in question as the subject); the “method of paraphrase” (i.e., reformulating the reasoning in such a way that the actual subject is acceptable to the proponent); and the “method of simple negation” (i.e., exclusively ascribing negative properties to the subject).<sup>31</sup> Phya pa’s method is a variation on the “method of conceptual subject.” It considers the apprehended object – the concept (*don spyi*) – not from the perspective of its nature, but from the perspective of the features (*rnam pa*) it represents.

Applying this method when discussing the subject of the invalidating argument, Phya pa describes “permanent” or “void of momentariness” as a “simple negation” – the simple negation “void of momentariness” – which is shown to be found in a verbal object<sup>32</sup> (but the subject is not the verbal object, i.e., the conceptual entity, itself). In other words, the subject is the conceptual feature “void of impermanence,” which can be indirectly ascertained by reflexive awareness.

### 1.2.3 Two versions of the logical reason’s characteristic of being a property of the subject

Having a method to achieve the “establishment of the basis” even in the case of a non-existent subject enables Phya pa to escape the fault of a logical reason not satisfying the first characteristic that is a precondition for being a correct logical reason – being a property of the subject (Tib.

<sup>31</sup> See Watanabe 2020 and Hugon 2020.

<sup>32</sup> We use the expression “verbal object” to render the term *sgra don* in Tibetan. One could also translate it “the object of a word.” The term *sgra don* is a calque of the Sanskrit *śabdārtha*, which is used by Dharmakīrti in PV 3.287 to characterize conceptual cognition (*śabdārthagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānaṃ tatra kalpanā*, “Wherever consciousness apprehends a verbal object, it is conceptual,” trans. Tillemans 1999: 280, n. 27). In Phya pa’s works, *sgra don* is equivalent to *don spyi* (lit. “generic object,” which we translate as “concept”), the apprehended object of conceptual cognition.

*phyogs chos*, Skt. *pakṣadharmatā*). Further, it allows him to account for a *strong version* of this characteristic. Indeed, according to Phya pa, the first characteristic must consist in the establishment that the logical reason is based (*rten pa*) on the property-possessor, or subject. This amounts to the *positive ascription* of a property (the logical reason) to the subject, which is not possible if the subject is not established. The strong version is also sometimes presented by Phya pa in terms of the subject being pervaded by the property that constitutes the logical reason. Phya pa rejects a *weak version* of the first characteristic, according to which the latter obtains if one can establish the *negation of the association of the property-possessor with the opposite of the logical reason*.

Strong version	Weak version
D is H	not(D with non-H)
sound is produced/ “sound” is pervaded by “produced”	it is not the case that “sound” can be associated with “non-produced”
what is permanent is non-existent	it is not the case that “what is permanent” can be associated with “existent”

Table 5: Two versions of the characteristic of “being a property of the subject” (*phyogs chos*)

#### 1.2.4 The four-step process

The use of the method of direct/indirect determination allows one to go from a determination pertaining to the cognition to a determination pertaining to its object. The latter amounts to the ascertainment of a particular feature  $x$  and is considered to be the positive ascertainment of this feature  $x$ . A further step in what can indirectly be ascertained is to go from the *positive ascertainment* of feature  $x$  to the *negation* of the opposite feature  $non-x$ . Importantly, given that the very first, direct ascertainment is made by reflexive awareness, all subsequent indirect ascertainments are held to be made by reflexive awareness as well. Reflexive awareness is also more generically termed “perception” (*mngon sum*) or “experience” (*myong ba*), in opposition to an inferential process of determination.

Phya pa's full-fledged application of the combined methods of direct/indirect determination and of "conceptual appearance" involves a series of consecutive steps, not all of which are always stated explicitly (the roman numerals used here are reported in the translation when this method is applied):

- i. reflexive awareness directly establishes that a conceptual cognition is apprehending  $x$ ;
- ii. indirectly, it establishes that what is apprehended is the feature  $x$ ;
- ii'. feature  $x$  is positively ascertained;
- iii. feature non- $x$  is negated;
- iv. the truth with regard to non- $x$  is negated.<sup>33</sup>

One should note that what is represented here by the variable  $x$  may be formulated positively (for instance, "permanent") or negatively (for instance, "void of momentariness"). In the latter case, the feature negated at step iii is usually expressed positively (e.g., "momentary") rather than by way of a double negation (e.g., "non-void of momentariness"). In certain cases,  $x$  and non- $x$  are not expressed as " $x$ " and its negation, but with two different expressions, for instance "one" and "many."

A particular application of this four-step process is found at the very beginning of the passage under consideration, to establish the direct incompatibility between "permanent" and "impermanent" – which is required for the application of the invalidating argument. Establishing incompatibility between two items, in Phya pa's view, requires that one item be shown to consist in the negation of the other item. For this, one item must first be positively established in order to show that the other item is its negation. The method of conceptual appearance is used here to compensate for the impossibility of achieving this positive establishment by perception or inference prior to the proof of impermanence.

### 1.2.5 *Argumentation by parallels*

In the translated passage, Phya pa makes frequent use of the technique of "argumentation by parallels." The reader is referred to Hugon 2008 for the details of this technique. To summarize the broad lines, it is a type

<sup>33</sup> As discussed in Hugon 2020: 149, this expression characterizes the apprehended object as being veridical in a specific way or with regard to a given property.

of analogical reasoning that involves the introduction of another domain (D2), which does not have to be thematically related to the domain of discussion (D1), but involves elements instantiating the same relational structure as the elements of D1 under consideration. For instance, if the thesis under discussion in D1 is the claim that “sound is permanent because it is produced,” a parallel could be made in the domain of cows with the claim “this calf is a horse because it has a hump and a dewlap.” The parallel domain and the claim made in this domain are chosen in such a way that the parallel claim is obviously problematic for the opponent, who is then driven to react by proposing an answer. This answer is then reiterated, *mutatis mutandis*, with regard to the initial claim in domain D1. The discussion often stops after four steps (claim in D1, parallel claim in D2, answer in D2, parallel answer in D1), but may also be more complex, unfolding in a zigzag pattern moving from one domain to the parallel domain and back several times over.

The passage translated in §2 involves cases of argumentation by parallels both where the instigator of the parallel is Phya pa (e.g., °22), and where the instigator is an opponent (°341–°343). In the former case, the discussion ends when Phya pa’s point has been made with regard to D1. If the parallel is instigated as an objection against Phya pa’s view, the argument ends when it is shown that the two domains are actually not parallel; for instance, when one arrives at a conclusion in D2 that is absurd, but the parallel conclusion in D1 is accepted.

### 1.3 *Summary of the passage on the invalidating argument*

While the passage translated in §2 is illustrative of Phya pa’s style and argumentative technique, this very style sometimes makes it difficult to keep track of the main line of the argument and to identify the points that Phya pa wants to make by introducing hypothetical objections and refuting them. To overcome this difficulty, we shall provide a running summary of the individual sections here.

The passage translated in §2 is a detailed exposition of the invalidating argument, which is presented in the form of an inference (A3; see Table 6):

What is permanent/non-momentary is non-produced/non-existent, because it is neither gradually nor suddenly efficient.



The argument is presented at the end of °1. Its goal is to negate “produced”/“existent” for “what is permanent”/“what is non-momentary,” and thereby to establish that “produced”/“existent” entails “momentary.” This, however, is only possible if “non-momentary” and “momentary” are directly incompatible – in other words, if there is a strict bipartition between what is momentary and what is not momentary; there is nothing that is both, and also nothing that is neither. The greatest part of °1 is thus devoted to proving this direct incompatibility by relying on the method of conceptual appearance (cf. §1.2.2) and the associated four-step process (cf. §1.2.4).

Pervasion (*khyab pa*) in the invalidating argument does not give rise to any extensive discussion; Phya pa only mentions cursively that it can be ascertained by perception (end of °1). The focus is rather on the nature of the subject of the argument A3 (°2) and on the establishment of the qualification of the subject by the logical reason (*phyogs chos*) in A3 (°3).

The subject of the invalidating argument is referred to with the expression “permanent” (*rtag pa*) or “not momentary” (*skad cig ma ma yin*). In °21, Phya pa points out the difference between the concept as concept (which is unreal, not efficient, not momentary) and the concept understood in terms of the feature it represents.<sup>34</sup> What is intended in the invalidating argument is not the negation of “produced”/“existent” with regard to the former, the concept per se (i.e., the argument is not about proving that concepts are unreal). In °22, Phya pa rejects the option that the subject “permanent” may be a permanent entity, invoking the necessity for the subject to be an established basis, and rejecting a weak version of the qualification of the subject by the logical reason (cf. §1.2.3). The subject is thus the simple negation “void of momentariness,” which is directly incompatible with “momentariness” (the property to be proven in A1) (°23). This “void of momentariness” is a feature of a concept or verbal object (°24), which is established by reflexive awareness via the method of conceptual appearance (cf. §1.2.2). Phya pa points out the limits of what can be ascertained via reflexive awareness (so as to avoid establishing

<sup>34</sup> The ambiguity resolved here is different from the ambiguity, discussed in Tillemans 1999: 218–220, between “A itself” and “particular A’s,” which can also both be understood from the expression “A”.

the thesis of the invalidating argument when establishing the basis), and the difference between what appears to reflexive awareness and what is being ascertained by it. This indirectly highlights a particularity of indirect ascertainment, namely, the possibility to ascertain an object that does not appear to a given cognition.

In our translation, we use the expression “what is permanent” to translate *rtaḡ pa* in the role of subject, which avoids the ambiguity that *Phya pa* clarifies in °21, and also clarifies that the argument is not about the quality of being permanent as a quality per se. In view of °22 and °23, it should be clear that “what is permanent” is not “a permanent thing,” but the contents of a conceptual appearance featuring the void of momentariness.

°3 deals with establishing that the logical reason “void of sudden or gradual efficacy” applies to the subject “what is permanent”/“what is void of momentariness.” The discussion runs on the opponent’s association of “efficient” with “many” and of “permanent” with “one:” one thus seeks to negate “many” with respect to “one.” In °31, the option that this may require two perceptions (one ascertaining “many,” the other ascertaining “one,” or a memory of “many” and a perception ascertaining “one”) is rejected on account of one perception (that ascertaining “one”) being sufficient. This option in turn (which advocates the four-step process to go from “ascertaining one” to “negating many”) is refuted in °32 by pointing out five faults.

The first two arguments rely on the idea that all ascertainments indirectly derived from a direct ascertainment via reflexive awareness also qualify as ascertainments by reflexive awareness. In particular, the thesis of A1 (the proof of momentariness) would become established by reflexive awareness (°321) and the thesis of A3 (the invalidating argument) would become established by reflexive awareness (°322).

The third argument (°323) draws from the premises associating “one” and “many” with “permanent” and “efficient,” respectively, the absurd conclusion that the thesis of A3 is established when ascertaining the negative entailment. Attempts to avoid these absurd conclusions by invoking a specific case – “coarse object that is multiple although its subtle parts lack multiplicity”<sup>35</sup> – that is, something permanent, but also multiple, leads

<sup>35</sup> In *Tshad bsdu*s 259, this concept is ascribed to the Vātsīputrīya.

to contradicting the opponent's initial claim that the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A3 is ascertained via reflexive awareness.

The fourth argument (°324) derives – through the ascertainment by perception of the qualification of the subject by the logical reason (according to the opponent) – the ascertainment by perception of the thesis of A3 and of the pervasion of A1, and hence the uselessness of A3.

The fifth argument (°325) rejects the possibility of deriving, from the ascertainment of “void of momentariness” by reflexive awareness, the negation of “gradually or suddenly efficient” by appealing to the rules regarding the negation between incompatible items (only a directly incompatible item or an incompatible item characterized by something directly incompatible can be negated).

Phya pa presents his own position in °33: the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A3 is ascertained by inference. He first (a) introduces two inferential proofs by Ratnākaraśānti (A4a and A4b) that rely on the relation between “single moment” and “suddenly efficient” and “many moments” and “gradually efficient,” and justifies that the establishment of pervasion in these proofs is made by inference. The establishment of the entailment of “many moments” in the case of “gradual efficacy” relies on the consideration of the distinct natures of the first moment (when the effect is not yet present) and the second moment (when the effect is present) (A5a). The establishment of the entailment of “one moment” in the case of “suddenly efficient” considers the second moment, when the effect is present and the cause is destroyed (A5b). Phya pa then (b) turns to Dharmakīrti. There, the readings of the *'Od zer* and the *Mun sel* differ, the first work referring to paragraphs in the PVin, the second giving only a general paraphrase. Discussed here in detail is the particular case of the “coarse object with a multiple nature consisting of singular subtle parts,” and the question of how efficacy can be negated for these subtle parts. A singular subtle part cannot have gradual efficacy (this requires a distinction between a previous and a subsequent moment, hence multiplicity) (A6a). What is permanent cannot have sudden efficacy (because its being part of a multiple nature that has to be the same at the first and second moments leads to absurd consequences).

In °34, Phya pa defends his own position against three objections. The first objection (°341) relies on the confusion between the concept per se

(which is unreal, etc.) and the features it represents. The discussion explores the issue of the relation between cognition being “erroneous”/“non-erroneous” and its object being “superimposed”/“veridical.” The second objection (°342) is similar, but about a different type of superimposed object than concepts, namely, illusions/hallucinations exemplified by the double moon. Such objects are the apprehended objects of non-conceptual erroneous cognition. Here too the power of ascertainment of reflexive awareness is shown to be limited to the appearing feature, but does not touch on the reality of the object. In reply to the last objection – that the invalidating argument is redundant because one can establish the pervasion of A1 based on (a) pervasion of “produced” by “efficient” (established by perception) and (b) pervasion of “efficient” by “momentary” (based on Ratnākaraśānti’s inferences) (°343) – Phya pa points out that (a) and (b) lack a common ground. If they were articulated in an inferential reasoning (as qualification of the subject by the logical reason and pervasion, respectively), they would have a common ground, but in such a case they would have to be ascertained differently than what is presupposed in the objection.

In terms of the arguments involved in the discussion, the passage on the invalidating argument is part of the discussion of A1. As mentioned in §1.1, it makes no explicit reference to A2, but focuses on A3. A3’s function is “to negate ‘produced’/‘existent’ for ‘what is permanent’.” It is conceived of as an inferential reasoning. The pervasion of the logical reason of A3 is said to be ascertained by perception. The establishment of the qualification of the subject by the logical reason is at the core of Phya pa’s discussion. Phya pa supports the idea that it has to be established by inference. He refers to two subsidiary inferences (A4a and A4b) that he ascribes to Ranākaraśānti, based on the non-apprehension of the pervader of the negandum. The pervasion of the negandum by the pervader in A4a and A4b is established by subsidiary inferences, A5a and A5b. When discussing Dharmakīrti’s views on the same topic, the discussion focuses on A4a negating efficacy for a special kind of permanent thing: a coarse object that is multiple whereas its parts are singular. Phya pa spells out a formal inferential argument for this in the *Mun sel* (see below, A6a). The argument is not spelled out in the *’Od zer*, but is presupposed in view of the use of expressions referring to “negative entailment,” “pervasion,”

and “logical reason” (which are to be understood as referring to an implicit argument A6a).

In all these proofs, “impermanent” and “momentary,” as well as “permanent” and “void of momentariness,” are used interchangeably. For simplicity’s sake, we use “impermanent” and “permanent” in Table 6 below.

		<b>Subject</b>	<b>Logical reason</b>	<b>Property to be proven</b>
<b>A1</b>	sound is impermanent because it is produced/existent	sound	produced/existent	impermanent
<b>A2</b>	what is produced/existent is impermanent, because it does not depend on other causes	what is produced/existent	not depending on other causes	impermanent
<b>A3</b>	what is permanent is non-produced/non-existent, because it is neither gradually nor suddenly efficient	what is permanent	neither gradually nor suddenly efficient	non-produced/non-existent
<b>A4a</b>	What is permanent does not have gradual efficacy, because there aren’t many momentary moments	what is permanent	no multiple moments	not gradually efficient
<b>A4b</b>	What is permanent does not have sudden efficacy, because there isn’t a single momentary moment	what is permanent	no single moment	not suddenly efficient
<b>A5a</b>	The first and second moments of what is gradually efficient are multiple moments, because they have incompatible properties	first and second moments of what is gradually efficient	incompatible properties	multiple moments
<b>A5b</b>	At the second instant of what is suddenly efficient, the cause is destroyed because the effect arises	second instant of what is suddenly efficient	effect arises	cause destroyed (therefore, single moment)

<b>A6a</b>	Take as the subject a single part within something multiple. It is void of gradual efficacy, because it is void of the distinction between a previous moment – what is not an unimpeded capacity – and a subsequent moment – what is an unimpeded capacity	permanent coarse object that is multiple whereas its subtle parts are singular	no distinction between previous moment (unimpeded capacity) and subsequent moment (impeded capacity)	not gradually efficient
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Table 6: Summarizing table of arguments and subsidiary arguments in the proof of momentariness in Phya pa’s works

#### 1.4 *Remarks on the translation*

The subdivisions (*sa bcad*) are those of the author. The passage appears in the overarching section entitled “Negating it (i.e., the logical reason) for ‘what is permanent’ by the invalidating argument” in the *’Od zer* (III.125.222.422.44), and “Negating ‘produced’ for ‘what is permanent’” in the *Mun sel* (242.324.122) (see Table 2 and Table 3). The corresponding *sa bcad* number indicating the place of this section in the overall structure of the respective works is only given in the first paragraph and, for simplicity’s sake, is replaced with ° in the following ones. The part of the numbering of the subsection that follows ° is the same for both texts. Lemmas of the PVin given in the *’Od zer* as “markers” (i.e., they indicate the paragraph of the PVin in which a given point is discussed) are rendered in the translation by reference to the corresponding passage in the edition of the Tibetan text of the PVin.

When the reading of the *’Od zer* and the *Mun sel* are both acceptable but differ in such a way that a different translation is needed, the alternative translation is indicated in a footnote. If one of them is faulty or both are faulty, only the reading adopted in the edition is mirrored in the translation.

In preparing the translation, we first adopted a “middle-way method,” avoiding the use of brackets but marking in gray the expressions implicit in Phya pa’s phrasing that we made explicit for the sake of clarity, as well as some repetitions meant to help the reader keep track of the elements involved in the arguments. For the present publication, we have taken the

further step of removing the color marking. Readers who do not know Tibetan will thus benefit from a less challenging reading, while readers able to compare our translation with the Tibetan text will easily spot where additions were made (we trust that they are uncontroversial). A few additional clarifications are provided in round brackets.

A critical edition of the section on logical reasons qua essential properties, which includes the passage dealt with in the present paper together with an annotated Japanese translation, will be available in the near future in the published version of Choi’s doctoral thesis. In order not to overlap excessively with Choi’s forthcoming publication in this regard, footnote annotations of the present English translation have been kept to a minimum.

To facilitate the identification of expressions referring to subject, logical reason, or property to be proven, these have been placed within quotation marks. As discussed earlier, the Tibetan formulation does not distinguish between properties and things having these properties, and the concept of these – an ambiguity that grounds some of the discussions in the passage. To contribute to an easier understanding of the English translation, we have supplied, in the case of the subject, the expression “what is ...,” e.g., translating *byas pa* as “what is produced” rather than as “produced.”<sup>36</sup> As no knowledge of Tibetan is presupposed from the reader, all terms have been translated. For orientation, the table below lists our choice of translation for recurring expressions and technical terms in the passage:

<b>Tibetan</b>	<b>English</b>
<i>mngon sum</i>	perception
<i>rjes dpag</i>	inferential cognition, inference
<i>rang rig</i>	reflexive awareness
<i>phyogs chos</i>	qualification of the subject by the logical reason

<sup>36</sup> One exception is when the characteristic of the subject being qualified by the logical reason (*phyogs chos*) is expressed by *Phya pa* in terms of the subject being pervaded (*khyab pa*) by the logical reason. There, for consistency with other discussions involving the notion of pervasion, the subject is expressed without the addition of the expression “what is ...”

<i>rtags</i>	logical reason
<i>chos can</i>	property-possessor, subject
<i>khyab pa</i>	pervasion, entailment
<i>skad cig ma</i>	momentary
<i>rtag pa</i>	permanent
<i>ldog pa</i>	concept, “exclusion property”
<i>don byed</i>	efficacy, efficient
<i>don spyi</i>	concept
<i>rnam pa</i>	feature, aspect
<i>rim pa</i>	gradual
<i>gcig char</i>	sudden
<i>nus pa</i>	capacity
<i>thogs med</i>	unimpeded
<i>yongs gcod la grub</i>	positive establishment
<i>yongs gcod la nges</i>	positive ascertainment

Table 7: Key terms and their English translation

## 2. Translation

III.125.222.422.44/242.324.122 Negating the logical reason for “what is permanent” by the invalidating argument/Negating “produced” for “what is permanent”

*'Od zer* 126a4; *Mun sel* 62b5

Regarding the establishment of pervasion (of A1)<sup>37</sup> via the negation of this logical reason (“produced”/“existent”) for “what is permanent,” Dharmakīrti wrote: “What is not momentary is not such” (PVin 2 Tib. 29,14).<sup>38</sup> This is to be elucidated by the following three points:

<sup>37</sup> The notations A1...A5 refer to inferences involved in the discussion. See Table 6 for a summarizing overview.

<sup>38</sup> *Mun sel*: “Regarding the determination by an invalidating argument that negates ‘existent,’ etc. for ‘permanent’...”



- Presenting the argument (°1)
- The nature of the subject and what ascertains it (°2)
- The valid cognition that determines<sup>39</sup> the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A3 (°3)

°1 Presenting the argument

'*Od zer* 126a4; *Mun sel* 62b6

As for the direct incompatibility between “momentary” and “void of momentariness:”<sup>40</sup>

(a) When the inferential cognition of momentariness has not yet arisen (via A1), there is no positive establishment of “momentary” following which “void of momentariness” would be negated, because perception does not engage momentariness<sup>41</sup> and an inferential cognition ascertaining momentariness has not yet arisen.

(b) As for the positive ascertainment of “void of momentariness” following which “momentary” would be negated, since “what is void of momentariness” is unreal, it is not the direct object of perception, and if “void of momentariness” was ascertained by inference, there would be infinite regress.<sup>42</sup>

(c) Nevertheless, when one experiences, by reflexive awareness, that conceptual cognition apprehends “void of momentariness” (i), what is apprehended by this conceptual cognition is indirectly established to be the feature “void of momentariness” (ii), because it would be contradictory for the apprehending part to be what apprehends “void of momentariness”

<sup>39</sup> *Mun sel*: “What determines...”

<sup>40</sup> See Hugon 2016a: 890–891 for an outline of Phya pa’s views on incompatibility. The ascertainment of direct incompatibility between A and B requires that either A or B is established, and that the other member of the pair be shown to amount to its negation. In (a) Phya pa argues that “momentary” is not established; in (b) that “void of momentariness” is not established. (c) provides a solution for ascertaining direct incompatibility nonetheless via the method of conceptual appearance (§1.2.2) and the four-step process (§1.2.4). The numbers (i) ... (iv) refer to these steps.

<sup>41</sup> Ordinary beings are unable to ascertain that the things they perceive are momentary via perception, they must resort to an inference. “Momentariness” qualifies as the apprehended object (*gzung yul*) of perception but not as its engaged object (*'jug yul*).

<sup>42</sup> This is because this inference would require establishing the direct incompatibility of “void of momentariness” and “momentary.”

and for what is apprehended by it not to be the feature “void of momentariness.”

Since the feature “void of momentariness” is positively established (ii’), the feature “momentary” is negated (iii); thereby, being true with regard to “momentary” is also negated (iv).

Since the negation of “momentary” is the very exclusion property<sup>43</sup> “void of momentariness,” a third option that would be neither “momentary” nor “void of momentariness” is eliminated.

(Thereby, “momentary” and “void of momentariness” are established to be directly incompatible.)

Based on an example such as a pot, one ascertains via perception that “produced”<sup>44</sup> is pervaded by “either gradually or non-gradually efficient.”

By stating

“What is not momentary” is “void of production,” “void of existence,” etc., because it is “void of gradual and of sudden efficacy” (= A3)<sup>45</sup>

one negates “produced” and “existent” for “what is not momentary.” Thereby, one determines that “produced” and “existent” are pervaded by “momentary.”

(Thereby, the pervasion of A1 is determined.)

°2 The nature of the subject and what ascertains it

*’Od zer 126a8; Mun sel 63a1*

As for what constitutes the subject (“permanent” in A3), this is to be elucidated by the four following points:

- Rejecting the option that the verbal object itself is the subject (°21)
- Rejecting the option that a permanent entity is the subject (°22)
- Establishing that the simple negation “void of momentariness” is the subject (°23)

<sup>43</sup> An “exclusion property” (*ldog pa*) is a conceptual property conceived as the elimination of what it is not (the excluded). Phya pa defines a “directly incompatible instance” as “what is to be determined as the very exclusion property consisting in the negation of the excluded” (see Hugon 2016a: 891–892, n. 28 for the reference).

<sup>44</sup> *Mun sel* adds: or “existent,” etc.

<sup>45</sup> A3 is thus presented as an inference based on a logical reason qua non-apprehension of the pervader (of the negandum).

- The way of establishing this simple negation based on a verbal object (°24)

°21 Rejecting the option that the verbal object itself is the subject

*'Od zer 126a9; Mun sel 63a2*

<sup>46</sup>(D1) If one thinks: The subject being the exclusion property consisting in the verbal object “permanent,” because “produced” is negated for the verbal object “permanent,” “produced” is pervaded by “impermanent.”

(D2) **Parallel:** Then, why not accept that because “efficient” is negated for the verbal object “pot,” “efficient” is pervaded by “non-pot”?

(D2') **Reply:** Since the verbal object “pot” and the real pot exist separately, although one negates “efficient” for the verbal object “pot,” one does not negate “efficient” for the real pot. Therefore, it would not be the case that “efficient” is pervaded by “non-pot.”

(D1') **Parallel reply:** Since the verbal object “permanent” and the permanent entity are necessarily established separately, although one negates “produced” for the verbal object “permanent,” one does not negate “produced” for the permanent entity. Further, since the verbal object “permanent” and a double moon void of momentariness, etc., exist separately, by negating “produced” for the verbal object “permanent,” one does not negate “produced” for the double moon void of momentariness, etc.<sup>47</sup> For this reason, how would it be established that “produced” is pervaded by “impermanent”?

<sup>46</sup> See §1.2.5 in the introduction on arguments by parallels. Here the argument runs on the idea that any verbal object (*śabdārtha*, Tib. *sgra don*), or concept (Tib. *don spyi*), being a fiction, is actually not produced and not efficient, but that this does not imply that *what it is a verbal object of* is necessarily not produced or not efficient. This is not evident for the concept “permanent” (the concept “permanent” itself is not produced, and what is permanent is not produced either). It is thus made evident using the example “pot:” the verbal object “pot” is not produced (because it is a conceptually created fiction), but a *pot* is a real entity that is produced. Here the author speaks of the verbal object in term of an “exclusion property” (*ldog pa*), on which see above, highlighting thereby its conceptual nature.

<sup>47</sup> Phya pa’s typology of apprehended objects includes three types: concepts, real entities, and hallucinations/illusions (that appear to non-conceptual erroneous cognition). In D2’, a distinction is made between “pot” in the realm of concepts and in the realm of real entities. In D1’ Phya pa extends the distinction pertaining to “permanent” to the third realm, including the “double moon,” which is the stock example for hallucinations/illusions.

°22 Rejecting the option that a permanent entity is the subject

*'Od zer 126b1; Mun sel 63a4*

<sup>48</sup>A permanent entity is also not the subject, because if a permanent entity were possible, “entity” could not be pervaded by “momentary.” And given that a permanent entity is inexistent, since the basis would be unestablished, the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A3 would not obtain.

**(D1)** If one thinks: Although the basis is inexistent, the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A3 is established by negating the association of “permanent entity” with “gradual or sudden efficacy.”<sup>49</sup>

**(D2) Parallel:** Then, (in the proof of emptiness) the qualification of the subject by the logical reason “neither one nor many” would be established when positing the negandum “ultimate entity” as the subject, because the association of “ultimate entity” with “partless unity or multiplicity” is indirectly negated when the association of “entity” with “partless unity or multiplicity” is negated due to “entity” without specification<sup>50</sup> being pervaded by “having parts.”

**(D2') Opponent's answer:** One may grant that there is no association of “ultimate entity” with “partless unity or multiplicity.” However, even though the logical reason “neither one nor many” is determined,<sup>51</sup> since the basis “ultimate entity” is unestablished, there is no qualification of the subject by the logical reason consisting in the logical reason being based on that basis.

**(D1') Parallel answer:** In A3 also, it might be the case that the association of “permanent entity” with “gradual or sudden efficacy” is negated.

<sup>48</sup> The view that the subject is a permanent entity is ascribed to rNgog Lo and Gangs pa she'u in *Tshad bsdus* 254.

<sup>49</sup> This account of the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in D1 and D2 amounts to a “weak version” of this characteristic of the logical reason, which Phya pa does not subscribe to. The “strong version” that Phya pa accepts is introduced in D2' and D1'. Cf. §1.2.3.

<sup>50</sup> Here and in what follows, “without specification” translates the Tibetan *tsam*.

<sup>51</sup> This specification eliminates the option that the qualification of the subject by the logical reason might not obtain due to the logical reason being impossible. See Hugon 2016b: Appendix.

However, since the basis “permanent entity” is unestablished, the qualification of the subject by the logical reason is not established insofar as the logical reason “void of gradual or sudden efficacy” is not based on that basis.

°23 Establishing that the simple negation “void of momentariness” is the subject

*'Od zer 126b4; Mun sel 63a6*

Thus, the simple negation<sup>52</sup> “void of momentariness” without specification is the subject, for the following reasons:

– This simple negation “void of momentariness” and “momentary” are directly incompatible. Thus, if one negates “produced” or “existent” with respect to the former (i.e., what is void of momentariness), since there is no other alternative apart from “void of momentariness” and “momentary,” it is established that “produced” or “existent” is pervaded by “momentary.”

– When negating “smoke” with regard to “absence of fire” without specification, one also negates “smoke” with respect to entities devoid of fire that are characterized by that “absence of fire.” Similarly, when negating “produced” or “existent” with respect to “void of momentariness” without specification, one also negates “produced” or “existent” with respect to entities void of momentariness that are characterized by the “void of momentariness.” Therefore, the negative entailment in A1 would not be partially doubtful.<sup>53</sup>

°24 The way of ascertaining this simple negation based on the verbal object

*'Od zer 126b5; Mun sel 63a8*

**Question:** This “void of momentariness,” in what basis is it found and by what valid cognition is it ascertained?

<sup>52</sup> On Phya pa’s understanding of “simple negation” or “negation without a positive retainer” (*med dgag*) and its counterpart, “negation with a positive retainer” (*ma yin dgag*) see Hugon 2015: 62–64.

<sup>53</sup> This counters the doubt that the logical reason of A1 might not be absent in part of the dissimilar instances.

**Answer:** “Entity” is pervaded by “momentary.” Therefore, this “void of momentariness” is not found in entities. It is found in all non-entities.

(a) This “void of momentariness” is found in non-entities that do not appear to cognition, but in that case it is not an object of experience.

(b) “Void of momentariness” is found in hallucinations/illusions such as a double moon and in concepts such as “matter,” which appear to cognition.<sup>54</sup> However, these lack clear appearance as having the feature “non-momentary.” Hence, “void of momentariness” cannot be ascertained through experience for them.

(c) Therefore, it is for concepts that have the feature “void of momentariness” that emptiness of momentariness is ascertained: When cognition is experienced to be apprehending “non-momentary” (i), its object is established to be the feature “non-momentary” (ii), and the feature “momentary” is negated (iii); then, truth with regard to “momentary” also is negated by the force of experience (iv). Thereby, the simple negation “void of momentariness” is established.<sup>55</sup> Hence what the basis consists of is established.

Reflexive awareness cannot precisely grasp whether the apprehending cognition is *erroneous*, therefore the object of this cognition (i.e., “void of momentariness”) is not established to be *falsidical*, a non-entity. Therefore, “void of existence” (what is to be proven in A3) is not already established.<sup>56</sup>

There is no support either for establishing that the apprehending cognition is *non-erroneous*, therefore there is no support for establishing that the object of this cognition (i.e., “void of momentariness”) is a *real entity*. Therefore, “void of existence” is not already eliminated either.

This is because “erroneous” and “non-erroneous” are not ascertained by reflexive awareness due to their being non-manifest.<sup>57</sup> Indeed, if

<sup>54</sup> Illusory objects such as a double moon appear to (are the apprehended objects of) non-conceptual erroneous cognition. Concepts appear to conceptual cognition and are its apprehended object.

<sup>55</sup> It is established as such in (ii), and established as a simple negation in (iii).

<sup>56</sup> Cf. §1.2.1 on corresponding sets of properties for cognitions and their respective object.

<sup>57</sup> On apprehended objects with manifest and non-manifest features, see Hugon 2011 and Hugon and Stoltz 2019: 13–16, 72, and 236. Only clearly featured properties that

“erroneous” and “non-erroneous” were ascertainable by reflexive awareness, the determination of a Self, etc. could be established to be erroneous by reflexive awareness (i), and thereby its object would be established to be falsidical (ii) and its being veridical would be negated (iii). Therefore, an inference negating the Self, etc., would be pointless. Also, extrinsically ascertained valid cognitions would be established to be non-erroneous by the force of experience (i) and their object would be established to be veridical (ii). Therefore the ascertainment of their validity would not depend on a subsequent ascertaining cognition.

**(D1) Objection:** Since the conceptual cognition that is characterized by the verbal object in terms of being “what apprehends the feature ‘permanent’ of this verbal object” appears to reflexive awareness, it follows that the characterizing property – the verbal object that has the feature “permanent” – also would appear to reflexive awareness. And if one accepts that, reflexive awareness would be erroneous with regard to the apprehended state of affairs.<sup>58</sup>

**(D2) Parallel:** (When inferring “fire” from “smoke,”) when “smoke” appears in a locus under consideration in a debate, does this phenomenon in terms of “being the effect of fire” appear or not?

- If it does not appear, then there would be two parts – one appearing, one not appearing – for a single nature;
- if it appears, when it appears as being the effect of fire, i.e., as a phenomenon that is characterized (by fire), the characterizing phenomenon – fire – also would appear, hence it would not have to be inferred.

**(D2’) Opponent’s answer:** One may grant that smoke appears as being the effect of fire. However, while *ascertaining* the characterized phenomenon (here: “effect of fire”) entails *ascertaining* the characterizing phenomenon (here: fire), the *appearance* of the characterized

appear to a cognition can be ascertained. A typical case of a “featureless” or “non-manifest” property is “impermanence.” The property of being “erroneous” or “non-erroneous” similarly cannot be established for the cognition via reflexive awareness.

<sup>58</sup> It would be erroneous due to its object being an unreal concept. This is an absurd consequence, as reflexive awareness is a kind of perceptual cognition that qualifies as a valid cognition. The author of the *Tshad bsdus* (266) reports the view of sTag pa (a disciple of Khyung Rin chen grags), according to whom the characterizing property must appear when the characterized phenomenon is determined.

phenomenon does not entail the *appearance* of the characterizing phenomenon. Therefore, a remote fire does not appear (even though smoke characterized as the “effect of fire” appears).

**(D1’) Parallel answer:** Here also, even though what apprehends “void of momentariness” (the characterized phenomenon) *appears* to reflexive awareness, the concept “void of momentariness” (the characterizing phenomenon) does not *appear* to reflexive awareness. Therefore reflexive awareness is not erroneous with regard to the apprehended state of affairs. This is because *ascertaining* the characterized phenomenon (here: what apprehends “void of momentariness”) entails *ascertaining* the characterizing phenomenon (here: “void of momentariness”), but the *appearance* of the characterized phenomenon does not entail the *appearance* of the characterizing phenomenon.

°3 The valid cognition that determines the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in the invalidating argument

*’Od zer 127a3; Mun sel 63b4*

As for what determines the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A3, this is elucidated via four points:

- Refuting determination via two perceptions
- Refuting determination via one perception
- The way to determine it via inference
- Rejecting objections in this regard

°31 Refuting the determination of the qualification of the subject by the logical reason via two perceptions

*’Od zer 127a4; Mun sel 63b5*

Some say:<sup>59</sup>

What is gradually efficient, which has a gradual capacity, is many. What is suddenly efficient also is a multiple feature, namely, the previous unimpeded

<sup>59</sup> A similar view is ascribed to rNgog Lo and Gangs pa she’u in *Tshad bsdus* 257–258. An interlinear note of *gSal byed* 60b4 ascribes to rNgog Lo the view that the qualification of the subject is established by two perceptions, but the view in question is formulated differently.



capacity and the subsequent arising of the effect. On the other hand, what is permanent always is a single-nature feature. Thus, when the apprehension as one and the apprehension as many are established to be incompatible through experience (i), the objects (one and many) are indirectly established to be incompatible (ii). Therefore, “sudden or gradual efficacy” (which is many) is negated for “permanent” (which is one).

This is not the case:

**(D1)** If, when negating “many” for the feature “one,” one negated “many” after remembering having previously taken as object the feature “many,” then

**(D2)** it would not be possible to negate “not an object of cognition” (for “object of cognition”) since there can be no memory of having previously taken as object “what is not an object of cognition.”<sup>60</sup>

**(D2’)** **Opponent’s retort:** Even though one does not remember something that is not an object of cognition, “not an object of cognition” is negated via the positive establishment of “object of cognition.”

**(D1’)** **Parallel:** Why wouldn’t “many” be negated via the positive establishment of the feature “one,” even without having previously taken as an object the feature “many”? (Hence there is no need for two perceptions.)

°32 Refuting the determination of the qualification of the subject by the logical reason via one perception

*’Od zer 127a7; Mun sel 63b7*

Some say:<sup>61</sup>

When a cognition apprehends something as permanent, this cognition is established to apprehend something as a singular nature (i); thereby, the object of this cognition is positively established to be the feature “one” (ii–ii’). This being the case, the feature “many” and true with regard to multiplicity are negated (iii–iv). Thereby, “sudden or gradual efficacy” is negated.

<sup>60</sup> There can be no memory of this, because what is not an object of cognition, cannot, by definition, be taken as object by a cognition.

<sup>61</sup> A similar position is ascribed to Byang chub skyabs in *Tshad bsodus* 265. This position features the steps of Phya pa’s method of conceptual appearance. Phya pa’s criticism addresses the association that is made here (as before, cf. °32) between “permanent” and “one,” and between “efficient” and “many.”

With regard to this position there are five faults:

- It follows absurdly that “permanent” would be negated for “sound” via perception (°231).
- It follows absurdly that “produced” would be negated for “what is permanent” via reflexive awareness (°232).
- It follows absurdly that the thesis of the invalidating argument would be established when ascertaining its negative entailment (°233).
- The invalidating argument would be neither the proof of a state of affairs nor the proof of a convention (°234).
- What is not characterized by something directly incompatible is not negated (°235).

°321 It follows absurdly that “permanent” would be negated for “sound” via perception

*'Od zer 127a7; Mun sel 63b9*

Under the above-stated premises that what is permanent is a singular nature and what is suddenly or gradually efficient is a multiple nature, is the pervasion of “sound” by “suddenly or gradually efficient” established by experience (b) or not (a)?

(a)

(D1) If it is not established by experience,

(D2) then it would absurdly follow that the pervasion of “produced” or “existent” by “suddenly or gradually efficient” would also not be established by experience.<sup>62</sup>

(D2') **Retort:** “produced” or “existent” are manifest, and “suddenly or gradually efficient” also is manifest. Therefore, why wouldn't they be determined to be, respectively, pervaded and pervading property when appearing?

(D1') **In parallel:** “sound” is manifest and “suddenly or gradually efficient” as well is manifest. Therefore, why wouldn't these two be determined to be, respectively, pervaded and pervading property when they appear as

<sup>62</sup> This is an absurd consequence, as it contradicts the claim made at the end of °1 that this is established via perception.

the same essence? (In conclusion, contra D1, pervasion of “sound” by “suddenly or gradually efficient” would be established by experience).

(b)

If “suddenly or gradually efficient” being the pervader of “sound” is determined by experience, since sound is pervaded by “multiple nature” (on account of equating “efficient” with “many”), “singular nature” is negated for “sound” by experience. And because when negating “one,” one negates “permanent” (on account of equating “permanent” with “one”), “permanent” would be negated for “sound” via perception.<sup>63</sup>

**Suggested retort:** By determining that “sound” is pervaded by “multiple nature” that amounts to “suddenly or gradually efficient,” one negates for sound “permanent” that amounts to “exclusively a singular nature” or to “not many whatsoever.” However, one does not negate “coarse object that is multiple although its subtle parts lack multiplicity.” Therefore “void of momentariness” is not negated.<sup>64</sup>

**Parallel application to A3:** By negating “many” one negates “suddenly or gradually efficient” for “what is permanent that appears as not many whatsoever” or for “permanent that appears exclusively a singular nature.” However, since “many” without specification is not negated for the feature “coarse object that is multiple whereas its subtle parts lack multiplicity,” “many” that amounts to “suddenly or gradually efficient” is not negated for this feature. Therefore, “void of sudden or gradual efficacy” is not established via reflexive awareness for “void of momentariness.”<sup>65</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Argument: (1) Sound is efficient → (2) sound is many → (3) sound is not one → (4) sound is not permanent. If the first step is directly established by experience, the subsequent steps are established indirectly by experience.

(4) being established by experience is an absurd conclusion, because it would mean that ordinary beings can ascertain the impermanence of entities via perception and that A1 would be useless. The objection that follows attempts to avoid this absurd conclusion, arguing that permanence is not negated.

<sup>64</sup> Argument: (1) Sound is “efficient” = “many” → (2) sound is not “permanent” = “one;” is not “permanent” = “not many whatsoever.” From (2) one cannot derive (3) sound is not “permanent” without specification, because a subtype of “permanent” that involve multiplicity is not negated in (2).

<sup>65</sup> This is not a structurally exact parallel, as the restriction applies this time to the subject “permanent” and not to the negandum “permanent.”

°322 It follows absurdly that “produced” would be negated for “what is permanent” via reflexive awareness

*'Od zer 127b2; Mun sel 64a4*

**(D1)** (According to you) when the feature “permanent” is established by the force of reflexive awareness, the feature “one” is established, thereby the feature “many” is negated, thereby “suddenly or gradually efficient” is negated.

**(D2)** In the same way “produced” also would be negated, because since it consists of the two, “cause” and “effect,” it is many.<sup>66</sup>

**(D2') Retort:** The association of cause and effect does not constitute “what is produced,” but the *effect alone* constitutes “what is produced.” Thus, it is not contradictory for a singular nature to be “what is produced” – if this was not the case, then a single momentary thing would be uncaused – therefore, even though “many” is negated (when the feature “permanent” is established by reflexive awareness), “produced” is not negated.

**(D1') Parallel retort:** What is gradually efficient is “many,” but what is suddenly efficient is not “many.” One applies the word “efficient” to the *cause alone*, and not to the association of cause and effect. Thus, it is not contradictory for a singular nature to be “suddenly efficient” – because otherwise a single isolated momentary thing would be void of the two types of efficacy and therefore it would be a non-entity – therefore, even though “multiple nature” is negated by the force of reflexive awareness, “sudden efficacy” is not negated.

Argument: (1) “many” negated for “permanent” = “not many” → (2) “efficient” negated for “permanent” = “not many.”

One cannot derive (3) “efficient” is negated for “permanent” without specification, because “many” is not negated for a subtype of “permanent,” and therefore “efficient” = “many” is also not negated for this subtype.

<sup>66</sup> Argument: (1) “permanent” established → (2) “one” established → (3) “many” negated → (4) “efficient” negated.

(3) → (4') “produced” is negated.

That (4) is indirectly established via experience is an absurd consequence because it means that the thesis of the invalidating argument (that what is permanent is not produced) would be established via experience.

**(D1) Opponent's answer:** Although a singular nature (the cause alone) can be “suddenly efficient,” since an effect will necessarily arise subsequently in its continuum, there is necessarily *multiplicity for the temporal continuum*. Given this fact, because something permanent does not have “multiplicity” in its temporal continuum, “sudden efficacy” is negated.

**(D2) Parallel answer:** Although a singular nature (the effect alone) can be “what is produced,” since a preceding cause necessary precedes in its temporal continuum, there is necessarily *multiplicity for the temporal continuum*. Hence, since something permanent does not have “multiplicity” in its temporal continuum, “produced” is negated.

**(D2') Opponent's retort:** By negating “many” for “what is permanent” that amounts to “not many whatsoever,” one negates “produced.” However, “many” without specification is not negated for “a coarse object that has multiplicity whereas its subtle instants have no multiplicity whatsoever;” therefore “produced” is not negated.

**(D1') Parallel retort:** In the same way, by negating “many” without specification for “what is permanent” that amounts to “what is not many whatsoever,” one negates “many” that amounts to “gradually or suddenly efficient.” But since one does not negate “many” without specification with regard to “what is permanent” that amounts to “a coarse object having multiplicity whereas its subtle parts are devoid of multiplicity,” one does not negate “many” that amounts to “gradually or suddenly efficient.”

°323 It follows absurdly that the thesis of the invalidating argument would be established when ascertaining the negative entailment

*'Od zer 127b7; Mun sel 64a9*

When ascertaining the negative entailment of the invalidating argument (i.e., that “void of non-existence”/“existent” entails “gradually or suddenly efficient”), one establishes that “existent,” etc. is pervaded by “many” that amounts to “gradually or suddenly efficient.” Therefore, by determining that “existent,” etc. is present only in what is multiple, one negates “existent,” etc., for what has a singular nature that is incompatible with multiplicity. And by negating “existent” for what is one, one negates “existent” also for what is permanent. Therefore, at the very time of ascertaining the negative entailment, the thesis of the invalidating

argument (i.e., that what is permanent is non-existent) would already be established.

**Objection:** Although “existent, etc.” is negated for what is a singular nature, “existent, etc.” is not negated for something permanent consisting in a coarse object that has multiplicity whereas its subtle parts have no multiplicity. Therefore, the thesis of the invalidating argument is not already established.

**Answer:** In the same way, when “permanent” that amounts to “not many whatsoever” is established via reflexive awareness, “many” is negated in this regard, and thereby “sudden or gradual efficacy” is negated. However, “many” without specification is not negated for a coarse object having multiplicity whereas the subtle parts have no multiplicity that is established via reflexive awareness, and therefore “many that is suddenly or gradually efficient” is not negated. Therefore, the qualification of the subject by the logical reason of the invalidating argument (i.e., that what is permanent is void of sudden or gradual causal efficacy) would not be established (as you claim, cf. °32) via reflexive awareness.

°324 The invalidating argument would be neither the proof of a state of affairs nor the proof of a convention

*’Od zer 128a1; Mun sel 64b1*

Is the proof “what is permanent is void of existence, because it is void of gradual or sudden efficacy” (= A3) the proof of a state of affairs (a) or the proof of a convention (b)?<sup>67</sup>

(a)

(D1) In the first case (if the invalidating argument proves a state of affairs),

(D2) why isn’t the proof of “emptiness” by the logical reason “neither one nor many” also the proof of a state of affairs?

(D2’) **Retort:** The proof of emptiness does not qualify as the proof of a state of affairs, because the superimposition of a third option

<sup>67</sup> This distinction is dealt with by Phya pa in *Mun sel* 72a5–72b6. He lists the types of logical reason that can establish either or both, with examples, but does not give defining criteria of these two types of proof.

beside “one” and “many” does not arise ever. Also, if “one or many” is visible for any basis, (ultimate) existence would also be visible in this basis (there is no need for a proof of a state of affairs).<sup>68</sup>

(D1’) Here also, why would the invalidating argument prove a state of affairs? Indeed, there is no doubt that there might be a third option beside “gradual efficacy” and “sudden efficacy.” Also, if “gradual or sudden efficacy” is visible for any basis, existence is also visible in this basis.

(b) If the invalidating argument is the proof of a convention:

For a learned person the thesis of A3 (i.e., what is permanent is void of existence) is already established by the valid cognition ascertaining the qualification of the subject by the logical reason (i.e., what is permanent is void of gradual or sudden efficacy). Therefore, just like the qualification of the subject by the logical reason is (according to you) determined via perception, it is also by perception that “existent” would be negated for “what is permanent.” If one accepts that, the pervasion of “existent” by “momentary” (in A1) would be determined by the force of this very perception.

If (one were to argue that) “existent” is negated for “what is permanent” via perception, but the pervasion of “existent” by “momentary” is not be indirectly established, then the pervasion of “existent” by “momentary” would also not be established by the force of the invalidating argument that negates “existent” for “what is permanent.”

**Objection:** The *invalidating argument* negates “existent” for “what is permanent” based on the memory of having perceived previously the negandum “existent.” Thereby the invalidating argument determines that “existent” is pervaded by “momentary.” But although *perception* negates “existent” for “what is permanent,” there is no memory of a previous

<sup>68</sup> The first part of the retort corresponds to a position ascribed to Jo btsun (= Khyung Rin chen grags) in *Tshad bsdus* 262: *jo btsun na re rang bzhin la gcig gi rang bzhin dang du ma'i rang bzhin gnyis las mi 'da' bar nges tsam na snang ba rten 'brel gyi steng du gcig gi rang bzhin dang du ma'i rang bzhin gnyis ka khegs pas rang bzhin med pa'i tha snyad tsam las don sgrub tu med do zhes pa.* The second part reflects the position ascribed in the same text to rGya (= rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags): *rgya na re he du'i dgag bya gcig dang du ma snang tsam na rjes dpag gi dpag bya yang dag gi rang bzhin yang snang la / yang rtag pa dang du bral snang tsam na rang bzhin med pa'ang snang bas rang bzhin med pa'i tha snyad tsam las don bsgrub tu med do zhe na.*

determination of “existent,” hence this perception does not determine that “existent” is pervaded by “momentary.”

**Answer:** Does reflexive awareness apply to this perception or not?

– If it does not, then this perception would not qualify as a cognition

– If it does, since experience is focusing on “existent,” it would be contradictory for the pervasion of “existent” by “momentary” not to be ascertained.

°325 What is not characterized by something directly incompatible is not negated

*'Od zer 128a5; Mun sel 64b6*

Thus, all valid cognitions – when one considers their own epistemic object – negate what is directly incompatible with the latter and what is indirectly incompatible that is characterized by something directly incompatible. For instance, when ascertaining “blue” by a valid cognition, “non-blue” is negated, and other properties such as “permanent” or “impermanent” in conjunction with non-blue are also negated.<sup>69</sup>

On the other hand, something indirectly incompatible that is not characterized by something directly incompatible is not negated: “non-momentary” is pervaded by “non-blue,” but nevertheless when ascertaining as “blue,” “non-momentary” is not eliminated (because it is not explicitly characterized by non-blue).

“Gradually or suddenly efficient” is not directly incompatible with “void of momentariness” that is established via reflexive awareness, because it does not amount to the exclusion property “momentary.”<sup>70</sup>

<sup>69</sup> The incompatibility between “x” and “non-x,” e.g., “blue” and “non-blue” is direct incompatibility. The incompatibility between “x” and anything pervaded by “non-x,” e.g., between “permanent” and “produced” or “blue” and “non-momentary,” is a case of indirect incompatibility. Indirect incompatibility in which the incompatible item is characterized by something directly incompatible is a case of indirect incompatibility in which the pervasion by “non-x” is explicit, e.g., between “blue” and “non-momentary non-blue.” See also *Mun sel 71b2–3* on the definition of these types of incompatibility, and *Mun sel 71b8–9* for a parallel statement about what can or cannot be negated.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. °1 on the direct incompatibility between “momentary” and “void of momentariness.”



Neither is “gradually or suddenly efficient” something indirectly incompatible that is characterized by something directly incompatible with “void of momentariness,” because it is not a phenomenon characterized by “momentary.”

Thus, the valid cognition that ascertains “void of momentariness” does not negate “gradual or sudden efficacy.”

Even if “gradually or suddenly efficient” amounted to the exclusion property “momentary” or was characterized by this (i.e., by “momentary,” in an explicit association) (and hence could potentially be negated when “void of momentariness” is ascertained by a valid cognition), since “momentariness” is not the object of the perception of ordinary beings, perception cannot determine whatsoever that it is the pervader of “produced” or “existent.”

°33 The way to ascertain the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in the invalidating argument via inference

*'Od zer 128a8; Mun sel 64b9*

(a) Ratnākaraśānti

The two proofs by Ratnākaraśānti rely on a logical reason qua non-apprehension of the pervader of the negandum.<sup>71</sup> They are:

<sup>71</sup> Mimaki (1976: 272–273, n. 257) provides the reference to the passage at the very beginning of Ratnākaraśānti’s *Antarvyāptīsamārthana* that Phya pa may have had in mind, although the phrasing is quite different. Kajiyama’s translation (1999: 114) reads: “[Effective actions in] succession and simultaneity do not exist in what is not momentary [permanent], for that which has a single, unchanging nature throughout the preceding and succeeding times cannot possess two contradictory properties, viz., being an agent of action and non-agent. Of these two, first, succession is impossible [in the permanent], since each and every thing making action in succession will have [the difficulty] that it is the agent [of a particular action] and the non-agent [of it] in the preceding and succeeding [times] respectively. Thus, all successive [actions] being impossible [in the permanent], now it only remains possible that all actions would be [made] simultaneously [in the permanent]. In this case, [however], the absolute contradiction would follow that [the permanent] is the agent [of all the actions] and the non-agent [of those actions] in the preceding and succeeding times respectively. As agency and non-agency are contradictory to each other, they are not possibly existent in one and the same locus (*dharmīn*).”

See also Steinkellner 1979: 93 for the establishment of these two points by Dharmakīrti in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. Mimaki (1976: 62–64) summarizes Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s discussion of these two points.

(A4a) What is void of momentariness does not have gradual efficacy, because there aren't many momentary moments.<sup>72</sup>

And

(A4b) What is void of momentariness does not have sudden efficacy, because there isn't a single momentary moment.

It is not the case that the subject and the respective logical reasons are not conceptually distinct, because the subject (“void of momentariness”) is the negation of the universal “momentariness” without specification and the logical reasons are the negations of specific kinds of momentariness, i.e., “single momentary moment” and “many momentary moments,” respectively.

(a.1) Qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A4a and A4b

As for the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A4a and A4b, according to the previously explained principle, when “void of momentariness” without specification is established by the force of reflexive awareness, “single momentary moment” and “many momentary moments” that are characterized by “momentary” are also negated.<sup>73</sup>

(a.2) Pervasion in A4a and A4b

**Question:** Is it perception or inference that ascertains that “gradually efficient” is pervaded by “many momentary moments” (in A4a) and that ascertains that “suddenly efficient” is pervaded by “one momentary moment” (in A4b)?<sup>74</sup>

– If it is perception, then this perception would be a perceptual valid cognition with regard to momentariness.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>72</sup> As the formulation in Phya pa's texts fluctuates between “*skad cig*” (“moment”) and “*skad cig ma*” (“momentary”) without this implying any difference of meaning, we adopt as unified translation “momentary moment” that conveys both, although redundantly.

<sup>73</sup> This is a case of indirect incompatibility, in which the incompatible items are characterized by “momentary” which is directly incompatible with “void of momentariness.” Cf. <sup>o</sup>325.

<sup>74</sup> These two proofs have been identified as “non-apprehension of the pervader.” This passage is about the establishment of the relation between pervaded (the *negandum*) and pervader.

<sup>75</sup> Phya pa distinguishes three kinds of perceptual awareness (*mngon sum*): perceptual valid cognition (*mngon sum tshad ma*), non-ascertaining perception (*snang la ma nges pa*), and perceptual post-knowledge cognition (*bcad pa'i yul can*). Perceptual awareness of

– If it is inference, then there would be infinite regress in establishing the pervasion.

**Answer:** Pervasion is ascertained by inference. Nevertheless, there is no infinite regress in establishing the pervasion. As follows:

**(a.21)** Pervasion in A4a

The proof that “gradually efficient” is pervaded by “many momentary moments,” relies on a logical reason that is an essential property:

**(A5a)** “What is gradually efficient” is such that some given effect has not yet arisen at the first moment, but arises subsequently. Thus, taking as the subject the first *and* the second moment of what is gradually efficient, this is pervaded by “distinct natures,” because “the first moment and the second moment” is pervaded by “being entities that have incompatible properties,” like blue and yellow.

**(a.211)** Qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A5a

As for the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A5a (i.e., that the subject “first moment and second moment” is qualified by “having incompatible properties”), it is established by perception, because perception perceives that the first moment is an entity that is not contiguous with an effect, whereas the second moment is an entity that is contiguous with an effect.

**(a.212)** Pervasion in A5a

That “entities having incompatible properties” is pervaded by “many natures” is also established by perception on the basis of entities that are respectively blue and non-blue.

By this argument A5a, having considered impartially the first and second moments of the coarse object to be what constitutes “the coarse object,” one determines that “the first and second moments” without specification is pervaded by “many natures.” Indirectly, one determines that “the first and second moments consisting in subtle parts” also is pervaded by “multiple natures.” Thereby one ascertains that “gradually efficient” is pervaded by “many moments.”

ordinary beings is a non-ascertaining perception with regard to impermanence, not a valid cognition, because it is unable to eliminate the superimposition “permanence.”

Thus, pervasion by the property to be proven “multiple nature” without specification is ascertained by perception. Further, by the force of the determination that the subject “many moments” without specification is pervaded (by “multiple nature”), one determines that “many subtle moments” also are pervaded (by “multiple nature”). Therefore, the pervasion by “many momentary moments” is established.<sup>76</sup>

**(a.22) Pervasion in A4b**

The following inference relies on a logical reason qua essential property:

**(A5b)** What is suddenly efficient is such that all effects arise exclusively in the second moment. Thus, taking as the subject the second moment of what is suddenly efficient, because it is pervaded by the arising of the effect, it is pervaded by the destruction of the cause.

**(a.221) Qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A5b**

The qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A5b – that the second moment is pervaded by the arising of the effect – is determined by perception.

**(a.222) Pervasion in A5b**

That “arising of the effect” is pervaded by “destruction of the cause” is also perceptually observed in an example such as the perception that a pot has been destroyed when potsherds arise.

Having considered indifferently the second moment of the coarse object to be “the coarse object,” one determines that “the second moment of what is suddenly efficient” without specification is pervaded by “destruction of the cause.” And indirectly one determines that “the second instant of the subtle parts” also is pervaded by “destruction of the cause.” Thereby, one ascertains that “suddenly efficient” is pervaded by “a single momentary moment.”

Pervasion by the property to be proven “destruction of the cause” without specification is ascertained by perception. And when the subject is

<sup>76</sup> The aim of this paragraph is to show that both the pervader and the pervaded in A4a can be considered “without specification” (unlike in Phya pa’s criticism of °32 and °33, where the coarse object with subtle parts posed problems). This is proven by A6a in the subsequent section presenting Dharmakīrti’s position.

taken in connection with the second moment, when determining that “the second moment of what is suddenly efficient” without specification is pervaded by “destruction of the cause,” one also determines indirectly that the “second moment of the subtle parts” is pervaded by “destruction of the cause.” Thereby that “what is suddenly efficient” is pervaded by “a single momentary moment” is indirectly established.<sup>77</sup>

(b) Dharmakīrti

In this regard, the Teacher Dharmakīrti, having presented the logical reason in PVin 2 Tib. 29,15–17,<sup>78</sup> said the following when establishing the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in A3:

What is not momentary is of two kinds: non-entity and entity.

– “Non-entity” is incompatible with “entity” without specification, therefore there is no doubt that “produced” or “existent,” etc. (which are pervaded by “entity” without specification) could apply to “non-entity.”

– “Entity” also is of two kinds: non-momentary in terms of being a single nature at all time (1), or non-momentary in terms of being a nature that is multiple without specification but whose subtle parts are not multiple (2).

(1)

Regarding a single nature at all time, when establishing by the force of reflexive awareness that it appears as exclusively one (ii), the appearance as many is negated (iii) and being true as many is negated (iv). Thereby, the pair “cause and effect” is negated. In doing so, “produced” and “efficient,” etc. also are negated by the force of reflexive awareness.

(2)

As for a nature that is multiple without specification but whose subtle parts are one, the two kinds of efficacy are not found in the coarse multiple nature, because they are not found in each singular subtle part existing inside the multiple nature.

<sup>77</sup> See the preceding note. This view and the analogue preceding explanation in the case of A4a were rejected by Byang chub skyabs (cf. *Tshad bsdus* 264).

<sup>78</sup> *Mun sel* does not refer to the words of the PVin but only states: “Further, according to the master Dharmakīrti, etc. ...”

<i>'Od zer</i>	<i>Mun sel</i>
<b>Question:</b> How is efficacy negated for a single part that exists within a multiple nature?	
<b>Answer:</b>	
<b>(a) Negating gradual efficacy</b>	<b>(a) Negating gradual efficacy</b>
	<b>Question:</b> How is gradual efficacy negated for a single part that exists within a multiple nature?
	<b>Answer:</b>
First, for what is permanent, one negates the distinction between a previous moment – what is not an unimpeded capacity – and a subsequent moment – what is an unimpeded capacity, therefore one negates gradual efficacy.	<b>(A6a)</b> Take as the subject a single part within something multiple. It is void of gradual efficacy, because it is void of the distinction between a previous moment – what is not an unimpeded capacity – and a subsequent moment – what is an unimpeded capacity.
	The qualification of the subject by the logical reason in this argument is established by the force of reflexive awareness: By establishing that the awareness apprehends something that is one (i), it establishes that the object is the feature “one” (ii). This being the case, the feature “many” is negated (iii) and thereby being true with regard to many is also negated (iv). Thus, one negates the distinction between a previous moment that is not an unimpeded capacity and a subsequent moment that is an unimpeded capacity.
Having said that, it is necessary that “gradually efficient” entails a distinction between a previous moment that is not an unimpeded capacity and a subsequent moment that is an unimpeded capacity. If it does not, is what is gradually efficient exclusively “not unimpeded capacity” or exclusively “unimpeded capacity”?	<b>Objection:</b> There may be no distinction (for the subject). However, isn’t the pervasion of “gradually efficient” by “distinction” nevertheless unestablished? <b>Answer:</b> (If there was no pervasion by “distinction between previous and subsequent moment”), is what is gradually efficient one as the “unimpeded capacity,” or one as the “non-unimpeded capacity”?

<p>– If it is exclusively “not unimpeded capacity,” since the effect would not arise whatsoever, it would be contradictory with its being gradually efficient – this has to be understood implicitly.</p>	<p>– If it is one as the “unimpeded capacity,” it is observed that “unimpeded capacity” entails the arising of an effect without degree. Therefore, gradual efficacy is negated.</p>
<p>– If it is exclusively “unimpeded capacity,” since “unimpeded capacity” is something that acts without dependence (on anything else), abiding and the non-arising of the subsequent effect are negated for it. Therefore “gradually efficient” is negated. This is explained in PVin 2 Tib. 29,17.</p>	<p>– If it is one as the “unimpeded capacity,” it is observed that this entails that an effect would not arise whatsoever. Therefore, “gradually efficient” is negated.</p>
<p>Through this, the negative entailment, namely, the pervasion of “gradually efficient” by “distinction between a previous moment that is not an unimpeded capacity and a subsequent moment that is unimpeded capacity” is established.</p>	<p>Thus, “gradual efficient” is pervaded by the existence of a distinction between non-unimpeded capacity and unimpeded capacity.</p>
<p>Having established what precedes, in the case of the appearing as non-momentary, there is positive establishment as the feature “without distinction” by the force of reflexive awareness (ii’). Thereby the feature “with this distinction” is rejected (iii) and thereby being with regard to having a distinction also is negated (iv). Therefore, “gradually efficient,” which is pervaded by “having a distinction” is negated. This is explained in PVin 2 Tib. 29,19.</p>	
<p><b>Objection:</b> This logical reason lacks pervasion (by the property to be proven), because although what is permanent itself lacks distinction, it is gradually active, because it is based on gradual conditions.</p>	
<p><b>Answer:</b> That what is permanent depends on conditions is negated by the logical reason “lacking transformation” in PVin 2 Tib. 29,21.</p>	

(b) Negating sudden efficacy	(b) Negating sudden efficacy
As for the negation of “suddenly efficient” for what is permanent based on the proof that “suddenly efficient” is pervaded by “momentary,” the absurd consequence that arises if, having taken as a basis “suddenly efficient,” one accepts it to be permanent, is stated in PVin 2 Tib. 29,22, as follows:	

If one were to accept that a nature that is identical with the unimpeded capacity of the first moment of something suddenly efficient is not negated at the second moment, then it would follow that the unimpeded capacity also is not negated, because it is not correct for something lacking parts that there should be two parts, one negated and one not negated.

If one accepts that (i.e., that the second moment also is the unimpeded capacity) then it follows that the nature of the second moment is contributing to the very effect at the second moment, because the cause of the very effect at the second moment is the unimpeded capacity.

However, since it is contradictory for something already established to depend on something else, it is established that the effect at the second moment is not something that is to be contributed to; thus, one negates that the nature of the second moment also is a contributor to the effect. Therefore, one negates that, at the time of the effect, there is a cause of the very effect that is an unimpeded capacity. And thus one negates that it (the second moment) has a nature that is identical with it (the unimpeded capacity).

Since “suddenly efficient” is pervaded by “momentary,” “suddenly efficient” is established to be found only for what is momentary, and therefore “sudden efficacy” is negated for “what is not momentary.”

°34 Rejecting objections in this regard

*'Od zer 129a8; Mun sel 65b8*

Regarding the rejection of objections pertaining to the determination by inference of the qualification of the subject by the logical reason in the invalidating argument A3 there are three points:



- Rejecting the absurd consequence that for the verbal object “ultimate,” etc., the opposite (i.e., “not ultimate,” etc.) would be negated.
- Rejecting the absurd consequence that the non-existence of a double moon would be invalidated by perception.
- Rejecting the absurd consequence that the invalidating argument would be pointless.

°341 Rejecting the absurd consequence that for the verbal object “ultimate,” etc., the opposite (i.e., “not ultimate,” etc.) would be negated

*'Od zer 129a9; Mun sel 65b9*

**Objection:**

(D1) (According to you) by the force of the experience of the cognition apprehending “void of momentariness,” “void of reality,” etc. (i), it is also established that what is apprehended is the feature “non-momentary,” “non-real,” etc. (ii); thereby the features “momentary” and “real,” etc., are negated (iii); thereby being true with regard to “momentary” and with regard to “real” *is* negated (iv),

(D2) then, in parallel, by the force of the experience of a cognition that apprehends “existent,” “impermanent,” “resisting analysis,” “not an object of cognition,” etc. (i), it is also established that what is apprehended by that cognition is the feature “existent,” “impermanent,” “resisting analysis,” “not an object of cognition” (ii). Thereby the features “unreal” and “void of momentariness” and “not resisting analysis” and “object of cognition” are negated (iii). Thereby being true with regard to these also is negated (iv). Therefore, “unreal,” “void of momentariness,” “not resisting analysis” and “object of cognition” – which pervade the verbal object itself – *are* negated for the verbal object.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>79</sup> The argument relies on the confusion between properties of the concept itself (concepts are unreal, permanent, belong to conventional reality [i.e., do not resist analysis], but are objects of cognition) and features that may be represented in conceptual cognition, which might be opposite to properties of the concept itself, e.g., the features “real,” “impermanent,” “resisting analysis” (or as formulated in the title of the section “ultimate”), etc. A simpler example would be of the concept “pot,” which is itself not produced, whereas the feature “produced” may be represented in the conceptual cognition apprehending this concept, insofar as what it is a concept of (what is a pot) is produced. See °21 and n. 46.

**(D2') Answer:** If it was the case that the cognition that apprehends as “existent,” “impermanent,” “resisting analysis,” “not an object of cognition” was established to be *non-erroneous* (i), the object also would be established to be *veridical* with regard to these (ii), and “unreal” and “void of momentariness” and “not resisting analysis” and “object of cognition” *would be* negated.

But the cognition is not established to be non-erroneous, therefore the object also is not established to be veridical with regard to these (i.e., as “existent,” “impermanent,” “resisting analysis,” “not an object of cognition”), and thereby “unreal,” “void of momentariness,” “not resisting analysis” and “object of cognition” *are not* negated.

**(D1') Retort:** In parallel: if it was the case that the cognition of “non-momentary” and “unreal” was established to be *non-erroneous* (i), the object also – “void of momentariness” and “void of reality” – would be established to be *veridical* (ii), and “momentary” and “real” *would be* negated (iii).

But the cognition is not established to be non-erroneous, and the object also is not established to be veridical, and thereby “momentary” and “real” *are not* negated.

**(D1) Answer:** It may well be the case that the cognition is not established to be non-erroneous, but if the cognition were *erroneous* then its object would be *superimposed* (*ja* superimposition) and therefore “momentary” and “real” *would be* negated.

**(D2) Objection:** Then, in parallel, it may well be the case that the cognition that apprehends as “unreal,” “void of momentariness,” “not resisting analysis,” and “object of cognition” is not established to be non-erroneous, but if the cognition were *erroneous*, then its object would be *superimposed* (*ja* superimposition) and therefore “unreal,” “void of momentariness,” “not resisting analysis,” and “object of cognition” *would be* negated.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>80</sup> The confusion between properties of the verbal object *per se* and apprehended features is revealed in this statement: the object being superimposed is about the nature of the verbal object, thus, as in the preceding statement, it is “real” and “momentary” that would be negated.

**(D2') Answer:** If these properties were negated via the establishment of the object as superimposed, then they would not pervade “superimposed.”

**(D1') Objection:** In parallel, if “momentary” and “real” were negated via the establishment of the object as superimposed, then they would not pervade “superimposed.”

**Answer:** We do accept that, so in what way are cases D1 and D2 similar?

°342 Rejecting the absurd consequence that the non-existence of a double moon would be invalidated by perception

*'Od zer 129b9; Mun sel 66a5*

**Objection:**

**(D1)** (According to you), the cognition is established to apprehend “void of momentariness” (i) and the object is established to be the feature “void of momentariness” (ii); thereby, “momentary” *is* negated for the object (iii),

**(D2)** then in the same way, when cognition is established to apprehend “double moon” (i), the object is established to be the feature “double moon” (ii); thereby, “the absence of double moon” *is* negated for the object (iii).

**(D2') Answer:** The apprehension of “double” is not established to be *non-erroneous*, thus the object is not established to be a *real* double thing. Thus, the void of real duality *is not* negated.

**(D1') Retort:** (The apprehension as “permanent” is not established to be *non-erroneous*, thus the void of real permanence is *not* negated.)

**(D1) Answer:** The apprehension as “permanent” is not established to be *non-erroneous*, however, since the object of an erroneous cognition is superimposed, “momentary” *is* negated.

**(D2) Retort:** In parallel, since the object of an erroneous cognition is superimposed, “void of real duality” *is* negated.

**(D2') Answer:** One cannot say that, because “superimposed” is pervaded by “void of real duality.”<sup>81</sup>

<sup>81</sup> D2' establishes that the two cases are not parallel. The next sentence takes up another idea, namely that the only thing that is established is the appearance – in D1, the

**(D2'') Objection:** Since “the mere appearing as double” is established by the force of reflexive awareness, it would follow that the non-appearing as double *is* negated.

If you say so, we accept that, because nobody would be able to negate what is the case from the point of view of appearing.

°343 Rejecting the absurd consequence that the invalidating argument would be pointless

*'Od zer 129b7; Mun sel 66a8*

**(D1) Objection:** The pervasion of “produced” by “efficient in one of the two ways” is perceptually established, and the two previously discussed inferences (A4a and A4b) established that the two kinds of “efficient” are pervaded respectively by “one moment” and “many momentary moments.” Therefore, the pervasion of “produced” by “momentary” is established without depending on the inference consisting in the invalidating argument.

**(D2) Parallel:** What would you say if we argued the following in parallel: “Mountain pass” is determined by perception to be “endowed with smoke” and it is also established by perception that “what is endowed with smoke” is pervaded by “fire.” Therefore, that “the mountain pass has fire” is determined by two perceptions. Hence, the inference relying on a logical reason *qua* effect is useless.

**(D2') Opponent's answer:** It is not the case that one understands that “the mountain pass has fire” via two perceptions. This is because the perceptions are applied in succession, but that “the mountain pass has smoke” and that “smoke is pervaded by presence of fire” are not established at the same time in a common basis.

**(D1') Parallel answer:** It is not the case that the ascertainment of the pervasion of “produced” by “momentary” does not depend on the invalidating argument. This is because one ascertains in succession that “produced” is pervaded by “efficient in one of the two ways” and that these

appearance as “void of momentariness,” in D2 the appearance as “two” – and that the only thing that can be negated is the “non-appearance (as such)” in both cases. Here this is only stated for D2.

two kinds of “efficient” are pervaded, respectively, by “one momentary moment” and “many.” But one does not ascertain these simultaneously on a common basis.

If one infers as follows:

Taking “what is produced” as a basis, since it is pervaded by “gradually or suddenly efficient,” it is pervaded by “momentary”

it may be possible to ascertain the pervasion (of “produced” by “momentary”) without depending on an invalidating argument, but this is ascertained in a different manner.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> It is unclear whether Phya pa is referring here to an attested alternative proof of pervasion, or is imply indicating that this determination would be different from what the opponent suggested in D1.

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