

Anne MacDonald (Austrian Academy of Sciences)

The Search for Candrakīrti: Will the Real Mādhyamika Please Stand Up?

The past few decades have seen a surge in the scholarly investigation of Indian Madhyamaka works, and the preparation and publication of new Sanskrit and Tibetan critical editions of the surviving compositions of Nāgārjuna (late 2nd-3rd c.) and his commentators Buddhapālita (6th c.), Bhāviveka (6th c.), and Candrakīrti (7th c.), often due to the discovery of previously unavailable Sanskrit manuscripts and fragments. Numerous translations into modern languages made on the basis of the early and more recent editions are now available, and many attempts have been undertaken to decipher the assertions of the texts. These attempts, informed by a variety of approaches to and assumptions about the material, have nonetheless not yet been able to bring about consensus amongst contemporary Madhyamaka scholars regarding the meaning and consequences of our authors' ontological, epistemological, and soteriological assertions.

It is of course of utmost importance for any critical assessment of later Tibetan presentations of Madhyamaka that the intention of the Indian authors be correctly understood. The talk will focus on Candrakīrti's explanation of emptiness, and consider some of the most influential of the modern interpretations of his Madhyamaka in an attempt to ascertain their value in our endeavour to plumb his philosophical views.

Arihiro Kosaka (University of Tsukuba)

The characteristics of Candrakīrti's commentary on the twenty-third Chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*

There is a difference in the interpretation of the twenty-third chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) entitled "Analysis of *viparyāsa*" between Candrakīrti (ca.7) and his predecessors. I have examined Candrakīrti's interpretation, comparing it with that of other commentators. Candrakīrti reads *śubhāśubhaviparyāsa*, which appears in three verses including the first verse in the twenty-third chapter as *dvandva* compound consisting of *śubha* and *aśubha* and *viparyāsa*. He identifies *śubha*, *aśubha*, and *viparyāsa* respectively with the causes of three *kleśas*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, and *moha*. Although this reading differs from that of the earlier commentators of the MMK, we can find the same interpretation of the compound in the *Śūnyatāsaptatīrti* attributed Nāgārjuna. Hence one can justly assume that Candrakīrti learned this compound analysis from the works attributed Nāgārjuna. While the earlier commentators of the MMK, Buddhapālita (ca. 4-5C) and Bhāviveka (ca. 6C), composed a commentary on the MMK only, among the works attributed Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti commented on other works too, i.e., the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* and *Śūnyatāsaptatī*. Moreover, he frequently quotes Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī*. Accordingly, one could suppose that his commentary on the MMK also reflects the knowledge of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka thought that he acquired from Nāgārjuna's other works than the MMK. In this paper, I would like to discuss about such several features that distinguish Candrakīrti's commentary from the others.

Chizuko Yoshimizu (University of Tsukuba)

Later Mādhyamikas on logic implicit in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 1.3 or negation of arising from other

Early Indian commentaries on Nāgārjuna's MMK, except for the Akutobhayā, take the following verse as the third verse of the first chapter and agree that it is to negate arising from other: *na hi svabhāvo bhāvānām pratyayādiṣu vidyate / avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate / /*. They, Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, understand that the verse provides two arguments for negating arising from other, i.e., the non-existence of an own-being of effects on conditions and the non-existence of otherness. Apart from this verse, Buddhapālita indicates an absurd consequence (*prasaṅga*) of accepting arising from other. Bhāviveka criticizes this *prasaṅga* argument and formulates a formal inference in the same manner that he does with regard to the negation of arising from self.

Later on, Kamalaśīla discusses the issue at length in his *Madhyamakāloka*, where he elaborates the argument against arising from other. It is likely that he refers to that of Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvātārabhāṣya*. Referring to all these Indian sources, the first Tibetan interpreters of the MMK, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags and his disciple Zhang Thang sag pa, specify the logic implicit in MMK 1.3. One of their concerns is to distinguish the positions between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, or substantialists and Mādhyamikas. This paper will examine their comprehensive exposition of MMK 1.3 and negation of arising from other.

Kevin Vose (College of William and Mary)

Awakening and Absence: Soteriological Models in Candrakīrti's Earliest Interpreters

Candrakīrti's stark portrayal of emptiness and the "cognitive" changes that realization of it would induce challenge the Mahāyāna conception of soteriology. In place of an inferential understanding of emptiness that would be contemplatively cultivated to the point of "yogic perception" (*yogipratyakṣa*), Candrakīrti offers *prasaṅga* reasoning that eliminates false views and a claim that realization entails the cessation of mind and mental factors (*citta-caitta*)—and so is not a cognitive event at all. Drawing on Anne MacDonald's work on Candrakīrti's metaphorical sense of "yogic perception," in which he uses the term to denote mental absence, this paper will explore the soteriological models in the writings of the two major propagators of Candrakīrti's texts in Tibet, Jayānanda and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags.

Jayānanda, the lone Indic commentator on any of Candrakīrti's texts, adopts the familiar model of "hearing, thinking, and contemplating" (*śruta-cintā-bhāvanā*), but with Candrakīrti-inspired interpretations. "Hearing" labels what Jayānanda terms "scriptural valid cognition" (*āgamapramāṇa*), derived from Nāgārjuna's texts. "Thinking" signifies *prasaṅga* reasoning that induces the relinquishment of views. "Contemplating" entails the cultivation of absence that brings about the cessation of both mind and appearances, a state Jayānanda metaphorically calls "omniscient wisdom" (*sarvajñajñāna*).

Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, the Tibetan translator of Candrakīrti's major works and author of the earliest known commentary on the *Prasannapadā*, likewise uses the latter's works to fashion an austere model of soteriology. *Prasaṅga* reasoning negates false conceptions, leading to a mere absence of views. "Yogic perception" is only a label for the direct correspondence between the absence of perception and the emptiness of things. "Realizing nirvāṇa" simply means the absence of mind that aligns with the absence of all appearances. This paper will show that, in the hands of these two early commentators, Candrakīrti's insistence on *prasaṅga* reasoning over *svatantra* inference indicates much more than a question of argumentative method: proper reasoning forms a crucial component of a distinctly Madhyamaka model of transformation.

Pascale Hugon (Austrian Academy of Sciences)

What is wrong with the Candrakīrtian *prasaṅga*? Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's criticism of Candrakīrti's followers in the light of his theory of argumentation by consequence

In his Madhyamaka works and several passages of his epistemological works as well, the Tibetan scholar Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) discusses in details the ‘neither-one-nor-many’ argument negating ultimate entities, following the line of thought of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla who posit it as an instance of autonomous reasoning (Tib. *rang rgyud*, Skt. *svatantra*). In his *dBu ma de kho na nyid kyi snying po* (also known as the *dBu ma shar gsum gyi stong thun*), the detailed discussion of this inference is preceded by the refutation of opponents – nominally identified as “Candrakīrti, etc.” – who contest the use of autonomous reasoning and advocate the exclusive use of argumentation by consequence (Tib. *thal 'gyur*, Skt. *prasaṅga*) to negate ultimate entities. Previous analyzes of this passage – notably by Helmut Tauscher (“Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's opinion on *prasaṅga* in his *dBu ma'i shar gsum gyi stong thun*,” 1999) and Kevin Vose (who translated it in full in his *Resurrecting Candrakīrti*, 2009: 141–169) – left a number of interpretative and terminological questions open, owing to the fact that the *sNying po* does not include an exposition of Phya pa's own theory of argumentation by consequence. A full account of the latter is found, however, in Phya pa's epistemological works.

Based on my previous investigations of Phya pa's theory of argumentation, I reconsidering in this talk the discussion in the *sNying po* in the light of Phya pa's views on argumentation by consequence. I clarify the concepts and terminology at play in order to identify more precisely what Phya pa considers to be problematic in the Candrakīrtian-style arguments he analyzes – the arguments against causation building on Nāgārjuna's MMK I.1 – which he calls *'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur* (*'gal ba sdud pa'i thal ba*). I also discuss the source of Phya pa's account of the opponent's view – thereby also assessing the fairness of Phya pa's description and arguments – and reflect on the historical context of the composition of this passage, in relation with Phya pa's debate with Jayānanda.