

Dharmakīrti's Criticism of *Anityatva* in the Sāṅkhya Theory

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Abstract In his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 3, Dharmakīrti criticizes the view of the Sāṅkhyas that the word *anityatva* (“impermanence”) means a process of transformation (*pariṇāma*) of primordial matter (*pradhāna*). In this connection, he deals with the following two explanations of transformation: (1) the disappearance (*tirodhāna*) of the previous *dharma* of an entity (*dharmin/dravya*) and (2) the cessation (*nivṛtti*) of the previous state (*avasthā*) of an entity (*avasthātṛ*). In response to these explanations, he proves that whenever a transformation takes place, the previous entity is destroyed, and therefore, impermanence does not mean transformation, but only destruction (*vināśa*). His criticism is basically along the same lines as Vasubandhu's arguments found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. However, because of developments in the theory of transformation, Vasubandhu's criticism allows room for a retort from the Sāṅkhya. For this reason, Dharmakīrti augments Vasubandhu's theory in order to make it sustainable against the more developed Sāṅkhya theory.

Keywords Dharmakīrti · Sāṅkhya · Yuktidīpikā · Vasubandhu · *Anityatva* · *Pariṇāma* · *Tirodhāna* · *Avasthā*

Introduction

Between the Sāṅkhya *satkāryavādin* and the Buddhist *kṣaṇikavādin*—the most fervent *asatkāryavādin*—there is a fundamental disagreement about how to explain the causal process. The former does not accept there to be production (*utpatti*) and destruction (*vināśa*) in the process, even though he advocates the *anityatva*

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(“impermanence”) of all things except the soul (*puruṣa*) and primordial matter (*pradhāna/prakṛti*). He explains *anityatva* as the process of transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *pradhāna* that continues to exist without any intrinsic changes.¹ In contrast, the latter argues that whenever any change or transformation takes place, the previous entity is destroyed and a new entity is produced. He therefore considers the word *anityatva* to mean destruction in the strict sense, i.e., destruction without leaving any trace (*niranvaya-nivṛtti*, *-vināśa*).

Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660), in his *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.17, criticizes the *anityatva* put forward by the Sāṅkhyas as a logical reason in the following argument attributed to their school:

[Thesis] The intellect (*buddhi*) does not have consciousness.

[Reason] For it is impermanent.

[Example] Just as the case of a form, etc. (*acetanā buddhiḥ, anityatvāt, rūpādivat.*)²

In the third chapter of his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (on k. 68; D215b2ff., P313a6ff.), Dharmakīrti classifies this logical reason as “unproved” (*asiddha*) and discusses his justification of this in detail. There, two different Sāṅkhya views on the meaning of impermanence are dealt with. One explains the meaning of impermanence as the disappearance (*tirodhāna*) of the previous property (*dharma*) of an entity. The other explains it as the cessation (*nivṛtti*) of the previous state (*avasthā*) of an entity. In this paper, I would like to expound on Dharmakīrti’s criticism of these two Sāṅkhya theories and to show that his discussion is based on, but also reinforces, Vasubandhu’s criticism of the Sāṅkhya theory of transformation (*pariṇāma*).

Two Explanations of *pariṇāma* and Vasubandhu’s Criticism

In his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu (ca. 350–430)³ refutes the Sāṅkhya notion of transformation in order to distinguish it from that of the Buddhists, that is,

¹ See YD 121,20–122,2 on SK 9: ... *kriyata utpadyate jāyata ity evamādir lokasya vyavahārah pravartate / ... paramārthatas tu na kasyacid utpādo ’sti na vināśaḥ /; *Mahāvibhāṣā* T. 1545 997a12–13: 有法常有。無法恒無。無不可生有不可滅。; *AKBh 301,1–3: vāṛṣaganyavādaś caivaṃ dyotito bhavati—yad asty asty eva tat, yan nāsti nāsty eva tat, asato nāsti sambhavaḥ, sato nāsti vināśa ity /; YSBh 186,1 on YS 4.12: nāsty asataḥ sambhavaḥ, na cāsti sato vināśa ity ...* See Imanishi (1968, p. 642) and Yamashita (1994, pp. 47, 57–58).

² At the beginning of PVin 3, Dharmakīrti has already mentioned that the production (*utpatti*) or impermanence of *buddhi* cannot be accepted by the Sāṅkhyas. The reason for this is described in PVin 3 on k. 68. PVin 3 on k. 1cd: *acetanāḥ sukhādayo buddhir vā, utpatter anityatvād vā, rūpādivat. ([D187b2–3, P285b1–2]: dper na blo dang bde ba la sogs pa ni sems pa med pa yin te / skye ba can nam mi rtag [D: rtags P] pa yin pa’i phyir gzugs la sogs pa bzhin no zhes bya ba’o zhes zer ba.)* Cf. NB 3.60. My thanks are due to Dr. Pascale Hugon for providing me the Sanskrit text of PVin 3, of which an edition is under preparation.

According to the Sāṅkhya tenets, *buddhi* is impermanent and does not have consciousness. SK 10–11: *hetumad anityam avyāpi sakriyam anekam āśritaṃ liṅgam / sāvayavaṃ paratantraṃ vyaktaṃ viparītam avyaktaṃ // triṅgaṃ aviveki viśayaḥ sāmānyam acetanam prasavadharmi / vyaktaṃ tathā pradhānaṃ tadviparītas tathā ca pumān //* See Iwata (1995, pp. 158–159, 173–174) and Inami (1995, pp. 45, 51, n.1). The proof criticized here by Dharmakīrti is not, however, found in the extant treatises of the Sāṅkhya

³ On the dates of Vasubandhu, see Deleanu (2006, pp. 186–194).

in order to show that whenever transformation occurs, the destruction of the previous entity and the production of a new entity must take place. He says:

AKBh159,18-22: *kathaṃ ca sāṅkhyānām pariṇāmaḥ / avasthitasya dravyasya dharmāntaranivṛttau dharmāntaraprādurbhāva iti / kaś cātra doṣaḥ / sa eva hi dharmī na samvidyate yasyāvasthitasya dharmānām pariṇāmaḥ kalpyeta / kaś caivam āha—dharmebhyo 'nyo dharmīti / tasyaiva tu dravyasyānyathābhāvamātraṃ pariṇāmaḥ / evam apy ayuktam / kim atrāyuktam / tad eva cedaṃ na cedaṃ tathety apūrvaiṣā vācoyuktiḥ* (em.: vāyo yuktiḥ ed.) /

[Question:] But what is “transformation” for the Sāṅkhyas?

[Vasubandhu:] (1) [They explain it as follows:] The appearance of one property (*dharmā*) in an entity (*dravya*) that remains in existence when another property ceases to exist.

[Sāṅkhya:] But what is the fault in this [definition]?

[Vasubandhu:] For, there can be no such property-possessor (*dharmīn*) that remains in existence while the transformation of its *dharmas* is assumed.

[Sāṅkhya:] But who says that *dharmīn* is different from its *dharmas*? Instead, (2) transformation means the same entity becomes different (*anyathābhāvamātra*).

[Vasubandhu:] In this case, too, it is not correct.

[Sāṅkhya:] What is incorrect in this [definition]?

[Vasubandhu:] It is an unprecedented way of speaking to say that this is that, but [at the same time that] this is not so.⁴

Here Vasubandhu considers two explanations of transformation attributed to the Sāṅkhya: (1) In the first explanation, an entity is considered to consist of *dharmā* and its possessor *dravya/dharmīn*. While a *dravya/dharmīn* continues to exist through the process of transformation, its *dharmas* cease to exist (*nivṛtti*). (2) In the second explanation, on the contrary, the distinction between *dharmā* and *dravya/dharmīn* is abandoned. It is asserted that through the process of transformation an entity takes on a different form of existence, but remains the same.

The first explanation is refuted by Vasubandhu as follows: It is not possible to assume that *dharmīn* remains in existence when its *dharmas* cease to exist because, from an ontological point of view, it is not acceptable, not only for the Buddhists but also for most of the Sāṅkhyas⁵ to distinguish between *dharmā* and *dravya/dharmīn*. Vasubandhu denies the second explanation by pointing out the contradiction between the sameness and the difference of one and the same entity. However,

⁴ On Yaśomitra's interpretation of this passage, see Bronkhorst (1997).

⁵ Most Sāṅkhyas do not accept there to be an ontological difference between *dharmā* and *dharmīn/dravya*. There was, however, at least one adherent of the Sāṅkhya who did accept it, viz. Mādhava (ca. 500), who was called a “destroyer of Sāṅkhya” (*sāṅkhyānāśaka*). See VNT 52, 27–28: ... *pūrvakān kāpilān atipatyā sāṅkhyānāśakamādhavavad* (em.: *sāṅkhyānām śakamādhavavad* ed.) *dravyasya vyatireke 'pi dharmakāraṇatvam iṣyate...* On Mādhava, see Frauwallner (1953, pp. 407–408), Solomon (1974, pp. 153–163) and Halbfass (1992, pp. 57–58).

in consideration of the development of the theory of transformation in the Sāṅkhya, Vasubandhu's criticisms are seen as somewhat problematic by Dharmakīrti.

Development of the Theory of *Pariṇāma* in the Sāṅkhya and Problems of Vasubandhu's Criticism

Disappearance of *Dharma*

With regard to the first explanation of transformation mentioned above, in several treatises almost the same description can be seen, as follows:⁶

pariṇāmaś cāvasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmānivr̥ttau dharmāntarapravṛttir iti / (NBh 183,1-2 on NS 3.2.15)
avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmānivr̥ttau dharmāntarotpattiḥ pariṇāma iti / (YBh 132, 4-5 on YS 3.1.13)
pariṇāmo (em.: *parimāṇo* ed.) *hi nāmāvasthitasya dravyasya dharmāntarānivr̥ttiḥ dharmāntarapravṛttiś ca* / (YD 111,15-16)

Moreover, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* (ca. 680–720)⁷ cites the following verse, which seems to be taken as an authoritative explanation of transformation in the Sāṅkhya.

[TEXT 1] *jahad dharmāntaraṃ pūrvam upādatte yadā param / tattvād apracyuto dharmī pariṇāmaḥ sa ucyate* // (YD 111,21-22; 163,12-13)⁸

When the property-possessor (*dharmin*), without abandoning its essence (*tattvād apracyuta*), relinquishes an earlier property (*dharmā*) and subsequently takes on another one, it is called transformation.

In these statements, transformation is explained with the terms *dharmā* and its possessor *dharmin* or *dravya*. Of these, the word *dharmin/dravya* refers, ultimately, to the three constituents (*triḡuṇa*) of *pradhāna*, i.e., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which do not undergo any intrinsic changes during the process of transformation.⁹ It is

⁶ Also in the Buddhist treatises, which were, however, strongly influenced by Vasubandhu, similar descriptions can be seen. AD 106, 10–12: *sāṅkhyasya tv avasthitasya dharmīṇaḥ svātmabhūtasya dharmāntarasyotsargaḥ* svātmabhūtasya cotpādaḥ pariṇāma iti* / (*Yamashita (1994, p. 59, n.54) reads “*dharmamātrasya*” instead of “*dharmāntarasya*,” but this emendation is not needed.); VN 13,11–14: *avasthitasya dravyasya dharmāntaranivr̥ttir dharmāntaraprādurbhāvaś ca pariṇāmaḥ* /; TSP 30,14–15 on TS 16: *vyavasthitasya dharmīṇo dharmāntaranivr̥tṭyā dharmāntaraprādurbhāvaḥ pariṇāmo varṇyate*.

⁷ See YD (introduction, pp. xxvii–xxviii). As Bronkhorst (2003) suggests, however, it is possible to assume the author of the YD to be slightly earlier.

⁸ Prajñākaragupta refers to a similar explanation of transformation. PVA 297,28–29 on PV 3.230: *pariṇāmaś ca tattvād apracyutasya dharmāntaraparityāgo 'paras parotpattiḥ* /.

⁹ See YD 164,16–30. This part is translated in Malinar (1999, pp. 630–631). Cf. Frauwallner (1953, pp. 390–391). For the explanation of *dharmā* and *dharmin* given in the YSBh, see Chakrabarty (1951, pp. 198–206).

only their arrangement that changes through the process.¹⁰ Due to this change in their arrangement, the entity, which consists of these three constituents, gives up a previous *dharma* (property), for example a particular color, etc., and takes on a different one. It seems that before the time of the YD this kind of explanation of transformation was generally accepted.

However, these contain a problem that is caused by the expression $\sqrt{hā}$ or “*nivṛtti*” (cessation) of *dharma*, because this means a kind of annihilation of existence not only for the Buddhists but also most of the Sāṅkhyas, as they do not accept there to be an ontological difference between *dharmin* and *dharma*. In order to avoid this difficulty, the author of the YD interprets the above-mentioned verse ([TEXT 1]) in the following manner:

[TEXT 2] YD 163,14–16: *yadā śaktyantarānugrahāt pūrvadharmam tirobhāvya svarūpād apracyuto dharmī dharmāntareṇāvīrbhavati tad avasthānam asmākaṃ pariṇāma ity ucyate* /¹¹

When the property-possessor, after its previous property has disappeared (*tirobhāvya*) due to its receiving (*anugraha*) another power without abandoning its nature (*svarūpa*), appears with another property, then we call such a situation transformation.

By relying on the notion of disappearance (*tiras* $\sqrt{dhā}$, *tiras* $\sqrt{bhū}$ and their derivatives) instead of using $\sqrt{hā}$ or the word “*nivṛtti*,” it can be said that in the process of transformation no annihilation or destruction takes place.¹²

This replacing the notion of destruction with that of disappearance can be traced back to the explanation of the cosmic cycle presented by the followers of

¹⁰ The view that differences between cause and effect are due to the different arrangement of the three constituents can be traced back to the following fragment of the *Śaṣṭitantra*. ŚT (Frauwallner (1958, p. 125)): *ādhyātmikāḥ kāryātmakā bhedaḥ śabdasparsasararūpagandhāḥ pañca trayāṇām sukhaduhkhamohānām sanniveśamātram**. (*Of the four sources of Frauwallner's reconstruction of the ŚT, the expression “*sanniveśamātram*” is found in NĀA 12,18. However, the other three suggest the reading “*sanniveśaviśeṣāḥ*”. See PST (D194a3–4, P220b3): ... *sgra dang reg pa dang gzugs dang ro dang dri ste lnga po nmams ni / bde ba dang sdug bsngal dang rmongs pa mams te gsum po nmams kyi bkod pa'i khyad par ro /; PST (D196b6–7, P223b3) 'o na sgra dang reg bya dang gzugs dang ro dang dri ste lnga po nmams ni bde ba dang sdug bsngal dang rmongs pa ste gsum po nmams kyi bkod pa'i khyad par te /; NĀA 314,8–9: sāmanyapūrvakāṇām ca bhedanām ityādy ekajātisamanvayapradarśanāthasukhāditiṅguṇajajātisamanvayaṃ kāryātmakānām tatsanniveśaviśeṣatvaṃ pakṣīkṛtya ... And also see NC 265,6–266,2: yāni tair ārabdhāni śarīrādīny ādhyātmikāni bhūtādīni vaikārikārabdhāni cendriyāni trayāṇām sukhaduhkhamohānām sanniveśaviśeṣāḥ sukhādimayā eva, tathā pṛthivyādayas tanmayakāraṇārabdhavāt /).*

The author of the YD seems to follow this Vārṣaganya's view. YD 109,13–19: *na hi naḥ kāraṇād arthāntarabhūtam kāryam utpadyata ity abhyupagamah / kiṃ tarhi / viśvātmakānām sattvarajastamasām apagataviśeṣāḥ sanmātralakṣaṇopacayaḥ pratinivṛttopariṇāmanavyāpārāḥ paramavibhāgam upasampṛtāḥ sūkṣmāḥ śaktayaḥ / tāsām adhikārasamarthyād upajātāpariṇāmanavyāpārāṇām sanmātrānukramena pracayam upasampadyamānānām sanniveśaviśeṣamātram vyaktam /*

¹¹ Almost the same explanation of *pariṇāma* as in the Sāṅkhya's reply to the *asatkāryavādin* is found in YD 121,4–6 on SK 9: *sādhānānugrhitasya dharmiṇo dharmāntarasyāvīrbhāvāḥ pūrvasya ca tirobhāvāḥ pariṇāmah / na cāvīrbhāvātirobhāvāv utpattinirodhau /*

¹² The development of the explanation of transformation found in the YD is pointed out by Frauwallner (1953, pp. 389–391) and Muroya (1996, pp. 49–50).

Vārṣagaṇya (Vārṣagaṇāḥ).¹³ In *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 10, it is stated that all things except *puruṣa* and *pradhāna* are impermanent.¹⁴ In his commentary on this *kārikā*, replying to the objection that as long as *satkāryavāda* is held to be true, the impermanence of things cannot be justified,¹⁵ the author of the YD sets forth his view by citing the followers of Vārṣagaṇya as follows:

[TEXT 3] YD 128,20-129,2 on SK 10: *kāraṇānām tu yaḥ parasparasamsargāt samsthānaviśeṣaparigrahaḥ, tasya virodhiśaktyantarāvīrbhāvād vyaktis tirodhīyata ity etad vināśasābdena vivakṣitam / tathā ca vārṣagaṇāḥ paṭhanti—tad etat trailokyam vyakter apaiti, na sattvāt/apetam apy asti vināśapratīṣedhāt/ saṃsargāc cāsya saukṣmyam saukṣmyāc cānupalabdhiḥ/ tasmād vyaktyapagamo vināśaḥ/ ...*¹⁶

However, the following is intended by the word *vināśa*: The manifestation (*vyakti*) of [the effect] that takes a special arrangement through the mutual connection of its causes disappears (*tirodhīyate*) upon the appearance of another incompatible power. In the same way, the followers of Vārṣagaṇya (Vārṣagaṇāḥ) say that the entire threefold world withdraws (*apaiti*) [only] from its manifestation, but not from its reality (*sattva*). Even when [its manifestation] has withdrawn, [it still] exists because destruction is negated [by us]. And because of its merger (*samsarga*) [with *prakṛti*], [the world] is subtle; and because of [its] subtleness, it cannot be perceived. Therefore, destruction is the disappearance (*apagama*) of manifestation.

According to the followers of Vārṣagaṇya, destruction (*vināśa*) means the disappearance of its manifestation but not the cessation of its existence. An object evolves out of its cause and then dissolves into its cause after having been manifest for some time. Even though it disappears from manifestation, it still exists in its cause. It is highly plausible that the author of the YD derives the notion of disappearance from this statement of the followers of Vārṣagaṇya and then applies it to the interpretation of TEXT 1 in order to avoid the problem caused by the expression

¹³ On the name of Vārṣagaṇya and Vārṣagaṇāḥ, see Chakravarti (1951, pp. 135–142), Wezler (1985a, p. 14, n. 6) and Wezler (1992, p. 288).

¹⁴ See above footnote 2.

¹⁵ YD 128,14: *āha: anīyatvānupapattiḥ satkāryavādābhyupagamāt /*

¹⁶ A slightly different version of this passage, but without the name, is found in the NBh as an example of *siddhāntaviruddha* and in the YSBh, in contrast, as *siddhānta*. NBh 43,11–13 on NS 1.2.6: *yathā so 'yam vikāro vyakter apaiti nīyatvapratīṣedhāt /... apeto 'pi vikāro 'sti vināśapratīṣedhāt /*; YSBh 127,8–128,2 on YS 3.13: *tad etat trailokyam vyakter apaiti nīyatvapratīṣedhāt / apetaṃ apy asti vināśapratīṣedhāt / saṃsargāc cāsya saukṣmyam, saukṣmyāc cānupalabdhir iti /* See Halbfass (1992, pp. 59; 66, n. 46).

$\sqrt{hā}$ or “*nivṛtti*” (cessation) of *dharmā*.¹⁷ Thanks to this notion of disappearance, the explanation of transformation based on the division between *dharmā* and *dharmīn* is strengthened. If this new explanation is taken into consideration, Vasubandhu's criticism might be refuted.¹⁸

Difference of State

From the second explanation of transformation found in the AKBh, what is known is only that this Sāṅkhya does not accept the difference between *dharmā* and *dharmīn*. But it is not clear how he explains the process of transformation. As long as this point is not made clear, Vasubandhu's criticism cannot be regarded as a decisive objection. Of course, the possibility is not denied that at the time of Vasubandhu the explanation of transformation without the distinction between *dharmā* and *dharmīn* had not yet been fully established in the Sāṅkhya. In any case, by the time of Dharmakīrti, one Sāṅkhya group explains the transformation by using

¹⁷ Before YD and AKBh, the notion of disappearance (and appearance), in connection with the Sāṅkhya theory, was already mentioned in the **Mahāvibhāṣā* (T.1545,996c14ff.). There, just after referring to the theory of transformation (轉變論, 隱顯論—the theory which states that there is neither destruction nor production of things, but only appearance and disappearance take place—is presented. A similar idea is mentioned in the *Yogācārabhūmi* as *abhivṛtyavāda*. The author of YBhū regards both *hetupahasadvāda*, i.e. *satkāryavāda*, and *abhivṛtyavāda* as the theory propounded by Vāśaṅganyā. See Imanishi (1968, pp. 642–643). For the text and translation of the relevant part of the YBhū, see Wezler (1985a, pp. 10–12).

Furthermore, in another part of the **Mahāvibhāṣā* (T.1545,1003c18–1004a2) the theory that the process of transformation consists of appearance and disappearance but not of production and destruction is criticized by two Buddhist teachers, i.e., Vasumitra (世友) and some Bhadanta (大德). However, except for the explanation of transformation criticized by Bhadanta, the explanations of transformation criticized by the author of YBhū and Vasumitra do not presuppose the analysis of an entity into property (*dharmā*) and property-possessor (*dharmīn*). In contrast, in the explanation of transformation criticized by Bhadanta, an entity is considered to consist of the entity itself, its characteristic (相/**lakṣaṇa*?), and state (分位/**avasthā*?). There, disappearance or appearance is regarded as a state of an entity. (I will discuss Bhadanta's criticism later in note 19.) Considering this, it seems slightly curious that Vasubandhu does not mention the notion of disappearance in his criticism, despite his familiarity with the **Mahāvibhāṣā*.

¹⁸ As Frauwallner (1953, p. 390) indicates, the author of the YD seems to think that the explanation of transformation by the disappearance of *dharmā* is not enough to give an answer to Vasubandhu's criticism. He replies to the criticism with the help of the notion of the whole (*avayavin*) and its parts (*avayava*). See YD 164,1–5: *ucyate—na, senādivad vyavasthānopapatteḥ / tad yathā senāṅgebhya nanyatvaṃ senāyāḥ / na ca senāṅgavināse senāvināśaḥ / tathā tantubhyo nānyaḥ paṭaḥ bauddhānām saṃyogāvayavavipratīṣedhāt / na ca paṭavināse tantuvināśaḥ / tatra yad uktaṃ dharmavināse dharmīvināśa ity etad ayuktam* / Considering his refutation of the existence of the whole (YD 112,12–115,12), the author of the YD might be of the opinion that *dharmā*, as in the case of the whole, is not a real entity but just a fictional construction. On the criticism of the existence of the whole in the YD, see Motegi (1994).

the term “state” (*avasthā*) instead of *dharmā*.¹⁹ This Sāṅkhya group considers the term “state,” unlike the term *dharmā*, to describe a more transitory and provisional condition of an entity and therefore the change of the state, or, even the destruction of the state, does not affect the continuing existence of that entity. With the help of this term, the Sāṅkhyas are able to maintain that one and the same entity, which again consists of the three constituents (*triḡuṇa*), becomes different by changing its state in the process of transformation. Thus, this Sāṅkhya theory could counter Vasubandhu’s criticism.

Dharmakīrti’s Criticism

In response to these developments of the theory of transformation in the Sāṅkhya school, Dharmakīrti, by refuting two crucial notions that had appeared, tries to support Vasubandhu’s criticism of transformation.²⁰

¹⁹ In the YD, causal relationships are explained by the change of state. YD 62,9–10 on SK 3: *tasmin pratyakhyāte guṇānām evāvasthāntarāpekṣaḥ kāryakāraṇabhavaḥ* /; YD 150,1–3 on SK 15: *iḥasmākaṃ kāryakāraṇayor arthāntaratvānabhyupagamād guṇānām avasthāntaram evāvasthāntarāpekṣaṃ kāryakāraṇaśabdavācyatām labhate* / See also NV 334,12–335,7 on NS 3.1.5, where the Sāṅkhya explains changes in *buddhi* by changes in its state.

As mentioned in the above note 17, **Mahāvibhāṣā* introduces Bhadanta’s criticism of the theory of transformation. **Mahāvibhāṣā* T.1545 1003c25–1004a2: 大德說曰。世間現見眾緣合時有諸法起。緣若乖離諸法便壞。非隱顯者有此差別。故知轉變不由隱顯。但由彼體有生有滅。復次法轉變時前後相別體亦應別。相體一故。相體一故。若法常住雖有隱顯分位差別而相無異。故知轉變體有生滅。“[Moreover,] Bhadanta says [as follows]: (1) It is obviously observed in the world that when their causes get together, constituent factors (法/**dharmā*) occur and that when their causes are set apart, constituent factors come to an end at that time. There is no such difference in the case of what disappears and appears. Therefore, it is understood that transformation does not consist of disappearance and appearance and that there are production and destruction of the entity itself [in the process of transformation]. (2) Furthermore, if, when a constituent factor transforms, the characteristic (相/**lakṣaṇa*?) of a previous [constituent factor] is different from that of the next one, then the [previous constituent factor] itself (體), too, must be different [from the next one] because the characteristic is identical with the [constituent factor] itself. If a constituent factor were permanent, then, even though its state (分位/**avasthā*?) such as being appearance or being disappearance differs, its characteristic would not differ. Therefore, it is understood that there are production and destruction of the [constituent factor] itself [in the process of transformation].”

In Bhadanta’s second criticism, a constituent factor (法), i.e., an entity is considered to consist of the entity itself (體), characteristic (相), and state (分位). According to Bhadanta, disappearance or appearance of an entity is regarded as the difference of its state. He thinks, perhaps, that only the change of the characteristic means the transformation of an entity but not the change of the state. As a result, he accepts the difference of state. Therefore, his criticism is not crucial for the Sāṅkhya who explains transformation by the difference of state.

²⁰ Also in his later work *Vādanyāya* (VN 13,9–15,12), Dharmakīrti criticizes two explanations of transformation in the context of the criticism of *satkāryavāda*. Compared with PVin 3, the structure of his criticism in the VN is much closer to that of Vasubandhu. When he criticizes the explanation, in which an entity is considered to consist of *dharmā* and *dharmin*, he mentions almost the same definition of transformation found in the AKBh (see above note 6). In the VN, however, the notion of disappearance of *dharmā* is not examined. Moreover, even though both the VN and PVin 3 deal with the theory of transformation explained with the notion of state, the manner of the criticism in the VN is different from that of in PVin 3.

In his PVin 3, the logical reason *anityatva* (“impermanence”) put forward by the Sāṅkhya for the proposition that the intellect (*buddhi*) does not have consciousness (*acetana*) is classified as a fallacious reason, i.e., unproved (*asiddha*). Explaining this, Dharmakīrti criticizes two Sāṅkhya theories: The former explains the impermanence by the disappearance of a property (*dharma*) of an entity and the latter explains it by the difference of the state (*avasthā*) of an entity. Those who proclaim these theories are called, according to Dharmottara, *abhivyaktivādin* (or *vyaktivādin*) and *avasthāntaravādin* (or *avasthāvādin*), respectively.²¹

Criticism of the Notion of Disappearance

In criticising these Sāṅkhya theories, Dharmakīrti presupposes that the logical reason put forward by the proponent must be accepted by both the proponent and the opponent,²² in other words, that the logical reason must provide a common understanding of a given state of affairs to both sides of the debate. From this point, Dharmakīrti begins an examination of the meaning of “impermanence” for the Sāṅkhya.²³

*tatrāpi hi śabda eva kevalaḥ siddhaḥ, nārthaḥ / na hi pare 'pracyutātmana
upalayanam anityatām icchanti'*²⁴

²¹ See PVinT (Ms114a5–7; D125b3–5; P147a5–8): *sāṅkhyāḥ kaścid abhivyaktivādī—saktirūpeṇāvasthītaḥ sarvo 'rtho vyajyata iti. anyas tv avasthāntaravādī—sarvātmanā hi sarve bhāvāḥ pradhānaprasevake vyavasthīta na dṛśyante. pratyayavaśāt tu prasevakān niṣkāsitā iva dṛśyā bhavanti. tato na vyaktir nivartate śaktiś cāvatiṣṭhate, api tv avasthāntaraprāptiḥ kevalā bhavati. “One sort of Sāṅkhya is an abhivyaktivādin [and he is of the following opinion:] Everything that remains in existence in the form of a power is manifested. However, the other [Sāṅkhya], i.e., the avasthāntaravādin [is of the following opinion]: All entities, indeed, are settled in the bag of pradhāna entirely, and they are not visible. But they become visible by the force of certain causal conditions, being, as it were, turned out of the bag. Therefore, [in the process of transformation] there is neither the cessation of the manifestation [of phenomena], nor remaining power, instead, [the entity] merely reaches another state.”*

As Dharmottara's subsequent remarks suggest, it seems that there must be a close relationship between this *avasthāntaravādin* and Vasumitra's theory, i.e., *avasthānyathika* mentioned in AKBh, etc. as the most authentic doctrine of the Vaiśiṣṭikas, in order to explain the difference of the present *dharma* from the past and future *dharma*. But a discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper. See PVinT (Ms114a8; D125b6; P147b1–2): *etasmims tu nirākṛte bhavatu vaiśiṣṭikapakṣanirākaraṇam, na tu tam evoddiśyāṃ granthaḥ pravṛttaḥ. tasyāpi sāṅkhyasya ...*

²² See PVin 3 on k.67: *tasmāt pratipādyapratipādakayor aprasiddhasandigdhadharmisambandhānvaya-vyatirekā dharmā hetvābhāsāḥ / ([D215b2, P313a5–6]: de 'i phyir chos can dang 'brel pa dang rjes su 'gro ba dang ldog pa dang [D: om. (dang) P] bsgrub par bya ba dang sgrub par byed pa dag la ma grub pa 'am the tshom za ba 'i chos ni gtan tshigs ltar snang ba yin no //)*

²³ Uddyotakara also criticizes the Sāṅkhyas' notion of disappearance (*tirobhāva*). According to him, the existence of the effect (e.g. a piece of cloth) is distinct from that of the cause (e.g. the threads it is made of) because they appear differently, i.e., what causes the difference must be produced. See NV 460,7–12: *aparesāṃ dharmāntarāvīrbhāvatirobhāvān iti / ... ye 'pi samsthānaviśeṣeṇāvasthītan tantūn paṭa iti varṇayanti, tān prati sādhanam, prāḡ upalabdihikālāt samsthānaviśeṣasūnyās tantavaḥ tatkāraṇatvāt turyādivat / etena kāryāntarāvatiṣṭhanta iti vyākhyātam / tathā dharmāntarāvīrbhāvatirobhāvān iti /*

²⁴ PVin 3 (D215b7–216a1, P313b4): *der yang sgra tsam 'ba' zhig grub kyi don ni ma yin no // nyams pa med pa 'i bdag nyid nye bar zhi ba ni mi rtag pa nyid du gzhan dag mi 'dod do //*

For, with regard to them (i.e., *buddhi*, etc., the topic of the thesis) too, it is only the word that is established [for both the proponent and the opponent], but not the state of affairs. For others (i.e., Buddhists) do not regard impermanence as a thing's resting [on *pradhāna*] (*upalayana*) without abandoning its nature.

Here, Dharmakīrti ascribes the following theory to the Sāṅkhya: When a thing, even though it continues to exist, goes back to *pradhāna* and becomes invisible,²⁵ it is considered to be impermanent. This concept of impermanence of the Sāṅkhya, of course, cannot be adopted by Dharmakīrti, who does not accept the existence of *pradhāna*. In response, therefore, the Sāṅkhya explains the transformation without using *pradhāna*, namely, by using the notion of disappearance.

*nanv asty eva tirodhānam/na vai paras tad anityatvam āha, kiṃ tarhi vināśam*²⁶

[Sāṅkhya:] There must be [a common thing that is understood through the word “impermanence” by both the Sāṅkhya and the Buddhist, and it is] disappearance (*tirodhāna*).

[Buddhist:] The other (i.e., Buddhist) does not call it impermanence, but [calls] destruction [impermanence].

Dharmakīrti denies that disappearance means impermanence because Buddhists only accept its meaning to be destruction. In opposition to this, the Sāṅkhya tries to explain that if the meaning of impermanence is taken to be disappearance, impermanence is accepted as a proper logical reason for both the Sāṅkhya and the Buddhist because there is a common feature between destruction and disappearance.

*nanu vinaṣṭatirohitayor dvayor apy avyaktis tulyety asty eva sāmānyam / atha keyam avyaktiḥ/adrśyātmatā/nanv anena lakṣaṇena pradhānapuruṣādayo 'py anityāḥ prasajanti*²⁷

[Sāṅkhya:] For both [the Sāṅkhya and the Buddhist], non-manifestation (*avyakti*) is equally [accepted] between what has been destroyed and what has disappeared. Therefore there must be a common thing (*sāmānya*).

²⁵ Dharmottara does not give much information about the meaning of “*upalayana*”. PVinT (Ms113a6–7; D124b1, P145b8–146a1): *yasmān na pare saugatā apracyutarūpasyopalayanam adrśyātmatvam anityatām icchanti*. To understand the meaning, the following verse from Kumāriḷa's *Ślokavārtika* is informative. ŚV ātmavāda k.30: *na cāvasthāntarotpāde pūrvātyantaṃ vinaśyati / uttarānuguṇārthā tu sāmānyātmani līyate* // See Uno (1996, pp. 109, n. 20–21).

²⁶ PVin 3 (D216a2–3, P313b6–7): *bskal* (D: *skal* P) *ba nyid yod pa ma yin nam zhe na / de la ni gzhan dag mi rtag par mi brjod do* // 'o na ci zhe na / 'jig pa la'o //

²⁷ PVin 3 (D216a3–4, P313b7–8): *gal te zhig pa dang bskal ba dag mi gsal ba nyid du 'dra* (D: *rung P*) *ba'i phyir gnyi ga la yang spyi yod pa nyid ma yin nam zhe na / ci ste mi gsal ba zhes bya ba 'di ci* (D: *om. (ci) P*) *zhig / mi mthong ba'i* (D: *ba P*) *bdag nyid do zhe na / mshan nyid 'dis* (D: 'di P) *gtso bo dang skyes bu la sogs pa yang mi rtag par yang thal bar 'gyur ro* //

[Buddhist:] Then what is this “non-manifestation?”

[Sāṅkhya:] It is imperceptibility (*adr̥śyātmatā*).

[Buddhist:] According to this definition, even *pradhāna* and *puruṣa*, etc.²⁸ would be impermanent.

Here, this Sāṅkhya accounts for the commonality between destruction and disappearance in terms of non-manifestation (*avyakti*). To this, Dharmakīrti replies by examining the meaning of non-manifestation. If this non-manifestation were to mean imperceptibility (*adr̥śyātmatā*), then *pradhāna* and *puruṣa*, against the Sāṅkhya's tenets, would be impermanent because they are not perceptible. To avoid this difficulty, the Sāṅkhya gives a slightly modified explanation.

*prāg anyadharmo 'vyaktir anityateti cet / anyadharmā ca prāg
apracuyātmeti ca suvyāhṛtam* I²⁹

[Sāṅkhya:] Impermanence means the non-manifestation of a thing that previously possessed a different property (i.e., perceptibility) [, but not mere non-manifestation].

[Buddhist:] But it is very nice to say that [one and the same thing] previously possessed a different property and [at the same time] it has not yet abandoned its nature.

With this explanation of impermanence, as provided here by the Sāṅkhya, *puruṣa* and *pradhāna* cannot be regarded as impermanent because they are always imperceptible. However, because it is unacceptable for Dharmakīrti that one and the same thing possesses two mutually incompatible properties at the same time,³⁰ there are only two alternatives: the previous *dharmin* and the next one are mutually distinct things, that is, the previous *dharmin* is destroyed; or the property (*dharma*) of the previous *dharmin* is destroyed. Since, from an ontological point of view, there is no difference between a *dharmin* and its property *dharma*, it follows in both cases that the previous entity has been destroyed.

²⁸ According to Dharmottara, this “ādi” refers to imperceptible things in a particular state (*avasthāviśeṣa*). Perhaps it means radically inaccessible things (*atyantaparokṣa*) that can never be ascertained whether they are impermanent or not. PVinT (Ms114a2; D125a6, P147a1): *ādigrahaṇād avasthāviśeṣa adr̥śyātmano 'nityā prāpnuvanti*. On the other hand, Prajñākaragupta seems to regard this “ādi” as referring to absolute nonexistence, such as a rabbit's horn. PVA 46,8–9: *nanu* (Ms-B: *nanu* (*na*) ed.) *tirobhāvo vinaṣṭānabhiviyaktayos* (em. (cf. *zhig pa dang mngon par mi gsal ba dag* T): *vinaṣṭānabhiviyakyos* ed., *vinaṣṭābhiviyaktayos* Ms-B) *tulya eva. ko 'yaṃ tirobhāvaḥ* (ed.: *ko yan tirobhāv(o) v(i)naṣṭābhiviyaktatā* Ms-B). *adr̥śyātmatā. nanu śaśaviṣāṇādīnām ca pradhānānām anityatāprāptiḥ*. It is worth noting that Prajñākaragupta criticizes the Sāṅkhya's notion of disappearance in accordance with Dharmakīrti's argument in PVin 3. See PVA 46,8–14 on PV 2.17.

²⁹ PVin 3 (D216a4, P313b8–314a1): *sngar chos gzhan yin pa mi gsal ba mi rtag pa yin no zhe na / sngar chos gzhan yang yin la nyams pa med pa 'i bdag nyid kyang yin no // zhes legs par tha snyad byas so //*

³⁰ See PVSV 20,21–22: *ayam eva khalu bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānām viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedas ca /* (For a translation and its annotation, see Gillon and Hayes (2008, pp. 352, 393–395)); PVin 2, pp. 89,14–90,1: *ayaṃ hi bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānām yad uta viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedas ca /*

Criticism of the Notion of State

Another Sāṅkhya, however, raises an objection against this criticism brought forth by Dharmakīrti. After considering an entity to consist of state (*avasthā*) and state-possessor (*avasthātṛ*) instead of *dharma* and *dharmin* in order to eliminate the ontological problem caused by the latter two terms, this Sāṅkhya explains impermanence of things by the change of its states.³¹ It is maintained that the state-possessor continues to exist even if its states cease to exist or are destroyed. Accordingly, it can be claimed that a remaining entity as well as some kind of destruction exist. Dharmakīrti begins his refutation of this view with a cross-examination of the meaning of “state.”

avasthā nivartate, nāvasthātetī cet / keyam avasthā / yeyam udakadhāraṇādyarthakriyāyām upanidhīyate, yām ayaṃ jantur adhyakṣam adhyavasyati ghaṭo 'yam iti, tannivṛttāv anivṛttāv apy aparasyāsya sarvasyābhāvāt / evaṃ tarhi saivāvasthā ghaṭo 'stu, yathoktalakṣaṇatvād asya / sa ca nivṛtta ity anivṛtto 'vasthātāvasthitaḥ paryanuyojyaḥ/san vā, na ghaṭo bhāvikaḥ, atallakṣaṇatvāt /³²

[Sāṅkhya:] [In the process of transformation, only its] state (*avasthā*) ceases to exist, but not the state-possessor (*avasthātṛ*).

[Buddhist:] What is this “state?”

[Sāṅkhya:] It is what is employed for a purposeful activity (*arthakriyā*) such as holding water. [Moreover,] this [ordinary] person determines it to be visible in the form “this is a pot.” For, when it ceases to exist, though the other (i.e., the state-possessor) does not cease to exist, neither of these (i.e., purposeful activity and the determination of the object) would occur.

³¹ In this connection, it should be noted that Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa (ca. 600–660) also uses the notion of state (*avasthā*) and state-possessor (*avasthāvat*) when he explains the transformation of the eternal soul (*āman*). According to him, one and the same soul, maintaining its existence, can change from the agent of an action (*kartr*) into the experienter of its fruits (*bhoktr*) by taking the latter state. In the sense that the soul is transformed from one state into another, the soul can be called impermanent (*anityā*). ŚV ātmavāda 22–23: *nānityaśabdavācyatvam āmano vinivāryate / vikriyāmātravācivte na hy ucchedo 'sya tāvat // syātām atyantānāṣe 'sya kṛtanāśākrāgamau / na tv avasthāntaraprāptaḥ loke bālayuvādivat //*

It is seen that there is a great similarity between this view of Kumāriḷa and that of the Sāṅkhya criticized here by Dharmakīrti. However, as we will see below, Dharmakīrti’s criticism presupposes the Sāṅkhya’s theory of three constituents (*triguṇa*). Therefore, it is likely that here he does not intend to criticize Kumāriḷa’s view of the soul, even if he could refute it. For Kumāriḷa’s explanation of the transformation of the soul, see Uno (1996, 1999). The latter points out the influence of the Jaina theory of many-sidedness (*anekāntavāda*) on Kumāriḷa’s theory.

³² PVin 3 (D216a5–7, P314a2–5): *gnas skabs ldog gi gnas skabs can ni ma yin no zhe na / gnas skabs zhes bya ba 'di ci (D: om. (ci) P) zhig / chu 'dzin pa la sogs (D: ... sogs pa P) don byed pa nye bar bsgrub pa gang yin pa ste / 'di bum pa 'o zhes 'jig rten pa 'di gang la mngon sum du lhag par zhen pa 'di yin te/de log na gzhan ma log kyang 'di thams cad med pa'i phyir ro zhe na / de lta (D: om. (lta) P) na ni 'o na gnas skabs de nyid bum pa yin te (D: no P) / de ni ji skad bshad pa'i mtshan nyid (D: ... nyid can P) yin pa'i phyir ro // de yang log pa'i phyir gnas skabs can ma log par gnas pa ni brgal zhing bntag par bya ba yin no // yod kyang bum pa'i dngos por ni mi 'gyur te / de'i mtshan nyid med pa'i phyir ro //*

[Buddhist:] If so, this very “state” would be the pot, because it (i.e., the pot) has the above-mentioned characteristic (i.e., being employed for a purposeful activity and bringing about the determination). And it (i.e., the pot as a state) has already ceased to exist. Therefore, [the existence of] the remaining state-possessor, which has not yet ceased [to exist], must be questioned.³³ Or if it exists, the pot [as a state-possessor] would not be real because it would not have such a characteristic.

According to this Sāṅkhya, the “state” is characterized as something that accomplishes purposeful activity and brings about the determination that this is the object of the cognition.³⁴ For Dharmakīrti, however, this means that the state can be considered real,³⁵ because only it has causal efficacy (*arthakriyāśakti*) and not the state-possessor. Therefore, the state-possessor would lose the reason for its existence and not be accepted as a real entity even though it exists in one form or another. As a result, it must be acknowledged that all real phenomena, whether internal or external, are characterized as causal efficacies and undergo destruction. In response to this criticism, the Sāṅkhya claims that the reality of an entity is not found in phenomena, but in something that is not manifest as a phenomenon but exists behind phenomena. This entity is *pradhāna*. This idea enables the Sāṅkhya to insist that the difference in causal efficacy affects only the appearance of an entity, not its identity.

vastv ekam evāvasthāntarāveśād bhedadṛṣṭir iti cet/sa evāvasthābhedo vastubhedalakaṣaṇaṃ kiṃ neṣyate/evaṃ hi sukhādīnām asandigdho bhedo bhavati ³⁶

[Sāṅkhya:] Due to its taking on a different state, one and the same entity (i.e., the state-possessor) looks different [from its previous form].

[Buddhist:] Why is it not accepted that this very difference of state is the characteristic of the distinctness of the entities? For, in this same manner, the [mutual] differences among pleasure (*sukha*), etc. are undoubtedly [accepted in the Sāṅkhya system].

Since all manifested phenomena, such as pots, etc., are transitory existences, the Sāṅkhya holds that only *pradhāna*, i.e., the non-manifest (*avyakta*), can be accepted as an unchangeable real entity. Therefore, it is the only thing that can serve as a state-possessor. When a state-possessor connects with different states, it changes its appearance and in each case manifests different causal efficacies. Hence it seems to

³³ PVinṬ (Ms114b6–7; D126a6, P148a2–3): *tasmād anivṛtto yo 'vasthātānnyas tasyāvasthāyāḥ, sa paryanuyojyaḥ sattvaṃ prati—kathaṃ punar asāv arthakriyāḥ pramāṇena vā vinā vidyamāno bhaved iti.*

³⁴ From SK 9, it is possible to derive the view that phenomena have the power to accomplish or produce their effects. SK 9: *asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt / śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvāc ca satkāryam* // And see also YSBh 132,8 on YS 3.14: *yogyatāvachchinnā dharmiṇaḥ śaktir eva dharmāḥ* / On this interpretation of YSBh, see Chakravarti (1951, pp. 198–200).

³⁵ PV 1.165ab: *sa pāramāthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamaḥ* / etc.

³⁶ PVin 3 (D216a7–216b1, P314a5–6): *dngos po gcig nyid gnas skabs gzhan dang 'brel pa'i phyir / tha dad par mngon pa (D: par P) yin no zhe na / gnas skabs tha dad pa de nyid dngos po tha dad pa'i mtshan nyid du ci ste mi 'dod / de lta yin dang bde ba la sogs pa rnam pa tha dad par 'gyur bar gdon mi za'o //*

be different things. However, the difference of the appearance does not mean that the state-possessor is different.

Dharmakīrti, in turn, refutes this by pointing out its inconsistency with the Sāṅkhya's own tenet. For the Sāṅkhya, *pradhāna* consists of the three constituents—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. They are, respectively, of the nature of pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) and delusion (*moha*), and are entirely different from one another. Moreover, they are described as having mutually distinct purposes (*artha*).³⁷ These *sattva*, etc. are, in non-Sāṅkhya treatises including the works of Dharmakīrti, often mentioned as being identical to pleasure, etc.³⁸ And here too, pleasure, etc. are referred to as constituents of *pradhāna*. Therefore, it can be said that pleasure, etc. are regarded as being different entities as well as having different powers,³⁹ i.e., causal efficacy. From this, Dharmakīrti derives the necessary relationship between a difference of causal efficacy and difference of entity. In this part of the PVin, however, the Sāṅkhya insists that the state-possessor/entity remains one and the same, even though its states, which are associated with state-possessor and characterized as causal efficacy, are different. If this were the case, then the differences among the three constituents could not be maintained because they have different causal efficacies. Therefore, as long as the Sāṅkhya maintains that there are differences among the three constituents, he has to accept that a difference of states means a difference of the state-possessor/entity, i.e., that the previous entity is destroyed and a new entity is produced in the process of transformation. In this way, Dharmakīrti shows that the Sāṅkhya's explanation of transformation relying on the notion of state is in conflict with his own tenets.

³⁷ See SK 12: *prītyapṛītiviśādātmaḥ prakāśapravṛttinīyamārthāḥ / anyonyābhibhavāśrayajanānamithunavṛttayaś ca guṇāḥ //*; GBh 15,4 on SK 12: *tatra prītyātmakaṃ sattvam, prītiḥ sukhaṃ tadātmakam iti / and* STK 52,10 on SK 12: *prītiḥ sukhaṃ prītyātmakaḥ sattvaḥ guṇaḥ*.

³⁸ In Dharmakīrti's works, the following examples can be found. PVin 3 on k.60 (D210a4–5, P307b6–7): *sa hi dharmī pradhānalakṣaṇa eko nityaḥ sukhādyātmako 'nyo veti yathākathāñcid api viśeṣitas tatsvabhavaḥ sādhitō bhavati / (=PVSV 94,11–13); VN 66,15: tatraikā prakṛtiḥ sukhaduḥkhamohaḥ /*. Also "sukhādi" in PV 4.144–145 (*tathaiva dharmiṇo 'py atra sādhyatvāt kevalasya na / yady evam atra bādha syāt nānyānutpādyasaktikaḥ // sakre chabdādyahetutvāt sukhādir iti pūrvavat / virodhitā bhaved atra hetur aikāntiko yadi //*) can be understood as referring to *pradhāna*. See Tillemans (2000, pp. 205–207). Note that Dharmakīrti does not necessarily use pleasure, etc. to describe *pradhāna*. He also uses *sattva*, etc. See PVin 3 on k.32 (D208b5–6, P298a8–298b1): *tac copalabhyamadhyarūpam pūrvāparayoḥ koṭyor astīti bruvāṇaḥ padārthavyavasthāṃ bādhatē / sattvarajastamasāṃ caitanyasya caivam paraspararūpavivekena vyavasthāyogāt /*

Kamalaśīla explicitly identifies *sattva*, etc. with *sukha*, etc. when explaining one of the five *vīta*-arguments put forth by the Sāṅkhya (probably Vārṣaganya) to prove the existence of *pradhāna*. TSP 27,1–7 on TS 14: *itaś caṣṭi pradhānam, bhedānām anvyadarśanāt /... sukhaduḥkhamohādījātisamanvitaṃ cedaṃ vyaktam upalabhyate/kutaḥ / prasādatāpadainyādikāryopalabdheh/tathā hi prasādalāghavābhiśvaṅgoddharāpṛitayaḥ sattvasya kāryam / sukham iti ca sattvam evocyate / tāpaśosabhedastambhodvegāpadvēgā rajasaḥ kāryam / rajas ca duḥkham / dainyāvaraṇasādanādharmaṣabihatsagauravāṇi tasmaśaḥ kāryam / tamaś ca mohaśabdenocyate /*

Some instances showing the interchangeability of *sattva*, etc. and *sukha*, etc. can be found in Jaina literature, i.e., the *Nayacakra* and its commentary, the *Nyāyāgamānusārīṇī*, as has been pointed out by Wezler (1985b, p. 6, 28 n. 27).

³⁹ See GBh 15, 6 on SK 12: *tathā prakāśapravṛttinīyamārthāḥ / arthaśabdaḥ sāmārthyavācī*.

Conclusion

Vasubandhu, in his AKBh, examines the Sāṅkhya's two explanations of transformation. One considers an entity to consist of *dharmā* and *dharmīn* and explains the process of transformation as the cessation (*nivṛtti*) of the previous *dharmā* and appearance of the next *dharmā* in a persisting *dharmīn*. In contrast, the other does not accept a distinction between *dharmā* and *dharmīn*, and claims that transformation means that the same entity becomes different. Vasubandhu criticizes both explanations, pointing out, with regard to the former case, that there is no ontological distinction between *dharmā* and *dharmīn*, and, in the latter case, that sameness and difference cannot be maintained in one and the same entity. However, by the time of Dharmakīrti, the theory of transformation had been developed in the Sāṅkhya school. The defects of the explanation of transformation in the AKBh, i.e., the cessation of *dharmā* and an entity's becoming different, have been superseded by the notion of (a) the disappearance (*tirodhāna/tirobhāva*) of *dharmā* and (b) the cessation of the state (*avasthā*) of an entity, respectively. Therefore, Vasubandhu's criticism would allow room for a retort from this more developed theory.

In discussing the meaning of *anityatva* propounded by the Sāṅkhyas as a logical reason, Dharmakīrti closely examines these two crucial notions and criticizes both of them. With regard to the notion of disappearance of *dharmā*, his criticism is not directly leveled against it, but against disappearance itself. In opposition to the Sāṅkhya's explanation that disappearance is a changing of the *dharmā*, i.e., perceptibility of things changing into imperceptibility, he shows that it is impossible to assume two contradictory *dharmas* in one and the same entity. Therefore, whenever something disappears, the previous *dharmā* or *dharmīn* itself is destroyed. As a result, because, from an ontological point of view, *dharmā* cannot be separated from *dharmīn*, the disappearance of an entity entails its destruction. Concerning the second notion, he points out the contradiction between the Sāṅkhya's description of the state (*avasthā*) and his theory of the three constituents (*triguṇa*). The Sāṅkhya identifies the state of an entity with a causal efficacy, while he insists that the three constituents are different from each other and at the same time they have different causal efficacies. Therefore, insofar as he holds the theory of the three constituents, he has to accept that a difference of state necessarily leads to a difference of the entity itself and means the destruction of the previous entity. In this way, Dharmakīrti shows that the word "impermanence" means destruction, and hence the Sāṅkhya, who does not accept the destruction of entities (*dharmīn/avasthātr*), cannot put forward "impermanence" as a logical reason because, in a proof, the logical reason must be accepted by both proponent and opponent.

Dharmakīrti's criticism of *anityatva* in the Sāṅkhya theory basically follows the same lines as Vasubandhu's arguments against the Sāṅkhya theory of transformation. However, Dharmakīrti supplies some important additions in order to make Vasubandhu's theory sustainable against the more developed Sāṅkhya theory. It can be said that Vasubandhu's theory is revived with the help of Dharmakīrti's modifications.

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