


(Bay of Bengal) (p. 32), but about 1–2 km from it along the Ariankuppam River. Elsewhere, Gurukkal places Poduke, often identified with Arikamedu, on the western coast of India (p. 154); it is close to the south-eastern/Coromandel shore. The author has not consulted recent studies on ancient pottery: torpedo jars are not Egyptian (pp. 30–1), but imports from Western Asia and turquoise-glazed wares need not necessarily be of Egyptian provenance (pp. 30–1). Gurukkal seems to assign rouletted ware a Mediterranean origin (p. 28, cf. p. 176), when studies have identified the Ganges River Valley as its place of manufacture. Pliny the Elder had no personal acquaintance with the Indian coasts (p. 63); his knowledge was second-hand at best and depended upon others who visited and reported on these littorals. Gurukkal mentions a Roman fleet destroying pirates in the Indian Ocean under Augustus (p. 239); no such event occurred. Many other factual errors and dubious interpretations, too numerous to list here, detract from the text.

The bibliography is muddled with authorship of some works misattributed (e.g. several entries by Tomber have been assigned to Thapar). It is woefully lacking in important citations, again, especially, but not exclusively, those published in the West, for example Salles and Sedov, *Qani': Le port antique du Ḥaḍramawt entre la Méditerranée, l'Afrique et l'Inde* (2010); Bagnall *et al.*, *Documents from Berenike, Vol. 2* (2005); Peacock and Williams, *Food for the Gods* (2007); Turner, *Roman Coins from India* (1989); Mathews, *Imperial Rome, Indian Ocean Regions and Muziris* (2015); Sidebotham and Wendrich for the 1994–96 and 1999–2000 seasons at Berenike, Sidebotham and Zych for the 2008–09 seasons at Berenike; Bowersock, *The Throne of Adulis: Red Sea Wars on the Eve of Islam* (2013); Peacock and Blue, *The Ancient Red Sea Port of Adulis, Eritrea: Results of the Eritro-British Expedition, 2004–5* (2007); Sinopoli and Parker, *Ancient India in its Wider World* (2008); Zazzaro, *The Ancient Red Sea Port of Adulis and the Eritrean Coastal Region* (2013); Strauch, *Foreign Sailors on Socotra: The Inscriptions and Drawings from the Cave Hoq* (2012); Avanzini *et al.* for volumes on Sumhuram/Khor Rori. Gurukkal misses many other important citations as well.

The misspellings, numerous factual errors and dubious interpretations that mar Gurukkal's effort suggest that no outside referees or editors vetted this manuscript. In some instances, his text requires citations/footnotes, which are missing (e.g. pp. 82, 140, 203–5, 245–8). There are no photos and the maps, while adequate, would be more informative if additional toponyms had been added, but Gurukkal writes primarily for an Indian audience. The book comprises a preface, seven chapters, a bibliography, an index and an author's encomium. Those interested in 'Indo-Roman' commerce should be aware of this book, but great caution should be exercised when reading it.

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Dharmakīrti on the Duality of Objects. *Pramāṇavārttika* III 1–63, by Eli Franco and Miyako Notake, Berlin, LIT Verlag, 2014, 173 pp., €24.90 (paperback), ISBN 978-3-643-90486-7

The book under review is the product of two authors, Eli Franco and Miyako Notake, and consists of an introduction by Franco, a critical edition, an annotated translation, a list of

abbreviations, a bibliography and an index of Sanskrit terms. Its subject is the beginning of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (*PV*), Chapter 3, an elaborate commentary on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (*PS*) 1.2 with its *Vṛtti* (*PSV* 1.1,15–20), which concerns the exact number of the means of knowledge or valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) forming the first part of the introduction to the main topic of the chapter on perception (*pratyakṣa*). While Dignāga's statements are short and apodictic,¹ not even hinting at any of the background problems involved (cf. Franco, p. 2), Dharmakīrti's 'commentary' (in *PV* 3.1–122) is 'the first organised explanation in the Buddhist epistemological school of the differences between the two kinds of object'.² And while Dignāga's 'final words' cannot be fleshed out because possibly-related earlier works of his are lost,³ Dharmakīrti's comments and discussions occasionally refer to concepts that had conceivably already been developed to some extent by opponents during the pre-Dignāgean period. This can be seen through his elaborate interpretations, with various objections and arguments for their rejection. These can hardly be understood without assuming a lively, ongoing polemical context, although such a context is hardly attested beyond the attacks on Dignāga of the Mīmāṃsaka Kumāriḷa and the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara.

The topic of the section chosen by the authors (*PV* 3.1–63) is indicated in its first two stanzas, *PV* 3.1–2: the fact that there are two means of knowledge because there are two objects, and an explanation why these are two.

With regard to this idea, namely, that the initial stanzas provide the whole section's structure, the authors are already of different opinions, and such differences occur throughout the book regarding a number of both major and minor structural as well as philological points. This is not at all surprising when considering the difficulties of the text at hand. Since the pioneering work of Hiromasa Tosaki, who produced an edition of the entire chapter together with an annotated Japanese translation (1979–85), and a few articles by others on individual or small groups of stanzas, the present book is the first new interpretation of this section using the available manuscripts and taking advantage of the progress that has been achieved in recent decades in the understanding of Dharmakīrti. The solution found to accommodate such differences is fair enough and clear: the introduction was written by Franco alone, but he refers to and explains Notake's different conceptions, and her deviations are also clearly documented wherever they occur.

The text is based on the hitherto printed editions of the *PV* compared with the only presently-available manuscript as well as two manuscripts of Prajñākaragupta's commentary that also contain, one only partly, the *PV* text. In addition to the critical apparatus, a separate apparatus offers citations in other sources. The variant readings found in the direct commentaries by Devendrabuddhi (only in Tibetan), Prajñākaragupta, Ravigupta (only in Tibetan) and Manorathanandin (only in Sanskrit), cited or implied by in-text lemmata, are also taken into consideration throughout. The Tibetan translations of the *PV* and of Ravigupta's commentary with embedded stanzas are added on the basis of the Peking and Derge versions. Within the section dealt with here, the text offered differs from Tosaki's edition of 1979 in only seven places.

Added to the presentation of the text are a translation and rich annotations. The translation includes explanatory words and passages in brackets that provide implied meanings, thus

1. 'Perception and inference are the means of knowledge. These are precisely two because object of a means of knowledge are the two characteristics. For other than the particular and the universal there is no object', cf. E. Steinkellner (ed.), 'Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chapter 1' (April 2005), 1.15–19 [http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf, accessed 18 April 2017].


2. Miyako Notake, 'Dharmakīrti's Argument over the Universal in the Third Chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*', vv. 11–50, in *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, Vol. 59, no. 3 (2011), p. 1245 (referring to stanzas 11–33).

3. Here, one might mention his *Sāmānyaparīkṣā* and the polemical treatises *Nyāya-*, *Vaiśeṣika-* and *Sāṅkhyaparīkṣā*.

allowing the text's terse and elliptic formulations to be intelligibly read in accordance with the interpretation of the authors. The annotations not only discuss the readings found in the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, but also provide a comprehensive survey of the interpretations in the commentaries and other relevant sources. The text's statements and arguments are explained in their logical connection and placed, as far as is possible, within the wider historical context. When necessary, the choice between one and the other interpretation as found in the commentaries is clearly explained. Because Prajñākaragupta, the author of the most extensive commentary, often provides alternative interpretations, the authors sometimes abstain from deciding, thus leaving room for a future, final interpretation, if this is at all possible. Certainly an indisputable merit of these notes is the fact that they include a collection of all later comments from the Buddhist side that can be associated with these stanzas of Dharmakīrti. Moreover, the authors clearly indicate which of these they follow and why. Without the commentaries, we would often be at a loss trying to grasp Dharmakīrti's meaning precisely.

We also have, however, the well-known long digression on concept-formation and the universal in the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV 1.40–185) with a *Vṛtti* by Dharmakīrti. As a whole, it is still only quickly accessible in Frauwallner's German translation of 1932 and 1933 with detailed explanations on the basis of the accompanying *Vṛtti* and Śākyabuddhi's *Ṭikā*. While Frauwallner's translation and explanations are entirely based on the Tibetan translations of these works, because of their particularly good quality Frauwallner's interpretations are remarkably accurate even when compared with the now-available Sanskrit texts. In the broad elaboration of the topics in Chapter 1, definitely prior to the composition of PV Chapter 3, various aspects of the text dealt with here are touched upon as well. In future research, some of the questions raised in the introduction (e.g., p. 20f.), with regard to Dharmakīrti's ideas on concept-formation, may benefit from an in-depth consideration, including as well his earliest deliberations and discussions. And some of the questions raised that here have no answer offered by Dharmakīrti that is deemed philosophically satisfactory, may eventually be answered by future research or, if not, will have to be left open if even the always silently-presupposed wider Buddhist conceptual context cannot provide one.

Notwithstanding the unsolved interpretational differences between the two authors, as an interpretation of the beginning section of this huge chapter on perception by Dharmakīrti, the book is a most interesting blend of philological acuity and philosophical penetration moved along by inevitably-arising questions.

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