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HEFT 58

**THE ROLE OF THE EXAMPLE (*DRṢṬĀNTA*)
IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LOGIC**

EDITED BY

SHORYU KATSURA

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gTsañ nag pa on Similar/Dissimilar Instances and Examples

Pascale Hugon, Lausanne

When explaining the *trairūpya*, that is the three characteristics presented by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as a definition of a valid logical reason, Buddhist logicians in the Tibetan tradition usually proceed by first defining three “bases of dependence” (*ltos gzi*)¹ on which the three characteristics are grounded. These three bases of dependence are respectively: the subject (*phyogs, pakṣa*), which is the basis for the establishment of the first characteristic, i.e., the fact that the logical reason is a property of the subject (*phyogs chos, pakṣadharmā[tā]*), similar instances (*mthun phyogs, sapa-kṣa*), which constitute the basis for the establishment of the pervasion of the logical reason by the property to be proved (*rjes su 'gro ba'i khyab, anvayavyāpti*), worded in terms of the reason's presence only in similar instances, and dissimilar instances (*mi mthun phyogs, vipakṣa*), on the basis of which one establishes the negative pervasion (*ldog pa'i khyab, vyatirekavyāpti*) or the reason's complete absence from dissimilar instances.

A divergence of opinion arose among Tibetan interpreters of Dharmakīrti's texts with regard to the definition of similar and dis-

¹ This term can be found already in rÑog lo tsā ba's *Tshad ma rnam ñes kyi dka' gnas rnam bśad* (rNam bśad) and is used systematically by gTsañ nag pa, Sa skya Pañḍita and his commentators, as well as in the later *bsdus grwa* tradition. I have not found any correspondence for this term in Indian texts.

similar instances, leading to numerous controversies. As a consequence of these different definitions, their classification of knowables in the context of a particular inference also differed. One can distinguish two opposing positions that I will term “the three-*pakṣa* view” and the “two-*pakṣa* view”. The three-*pakṣa* view is supported mainly by Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251) and followers of the *Tshad ma Rigs pa'i gter* (Rigs gter). As a quick outline: followers of the three-*pakṣa* view hold that knowables are to be divided into three distinct *pakṣa*: similar instances (*sapakṣa*), dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*), and a third *pakṣa* consisting of instances for which the possession of the property to be proved is not determined. The subject is to be found in this third *pakṣa*, because its qualification by the property to be proved is questioned; if it is to remain an object of doubt, it cannot be classified as either a similar or a dissimilar instance. On the contrary, for subscribers to the two-*pakṣa* view, all knowables are classifiable in exactly two directly contradictory *pakṣa*: instances possessing the property to be proved on the one hand, and instances that do not possess it on the other. The subject, although constituting a distinct basis of dependence (*ltos gzi*), does not constitute a distinct *pakṣa*, but must be classified in either *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*.

The difference between these two views might appear as a minor one, but it actually reveals much about the understanding of the inferential process by the respective proponents. In particular, because *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are used as bases of dependence for the second and third characteristics, the way they are defined influences the whole account of the ascertainment of these two characteristics, including the question of their logical equivalence. It also has an impact on technical points such as the interpretation of the fallacy arising in the case of “uncertain not-common logical reasons” (*asādhāraṇānikāntikahetu*), as was already shown by Til-

lemans in his article titled “On *Sapakṣa*”², which contrasts Sa skya Pañḍita’s three-*pakṣa* view with the two-*pakṣa* view of post-Sa pañ dGe lugs pa scholars. This article also shows how the latter’s view, albeit considered by modern scholars as “unorthodox”, actually finds support in Dharmakīrti’s writings.

In the tenth chapter of the Rigs gter, which deals with inference for oneself (*rañ don rjes dpag, svārthānumāna*), Sa skya Pañḍita devotes long sections to the presentation and refutation of the opposing two-*pakṣa* view. Sa skya Pañḍita himself does not identify his opponent(s) by name, and commentators merely state that the opposing view is that of most Tibetan logicians³. His account of the opponent’s position is based on the presentation found in gTsañ nag pa’s *Tshad ma rnam par nes pa’i ṭi ka legs bsad bsdus pa* (bsDus pa) and mTshur ston’s *Tshad ma śes rab sgron ma* (sGron ma)⁴. As such, the gTsañ nag pa-mTshur ston view appears to be

² TILLEMANS 1990.

³ Only Glo bo mkhan chen identifies the opponent as gTsañ nag pa (Ñi ma 216: *slob dpon gTsañ nag pa la sogs pa’i bod dag*). Go rams pa says: “most Tibetans” (gSal byed 93a3: *bod phal cher*), Śākya mchog ldan: “Tibetan logicians” (Rol mtsho 104a4: *bod kyi rtog ge pa rnams*). In Pham byed, he never makes reference to gTsañ nag pa, but quotes several passages showing that Phya pa Chos kyi señ ge also subscribed to a two-*pakṣa* view.

⁴ On gTsañ nag pa brTson ’grus señ ge (12th century) – one of the eight great disciples of Phya pa Chos kyi señ ge (1109-1169) – and mTshur ston gZon nu señ ge (1150-1210), who was one of Sa skya Pañḍita’s first teachers on *pramāṇa*, see JACKSON 1987: 104-107 and VAN DER KUIJP 1983 and 1989. On sGron ma, see VAN DER KUIJP 1993: 287-289. I am very thankful to Prof. van der Kuijp who made a copy of mTshur ston’s text available to me. As far as the passages taken into consideration below are concerned, mTshur ston’s text appears to be mainly a reformulation of gTsañ nag pa’s tenets. sGron ma’s formulation is usually clearer
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especially representative of the Tibetan two-*pakṣa* view before and during Sa skya Paṇḍita’s time, and since both bsDus pa and sGron ma are extant, we can have a detailed account of this theory that does not rely exclusively on Rigs gter’s presentation. The views of pre-Sa paṅ logicians such as gTsañ nag pa and mTshur ston must have played an important role in the early phase of the development of Tibetan epistemology. Also, their texts contain original interpretations of Dharmakīrti as well as innovative ideas that cannot be traced back to Indian texts. The question of their influence on the later Tibetan tradition, in particular on the authors of post-Sa paṅ *bsdus grwa* – who are generally considered to follow Phya pa’s ideas – remains yet to be answered.

My goal here is to present some material that should contribute to a better understanding of the place of gTsañ nag pa among Dharmakīrti’s interpreters on questions linked with inference, and in particular with the *trairūpya*. As background information, I will start with a presentation of gTsañ nag pa’s definition of similar and dissimilar instances, and of the way knowables are to be classified as one or the other, leading to a clarification of notions such as “being a *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*” and “being present in *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*”. Then, turning to the question of the ascertainment of the second and third characteristics, I present gTsañ nag pa’s ideas on the nature and function of similar (*mithun dpe, sādharmanyadrṣṭānta*) and dissimilar examples (*mi mithun dpe, vaidharmanyadrṣṭānta*). In particular, I show their importance in the context of “uncertain not-common” (*thun moñ ma yin pa ma ñes pa, asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) logical reasons and examine why, in this context, gTsañ nag pa in

and more detailed than bsDus pa. Nevertheless, some parts of gTsañ nag pa’s text do not find an equivalent in sGron ma. As far as the content is concerned, Rigs gter presents a view common to both gTsañ nag pa and mTshur ston, but from the specific choice of arguments or examples, it appears that Sa skya Paṇḍita’s account in Rigs gter is closer to sGron ma.

point of fact resorts to using *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* not including the subject. I then argue that the two-*pakṣa* and the three-*pakṣa* views, although they appear, and intend to be, irreconcilable, actually have to deal with the same problem, namely the question of avoiding the fallacy of *siddhasādhana* (i.e., proving something that is already established) while ascertaining a universally valid necessary connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved, and that they solve it using similar means, in particular resorting to examples.

gTsañ nag pa’s definition of similar and dissimilar instances

Dharmakīrti’s definition of similar and dissimilar instances as found in PVin or NB⁵ – namely what is similar/dissimilar to the subject (*pakṣa*) on account of possessing the universal which is the property to be proved (*sādhya-dharma*) – that Sa skya Pañḍita will use to support his own definition – is accepted by gTsañ nag pa only as a definition of similar and dissimilar instances in an “etymological sense” (*sgra’i don*)⁶. As for “real” *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, they are defined using the following verse:

⁵ PVin 3 D4211 [Ce 202a2], cited in DhPr 98,9: *sādhya-dharma-sāmānyena samānaḥ pakṣaḥ sapakṣas tadabhāvo ’sapakṣaḥ*. NB 2.7-8=NP 2.2: *sādhya-dharmasāmānyena samāno ’rthaḥ sapakṣaḥ | na sapakṣo ’sapakṣaḥ* / See TILLEMANS 1990: 58-59 for the diverse interpretations of this definition.

⁶ The “etymological definitions” accounted for in bsDus pa 92a3-5 are: *mthun phyogs ni sa pha kṣa ces pa phyogs btags pa ba rtsod g’zi dañ bsgrub bya’i chos kyis ’dra ba* and *mi mthun phyogs ni a sa pha kṣa ces pa rtsod g’zi dañ bsgrub bya’i chos kyis ’dra ba myed pa* (sGron ma 37b2-4: *phyogs btags pa ba rtsod g’zi’ chos can dañ bsgrub bya’i chos yod du mthun pa* and *phyogs dañ bsgrub bya’i chos yod du mi mthun pa*).

sapakṣa/vipakṣa etymologically speaking and real *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* are then explained to stand in a *mu gsum* relation (although mTshur ston ar-
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*bsgrub bya'i chos ldan mi ldan las | mthun phyogs mi mthun
phyogs su brjod* [sGron ma: 'dod]

[An instance] is said to be a similar instance (*sapakṣa*) or a dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*) on account of possessing or not possessing the property to be proved.

Although its author is not identified by name in the text, this verse can be recognized as Ratnākaraśānti's definition as termed in the *Antarvyāptisamarthana*⁷.

gues that *vipakṣa* stand in a *mu b'zi* relation). The following examples are given: For *sapakṣa*: both “etymological” and real: a similar example; neither: a dissimilar example; real but not etymological: the subject (because it is not similar to itself). For *vipakṣa*: both “etymological” and real: dissimilar example; neither: similar example; etymological but not real: the subject.

Note that this distinction is already made by Phya pa in terms of *sgra bśad pa* and *mtshan ñid yod pa* (cf. Pham byed 27a1-4: *Rigs pa'i dbaṅ phyug phya pa ni 'di ltar b'zed de [...]* *mthun phyogs kyi mtshan ñid kyaṅ yod la sgra bśad pa'aṅ yod pa ni | sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa na bum pa lta bu'o || mtshan ñid yod kyaṅ sgra bśad pa med pa sgra rtag par sgrub pa na nam mkha' la sogs pa lta bu'o || gñis ka med pa sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa na nam mkha' lta bu'o || sgra bśad yod la mtshan ñid med pa ni mi srid pa ñid do || mi mthun pa'i phyogs la'aṅ de ltar b'zed do ||*)

This distinction is made by later dGe lugs pa authors such as 'Jam dbyaṅs b'zad pa and Yoṅ 'dzin in their *rTags rigs* using the term *sgra bśad du 'jug gi mthun phyogs* for “*sapakṣa* etymologically speaking”. See TILLEMANS 1990: 56.

⁷ AVS 100,4-5,101,4-7: *matau sapakṣāsapakṣau sādhyadharmayutāyutau | bsgrub bya'i chos ldan mi ldan las | mthun phyogs mi mthun phyogs su 'dod*. Translated in KAJIYAMA 1999: 127: “What is possessed of a probandum is regarded to be a similar case, and what is not possessed of it a dissimilar case.”

This citation is identified as such in Rañ 'grel 272: *kha cig slob dpon śānti pa'i rjes su 'braṅs nas bsgrub bya'i chos daṅ ldan pa mthun phyogs | mi ldan pa mi mthun phyogs 'zes zer la |*. Śākya mchog ldan →

As a consequence of this definition, knowables will be divided into two *pakṣa*, according to whether they are *bsgrub bya'i chos ldan* (possessing the property to be proved) or *bsgrub bya'i chos mi ldan* (not possessing the property to be proved). When explaining the meaning of *ldan*, gTsañ nag pa introduces an original feature that is already found in Phya pa's texts, but does not seem to have a source in Indian texts: gTsañ nag pa distinguishes two types of properties to be proved, namely properties of a substance (*rdzas pa'i chos*) – also termed properties based on a substance (*rdzas la rten pa'i chos*) – and properties of a distinguisher (*ldog pa'i chos*) – also termed properties based on a distinguisher (*ldog la rten pa'i chos*).⁸ In doing so, he distinguishes three ways in which an in-

mentions that this definition was already used by Phya pa (Pham byed 25b3: *Rigs pa'i dbañ phyug phyu pa ni | bsgrub bya'i chos dañ ldan pa dañ | mi ldan pa zes gsuñ la*). As will be shown below, gTsañ nag pa is not really a “follower of Ratnākaraśānti”, for he does not agree with Ratnākaraśānti on the major question of *antarvyāpti*, nor on the explanation of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*. One can wonder why he would be quoting Ratnākaraśānti's definition if he disagreed with the main tenets of his view. One answer could be that gTsañ nag pa felt that quoting an Indian author instead of introducing a personal definition would bring a note of authenticity to his position.

⁸ The notions of *rdzas* and *ldog pa* are first introduced by gTsañ nag pa in the section dealing with definitions (i.e., *mtshan gzi – mtshon bya – mtshan ñid*). gTsañ nag pa's definitions of these notions are the following:

bsDus pa 15a7: *ldog pa'i chos rnams 'bral mi śes par 'dus pa'i don ni de dag gi rdzas su brjod ciñ 'dus ba can gyi chos rnams ldog par brjod pa yin te khrab dañ byañ bu bzin no |* (sGron ma 14a6: *'dir rdzas dañ ldog pa chos [read: ces] bya ba'i don gzi' cig gi steñ du chos du ma 'bral mi śes par 'dus pa 'am tshogs pa ni rdzas yin la | 'dus pa can gi chos kha yar ba ni ldog pa yin te dper na khrab dañ khrab kyi byañ bu bzin no |*) →

stance can be said to “possess” (*ldan*) a property, that I will call modes of proof⁹:

If the property to be proved is a property of a substance (*rdzas chos*), there are two modes of proof. In the first one, the property is distinct (*tha dad*) from the subject. One proves the presence of the property to be proved on the locus of the subject (thus using the Tibetan verb *yod*), and subject and property stand in a relation described as “[constituting] a unique substantial aggregate” (*rdzas tshogs pa gcig*). A typical example of this is the proof of fire on the mountain by means of the logical reason “smoke”. Mountain and

rdzas must be seen as a kind of aggregate formed of different parts that would be the *ldog pa*, just as, in the example, a coat of mail (*khraḥ*) is formed by the juxtaposition of iron rings (*byañ bu*). This seems to amount to a distinction between the concrete and the abstract, but gTsañ nag pa’s description of these two notions remains unclear and displays notable differences with the account of *rdzas* and *ldog pa* found in later *bsdus grwa* manuals, that identify *rdzas* with *dños po* (entity) and *don byed nus pa* (causally efficient), and *ldog pa* with ultimately unreal, mind-created concepts. Indeed, in *bsDus pa*, *rdzas* is said to be different from *dños po* (entity) and *rañ dbañ du grub pa* (self-established). While keeping in mind these differences, I will translate *rdzas* by “substance”, and *ldog pa* by “distinguisher”. (Note also that in later *bsdus grwa* manuals the distinction between *rdzas* and *ldog pa* is not used in the context of inference. For an account of these notions in later Tibetan textbooks, see ONODA 1980 and 1992: 54, 140-141, and DREYFUS 1997.)

⁹ Cf. Rañ ’grel p. 273 that introduces gTsañ nag pa’s distinction in terms of *bsgrub pa’i tshul*. The formulation of the different modes of proof as well as examples found in *bsDus pa* 88b6 and 89a2 (sGron ma 35a5-7) are parallel to the presentation of three “modes of definition” (*mtshon pa’i tshul*) in *bsDus pa* 15b3-4 (sGron ma 14a9-b3). In that earlier passage the notions of *mtshan gži*, *mtshon bya*, *mtshan ñid* in the process of defining (*mtshon pa*) play a role completely parallel to those of *rtsod gži*, *sgrub bya’i chos*, *rtags* in the process of a proof (*bsgrub pa*) by inference.

fire are two distinct substances forming a unique aggregate. Accordingly, all the bases forming a unique aggregate with fire – as for instance a kitchen – are said to possess the property to be proved and are therefore similar instances, and those which do not – such as lakes – are dissimilar instances.

The second mode of proof is the case where the property is identical (*gcig*) with the subject. One proves that the subject has a certain nature (thus using the Tibetan verb *yin*), for instance when one proves that sound is impermanent. There, subject and property to be proved stand in a relation of substantial identity (*rdzas cig*).

The third mode of proof takes place when the property to be proved is a property of a distinguisher (*ldog pa'i chos*). The predicative relation explained in terms of “being based on the own distinguisher (*rañ ldog*)” is also presented, by analogy with the case of distinct substances, in terms of the distinguishers constituting a unique aggregate (*ldog pa tshogs pa cig*)¹⁰. This technical formulation is usually replaced in the examples by the idea of the “own distinguisher” of the subject being suitable for the conventional designation expressed by the property to be proved. So for example when proving that “emptiness is a simple negation”, what is aimed at is to prove that emptiness can have the designation “simple negation” (*ston pa ñid med dgag gi tha sñad du ruñ*).

Accordingly, the general interpretation of *ldan* (alternatively *rten*) is that an instance possesses the property to be proved if “the prop-

¹⁰ What one is proving is literally that the subject “is that distinguisher” (*ldog pa der bsgrub*), or that the property is based on the subject as “own distinguisher” (*rañ ldog*). Cf. DREYFUS 1997: 182, and p.501, n. 39: “The own distinguisher (also called the general distinguisher, *spyi ldog*) is the conceptual identity of the thing and equivalent to the distinguisher of that thing.”

erty to be proved is based on [this] base like it is based on the subject”.¹¹

The classification of knowables

The basic tenet of the two-*pakṣa* view held by gTsañ nag pa is that there are only two *pakṣa*, meaning that all knowables are either *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*, which is expressed by saying that all knowables can be classified in the two *pakṣa*¹². By showing that *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are directly contradictory (*dños 'gal*), one guarantees that what does not belong to one of them belongs to the other, and vice-versa. There is, therefore, no possibility of having instances which constitute a third *pakṣa* (or *phuñ gsum*), be it a “positive *pakṣa*” (*bsgrub phyogs*, something that is both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*) or a

¹¹ bsDus pa 88b6: *gzi gañ la rtsod gzi' la ji ltar bsgrub par bya ba'i chos de ltar rten pa* (sGron ma 35a5: *rtsod gzi' la bsgrub bya'i chos ji ltar bsgrub lugs ltar ldan pa yin*). The expressions *bsgrub tshul dañ mthun par* “in keeping with the mode of proof” or *'god tshul dañ mthun par* “in keeping with the mode of presentation” are often found in definitions in later Tibetan manuals (for example Yoñ 'dzins's rTags rigs, respectively p.19 and p.23). No specific explanation is ever offered in those texts on what these modes of proof are. I think that gTsañ nag pa's distinction of the three modes of proof arising from his general interpretation of *ldan* could be the source of this formulation. Since later Tibetan scholars do not retain the distinction between *rdzas* and *ldog pa* in this context, the issue of “keeping with the mode of proof” comes down to distinguishing cases where the property to be proved is identical with the subject (verb *yin*) and where it is distinct from the subject (verb *yod*) (cf. TILLEMANS 1990: 69, n. 21).

¹² I use the expression “classification of knowables into two *pakṣa*” to translate *phyogs gñis su ses bya kha tshon chod pa*. In fact *kha tshon chod pa* conveys the meaning of “determining”, but it will be shown later that it does not have the same import as *ñes pa* or *grub* as far as the idea of establishment is concerned.

“negative *pakṣa*” (*dgag phyogs*, something that is neither *sapakṣa* nor *vipakṣa*).

gTsañ nag pa uses the above-mentioned distinction between *rdzas* and *ldog pa* to overcome difficulties caused by the classification of problematic instances.¹³ Indeed, the main characteristic of substances (*rdzas*) and distinguishers (*ldog pa*) is that a singular substance cannot be qualified by both a “property of a substance” (*rdzas chos*) and its opposite, and that a singular distinguisher cannot be qualified by both a property of a distinguisher and its opposite.¹⁴ It follows that, when proving a property of a substance, all substances will necessarily belong to one or the other *pakṣa*, for with regard to a singular substance, only one of two opposite prop-

¹³ gTsañ nag pa’s opponent presents cases that cannot be classified in exclusively one *pakṣa*. For example “pot” in the proof that smoke is a valid logical reason, or “simple knowable” in the proof that sound is impermanent. Cf. bsDus pa 90a3 (sGron ma 36a7).

¹⁴ The clearest account of these characteristics is found in sGron ma 14a7: *rdzas chos dañ ldog chos ces bya ba’i don yan de dañ de min gñis gži’ rdzas cig la ’gal na ni rdzas la rten pa’i chos yin te | dper na sño mi sño dañ rtag mi rtag la sogs pa’o || de dañ de min gñis ldog pa cig la ’gal na ni ldog pa la rten pa’i chos yin te | dper na gtan tshigs dañ mtshan ñid dañ med dgag dañ ma yin dgag la sogs pa’o |* (bsDus pa 15a7: *de lta yin dañ skye ’jig la sogs pa’i ldog pa ’ga’ zig ni rdzas la rten pa’i chos yin te de dañ de ma yin rdzas cig la mi ruñ pa’i phyir ro || sgrub bya dañ gtan tshigs la sogs pa ’ga’ zig ni ldog pa la rten pa’i chos yin te ldog pa tha dad na rdzas gcig la’añ ruñ pa’i phyir ro*)

“And also the meaning of *rdzas chos* and *ldog chos* is the following: if being [x] and not being [x] are contradictory for a unique substantial basis, [x] is a property based on a substance, like for instance blue and not blue, permanent and impermanent, etc. If being [x] and not being [x] are contradictory for a singular distinguisher, [x] is a property based on a distinguisher, for instance ‘logical reason’, ‘defining characteristic’, ‘simple negation’, ‘negation with positive implication’, etc.”

erties can qualify the substance. The same reasoning is applied in parallel to the case of properties of a distinguisher (*ldog pa'i chos*). In doing so, gTsañ nag pa finds a firm grounding for his claim that the two *pakṣa* are directly contradictory. On the other hand, he is bound to make a concession on the basic proposition that **all** knowables are classifiable into two *pakṣa*, in order to disclaim the opponent's objection that since there is no contradiction in having two opposite properties of a distinguisher (*ldog chos*) qualifying one substance, when one proves the property of a distinguisher, some substances could constitute a "positive *pakṣa*" (*bsgrub phyogs*), and that inversely, when proving the property of a substance (*rdzas chos*), some distinguishers could constitute a "negative *pakṣa*" (*dgag phyogs*). gTsañ nag pa overcomes this objection by saying that when proving a property of a substance, only substances have to be classified, while distinguishers do not have to be classified since one is not affirming or negating a distinguisher. Correspondingly, in the case of the proof of a property of a distinguisher, only distinguishers have to be classified.¹⁵ The instances that are not of the same type as the subject (i.e., *rdzas* or *ldog pa*) will then be considered to be outside the scope of the classification without ac-

¹⁵ bsDus pa 90a5: *de la 'dir me dañ mi rtag pa la sogs pa rdzas la rten pa'i chos bsgrub pa'i tshe rañ gi rten rdzas la kha tshon gcod pa na dños po dañ ses bya rten pa'i rdzas gsum pa myed la | ldog pa gñi gar 'du ba mi 'gal te ldog pa dgag sgrub mi byed pa'i phyir ro || [...] gtan tshigs la sogs pa ldog pa la rten pa'i chos sgrub pa'i tshe rten ldog pa kha tshon gcod pa na ldog pa gsum pa med la rdzas gñi gar 'du ba mi 'gal te rdzas dgag sgrub mi byed pa'i phyir ro ||* (Parallel passage in sGron ma 36a7-36b2)

Śākya mchog ldan (Pham byed 31a3) shows that this solution was already proposed by Phya pa, but while in gTsañ nag pa's text, emphasis is put on the fact that instances with a different nature from the property to be proved do not **have to** be classified, Phya pa points out that the main reason is that there are problematic cases that **cannot** be classified.

quiring the status of distinct *pakṣa*. This concession has the consequence that the notions of pervasion and contradiction also will have to be interpreted in relation to a referential (the domain of substances or distinguishers) instead of universally.

Within each type of proof (i.e., *rdzas* or *ldog pa*), the subject and the property to be proved as well as the logical reason also have to be classified.¹⁶ As far as the subject is concerned, it is always a similar instance; this is easy to understand, for the possession of the property to be proved by the subject is a necessary condition for the thesis to be established. In the proof of the property of a substance, the property to be proved must be a similar instance. This is because properties of a substance are always homological, that is always qualify themselves.¹⁷ As a consequence, a valid logical reason

¹⁶ Properties of a substance are themselves substances and properties of a distinguisher are themselves distinguishers.

¹⁷ On the question of heterological/homological properties, note the parallel with the definitions of *rdzas chos* and *ldog chos* given in Yoñs 'dzin bsDus grwa: *rdzas chos: khyod khyod rañ yin, khyod ma yin pa khyod ma yin. ldog chos: khyod khyod rañ ma yin pa'am khyod ma yin de khyod yin pa gañ ruñ yin pa*. See ONODA 1992: 54.

To account for the fact that something, although not literally speaking “based on itself”, can be said to possess the property it itself is, gTsañ nag pa introduces a new interpretation of *ldan*, namely that when two terms are in a relation of predication, both the basis that possesses the property (*ldan gži*) and the property possessed (*ldan chos*) can be said to be *ldan*. bsDus pa 89a2 (sGron ma 35a7): *ldan pa'i brjod byar yañ rten pa rten chos gñi ga yañ 'dus pa yin te | gži 'am chos rkyañ pa la ldan pa'i sgra mi 'jug pa'i phyir ro || des na bsgrub bya'i chos rañ la rañ ldog gñis pa mi rten yañ rañ ñid ldan chos yin pas ldan pa'i brjod bya las ma 'das pa ñid do ||*

in the proof of the property of a substance will also always be a similar instance. Indeed, if it were a dissimilar instance, the fact that it qualifies itself would lead to the fallacy that the logical reason qualifies a dissimilar instance, in other words is present in *vipakṣa*, which would contradict the third characteristic.

On the other hand, properties of distinguishers can be either homological or heterological. Accordingly, the property to be proved, as well as the logical reason can be either a *sapakṣa* or a *vipakṣa*. There are thus four possible configurations.¹⁸ There, many controversies arise because the opponent wrongly identifies the logical reason “being a *sapakṣa* (or *vipakṣa*)” and “being present in *sapakṣa* (or *vipakṣa*)”.¹⁹ The pointed fallacies can be avoided by

bsDus pa 90a3 (sGron ma 35b9): *bsgrub bya'i chos ni sbyor ba thams cad la mthun pa'i phyogs kho na ste ldan chos ldan par 'du ba'i phyir ro ||*

¹⁸ For instance if one proves that something is a simple negation (*med dgag*), the property to be proved, *med dgag*, is heterological and hence a *vipakṣa*. If one proves that something is a negation with a positive implication (*ma yin dgag*), the property to be proved, *ma yin dgag*, is homological and hence a *sapakṣa*. As for the logical reason, for instance the logical reason *sgrub chos dor ba* that proves *med dgag*, it is itself a simple negation and hence a *sapakṣa*, but the logical reason *med dgag gi tha sñad kyi stoñ pa* proving *ma yin dgag* is a *vipakṣa*, because it is not itself *ma yin dgag*.

¹⁹ One finds numerous examples of such controversies. For instance in bsDus pa 91a, an opponent argues that in the case of the property to be proved *med dgag* (simple negation), which is heterological and therefore a *vipakṣa*, there can be no *anvaya* since the logical reason must be excluded from *vipakṣa*. gTsañ nag pa's answer is that although the logical reason does not qualify *med dgag* – which is a *vipakṣa* – it qualifies that which possesses the property *med dgag* (i.e., what is a *sapakṣa*) in the same way that it qualifies the subject and therefore there is *anvaya*. Also, →

remembering that, for the logical reason, “being present in *sapakṣa*” really means “to qualify a similar instance like it qualifies the subject”. Thus for instance the so-called “uncertain common logical reasons” (*sādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu*) do not constitute, as the opponent maintains, a “positive *pakṣa*” (*bsgrub phyogs*), because although they do qualify similar as well as dissimilar instances, and are therefore “present in *sapakṣa* and in *vipakṣa*”, they are themselves either similar or dissimilar instances. If this is clear in the case of the proof of the property of a distinguisher, it remains problematic when proving the property of a substance, for we have seen that since properties of substances are homological, “being a *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*” is linked with “being present in *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*”. The impossibility of a “positive *pakṣa*” (*bsgrub phyogs*) is guaranteed theoretically by the characteristic of *rdzas* mentioned above; still, uncertain subjects and logical reasons are said to be *ci rigs pa* (either), i.e., they are not exclusively *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*. gTsañ nag pa adopts two strategies to bypass the rule that a unique substance cannot be qualified by opposite properties. The first one is to deny the status of unique substance to the problematic instance, the second is to consider distinct aspects of a unique sub-

for instance, logical reasons can be *vipakṣa* without being necessarily present in *vipakṣa*.

The idea of conformity with the mode of proof is important, for a logical reason can occur in *vipakṣa* although not in the way it is presented with regard to the subject. For instance when proving that “produced” is a logical reason to prove sound’s impermanence because it fulfils three characteristics, the logical reason “three characteristics” is included in “knowable” (*śes bya*), which is a *vipakṣa*. As such, it does occur in *vipakṣa*, but since it does not qualify *vipakṣa* in the way it qualifies the subject, there is no fault in the establishment of *vyatireka*.

stance so that each of the opposite properties will apply to a different “ground” (*ltos sa/yul*).²⁰

²⁰ The first strategy is applied to “knowable” (*śes bya*) in the proof that sound is impermanent. *śes bya* (alternatively *g’zal bya*) cannot be considered to be a unique substance, because it is only a similar concept (*ldog mtshuñs*) superimposed on a plurality of substances. So *śes bya* does not have to be exclusively *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa* and still constitutes a case of *sādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu* in the proof that sound is impermanent because it qualifies both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* in the way it qualifies the subject. (bsDus pa 90a2: *ma grub pa dañ ma ñes pa’i g’zi rtags ni ci rigs par ’du ste | de yañ chos la khyab ches pa’i spyi ldog g’zi rtags su ’god pa’i chos ni rdzas la rten pa’i ldog mtshuñs rnam mthun pa dañ mi mthun pa’i phyogs gñis su ’gyur bar blta’o || [...] 90a5: de la ’dir me dañ mi rtag pa la sogs pa rdzas la rten pa’i chos bsgrub pa’i tshe rañ gi rten rdzas la kha tshon gcod pa na dños po dañ śes bya rten pa’i rdzas gsum pa myed la | [...] śes bya tsam gyi rdzas ni du ma ñid yin te ldog mtshuñs sgro btags pa’i gcig la rdzas kyi spyi med pa’i phyir ro ||)*

The second strategy is applied with regard to an uncertain subject. The example given in bsDus pa 90b3 is far from clear: inference (*rjes dpag*) is said to be a substance that cannot be classified when proving “is a direct perception”, because it is both *mñon sum* and *mñon sum ma yin*. The opponent’s objection (using “a cognition consisting of the appearance of two moons” (*zla ba gñis snañ gi śes pa*) as the subject) is dealt with more clearly in sGron ma: “‘Being a direct perception’ (*mñon sum yin*) and ‘not being a direct perception’ (*mñon sum ma yin*) are absolutely not contradictory when considering two distinct ‘spheres’ (*yul tha dad*). When considering a unique ‘sphere’ (*yul cig*) in the case of a singular substance, there is a contradiction. Nevertheless even when considering a unique sphere, we can determine it [as *sapakṣa* and/or *vipakṣa*] because it is a substance that is not a direct perception – i.e., a *vipakṣa* – when considering the two moons (*zla ba gñis la ltos nas*) which are seized in that way, but it is a substance that is a direct perception – i.e., a *sapakṣa* – when considering the nature of cognition (*śes pa’i ño bo la ltos nas*). Similarly, ‘being a cause’ and ‘not being a cause’ and ‘being an effect’ and ‘not being an effect’ are contradictory with regard to a unique

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Efforts aiming at the classification of the subject, the logical reason and the property to be proved, as well as problematical instances, are made in order to guarantee the elimination of doubt when it comes to the ascertainment of *anvaya*- and *vyatirekavyāpti*. This is the reason why gTsañ nag pa's primary claim is that **all** knowables must be classified. As we have seen above, the initial distinction between *rdzas* and *ldog pa* turns out to be of major importance, because it divides the universe of discourse into two distinct levels that do not intermix as far as inference is concerned. When proving the property of a substance, one will deal only with substances and their properties, and when proving the property of a distinguisher, one will deal only with distinguishers and their properties. One will thus always consider a domain where the law of excluded middle applies, allowing a strict bipartition of its members that guarantees that no case will be left out when *anvaya*- and *vyatirekavyāpti* are ascertained, and that these two are logically equivalent.

Having clarified the nature and definition of similar and dissimilar instances, which were presented as the bases of dependence (*ltos gzi*) of the positive and negative pervasion, I now turn to questions related to the ascertainment of the second and third characteristics, introducing the notion of examples.

substance, but it must be understood that, although they are contradictory when considering a unique 'ground of reference' (*ltos sa cig la ltos nas*), they are not contradictory with regard to a unique substance when considering distinct 'grounds of reference' (*ltos sa tha dad la ltos nas*)."

(sGron ma 36b3: *mñon sum yin ma yin gñis yul tha dad la ltos nas ni 'gal ba tsam yañ med la | yul cig la ltos nas rdzas gcig la 'gal mod kyi yul cig la ltos nas ni de 'i tshe yañ kha tshon chod te 'di ltar gzuñ pa zla ba gñis la ltos nas mi mthun phyogs mñon sum ma yin pa 'i rdzas yin la | śes pa 'i ño bo la ltos nas mthun phyogs mñon sum gyi rdzas yin pa 'i phyir ro || de bžin du rgyu yin ma yin dañ 'bras bu yin ma yin rdzas cig la 'gal ba yañ ltos sa cig la ltos nas 'gal ba yin gyi ltos sa tha dad la ltos nas rdzas cig la mi 'gal bar rig par bya 'o |*)

Nature and function of examples

Although gTsañ nag pa borrows his definition of similar and dissimilar instances from Ratnākaraśānti, he does not subscribe to the theory of intrinsic entailment (*antarvyāpti*). On the contrary, examples are necessary, endowed with a specific function that goes beyond helping “less intelligent people” (*rmoñs pa, mūdha*), as conceded by the *antarvyāptivādin*. Indeed, we will see how the absence of examples is linked to the logical reason being uncertain/inconclusive. The notion of examples is introduced by gTsañ nag pa when he classifies into two categories logical reasons whose first characteristic is established: logical reasons that occur only in the *pakṣa* (subject), termed “not-common” (*thun moñ ma yin pa, asādhāraṇa*), and logical reasons that occur also in instances other than the subject (*rtsod gzi las gzan la'añ 'jug pa*), termed “common” (*thun moñ pa, sādharmaṇa*).²¹ This “other” (*gzan*) is defined as a base – substance (*rdzas*) or distinguisher (*ldog pa*) – that does not have the defining characteristic (*mtshan ñid, lakṣaṇa*) of the subject.²² Such instances will be similar examples (*mthun dpe, sādharmaṇyadrṣṭānta*) if the property to be proved is established (*grub*), and dissimilar examples (*mi mthun dpe, vaidharmyadrṣṭānta*) if it is negated (*bsal*).²³ gTsañ nag pa then enumerates five cases illustrat-

²¹ bsDus pa 94b8 (sGron ma 40b2).

²² bsDus pa 95a4: *rdzas sam ldog pa yañ ruñ gzi gañ la ji skad bśad pa'i rtsod gzi'i mtshan ñid myed pa'o* (sGron ma 40b5: *rañ ldog la ji skad bśad pa'i rtsod gzi'i mtshan ñid med pa ni rtsod gzi las gzan yin*).

²³ bsDus pa 95a5 (sGron ma 40b3) : *de la rtsod gzi'i mtshan ñid myed pa ni* (sGron ma *bsgrub bya grub pa dañ bsal pa yin pas mthun pa dañ mi mthun pa'i dpe' gñis su 'gyur la |*

In the following passages, the emphasis is put exclusively on similar examples (*mthun dpe*).

ing similar examples by contrasting the status of similar examples to that of the subject:

1. The subject and the example constitute two distinct substances (bsDus pa: *ño bo tha dad*; sGron ma: *rdzas tha dad*). For example: a mountain and a kitchen are respectively subject and example in the proof, by means of the logical reason “smoke”, that there is fire on the mountain.
2. The subject and the example share an identical nature (*ño bo gcig ñid*), but the first is hidden (*lkog gyur*), while the second is perceptible (*mñon gyur*). For example: “what has the designation ‘cow’” and a white-haired [ox] (*kar zal*)²⁴ in the proof that what has the designation “cow” is impermanent because it has a hump and a dewlap.
3. Both the subject and the example are hidden (*lkog gyur*), but the subject is subtle (*phra ba*) while the example is evident (*gsal ba, vyakta*). Thus “what is impermanent” (*mi rtag pa*) is an example in the proof that “acoustic illusion” (*sgra’i sgyu ma lta bu*) can have the designation “conditioned (thing)” (*’dus byas kyi tha sñad du ruñ*) because it is generated by causes (*rgyus bskyed*).²⁵

²⁴ *kar zal*: bsDus pa and sGron ma’s spelling for *dkar zal*. The expression originally designates the white colour of an animal’s hair (cf. *ba glañ dmar zal*: the red colour of a cow); it is used here to designate an animal whose hair is white (or white with black spots cf. *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo*, p.2454: *gži dkar por nag thig yod pa la dkar zal*). Jäschke also gives the meaning “heifer” for *zal mo*, so that *kar zal* can be understood as “white calf” (*kar zal pho*) or “white heifer” (*kar zal mo*), but according to *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo*, *zal pho* and *zal mo* simply designate white male bovines and white female bovines respectively.

²⁵ This case is not mentioned in sGron ma.

4. Both the subject and the example being perceptible (*mñon gyur*), one can be a particular case of the other. For instance, the particular case (*bye brag*) “knowable non-entity” (*dños med kyi śes bya*) is an example in the proof that “knowable in general” (*śes bya tsam*) is empty (*stoñ pa*) because it is neither one nor many (*cig dañ du ma dañ bral ba*). Or, inversely, the general case (*spyi*) can be used as an example: for instance “sound in general” can be an example to prove that a particular sound is empty because it is neither existent, non-existent nor being generated (*yod med skye ba dañ bral ba*).²⁶
5. In the proof of the property of a distinguisher, subject and example can be coextensive (*khyab mñam pa*) distinct concepts (*ldog pa tha dad*). For instance sound’s audibility (*sgra la mñan bya*) can be an example in the following proof: sound’s existence (*sgra’i yod pa*) can have the designation “property of the subject” (*pakṣadharmā*) with regard to sound because the logical reason is established with regard to the subject.

What distinguishes the example from the subject is that, whereas the possession of the property to be proved remains doubtful for the subject, it is already established in the example, in most cases because it is “easier” to establish it. As illustrated above, the feasibility of establishment of the property to be proved is conditioned first by the facility of comprehension of the property-possessor, which in turn depends on the nature of the property-possessor – as in 3 (subtle/evident) – and on the disputant’s intellectual dispositions – as in 2, where a stupid or uneducated disputant simply does not know the meaning of “cow” – or depends on the disputant’s previous knowledge. It is equally conditioned by the possibility of establishment of the property. If the property cannot be established in

²⁶ The second possibility is not given in sGron ma

any case, there can be no example. Illustration of this point can be found in the case of the following proof: “This man is the reincarnation of a god because he has eyes” (*skyes bu 'di ni lha las 'phos pa yin te mig dan ldan pa'i phyir*).²⁷ The logical reason “having eyes”, although “common” in that it occurs in instances other than the subject, will be termed “not-common” because the instances in which it occurs cannot be determined as possessing or not possessing the property to be proved, and hence cannot be examples. In example 4 above, the property “empty” is “easier” to establish for the example, because it can be established by reflexive cognition (*rañ rig, svasamvedana*) with regard to “non-entity”, but its establishment remains doubtful for all the other instances. This example deserves further attention: First it is a case where the subject includes everything, since everything is knowable. Here, although there is no instance substantially different from the subject in which the logical reason occurs, there is a possibility to find an example because gTsañ nag pa’s definition of “other than the subject” does not restrict the meaning of “other” to “substantially different”. Second, in this proof, a particular case has to be taken as an example because the logical reason is a specific property of the subject. There could be a risk that, if this particular case is a valid example merely because it illustrates the co-presence of the logical reason and the property to be proved, fallacies would arise in the cases where the property to be proved is a specific property of the example but not a property of the subject. Taking as an example a particular case of the subject also raises the question whether a particular sound – for instance “sound of a drum” – can serve as an example in the proof that sound in general is impermanent because

²⁷ Another example is the property “omniscient”; in this case, the property cannot be established, but it can be negated. Thus, in the case of the proof “this man is not omniscient because he speaks”, similar examples can be presented, but not dissimilar examples.

it is audible, a possibility mentioned in Ratnākaraśānti's *Antarvyāptisamarthana*.²⁸ Accepting this possibility would lead gTsañ nag pa to consider “audibility” as a “common”, and furthermore valid logical reason. But gTsañ nag pa explicitly rejects this possibility, showing that the case is not parallel to the preceding proof of emptiness. His main argument is that in the case of the logical reason “audibility”, the instance “sound of a drum” does not have a status different from that of the subject in that the property to be proved, “impermanence”, is hidden in both the subject and the example. This amounts to saying that there is no difference between sound in general and a particular sound in terms of feasibility of ascertainment of the property to be proved: if impermanence is not perceptible in the subject “sound”, it cannot be any more perceptible in a particular sound, and if it were perceptible in the subject, there would be no need for an example. On the contrary, in the case of the proof of emptiness, the property to be proved, “empty”, is

²⁸ ASV 110,4-5: *sarvaśabdeṣu vimatau bādhakam pramāṇam pravarttamānam / adṛṣṭāntam api tatraikaṃ dṛṣṭāntayati*. Translated in KAJIYAMA 1999: 129: “When opinions are divided with regard to all sounds, the annulling cognition which is taking place, though having no example, adduces one of [all sounds] as an example.”

Note that in this formulation Ratnākaraśānti uses “all sounds” as the subject, while gTsañ nag pa uses “sound” (*sgra*) or “mere sound” (*sgra tsam*), which I take to be equivalent to “sound in general” (*sgra spyi*), in parallel to the formulation “general knowable”/“knowable in general” (*śes bya'i spyi*) in the above example (this is at least the case in sGron ma, which uses in the parallel passages the expressions *sgra tsam* and *śes bya tsam*). gTsañ nag pa obviously considers that the problem is the same whether one speaks of *A kyi spyi*, or *A tsam* but most probably considers that this formulation is not equivalent to *A thams cad* (all As), that is never used in this context. On the Tibetan problematic of A (for instance, “sound in general”) versus A's (the particular sounds), see TILLEMANS 1995, especially pp. 866-871.

perceptible in the example, but hidden in the subject.²⁹ Thus “non-entity” can be an example because it is indeed an instance different from the subject in which the logical reason occurs. But since “sound of a drum” is not different from the subject in that the establishment of the property to be proved goes together for them, gTsañ nag pa rejects the possibility for a particular sound to be an example, and confines “audibility” to the status of “not-common” logical reason.

The following considerations about the characteristics of the examples can be made from this analysis of the different types of examples:

The idea of analogical inference (i.e., properties established for the example are established for a particular subject on the ground of a similarity between the two, for instance sharing the same nature) and that of inductive generalisation (i.e., properties established for the example are established for the general case) are subordinated

²⁹ bsDus pa 95b3: *de rgyu mtshan gañ las | 'dir śes bya dañ dños myed kyi śes bya ni gcig dañ du bral gyis stoñ ñid sgrub na dpe' dañ rtsod gźir ruñ pa yin te rtags dañ bsgrub bya gñis ka dpe' la mñon du gyur źiñ rtsod gźi' la lkog du gyur pa'i phyir ro ||*

der yañ de skad brjod na gtan tshigs ma grub ste sgrub bya mi rtag pa gñi ga la lkog du gyur źiñ rtags mñan bya gñi ga la mñon du gyur pa'i phyir ro ||

'dir de skad brjod par ni mi nus ste stoñ ñid dpe' la lkog gyur yin na dños med 'dzin pa'i rañ rig gis dños po'i spyi khegs kyañ bye brag mi khegs par 'gyur la | rtags rtsod gźi' la lkog gyur yin na sgra 'dzin pa'i mñon sum gyis mñan bya ma yin pa'i dogs pa mi chod par thal ba'i phyir ro || des na rtags rtsod gźi la lkog gyur yin pa dañ bsgrub byas khyab par bsgrub pa la tshul 'di ruñ gi gźan du ma yin pas | der yañ don byed nus pa'i mñan bya źes dañ | byas pa'i sgra yin pa'i phyir źes bkod na ruñ pa yañ yin no ||

to the idea of ascertainment of an invariable connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved. The function of the example is not only to illustrate the co-presence of two properties but to be a pertinent instance that will allow the disputant to whom the example is presented to ascertain the invariable connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved, which will in turn allow him to ascertain the second and third characteristics of the logical reason. A necessary condition for this is that the property to be proved must be established for the example while remaining doubtful for the subject. On this matter we have seen how, in differentiating subject from example, gTsañ nag pa uses mainly a difference in terms of feasibility of establishment (perceptible/hidden, evident/subtle), and possibility of establishment. Because possession of the property to be proved (*bsgrub bya'i chos ldan*) does not necessarily imply establishment of the property to be proved (*bsgrub bya'i chos grub*), a distinction has to be made between properties things really have, and properties established by the disputant. One point needs to be made here: we have seen before that in valid cases the subject is a *sapakṣa*, i.e., possesses the property to be proved. Still, for gTsañ nag pa, the subject can never be an example because, in addition to not being different from itself, the property to be proved is neither established nor negated with regard to the subject before completion of the proof. This point is important, because from the point of view of later opponents against the two-*pakṣa* view, if the subject is a *sapakṣa*, the possession of the property to be proved will be established and it will cease to be an object of doubt, thus leading to the fallacy of *siddhasādhana* (proving something that has already been proven).³⁰ It is clear however, from the above presentation, that

³⁰ Sa skya Paṇḍita does not state explicitly that a fallacy of *siddhasādhana* occurs in this case, but points to the fact that here there would be no
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gTsañ nag pa never intended to imply that for similar instances the possession of the property to be proved is established, and that he subscribes to the view that the subject must be a doubtful instance to the same extent as do holders of the three-*pakṣa* view.

Hence, for gTsañ nag pa, a similar example is not a similar instance in which the logical reason occurs; rather, it is a similar instance that is acknowledged to be a similar instance (i.e., for which the property to be proved is established) in which the logical reason is known to occur. I will now consider how these epistemic requirements intervene in the definition of uncertain logical reasons, considering in particular the problematic case of not-common logical reasons, and examine on what ground these reasons are classified as “uncertain” by gTsañ nag pa. I will inquire to what extent gTsañ nag pa’s interpretation can be traced back to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and compare it with the dGe lugs pa view.

Uncertain not-common logical reasons

gTsañ nag pa’s classification of logical reasons whose first characteristic (i.e., *pakṣadharmā*) is established uses the idea of mental ascertainment (*blo’i dbaṅ gis dbye ba/blos ji ltar mthoṅ pa’i sgo nas dbye ba*) in that it considers not only the factual presence/absence of the logical reason in similar and dissimilar instances, but whether presence and absence are acknowledged by the disputant. gTsañ nag pa thus makes a first quadripartition according to whether the logical reason can be perceived (*mthoṅ*) in both *pakṣa*, in neither *sapakṣa* nor *vipakṣa*, in *sapakṣa* only, or in

pakṣa to serve as a basis of dependance for *pakṣadharmā*. The first characteristic would have to be reformulated as “being a property of the similar instance which is a subject of enquiry”. Cf. Rigs gter 275,21: *śes ’dod phyogs su mi ’dod phyir // ltos g’zi daṅ po med par ’gyur // ltos g’zi daṅ po mi ’dod na // ’di la phyogs chos mtshan ñid dka’ //*

vipakṣa only. Each case is further divided into four according to whether the logical reason, if not perceived, is present or absent, and if perceived is partially or completely present, thus obtaining a total of sixteen sorts.³¹ Out of these sixteen, only one is a valid logical reason: the logical reason is perceived only in *sapakṣa*, it is factually absent in *vipakṣa* and is determined as contradictory to the opposite of the property to be proved. One case is that of a contradictory logical reason, and the twelve others are uncertain logical reasons. When gTsañ nag pa talks of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* here, he is actually considering similar and dissimilar instances that do not include the subject.³² Indeed, since the subject has been proven to be a *sapakṣa* if correct and a *vipakṣa* if contradictory, were *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* to be taken in their “real” sense (therefore including the subject), it would be impossible to have a case where the logical reason is absent in both, because it would be present at least in the *pakṣa* where the subject belongs (remember we are dealing with cases for which the *pakṣadharmā* has been established).³³

I will restrict my analysis to the four cases where the logical reason is perceived neither in similar instances nor in dissimilar instances:

1. The logical reason is in fact present in both *pakṣa*. For example: “having eyes” in the proof that this man is the reincarnation of a god.

³¹ See bsDus pa 96a4ff. and sGron ma 41a8ff. bsDus pa only lists the different categories without giving any example.

³² This fact is mentioned explicitly only in sGron ma 41a8.

³³ Note that this last argument is precisely the one presented by the dGe lugs pa to argue for a metaphorical interpretation of “absence in both *pakṣa*” (see TILLEMANS 1990: 61).

2. The logical reason is absent in both *pakṣa*. For example: “audibility” in the proof of sound’s impermanence.³⁴
3. The logical reason is present in *sapakṣa* only. For example: “produced” in the proof of sound’s impermanence, given that the disputant believes that only sound is produced.
4. The logical reason is present in *vipakṣa* only. For example: “produced” in the proof of sound’s permanence, given that the disputant believes that only sound is produced.

These four types are grouped by gTsañ nag pa under the heading “uncertain not-common [logical reasons]” (*thun moñ ma yin pa ma ñes pa, asādhāraṇānaikāntika*). The first two cases have already been shown above to be cases where no examples can be adduced. The same is true for the third and fourth cases, due to the disputant’s failure to acknowledge that there are instances that can be examples.

So each of these four cases exemplifies the failure of one of the factual or epistemic requirements necessary for the existence of a positive example: in the case of “having eyes”, there is failure to acknowledge the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* as being respectively similar and dissimilar instances because the property to be proved cannot be either established or negated. In the case of “audibility”, there simply do not exist instances other than the subject where the logical reason occurs, and the subject cannot be an example. In the third and fourth cases, there is failure to acknowledge the presence of the logical reason in something other than the subject because the disputant considers the logical reason as a property specific to the subject.

³⁴ This case matches the case of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* given by Dignāga in his *Hetucakra*, with the only difference that sGron ma has *mi rtag pa* instead of *rtag pa*.

Now why are these not-common logical reasons necessarily uncertain (*ma ñes pa*)? gTsañ nag pa's general definition of uncertain reasons is that the *pakṣadharmā* is established, and that neither exclusion from *sapakṣa* or from *vipakṣa* is established.³⁵ And his definition of uncertain not-common logical reasons is: [*pakṣadharmā* is established, and] even though the logical reason is not perceived (*ma mthoñ*) in *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, [its] exclusion from either is not established.³⁶ By saying that the logical reason's exclusion from *vipakṣa* (or *sapakṣa*) is not established, what is meant is that the third characteristic is not fulfilled, so that the reason is uncertain because *vyatireka* is not ascertained (or alternatively, reverse-*vyatireka*, i.e., exclusion from *sapakṣa* is not ascertained). Absence of an example is thus linked with incertitude because it is the example that enables the disputant to ascertain the invariable connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved, and therefore to guarantee the logical reason's exclusion from *vipakṣa* (or to ascertain a counter-connection that guarantees the logical reason's exclusion from *sapakṣa*).

³⁵ bsDus pa 96b1: *ma ñes pa'i spyi'i mtshan ñid ni phyogs chos grub ciñ rtags mthun phyogs mi mthun phyogs gñis ka la* [sGron ma 41b7: *las*] *ldog pa ma grub pa*. Establishment of the exclusion from dissimilar instances would make it a valid reason, while establishment of the exclusion from similar instances would make it a contradictory reason. See bsDus pa 96b5: *'gal ba ni phyogs chos grub ciñ rtags mthun phyogs la* [sGron ma 42a2: *las*] *ldog pa grub pa* and *yañ dag ni phyogs chos grub ciñ rtags mi mthun phyogs la ldog pa grub pa*.

³⁶ bsDus pa 96b2: *thun moñ ma yin pa ma ñes pa ni* [sGron ma 41b8: *phyogs chos grub ciñ*] *rtags mthun phyogs mi mthun phyogs la ma mthoñ yañ gñis ka las ldog pa ma grub pa*.

Let us consider how this relates to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's respective positions.³⁷ For Dignāga, what causes a not-common reason to be uncertain is that *anvaya* is not established because there is no concrete example for the positive concomitance. As a consequence, the opponent cannot ascertain the second characteristic, because this requires the statement of an example showing him the inseparable relation (*avinābhāva*) between the logical reason and the property to be proved. Dignāga also states that in the case of "audibility" to prove sound's impermanence, the third characteristic – *vyatireka* – is established. Dharmakīrti's point, on the other hand, is that these not-common logical reasons are uncertain because *vyatireka* cannot be ascertained. Indeed, the exclusion from *vipakṣa* remains doubtful because mere non-perception (*adarśana-mātra*) of the logical reason does not confirm its absence.

Further, in Dharmakīrti's analysis of the logical reason "possessing breathing, etc. (*prāṇādimat*)" to prove that a living body possesses a self (*sātmaka*), one finds the idea that this "non-perception" can also be due to the fact that the locus where the logical reason is to be perceived – i.e., what possesses or does not possess a self – is not established for the disputant, because the self is a notion that is epistemically remote.³⁸ This same idea is present in gTsañ nag pa's example of proving the property "being the reincarnation of a god". It seems then reasonable to say that gTsañ nag pa's exposition of

³⁷ These questions have already been analyzed in detail in TILLEMANS 1990: Appendix 76-79, ONO 1999, as well as by Prof. Katsura and Iwata in the present volume. I borrow from their conclusions the elements relevant to the interpretation of gTsañ nag pa's theory.

³⁸ See the following passages (quoted and translated by Iwata): PVin 3 Q321b: 'di gñis las gcig la gnas par ñes pa med de | de'i bdag ñid du 'grub pa la ma grub pa'i phyir ro || and PVin 3 Q322a3-4: bdag (b)skal bas 'jug pa dañ ldog pa mi 'grub pa'i phyir srog la sogs pa yañ de la 'jug pa dañ ldog pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro ||

the epistemic requirements for the possibility of an example displays ideas already present in Dharmakīrti's texts, although they cannot be said to be directly based on them since gTsañ nag pa does not refer to these key passages. The same is true about the question of gTsañ nag pa's adoption of a two-*pakṣa* view.³⁹

The dGe lugs pa position that is analyzed in TILLEMANS (1990) comes down to the same conclusion, namely that absence of an example makes it impossible for the opponent to ascertain *vyāpti*, and that a distinction has to be made between the factual presence of a property and its mental ascertainment.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, gTsañ nag pa cannot be proved to be the source for the dGe lugs pa's position, because the following difference must be accounted for: the dGe lugs pa want to take Dignāga's definition of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* – i.e., the logical reason is absent in *sapakṣa* and absent in *vipakṣa* – as a general definition, and insist on considering *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* in their “real” sense, that is including the subject. Consequently, they are bound to adopt a metaphorical interpretation of “absence”: in the case of “audibility”, the logical reason is in reality

³⁹ Several passages in Dharmakīrti's texts tend to show that he himself supported a two-*pakṣa* view. See for instance Dharmakīrti's claim that “audibility” cannot be present in things other than the two alternatives eternity and non-eternity, and that “breathing, etc.” should be present either in things which possess the self or in things that do not possess it (see PVin 3 Q229b8: *thun moñ ma yin pa yañ gñi ga las phyi rol du gyur pa mi srid pas* [...] and PVin 3 Q321b: [...] *gñis kyi bdag ñid las phyi rol du gyur pa med pa'i phyir* [...]).

⁴⁰ Cf. TILLEMANS 1990: 63-64: “Instead of asking factual questions as to whether or not the reason is present in *sapakṣa*, one inquires about what the opponent can or cannot reasonably know or think – in effect, the *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu* has been transformed into a problem of epistemic or belief logic.”

present in *sapakṣa* only, because it is only present in the subject, but the debater cannot know it without an example, hence “absence” must be taken as “unascertained presence”.⁴¹ But gTsañ nag pa does not follow the same line of reasoning because his presentation of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* relies on his previous definition of *asādhāraṇa*, which included the idea of absence of the logical reason in instances other than the subject where the property to be proved is established. Therefore *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* in this context are considered not to include the subject. Consequently, in the case of audibility “absence in *sapakṣa*” does not have to be interpreted metaphorically. But, for gTsañ nag pa, “absence in *sapakṣa* and absence in *vipakṣa*” occurs only in a particular case of *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*. So gTsañ nag pa, instead of reinterpreting Dignāga’s definition, completes it by adding the question of the debater’s mental ascertainment, thus raising it to a so-called epistemic level, so that the general criterion of the *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu* becomes “non-perception in *sapakṣa* and non-perception in *vipakṣa*” (*sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* not including the subject). However, gTsañ nag pa does not depart from his idea that *vyāpti* is based on the real *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* including the subject. Indeed, although the ascertainment of *vyāpti* necessitates the use of instances for which the property to be proved is established, *vyāpti* itself is purely a matter of factual possession of the property to be proved regardless of its establishment, therefore it also applies – and it is necessary that it will apply – in the case of the subject. Accordingly, the definition of *anvaya* is: the logical reason occurs only in *sapakṣa* in the same way it is presented with regard to the subject, and that of *vyatireka*:

⁴¹ Cf. TILLEMANS 1990: 62-63, where it is shown that this interpretation of Dignāga finds support in Dharmakīrti’s writings.

the logical reason does not occur in *vipakṣa* in the same way it is presented with regard to the subject.⁴²

Concluding remarks

In the introduction, I started by stating how numerous controversies arose between partisans of the two-*pakṣa* view and those of the three-*pakṣa* view. Indeed, presentations of the two-*pakṣa* and three-*pakṣa* views, especially those made by their respective supporters, tend to emphasize differences in such a way that the two views appear irreconcilable, while both claim to be the correct interpretation of Dharmakīrti's thought. Thus, in Sa skya Paṇḍita's *Rigs gter*, gTsañ nag pa is pictured as holding a completely heterodox view because he introduces a distinction in terms of *rdzas* (whose definition Sa skya Paṇḍita does not agree with) and *ldog pa* (Sa skya Paṇḍita rejects the interpretation of *ldan* proposed by gTsañ nag pa in this case), but mainly because by including the subject in similar instances he deprives the logical reason of a basis for its first characteristic. An implicit corollary is that in such a case, when the presence of the logical reason in only *sapakṣa* is established, there is no more doubt with regard to the subject, thus constituting a fault of *siddhasādhana*.⁴³ In response, the main reproach made against

⁴² bsDus pa 100a2: *rjes 'gro'i mtshan ñid ni rtags rtsod gzi la dgod par bya ba ltar mthun phyogs ñid la 'jug pa'o | [...] ldog pa'i tshul ni rtags rtsod gzi la dgod par bya ba ltar mi mthun phyogs la 'jug mi srid pa'o |*

The two are logically equivalent as long as one stays on one of the levels of proof (*rdzas* or *ldog pa*) introduced by gTsañ nag pa in the classification of all knowables into two *pakṣa* exclusively.

⁴³ Note that the three-*pakṣa* view also is accused of the fault of *siddhasādhana*, because when using the notion of *sapakṣa* to establish *vyāpti*, the idea of “being similar to the subject on account of possessing the property to be proved” implies that one should know that the subject possesses the
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the three-*pakṣa* view is that if the subject is left out, doubt will always remain in the ascertainment of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. So both views actually have to face a similar dilemma: keeping the subject doubtful, but ascertaining an invariable connection that holds in all cases, including the subject. While being conscious of other discrepancies that remain between the two views, it is important to note that both views will address this problem by explaining the actual process taking place in the ascertainment of *vyāpti* in the same way: the invariable connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved is ascertained on the basis of a similar example. The idea of “similarity” of the example is induced in both cases by the definition of *sapakṣa*: For the two-*pakṣa* view, subject and example are similar because the subject also is a *sapakṣa*. Therefore, both possess the property to be proved. For the three-*pakṣa* view, *sapakṣa* are by definition similar to the subject. In a proof the proponent can use this similarity to show the opponent that, reciprocally, the subject is similar to the *sapakṣa*, in particular to one of them: the example. This enables the opponent to understand that the subject also possesses the property to be proved, although the subject is not itself a *sapakṣa*. So whereas gTsañ nag pa introduces the epistemic criterion that the possession of the property to be proved is established by the disputant only when he presents similar examples, keeping the criterion for being a *sapakṣa* on a factual level, the three-*pakṣa* view includes the epistemic criterion implicitly in the definition of *sapakṣa* already. Thus, both will agree that the subject is a doubtful instance, the example a determinate one, and that once an invariable connection is ascertained it is universally valid. The difference between the two views comes down to the question of at which point to account for mental ascertainment, and the fact that they accept respectively two

property to be proved in order to know what is similar to it on this account.

pakṣa or three *pakṣa* is a consequence of this. So while both positions diverge theoretically as to their interpretation of Dharmakīrti with regard to the interpretation of notions such as *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* and presence/absence in *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*, practically, when it comes to the question of ascertainment of the invariable connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved, both actually use the same method, thus, in point of fact, finding some common ground on a matter constantly presented as a major point of contention between them.

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