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# Hōrin

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## Interpretations of the *trairūpya* in Tibet

Pascale Hugon

The approach of Tibetan logicians presenting or commenting on Dharmakīrti's treatises is, from a certain angle, not unlike that of modern scholars applying the Principle of Charity: they presuppose that the texts they are explaining express a consistent thought. The task of the interpreter, which demands that he remain faithful to the intention of the author with explaining the explicit as well as the implicit meaning of the text, can become quite difficult when the literal formulation of the text suggests the possibility of an inconsistency. In such a case, the interpreter has to design a strategy of interpretation that will allow him to integrate the author's problematic formulation into a coherent whole. This need to conciliate internal consistency and the author's own wording is an aspect of the interpreter's work that is well illustrated in the context of the interpretation of Dharmakīrti's *trairūpya* by Tibetan logicians in their presentation of inference.

Inference (*anumāna*) from the point of view of Buddhist logic is in itself a cognition (*jñāna*) – and moreover a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) – arising on account of the knowledge of something else, which stands not only as an evidence or sign for the former, but also as a justification for the validity of the new cognition. The presentation of inference thus revolves principally around this key notion of logical reason (*hetu* or *liṅga*) through which an inference is evaluated: one comes to talk of proper and fallacious logical reasons rather than proper and fallacious inferences. Since Vasubandhu, a necessary connection between the logical reason and the object to be inferred in terms of 'inevitable relation' (*avinābhāva, nāntarīyakatva*) was postulated as the foundation of the inferential process. While Dignāga established the concept of pervasion (*vyāpti*) as the structural basis for this inevitable relation, Dharmakīrti introduced the notion of essential connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) to account for the possibility of the inevitable relation.<sup>1</sup> Dharmakīrti inherited from Dignāga the criterion of a so-called 'triple characterization' (*trairūpya*), to which he ascribes the role of *definiens* of a proper logical reason. The triple characterization is thus given both as a necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of the inference. The three characteristics, called in Sanskrit '*pakṣadharmā*', '*anvaya*' and '*vyatireka*', are defined by Dharmakīrti respec-

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. KATSURA 1986, OETKE 1994: 114–117 and Part V.

tively as: ascertained presence in the subject (*pakṣa*), ascertained presence in similar instances only and ascertained complete absence in dissimilar instances.<sup>2</sup> Dharmakīrti defines similar instances (*sapakṣa*) as “things which are similar [to the subject] on account of [possessing] the universal which is the property to be proved” and dissimilar instances (*asapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*) as “what is not [similar on account of this]” or as “what is not *sapakṣa*”.<sup>3</sup>

Dharmakīrti’s legacy to his interpreters thus comprises three parts:

- a) the *trairūpya* as a necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of the inference,
- b) the formulation of the second and third characteristics in terms of presence and absence of the logical reason in similar and dissimilar instances,
- c) a definition of similar and dissimilar instances that involves the notion of ‘similarity with the subject’.

The exegesis of Dharmakīrti’s *trairūpya* formula in the texts of his Tibetan interpreters is known to be the occasion for divergent standpoints.<sup>4</sup> The two main tendencies are represented on the one hand by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) and his followers (extending as far as the fundamental ideas are concerned to later dGe lugs pa authors), and on the other hand by Sa skya Paṇḍita (= Sa paṇ) (1182–1251) and followers of his *Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter* (hereafter *Rigs gter*).<sup>5</sup> The two parties, on the basis of their different compre-

<sup>2</sup> This formulation is found in *NB* II.5: *trairūpyaṃ punar līngasyānumeye sattvam eva sapakṣa eva sattvam asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam*. An alternative formulation is the one of *PVīn* II.5<sup>1–2</sup>: *anumeye ’tha tattulye sādabhāvo nāstitāsati / niścita*. Tibetan logicians usually deal with the first one. The words ‘only’ and ‘complete’ in my translation are an attempt to render the restrictive meaning of the Sanskrit particle ‘*eva*’ (see GIL-LION & HAYES 1982).

<sup>3</sup> *NB* II.7 (= *NP* 2.2): *sādhya dharmasāmānyena samāno ’rthaḥ sapakṣa / na sapakṣo ’sapakṣaḥ / and PVīn* III D 202a2, cited in Durvekamiśra’s *Dharmottarapradīpa* (NB 98.9: *sādhya dharmasāmānyena samānaḥ pakṣaḥ sapakṣas tadabhāvo ’sapakṣaḥ*). There seems to be no difference for Dharmakīrti between the terms ‘*asapakṣa*’ and ‘*vipakṣa*’, although it is the first, and not the second that is used in the formulation of the *trairūpya*. In Tibetan, both terms are translated as ‘*mi nthun phyogs*’.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. TILLEMANS 1999: Chap. V “On *Sapakṣa*” and HUGON 2004.

<sup>5</sup> Tenets that are characteristic of the first party are found in two of Phya pa’s texts that have recently become available: the *Tshad ma yid kyi mun pa sel ba* (hereafter *Mun sel*) and a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s *Pramānaviniścaya* entitled *Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ’grel bshad yi ge dang rigs pa’i gnad la ’jug pa’i shes rab kyi ’od zer* (hereafter *’Od zer*). A similar interpretation of the *trairūpya* is found in the text entitled *Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ṭi ka legs bshad bsdus pa* (hereafter *bsDus pa*), a commentary on the *Pramānaviniścaya* composed by Phya pa’s disciple gTsang nag pa, as well as in the *Tshad ma shes rab sgron ma* (hereafter *sGron ma*) of mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge, or the later gZhan gyi phyogs thams cad las rnam pa rgyal ba of Chu mig pa Seng ge dpal. Post-Phya pa texts display additional material in that they take up further controversies –

hension of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, have been described as heterodox and orthodox (TILLEMANS), or as proponents of a two-*pakṣa* view (i.e. bipartite universe) vs. a three-*pakṣa* view (i.e. tripartite universe) (HUGON).<sup>6</sup> This difference is the ground for an ongoing controversy between the two parties, and a crucial point for the evaluation of the internal consistency of Dharmakīrti's text. Most Tibetan interpreters of Dharmakīrti – and many modern scholars as well – find it difficult to see how, among the three parts of Dharmakīrti's presentation that have to be taken into account, b) and c), taken literally, could be compatible with a) (we will see why below). Still, none of them is ready to give up a) as such, and their attempts at keeping Dharmakīrti's thought consistent involve various strategies in which b) and c) are either discarded or transformed. The choice of each author to adopt a given definition for *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* is thus the first move in a complex strategy where what is at stake is explaining how the *trairūpya* can guarantee the validity of inference.

Before turning to the detail of the respective strategies of Phya pa and Sa skya Paṇḍita, I will examine three definitions of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* and the way the universe of discourse can be partitioned according to each of them. I will also show what consequence this bears on the nature and function of the *trairūpya* and on its alleged success.

### Definitions of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* and bipartite vs. tripartite universe

In characterizing the definitions of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* that will follow, I will make use of the distinction between a 'restrictive' and a 'non-restrictive' version of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*, i.e., respectively, *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* that exclude the

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some of which possibly arose in response to Phya pa's presentation – and introduce various innovations or refinements, but the core of the presentation remains the same. Phya pa's views contrast with those of rŅgog Lo tsā ba (1059–1109) and other authors which are mentioned briefly and refuted in *bsDus pa* 87b6–88a5 (≡ *sGron ma* 34b2–35a3), that I will not take into account in this study.

As for the second party, I will consider mainly the portion of the tenth chapter of Sa skya Paṇḍita's *Tshad ma Rigs pa'i gter* dealing with the *trairūpya*, and make occasional mentions of the interpretations or original contributions made by commentators.

<sup>6</sup> TILLEMANS (2004) suggests to equate the former with *antarvyāptivādin*. This identification is not accurate for Phya pa and his immediate followers strongly maintain that the establishment of pervasion cannot be accomplished on the basis of the subject itself, but necessitates the knowledge of an instance different from the subject that exemplifies the two properties at stake.

subject and do not exclude the subject.<sup>7</sup> I will also draw a distinction between 'realistic' and 'epistemic' versions of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*, along the line of the distinction made by Oetke between realistic and epistemic versions of the *trairūpya* (OETKE 1994). Namely, a realistic definition of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* gives conditions that are independent of the debater's knowledge while an epistemic definition includes the requirement that the debater must have ascertained these conditions.<sup>8</sup> Thus, for instance, 'what possesses the property to be proved' is a realistic definition of *sapakṣa*, and 'what is ascertained to possess the property to be proved' is its epistemic counterpart. The epistemic operator involved in the second type of definition is taken in a strong sense: it is not the mere knowledge of the fact that a given thing possesses the property to be proved, but this fact must have been ascertained through a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) involving certitude. Along with 'realistic' and 'epistemic' versions, I will distinguish a 'pragmatic' version of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, where instances of these classes are given a special role in the *trairūpya*, namely that of example.

In Tibetan texts, the restrictive or non-restrictive character of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* is expressed in terms of the subject constituting or not a third class (*phung gsum*). What I called realistic, epistemic and pragmatic versions are categories that are used in the Tibetan tradition itself. Indeed, Śākya mchog ldan and Gilo bo mkhan chen distinguish three kinds of *sapakṣa* (the same kinds are found for *vipakṣa* as well) as follows:

- a) *sapakṣa* that exist in reality (*don la gnas pa'i mthun phyogs*), for instance, something impermanent (when one is proving that sound is impermanent).
- b) *sapakṣa* that exist in the debater's mind (*blo ngor gnas*), for instance something impermanent that the debater has ascertained to be impermanent.
- c) *sapakṣa* that are bases for the determination of positive and negative inclusion, that are co-extensive with positive and negative examples.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Cf. OETKE 1994: 22.

<sup>8</sup> The term 'realistic' has to be taken with caution. Indeed, reality in a Dharmakīrtian system is the realm of undivided and distinct particulars, which are outside the scope of language. The notions of subject and property are superimposed exclusions that do not exist as such in reality. Hence one should think of the 'realistic level' as that of things as they could be known.

<sup>9</sup> Gilo bo mkhan chen's position is not found in his commentary on the *Rigs gter* but appears in his *rTlugs rigs*. His presentation appears to be based on the one found in Śākya mchog ldan's *Rigs gter Pham byed*. Cf. *sGron me* p. 51, n. 58.

a) Dharmakīrti's definition

By the expression 'Dharmakīrti's definition' I will refer to the literal wording of the definition found in *PVin* and *NB*, i.e., that *sapakṣa* are "things which are similar to the subject on account of possessing the universal which is the property to be proved".<sup>10</sup> From the point of view of the Tibetan, this definition necessarily involves a tripartite universe consisting of *sapakṣa*, *vipakṣa* and the subject (*pakṣa*).<sup>11</sup> The tripartition is here a consequence of the notion of 'similarity with the subject'. Tibetan thinkers agree that something cannot be similar to itself – hence the subject cannot be a *sapakṣa* – and since accepting that the subject is a *vipakṣa* would lead to the consequence that the third characteristic (absence in *vipakṣa*) could never be ascertained once the first (presence in the subject) is fulfilled,<sup>12</sup> the subject is therefore kept outside the range of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Dharmakīrti's definition can thus be characterized as a restrictive version of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* as their domain is restricted to instances different from the subject, and as a realistic version insofar as it does not include an explicit epistemic operator.

As it has been noted by several modern scholars, the *trairūpya* using the notions of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* characterized in that way cannot guarantee the truth of inference.<sup>13</sup> The problem is that as soon as one instance is excluded from the domains of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, the characteristics having to do with the presence and absence of the logical reason in these domains

<sup>10</sup> See n. 3 above.

<sup>11</sup> That Dharmakīrti's definition of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* implies a tripartite universe is also endorsed by several modern authors, e.g., GILLON & LOVE 1980, OETKE 1994: 29–32 on the other hand argues that the definition of the *Nyāyapraveśa* (which is the same as in *NB*), despite the mention of 'similarity', does not necessarily lead to an exclusion of the subject from the domain of *sapakṣa*.

<sup>12</sup> This consequence appears as one of the three absurd consequences drawn from the literal acceptance of Dharmakīrti's definition in *bsDus pa* 88a6 (*rtsod gzhi rang dang 'dra ba myed pas mi mthun phyogs su 'gyur ba la rtogs zhugs na ldog pa myed la ma zhugs na phyogs chos myed par 'gyur ro*) and *sGron ma* 34b4–5 (*yang dag gi rtsod gzhi chos can mi mthun phyogs su thal te rang nyid rang dang bsgrub bya'i chos yod du mthun pa med pa'i phyir ro // 'dod na de la rtogs zhugs pas ldog pa ma grub par 'gyur ro*).

<sup>13</sup> This problem was pointed out notably in GILLON & LOVE 1980, KATSURA 1983 n. 16, OETKE 1994: 29pp., TILLEMANS 1999 n. 41. GILLON & LOVE represent the formulation of *anvaya* as (x) (Hx → (Sx and -Px)), and that of *vyatireka* (x) (-Sx → -Hx). However if the subject is not a *vipakṣa*, they should formulate *vyatireka* as (x) ((-Sx and -Px) → -Hx). TILLEMANS showed that from the *pakṣadharmā* and *anvaya* expressed in that way it is possible to derive the conclusion (x) (Px → Sx), but also the absurd statement (x) (-Px). By formulating *anvaya* as (x) ((x ≠ p and Hx) → Sx) as propounded in OETKE 1994: 24 it is possible to avoid the unwanted consequence pointed out by TILLEMANS, but it is still not possible to entail the conclusion Sp from the *pakṣadharmā* and *anvaya*.

can only guarantee a restricted pervasion, and extending this restricted pervasion to the case of the subject is not always correct. There can thus be cases where the *trairūpya* is fulfilled but the conclusion is wrong.<sup>14</sup> Such a *trairūpya* cannot therefore be accepted as a sufficient condition for the validity of inference.

#### b) *Phya pa's definition*

The definition adopted by Phya pa and his followers is identical to that of Ratnākaraśānti. *Sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are defined as “what possesses the property to be proved” (*bsgrub bya'i chos dang ldan pa*) and “what does not possess the property to be proved” (*bsgrub bya'i chos dang mi ldan pa*).<sup>15</sup> As ‘possessing the property to be proved’ and ‘not possessing the property to be proved’ are directly contradictory (*dn̄gos 'gal*), *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* constitute two complementary classes which are both disjoint and exhaustive. The strict bipartition of all instances (i.e., of all knowable things, Tib. *shes bya*) into *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* is ensured by the application of the principle of excluded middle and the principle of non-contradiction. The first principle ensures that every instance is either *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*. There is therefore nothing falling outside the scope of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* that would constitute a third class (*phung gsum*), sometimes called in Tibetan texts a ‘negative class’ (*dgag phyogs*), i.e. what is neither *sapakṣa* nor *vipakṣa*. The second principle ensures that nothing can be both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. This, for the Tibetan, also means avoiding a third class that would be a ‘positive class’ (*bsgrub phyogs*).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Whenever two properties are concomitant except in one case, and this case is taken as the subject, we will obtain a case where the *trairūpya* can be fulfilled without the conclusion being true. See for example the proof ‘2 is an odd number because it is a prime number’. The logical reason fulfills the three characteristics: indeed, 2 is a prime number, all prime numbers except 2 are odd, and no even number except 2 is prime. Still, the conclusion ‘2 is an odd number’ is wrong.

<sup>15</sup> *Mun sel* 45a4 reads “*bsgrub bya'i chos dang ldan pa mthun pa'i chos yin*”, which must be corrected into “...*mthun pa'i phyogs yin*”, as in ‘*Od zer* 83b5. *bsDus pa* and *sGron ma* cite the relevant verse of Ratnākaraśānti’s *Antarvyāptisamarthana* (AVS XVII p.100): *matau sapakṣāsapakṣau sādhyadharmayutāyutau* / (tib. *bsgrub bya'i chos ldan mi ldan las // mthun phyogs mi mthun phyogs su 'dod* (*bsDus pa: brjod*)).

<sup>16</sup> The impossibility of a third class of either kind is stated by Phya pa without justification (cf. ‘*Od zer* 84a7–b2 and *Mun sel* 45a9–45b4: *gnyi ga yin dang gnyi ga ma yin pa mi srid pa*). gTsang nag pa (*bsDus pa* 89a8–b1) and mTshur ston (*sGron ma* 35b4–5) justify it on the basis of the direct contradiction between ‘*bsgrub bya'i chos ldan*’ and ‘*mi ldan*’. A reasoning similar to the one expressed in *sGron ma* is also attributed by Śākya

This definition does not involve any epistemic requirement. Possession or non-possession of a given property is the only condition that must obtain for an instance to be a *sapakṣa* or a *vipakṣa*. The subject also is either *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa* (although it is always *sapakṣa* in a valid inference). Phya pa is thus adopting a non-restrictive and realistic version of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. The bipartition (in Tibetan ‘*phyogs gnyis su kha tshon chod pa*’) of knowable things into *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* concerns the realistic level only, and does not imply that the debater knows every knowable thing, nor that he knows which instances are *sapakṣa* and which ones are *vipakṣa*. It only concerns instances as they are (as they could be known), and not as they are actually known.<sup>17</sup>

With such a version of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, the characteristics of ‘presence of the logical reason in *sapakṣa* only’ and ‘complete absence of the logical reason in *vipakṣa*’ spell out an unrestricted pervasion of the logical reason by the property to be proved. As the unrestricted pervasion is also relevant in the case of the subject, there will be no case where the three characteristics are fulfilled and the conclusion is wrong. One must however not forget that the formulation of the *trairūpya* dealt with by Tibetan interpreters contains the notion of ‘certitude’, conveyed by the Sanskrit word ‘*nīścita*’. We are thus dealing with an epistemic version of the *trairūpya* that does not only describe the realistic conditions that must obtain for the inference to be correct, but specifies that the debater has to ascertain these conditions. As shown by Oetke (OETKE 1994: 79–81), there are many ways to account for the scope of an epistemic operator. For Phya pa, the fact that the debater ascertains that the logical reason is present in *sapakṣa* only and completely absent in *vipakṣa* is equivalent to his knowing that pervasion holds between the logical reason and the property to be proved. It does not in itself imply the knowledge of an instance of *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa* (but the knowledge of an example is required as a means of ascertaining the pervasion). So although the characteristics are expressed in terms of presence and absence in a certain class of instances, the debater’s knowledge does not pertain to the elements belonging to these classes, but to the relation between the logical reason and the property that generates these classes. The *trairūpya* gives the conditions that have to be ascertained for the inference to be valid, but does not however tell the debater how to ascertain these conditions. The pragmatic aspect is left out of the formulation of the *trairūpya* (it is dealt with by the interpreters in

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mchog ldan to sMra ba’i seng ge Dar ’bag pa (probably a mistake for Dan ’bag pa), one of Phya pa’s Eight Lions (*Rigs gter Phom byed* Ta 31a7 (= 61)).

<sup>17</sup> For instance I know that all lottery tickets either bear the winning number or do not bear the winning number, but this (unfortunately) does not mean that I know for each ticket whether or not it bears the winning number.

other sections), but the set of conditions given on the basis of Phya pa's realistic and non-restrictive version of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* can indeed fulfill the role of necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of the inference.

c) *Sa skya Paṇḍita's definition*

The definition given by Sa paṅ in the *Rigs gter* is but a paraphrase of the definition of the *Pramānaviniścaya*, which he quotes in his auto-commentary.<sup>18</sup> At first sight, Sa paṅ thus endorses a realistic and restrictive version of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* identical to that of Dharmakīrti. Sa paṅ's commentators argue however that an epistemic requirement must be taken into account in Sa paṅ's definition, so that *sapakṣa* are instances that are *ascertained* to be similar to the subject on account of possessing the property to be proved, and *vipakṣa* instances that are *ascertained* to be dissimilar to the subject on this account.<sup>19</sup> Although no mention of ascertainment (*nges pa*) is found in the defining verse of the *Rigs gter*, the commentators are quite right to claim that one must account for an implicit epistemic predicate, for Sa paṅ's acceptance of an epistemic version of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* is made clear in other parts of the tenth chapter. These passages also link this epistemic version with the notion of a tripartite universe.<sup>20</sup> There is however a

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *RT* X.21cd: *phyogs dang bsgrub bya'i chos kyi spyis // mshungs dang mi mshungs phyogs gnyis yin*. Sa skya Paṇḍita explains the word "mthun" (in "mthun phyogs", skt. *sa-pakṣa*) by its synonym "mshungs", and makes explicit what similar instances are similar to by saying "similar to the *pakṣa*", i.e. to the conceptual representation of the subject.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *sGron me* [3.1.1.2.1]. Glo bo mkhan chen's definition might be inspired by that of Śākya mchog ldan, although the latter defines *vipakṣa* as "what is *not ascertained* as similar to the subject on account of possessing the property to be proved", and not as "what is *ascertained as not similar*..." (see *sGron me* p. 51, n. 57). Glo bo mkhan chen even claims that the epistemic predicate is explicitly present in Dharmakīrti's version, and adds the word "nges pa" (skt. *niścita*) when quoting it (*sGron me* p. 135).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *RT* X.13cd: *blo ngor dgag sgrub byed na ni // yod med ma nges gsum du 'gyar //* and *RTRG* ad *RT* X.13: *blo ngor byed na yod pa[r] nges pa'i mthun phyogs med par nges pa'i mi mthun phyogs / gnyis kar ma nges pa'i phyogs rkyang pa ste phung po gsum ci ste med /*. And also *RTRG* ad *RT* X.20cd: *de bzhin du sgra mi rtag par bsgrub pa na'ang mi rtag pa dang ldan par nges pa mthun phyogs mi ldan par nges pa mi mthun phyogs gnyi gar ma nges pa btang snyoms pa yin te /*. In these passages the notion of 'similarity with the subject' is left out. It must however be taken into account, so that Sa paṅ's version is the epistemic counterpart of a Dharmakīrtian restrictive version rather than the counterpart of a Ratnākaraśāntian non-restrictive version. This makes no difference as far as the status of the subject is concerned, but the epistemic counterpart of a Dharmakīrtian restrictive version involves a few problems pertaining to the scope of the epistemic operator of the *trairūpya*, namely, that ascertainment of the presence of the logical

difference between the tripartition induced by Dharmakīrti's definition and that induced by Sa paṅ's. In the first case, the reason for the existence of a third class is the notion of similarity, and the third class contains only one element: the subject. In the case of Sa paṅ, the existence of a third class is a consequence of the epistemic requirement introduced in the definition: this third class is constituted of instances for which there has been no ascertainment of the possession or non-possession of the property to be proved. It includes the subject of inference, for which there cannot (by definition) be an ascertainment regarding the property to be proved, but also includes all the instances which are doubtful or indifferent for the debater, instances about which he entertains erroneous thoughts, as well as all the instances he simply has not ever taken into consideration. This third class can turn out to be constituted of most of the instances in the universe. In return, depending on the debater's previous knowledge, the classes of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* can be rather small, or they can even be empty. If *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are not exhaustive of all instances, the two classes are however disjoint: as ascertainment involves knowledge through a *pramāṇa*, there cannot be another *pramāṇa* ascertaining the opposite. Sa paṅ explicitly states that the tripartition is mental (*blo ngor*). It is important to remember that Sa paṅ does not object to a bipartition of knowable instances on a realistic level: things in reality either possess or do not possess a given property. Thus his refutation of Phya pa does not concern the bipartition of knowable instances as such, but only the idea that these two classes on a realistic level are the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* mentioned in the *trairūpya*. For Sa paṅ, the latter are classes of a mental universe, and this universe is tripartite.

Are *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* in Sa paṅ's model equivalent to examples? The answer to this question depends on two things: the definition of examples and the role *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are given within the *trairūpya*. To my knowledge Sa paṅ himself does not define examples in the *Riḡs gter*. In the texts of Sa paṅ's predecessors, examples are defined as instances different from the subject for which the possession of the property to be proved is either ascertained or negated.<sup>21</sup> Notwithstanding the notion of similarity, this definition

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reason in *sapakṣa* only presupposes that the debater knows what a *sapakṣa* is, and knowing that it is 'what is similar to the subject on account of possessing the property to be proved' would involve knowing that the subject possesses the property to be proved. See *TRG* X 281, 9–12.

<sup>21</sup> *bsDus pa* 95a4 (sGron ma 40b3): *de la rtsod gzhi'i mtshan nyid myed pa ni* (sGron ma: *bsgrub bya*) *grub pa dang bsal pa yin pas mthun pa dang mi mthun pa'i dpe' gnyis su 'gyur la /*. It is not said that homogenous examples should illustrate the presence of the logical reason. Dignāga himself does not make a difference between 'lightning' and 'pot' in the proof that sound is impermanent because it is produced by an effort: both are

corresponds to Sa paṇ's definition of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, so that one could say that *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are equivalent to examples, or that examples are a subset of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. To affirm that *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* are equivalent to examples involves more than a definition: it would mean that they are given a pragmatic function, and that the *trairūpya* has to be considered accordingly.

Now, if the *trairūpya* on the basis of Sa paṇ's version of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* is conceived as the statement of the conditions that must obtain for the inference to be correct, it will fail in its role of sufficient condition just as was the case of the *trairūpya* based on Dharmakīrti's definition. In Sa paṇ's case, the pervasion would be even more restricted than in this former case, as it would hold only for the instances that the debater knows (which can be very few). Thus the conditions expressed by the *trairūpya* are not even close to be equivalent to the ascertainment of a universal necessary connection. But if *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are taken as examples and thus given a pragmatic function, ascertainment of the presence and absence of the logical reason in *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* must not be understood as the realistic *cum* epistemic conditions that must obtain for the inference to be correct, but as a method that will enable the debater to ascertain the relation between the logical reason and the property to be proved.<sup>22</sup> This pragmatic function of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, although favored by some of Sa paṇ's commentators, is not explicitly indicated in the *Rīgs gter*. Thus, taking *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* as examples is a charitable reading that enables one to make sense of the *trairūpya* in this case: it is not that the necessary relation is established in the domain of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* (for that would amount to a restricted pervasion only), but on the basis of this domain.

What distinguishes Phya pa's position from Sa paṇ's is really the difference between a realistic and an epistemic version of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*, the distinction between a non-restrictive and a restrictive version being a consequence of the first. The opposition between the bipartition in Phya pa's system and the tripartition in Sa paṇ's system is thus a direct consequence of their definition of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, and is principally a question of the level on which the partition takes place.

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equally given as (homogenous) examples of something impermanent, although only the second is produced by an effort (cf. *Hetucakra* D 4209, verses 10b-11).

<sup>22</sup> This is only the starting point of the method, but how exactly the debater ascertains the necessary relation on the basis of an example is not explained in this context. TILLEMANS (2004) suggests that the use of one example to establish pervasion should not be seen as a case of ampliative induction, but rather as the use of 'best example(s)'/paradigm case(s)' as the basis of an analysis leading to the ascertainment of a relation.

Adopting a given version of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* also has consequences on the function ascribed to the *trairūpya* and on its success or failure as a necessary and sufficient condition of validity. In the above analysis, we have found two ways to make sense of the *trairūpya*:

- a) On the basis of a realistic non-restrictive version of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*, one can take the *trairūpya* as the realistic *cum* epistemic conditions, i.e., the conditions that must obtain in reality and the fact that the debater has ascertained these conditions. It presupposes a number of conditions pertaining to the possibility and feasibility of ascertainment, i.e., to the level of pragmatic constraints, but does not state them explicitly.
- b) On the basis of an epistemic version of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa*, the *trairūpya* will fail in its role of sufficient condition unless *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are given a pragmatic function, in which case the *trairūpya* no longer expresses conditions of validity, but indicates a method (or part of the method) that leads to the ascertainment of the necessary relation.<sup>23</sup>

I will now turn to the respective strategies of Phya pa and Sa skya Paṅḍita in order to explicit their choice in the interpretation of the components of the *trairūpya* and the role they ascribe to it.

#### A. Phya pa's strategy

Phya pa's reason to adopt a definition along the line of Ratnākaraśānti, relegating Dharmakīrti's definition to the rank of a mere etymological explanation,<sup>24</sup> is the understanding that a bipartite universe is a requisite for a proper application of the criterion of *trairūpya*. How this definition enables bipartition is, as we have seen above, by presenting conditions for *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* that are directly contradictory (*dn gos 'gal*), which allows the application of the principle of excluded middle and non-contradiction.

It turns out that bipartition is not as unproblematic as it seems, due to the introduction by Phya pa of a distinction between two types of knowable instances (called '*rdzas*' and '*ldog pa*'), a distinction that is developed by

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<sup>23</sup> SIDERITS 2003: 309 describes these two aspects as joined in the structure of *anumāna* that includes the statement of *vyāpti* and examples (also called *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*). This is according to him a double structure describing both the conditions that must obtain in the world to bring about a true cognition and the steps the cognizer ought to take to acquire such knowledge. Tibetans are dealing only with the *trairūpya*, which is never in itself seen as a possible double structure, so that a choice has to be made between the two aspects it can represent.

<sup>24</sup> Instances thus defined constitute a subset of the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* according to Ratnākaraśānti's definition, but play no role in the *trairūpya*. See TILLEMANS 1999: 92–94 and HUGON 2004: 57–58.

gTsang nag pa and becomes the main target in Sa paṅ's criticism of Phya pa's view of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*.<sup>25</sup> The core of the problem is that any property can be predicated to any type of instance, but possession and non-possession of a property are directly contradictory only for instances of the type that matches the type of the property. It becomes difficult to see how all knowable instances in an inference can be classified into exactly two classes. Since for some instances possession and non-possession of the property are not contradictory, these instances would constitute a third class, the class of things that are both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Phya pa makes up for the breach in the strict bipartition of instances by restricting the domain of inference to instances that are of the same type as the subject, i.e., instances for which the principle of non-contradiction applies. This enables him to preserve a bipartite universe, but only a restricted one. As a consequence, *anvaya*, *vyatireka* as well as the necessary connection itself will only hold for a restricted domain. Still, as this restricted domain does not exclude the subject, we do not run into the problems involved in the tripartite models described above.

The questions why bipartition is necessary and why it cannot be accounted for using Dharmakīrti's definition are dealt with more explicitly by gTsang nag pa and mTshur ston. First, bipartition is necessary because it guarantees a) that *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are equivalent (a requirement stated by Dharmakīrti) and b) that the conclusion is not subject to doubt. This second point is established because bipartition also enables the application of the law of double negation: affirmation of the thesis is logically equivalent to refutation of the anti-thesis. Even though proof and refutation are not psychologically identical, affirmation of the thesis is a cognition devoid of doubt only if the possibility of its negation cannot exist. According to Phya pa *et al.*, Dharmakīrti's definition, taken literally, implies a tripartite universe, and a tripartite universe means that the instances outside the domain of ascertainment of the pervasion are responsible for a doubt that prevents certitude when proving or negating something.<sup>26</sup>

After the efforts put in to establish the whole structure enabling a 'strong version' of the *trairūpya* that guarantees the truth of the conclusion, it is surprising to see that Phya pa as a matter of fact does not accept the *trairūpya* as

<sup>25</sup> This theory has many philosophical and linguistic implications that are beyond the scope of the present paper and will be taken up on a further occasion. Introductory remarks can be found in HUGON 2004: 62–69.

<sup>26</sup> See *bsDus pa* 89a6 and *sGron ma* 35b2–4 'the necessity of the (bi)partition' (*kha tshon chod dgos pa*). A further problem that partisans of Ratnakāraśānti's definition see in Dharmakīrti's version comes from the mention of 'similarity to the subject'. See n. 20 above.

the *definiens* of a proper logical reason.<sup>27</sup> It is not that the *trairūpya* is an insufficient condition, but, on the contrary, as a consequence of the equivalence of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, the *trairūpya* contains redundant, and therefore superfluous elements. What is taken as *definiens* is the minimal sufficient condition, that is, a *dvairūpya* (two characteristics) consisting of the *pakṣa-dharma* and *vyatireka*.<sup>28</sup> The *trairūpya* can still be considered as a general definition (*spyi'i mtshan nyid*), but the *dvairūpya* is enough as a means to eliminate all fallacious logical reasons.

By ensuring bipartition, even if it is not universally, Phya pa avoids the pitfalls brought about by restrictive conceptions of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* that exclude the subject. Fulfillment of the *trairūpya* on the basis of the bipartite universe of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* guarantees that the logical reason is correct, and hence that the conclusion of the inference is true. Facing the incompatibility between a restrictive conception of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* faithful to Dharmakīrti's definition and a strong version of the *trairūpya* compatible with the claim that it is a necessary and sufficient condition of validity, Phya pa does not hesitate to sacrifice the literal interpretation of the text for the benefit of his logical aim. The fact that his followers will explicitly link the chosen definition with another Indian logician, Ratnākaraśānti, may be seen as an attempt to make up for the ousted consistency with the original wording of Dharmakīrti's text.

### B. Sa paṅ's strategy

The scenario found in the *Rīgs gter* is somewhat more complicated, involving a switch from one standpoint to another that appears as an inevitable strategic

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<sup>27</sup> The initial discussion of the *trairūpya* in Tibetan texts made on the basis of the three bases (*ltos gzhi*) – i.e. *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa*, *vipakṣa* – is meant as an explanation of the term '*trirūpalīnga*' in the definition of inference, and has the function of distinguishing proper logical reasons from fallacious ones. The question of the *trairūpya* as a putative *definiens* is taken up in the following section concerned solely with proper logical reasons.

<sup>28</sup> It is an author anterior to Phya pa (maybe rGya dmar ba or one of his direct predecessors) who first proposed a refutation of the *trairūpya*. Two different versions of this refutation can be found respectively in *Mun sel* 60a4–7 and 'Od zer 93b4–7. The latter is also summarized in *bsDus pa* 100b3–4 and *sGron ma* 45a1–2. On the basis of this refutation, rGya dmar ba (identified in *sGron me* for this position) suggests two possibilities for the *definiens* of the logical reason, both are *dvairūpyas*: either *pakṣadharma* and *anvaya*, or *pakṣadharma* and *vyatireka*. Phya pa refutes the first alternative in *Mun sel* 60a8–b8 and 'Od zer 94a4. Parallel refutations can be found in *bsDus pa* 100b4–5 and *sGron ma* 45a3.

move to 'save the *trairūpya*', but is difficult to justify with regard to the coherence of Sa paṅ's views and his attitude toward the original text.

In the first part of the section on *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* in the *Rigs gter*, Sa paṅ argues against his bipartitionist predecessors, defending the view of a tripartite universe where *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are distinct bases for the three characteristics as they are formulated by Dharmakīrti. If this move seems at first to be a return to orthodoxy, it is so only in appearance, as Sa paṅ in point of fact resorts to an epistemic version of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* (although Sa paṅ could argue that the epistemic operator has to be understood implicitly in Dharmakīrti's definition). As we have seen, unless *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* are taken as examples and the *trairūpya* in that case is interpreted as a method of ascertainment *on the basis of* a limited domain, it will amount to an ascertainment *for* a limited domain, which is not a sufficient condition for the validity of inference. But when confronted with the failure of the *trairūpya*, it is not this solution that Sa paṅ favors. Instead, when facing the opponent's reproach that if indeed the universe is not bipartite, but tripartite, there could be no certainty regarding the conclusion of inference,<sup>29</sup> Sa paṅ's strategy consists in no less than eliminating the notions of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* from the picture of the *trairūpya*. Sa paṅ says: "Affirmation and negation (i.e. proof and refutation of the thesis) are not the deed of the *pakṣas* (i.e. *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*), but are established by means of two *pramāṇa* based on examples."<sup>30</sup> Further, Sa paṅ defines the characteristics of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* without mention of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, in terms of relation ('*gal pa*) and opposition ('*gal ba*) between the logical reason and the property to be proved. *Anvaya* is explained as the fact that the property to be proved follows the logical reason, and *vyatireka* as the absence of the logical reason when the property to be proved is absent.<sup>31</sup> Ascertainment of *anvaya*

<sup>29</sup> RT X.20ab: *phyogs gnyis dngos 'gal ma yin phyir // dgag sgrub nam gzhag 'jig ce na //*. RTRG: *gal te mthun phyogs mi mthun phyogs gnyis su kha tshon ma chod na dgag bya khegs pas bsgrub bya 'grub pa dang / bsgrub bya grub pas dgag bya khegs pa'i nam gzhag mi rung ngo snyam na /*

<sup>30</sup> RT X.20cd: *dgag sgrub phyogs kyis) byed pa min // tshad ma'i 'gal 'brel nges pas 'grub //*. RTRG: *dgag bya khegs pa dang bsgrub bya bsgrub pa'i gnad ni / phyogs gnyis kyis byed pa ma yin gyi / tshad ma'i stobs las byung ba'i 'gal 'brel nges pas bsgrub pa yin no //*

<sup>31</sup> RTRG ad RT X.21ab: *rtags dang bsgrub bya'i 'brel pa tshad mas nges nas rtags kyi rjes su bsgrub bya 'gro ba rjes 'gro dang / bsgrub bya log na rtags ldog pa ni ldog pa'i tshul lo // de dag shes 'dod kyi steng du nges mi nus pas dpe'i steng du nges par byed do //*. Elsewhere (RTRG 288 ad X.30e-31a), they are simply formulated as: *yod na yod pa'i rjes 'gro dang / ldog na ldog pa'i ldog pa*. The verse X.21ab expresses *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in terms of 'ascertainment of presence and absence' (*rtags dang bsgrub bya 'brel stobs kyis // yod med nges pa rjes 'gro ldog //*): in view of the auto-commentary, I take

and *vyatireka* and ascertainment of the necessary connection are considered to be equivalent.<sup>32</sup> When presenting the *definiens* of a proper logical reason, Sa paṅ adopts two conditions: ascertained *pakṣadharmā* and ascertained necessary relation.<sup>33</sup> This, he argues, is not a *dvairūpya* (i.e., two characteristics), but a *trairūpya* because the necessary relation encompasses both *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. The newly defined characteristics of this *trairūpya* are quite far from the original formulation in terms of presence and absence in *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, but they fulfill the role of necessary and sufficient condition of validity. How the characteristics are to be ascertained is not explicit in the formulation of the characteristics themselves; the exact method is dealt with in the section on relation and opposition.

In the presentation of his own position, Sa paṅ inverses the Tibetan traditional method of analysis: Tibetan authors first identify the basis (*ltoṣ gzhī*) and then define and explain the characteristic based on it. On the opposite, Sa paṅ first defines *anvaya* and *vyatireka* – that are not based on *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* – and then proceeds to the presentation of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Thus even if the new formulation of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* does not use *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, these notions are not completely eradicated. But what can be their role if they are not part of the formulation of the new *trairūpya*?

‘presence’ and ‘absence’ to refer to the ‘presence of the *sādhyā* in presence of the logical reason’ and ‘absence of the logical reason in absence of the *sādhyā*’. Śākya mehog ldan however is of the opinion that they refer to ‘presence in *sapakṣa* only’ and ‘absence in *vipakṣa*’ (*Rigs gter Rol mtsho* Dza 105b3 (= 656)).

<sup>32</sup> *RTRG* X 288, 4–5: *yod na yod pa’i rjes ’gro dang / log na ldog pa’i ldog pa tshang na ’brel pa grub pa*, and 288, 12: *’brel pa grub na rjes su ’gro ldog gi tshul gnyis grub pa*. Further, Sa paṅ gives a similar argument, but instead of speaking of *anvaya* (tib. *rjes ’gro*) and *vyatireka* (tib. *ldog pa*), he talks of the presence of two *pramāṇa*, that respectively affirm with regard to *sapakṣa* and negate with regard to *vipakṣa*. (*RTRG* X 288, 10–12: *mtshun phyogs la bsgrub mi mtshun phyogs la ’gag byed kyi tshad ma gnyis med na ’brel pa mi ’grub cing ’brel pa grub na rjes su ’gro ldog gi tshul gnyis grub pas tshul gsum grub pa nyid do //*). It is not clear whether *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* here are really meant to be the examples on the basis of which *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are ascertained, or if Sa paṅ is going back to the original formulation of the characteristics. This also seems to have puzzled the commentators, who omit to comment the first part of the sentence. *Rigs gter Nyi ma* 222,13 only retains the expression *’tshad ma gnyis med na’*. *Rigs gter Rol mtsho* 108a2 (= 661) explains it by *’brel pa nges pa la rjes su ’gro ldog nges byed kyi tshad ma gnyis dgos pas so’*. See also *Rigs gter rNam bshad* 236a3–5.

<sup>33</sup> *RT* X.30cd: *phyogs chos grub cing ’brel pa nges // gtan tshigs mtshan nyid skyon med yin //*. Glo bo mkhan chen glosses *’brel pa’* by *’khyab pa’* in *sGron me* and in *Rigs gter Nyi ma* stresses the equivalence of Sa paṅ’s *definiens* with *PV* I.1a (= *HB* I.1a): *pakṣadharmas tadamiṣena vyāpto*. Śākya mehog ldan explains *’brel pa’* by *’rtags chos gnyis la med na mi ’byung ba’i ’brel pa’* (i.e. *avinābhāva*). See *sGron me* 62–63, n. 74.

Although Sa paṅ turns to a new formulation of the *trairūpya*, nowhere does he refute the original formulation, possibly out of loyalty towards Dharmakīrti's text. *Sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* can thus play a role as part of the *trairūpya* in its original formulation, although it is not clear what the function of this original *trairūpya* could be – maybe a test to eliminate fallacious reasons (i.e., a necessary, but not sufficient, condition), maybe a method of ascertainment. Also, Sa paṅ introduced *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* as the bases (*ltoṣ gzhī*) of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. If *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are taken in their new formulation, this could support the idea that *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are actually the examples on the basis of which these two characteristics are ascertained.

The only aspect of the role of *sapakṣa* that is expressed clearly in the *Rīgster* is that it becomes a didactical tool in inference for others (*parārthānumāna*). This point is made in a controversy about the notion of 'similarity with the subject' in the definition of *sapakṣa*. The whole argument presupposes that the characteristic of *anvaya* is 'ascertained presence in *sapakṣa* only' (to which Sa paṅ makes no objection). As pointed out above,<sup>34</sup> one criticism of a definition involving the notion of 'similarity with the subject' is that if 'ascertainment of the presence in *sapakṣa* only' is taken intensionally, the debater who knows that the logical reason is present in *sapakṣa* must know what a *sapakṣa* is, and therefore must know that the subject possesses the property to be proved (else he would fail to understand the similarity between the two). To avoid the pitfall of proving something that is already established (*siddhasādhana*), Sa paṅ offers the following explanation: in an inference for others, the proponent knows that the subject possesses the property to be proved, but the opponent does not. Hence when there is ascertainment of the necessary connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved on the basis of a positive example, both debaters know, extensionally speaking, that the logical reason is present in a *sapakṣa* (since the positive example is a *sapakṣa*) – and even in *sapakṣa* only – but only the proponent has the intensional knowledge of that fact, because he is the only one to know what a *sapakṣa* is. The proponent can then point to the opponent the fact that the example is a *sapakṣa*. At this point the opponent understands, on the basis of the notion of 'similarity' present in the definition, that the subject also possesses the property to be proved.<sup>35</sup> The notion of 'example' alone

<sup>34</sup> See n. 20 above.

<sup>35</sup> See *RTRG* X 281, 14–17: *tshang mang du du ba me dang 'brel par nges nas la la'ang du bas me grub na mthun dpe mthun phyogs kyi tha snyad du 'jog go // des na du ba dang me'i 'brel pa grub pa'i tshang mang 'di dang la gnyis me dang ldan par mthun no // zhes rgol bas bsgrub nas phyir rgol la ston pa'i phyir 'gal ba med do //*. See also *sGron me* p. 54, n. 63 and HUGON 2004: 84–85.

is involved in the ascertainment of the necessary relation, but the notion of *sapakṣa* can be used if needed to help the other debater to reach the conclusion by applying the necessary relation to the case of the subject.

So, Sa paṅ first starts with a version of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* and of the *trairūpya* that he wants to be as close as possible to the original formulation found in Dharmakīrti's texts. Faced with an objection hinting at the failure of such a *trairūpya* based on a tripartite universe, he turns to a new formulation that provides him with a stronger *trairūpya* which is a sufficient condition of validity, but at the cost of the formulation of the characteristics taken as the starting point of his exegesis, and leaving no place in the *trairūpya* for *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, in brief, giving up most of the original formulation of Dharmakīrti's text. Sa paṅ appears to be caught between exegetical concerns and logical concerns, and fails to bridge the gap between the two. The original version of the *trairūpya* remains in his system, but it is not clear what role is ascribed to it. It appears as a long-lasting vestige of Indian logic that can no longer be explained satisfactorily.<sup>36</sup>

## Conclusion

Tibetan logicians see Dharmakīrti's *trairūpya* as rooted in three bases (*ltoṣ gñi*), i.e., *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Their identification is therefore of major importance for the interpretation of the characteristics themselves. Phya pa is, as far as we know, the first to consider the question from a logical angle, for instead of trying to make sense of the *trairūpya* with the given definitions of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, he reconstructs the conditions under which the *trairūpya* can be a necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of inference. Sa paṅ follows a somewhat schizophrenic strategy, sticking on the one hand to a supposedly orthodox interpretation of the text, thus adopting definitions for *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* involving a tripartite universe, inducing a version of the *trairūpya* that can at best indicate a method of ascertainment, and coming up on the other hand with a strong version of the *trairūpya* that sacrifices the notions of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, as well as the given formulation of *anyaya* and *vyatireka* – a very daring move for an au-

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As for Sa paṅ's commentators, the formulation of the *rūpas* based on *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* is not abandoned so easily, and is still used for instance by Śākya mehog ldan and Go rams pa. See *Rigs gter rNam bshad* 235a (= *Rigs gter gSal byed* 96b6) and *Rigs gter Pham byed* 40b (= 80). Glo bo mkhan chen on the other hand adopts Sa paṅ's new formulation.

thor for whom consistency with the literal text is highly valued and repeatedly taken as a means to evaluate his predecessors' interpretations!

If we consider the three points of Dharmakīrti's legacy listed in the introduction, Phya pa modifies c) (the definition of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*) and succeeds in accounting for b) (the original formulation of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*) and a) (the *trairūpya* as the *definiens* of a correct logical reason). Sa paṅ on the other hand tries to account for a), b) and c) together, but ends up keeping only a).

The designations 'heterodox' and 'orthodox' given to supporters of Phya pa's interpretation and supporters of Sa paṅ's interpretation thus have to be reconsidered. Even the description of Sa paṅ as 'orthodox' on account of his definition of *sapakṣa/vipakṣa* is questionable since one finds no explicit mention of an epistemic predicate in Dharmakīrti's definition. Katsura has given evidence that an epistemic predicate is however taken into account by Dignāga when he explains the difference between *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa*, saying that, unlike in the *pakṣa*, in *sapakṣa* the property to be proved is 'understood' (*rtogs pa*). This idea is expressed by the Sanskrit word 'vidita' in Jinendrabuddhi's commentary. Dignāga also says that the property to be proved is not in fact 'to be proved' (*bsgrub bya*) in the case of *sapakṣa*. Jinendrabuddhi explains it by saying that the property to be proved is already established (*siddha*) in that case.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, although Phya pa's dismissal of c) appears as an unorthodox move, recent studies of Dharmakīrti's views tend to the conclusion that it finds support in Dharmakīrti's writings. The relevant passages at least confirm that Dharmakīrti was a supporter of bipartition induced by the criterion of possession or non-possession of a property.<sup>38</sup> The two classes, in which the logical reason is present or excluded, are also called by the name of 'sādhya' and 'asādhya', i.e. 'what is to be proven' and its contrary.<sup>39</sup>

While Phya pa himself does not try to find support in Dharmakīrti's text for his bipartitionist view, Sa paṅ on the other hand refers to a passage of *PVin* III that, according to him, support the claim that there is bipartition on

<sup>37</sup> See *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III.18 and *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (tr. Kanakavarman) Q 5702 130a7-b2 and *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtkā* D 4268 162a3-5.

<sup>38</sup> IWATA (2004: 120) cites a passage that clearly contains the mention of the principle of excluded middle in the case of the properties 'possessing a self' and 'not possessing a self', *PVin* III Q 321b3: *gang la srog la sogs pa gnas par 'gyur ba bdag dang bcas pa dang bdag med pa las phung po g'zhan med de* (cf. *NB* III.98: *na hi sātmanirātmakābhyaṃ anyo rāṣir asti yatrāyaṃ prāṇādir vartate*).

<sup>39</sup> See *PV* IV.220 and the discussion in TILLEMANS 1999: 106. Dharmakīrti does not himself equate these two with *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, but it is how the commentators gloss these words.

the realistic level, but tripartition on the epistemic level, the latter being the one concerned with *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*.<sup>40</sup> In the passage cited by Sa paṅ, Dharmakīrti says: "Occurrence and non-occurrence of properties, that have the characteristic of being mutually contradictory, [and] do not depend on the arrangement of *pakṣa* etc., do not distinguish a third class".<sup>41</sup> In this passage, the bipartition, that is strictly concerned with the presence and absence of a property, is opposed to a so-called 'arrangement of *pakṣa* etc.'. In the same passage, Dharmakīrti explains that this 'arrangement of *pakṣa* etc.' is not made when presenting the necessary connection (in an inference for other). Indeed the only thing that matters at this stage is the occurrence and non-occurrence of the logical reason in (respectively) presence and absence of the property to be proved.<sup>42</sup>

In the ongoing controversy, different versions of *pakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are put to the fore by the opponents, and Dharmakīrti differentiates among them those that depend on the debater's intention (*'dod pas gzhag pa'i mtshan nyid*, \**icchayā vyavasthālakṣaṇa*), and those that represent things as they are in reality (*dingos po'i dhang gi rnam par gnas pa*, \**vastuśādhā vyavasthā*). In the 'arrangement of *pakṣa* etc.', the status of the *pakṣa* (subject) is of the first kind, but it is said also that the *pakṣa* can on some occasion be *vipakṣa* if it does not possess the property to be proved (for instance if one proves that sound is permanent because it is produced); in that case it is a *vipakṣa* according to the second type. The second type (i.e., things as they are in reality) matches what we have called a realistic version. As for the first one, the debater's intention has to do with the choice of what is to be proved, and thus with the special status given to the subject, with regard to which the debater wishes to establish a given property. It is not clear however how *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* stand in this case. They could just depend on the de-

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *RTRG* X 285,24–286,4. The passage cited there occurs in *PVin* III D 218a2ff in the section dealing with unestablished logical reasons (*asiddhahetu*), and more precisely with the case of the logical reason 'not being a *vipakṣa*' (\**vipakṣavyatireka*).

<sup>41</sup> *PVin* III D 218b3: *de'i phyir chos rnam kyī 'jug pa dang ldog par phyogs rnam par gzhag pa la mi ltos pa de dag ni phan tshul spangs te gnas pa'i mtshan nyid yin pas phung po ldog par byed pa ma yin no* (\**tasmād anapekṣitapakṣādivyavasthau dharmānām vṛttivyatirekau parasparaparīhārasthālakṣaṇau na tṛīyaṃ rāśim vyatirecavataḥ*).

<sup>42</sup> *PVin* III 218b5: *gang las skyon 'dir 'gyur ba gnan tshugs kyis 'brel pa ston pa'i dus na phyogs la sogs pa'i rnam par gzhag pa yod pa ma yin no* // (\**na ca hetoḥ sambandhopadarśanakāle pakṣādivikalpo 'sti yato 'yam doṣaḥ syāt*). According to Dharmottara, it is crucial that the relation ranges over the whole realistic universe, because if one instance were excluded from the analysis, doubt would remain. Cf. *Dh Q* 158b6ff., and in particular 159a1: *gang gi phyir don thams cad bsduṣ pa nyid kyis rjes su 'gro ba ni tshad mas bstan par nus pa yin te / dugos po cig la log na yang the tshom mi ldog pa'i phyir ro //*

bater's intention in the sense that he does not have the wish to prove the given property with regard to them, which does not imply that he already has established the given property in their case. Thus one cannot say for sure that the so-called 'arrangement of *pakṣa* etc.' corresponds to the tripartite arrangement of *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* as understood by Sa paṅ. Also, when Dharmakīrti says that the statement of the necessary connection does not depend on the arrangement of *pakṣa* etc., this can mean two things: a) none of the notions of *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* play a role in the necessary connection, or b) one should not give a special status to the subject in this context (it will be either *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*).<sup>43</sup> While the first option is reflected in Sa paṅ's new version of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, the second would be illustrated by Phya pa's interpretation, where the notions of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* remain, but what is really at stake is just the property to be proved.

One can thus see a unity of comprehension among Tibetan interpreters regarding the author's intention as to the foundation of the inferential process: the necessary connection between the logical reason and the property to be proved. As these authors not only have to deal with the intention of the text, but also with its literal formulation, they must nonetheless take into account the characteristics of 'presence in *sapakṣa* only and complete absence in *vipakṣa*' stated by Dharmakīrti. The original text offers support for many of the ideas we find in the texts of the Tibetan thinkers. Its ambiguity also leaves the door open for several interpretative strategies that all aim at giving a consistent explanation of a problematic text on a very important issue.

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| Dh  | <i>Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā</i> (Dharmottara). Tib. in D 4227, Q 5727.  |

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<sup>43</sup> One only finds a gloss on this passage in Devendrabuddhi's commentary ad PV1.185 = PVin III.79. It reads: *chos rnam 'jug pa dang ldog pa'i phyogs rnam par gzhas pa la mi ltos pa'o zhes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba yod pa dang med pas phyogs dang mi mthun pa'i phyogs su dngos po'i dbang gis gnas yi skyes bus phyogs su byas pa dang / ma byas pa las bsgrub par bya ba mi ldog par mi 'gyur ba'o //* (PVP D 276a2).

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