

The Diverse Faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe

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INTRODUCTION

- ❖ By the early 2000s, massive changes in family-related values and behaviour have spread to the whole Europe (perhaps ex. Albania)
- ❖ The “Second Demographic Transition” (SDT) has become widely used as a label, description and even explanation of demographic shifts
- ❖ Recognition of a ‘big change in the family’ also among sociologists and economists
- ❖ However, the SDT remains a complex and fluid narrative:
 - Keeps evolving over time
 - “Escaped the control of its initial proponents” (Billari and Wilson 2001)
- ❖ Consequently,
To many observers it remains unclear what the SDT is and what are its main behavioural (demographic) and attitudinal manifestations

INTRODUCTION

Aim of this talk:

- 1) Review which changes in family behaviours and family values seem to be universal in Europe
- 2) Discuss the link between the second demographic transition and fertility
- 3) Discuss how the SDT concept can accommodate demographic shifts in Central and eastern Europe after 1990

Caution:

- parts of this talk speculative
- little empirical analysis, simplistic cross-sectional associations

INTRODUCTION

Much of this presentation stems from a book Project “Childbearing Trends and Policies in Europe” (edited by T. Frejka, T. Sobotka, J. M. Hoem and L. Toulemon)

- *to be published July 1, Special Collection in **Demographic Research***

- 18 country chapters
- Special focus on Central and Eastern Europe (10 countries: ALB, BG, CZ, HU, LIT, PL, RUS, UKR, SK, SLO)

- 8 concluding (Overview) Chapters

Ch. 4: *Changing family and partnership behaviour* (coauthor L. Toulemon)

Ch. 6: *The diverse faces of the SDT in Europe*

- Mix of insights from country chapters and own research

1) Common trends in partnership and family behaviours in Europe (*stylised facts & findings*)

Persistent diversity remains the best catchphrase!

LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:

More single living, but also later home leaving (except in Nordic countries and some parts of Western Europe)

Retreat of marriage: marriages become marginal for men below age 25 and for women below age 22

1) Common trends in partnership and family behaviours in Europe (*stylised facts & findings*)

Cohabitation spreads to all parts of Europe and (only) partly substitutes delayed and foregone marriages. Living-apart-together gains on importance.

- a new ‘norm’: cohabitation first, marriage later or never
- longer and more permanent arrangements, often including children

Divorce rate increases to high levels (50% may be a ‘natural’ ceiling) and dissolution rate of cohabiting unions remain high

- more than union may eventually become a majority experience

1) Common trends in partnership and family behaviours in Europe (*stylised facts & findings*)

CHILDBEARING and FERTILITY:

First births are postponed in all parts of Europe after 1990


- mean age of mother at first birth around 29 in Southern Europe (ex. Portugal), the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland
- since the 1990s rapid increase in childbearing at ages 40+

Childlessness increasing all over Europe; at or above 20% in Austrian, Germany, Switzerland and the UK

Extra-marital births rising rapidly

- EU-25: 5% in the 1960s, 18% in 1990 and 33% in 2005
- More births in cohabiting unions and among non-resident couples

England and Wales: Extra-marital births by the type of their registration by parents



Source: Population Trends 2006, 2008

Some of the ‘surprises’ in this family transformation

Living arrangements in 2001:

Young adults (age 20-34): Living with parents considerably more common than single living (ex. Nordic c., The Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland)

Fewer than one half of men live in union (only 27% in Southern Europe (ex. Portugal) and Slovenia)

Age 20-44: Single parenthood more common than cohabiting with children (ex. Nordic c. and France)

➤ High children’s exposure to family disruption (Heuveline et al. 2003)

Retreat from fatherhood: Fewer than 50% of men live with children, in part due to partnership dissolution

Major changes in family values and attitudes (stylised facts and findings)

- Widespread acceptance of cohabitation and its positive evaluation, especially as a premarital living arrangement
 - o already mid-1990s, also in Southern Europe and most of CEE (Liefbroer & Fokkema 2008)
- Tolerance of voluntary childlessness, extra-marital and extra-partnership sex (also among teenagers and young adults), extra-marital childbearing and homosexuality (latter not universal)
- **New concept of family:** Children define family more than marriage
- **New role of children:** Childrearing serves individual self-fulfilment and 'private joy', children become more equal with their parents
- **Different motivation for or against parenthood:** Leisure and self-realisation become accepted reasons for not having children

Some of the ‘surprises’ in these value changes

- Great importance placed on **family life** (with children), also in most ‘advanced’ SDT countries like Sweden
- Family has changed, but **marriage remains rather highly valued**, and desired as an ‘ultimate’ living arrangement
- **New norms and demands of ‘responsible parenthood’** place more pressure on parents and may serve as reasons for not having children

2) Second Demographic Transition and Fertility

Three main links between the SDT concept and fertility trends (van de Kaa 1987, 2001, Lesthaeghe 1995):

- 1) SDT linked to a *massive postponement of parenthood* (facilitating role of modern contraception emphasised)
- 2) SDT leads to a marked *rise in non-marital childbearing*
- 3) SDT leads to a *structural long-term subreplacement fertility*
 - Period fertility may eventually recover a bit (‘recuperation’), but not enough to bounce back to the replacement level (van de Kaa 1997 & 2001: an ideal scheme of 15 stages of the SDT)
 - Some studies simplistically equal SDT with the shift to very low fertility


Not initially envisioned: Rising contribution of immigrants to childbearing and fertility rates

Analysis of the SDT-fertility link


Two indexes capturing different dimensions of the SDT:

- **Index SDT1** (demographic factors in 2004):
 - mean age at first birth, first marriage, teenage fertility, non-marital ratio, total divorce rates, total first marriage rate, prevalence of cohabiting unions; 34 countries
- **Index SDT2** (ideational & value factors around 2000); based on the European Values Study in 29 countries
 - 8 questions: Family values, non-conformism, permissiveness, secularism
 - Both indexes and their components can range from 0 (= no SDT) to 10 (=max. score on SDT factors)
 - SDT1 and SDT2 indexes closely correlated ($r=0.84$)
 - A combination of the mean values of the SDT1 and SDT2: **SDT index**


A strong correlation between ‘behavioural’ and ‘ideational’ component of the SDT




A strong SDT – fertility postponement link



But a *positive* association between SDT and period total fertility





- Association between SDT index and period TFR existed in ,Western‘ countries already in 1990
- In 2000, this association also holds when TFR adjusted for tempo effects (weaker)
- Also a slightly positive link between SDT index and intended family size of women aged 25-39 (Eurobarometer 2006, Testa 2007)



Interpreting the SDT-fertility link

- SDT does not necessarily lead to a long-term decline of fertility much below replacement level (Sweden, France)
 - SDT brings widespread acceptance of childlessness and non-family living arrangements, but not necessarily a diminishing positive attitude to of family life and low fertility preferences
 - Peculiar timing pattern:
 - 1) SDT strongly linked to **fertility postponement**; it results in very low fertility rates at young ages
 - 2) SDT also closely linked to the **'recuperation' component**: high late fertility rates in most 'advanced' SDT countries
- > the net outcome is a **positive association with fertility**

SDT-2 and age patterns of fertility in Europe



Data exclude Southern Europe and Ireland

Interpreting the SDT-fertility link

Discussion: Why are countries that manifest most strongly SDT so successful on the 'recuperation' dimension?

- importance of institutional factors (childcare, gender equality, etc.)

Hypothesis: 'Advanced SDT' countries have institutional setting conducive to childbearing that is compatible with changed character of partnership and family

- SDT does not necessarily lead to low fertility intentions
- High realisation of fertility intentions later in life and thus reduce the intentions – behaviour gap
- Welfare regime divisions: Are new family values AND family & gender-friendly policies shaped by a common underlying dimension? (Female emancipation and gender symmetry? Educational expansion?)

Speculation:

Very low fertility is a temporary by-product of the SDT, produced by a mismatch between new values + behaviour and institutional arrangements that have not adjusted yet to these new patterns

3) Charting SDT trajectories: Lessons from Central & Eastern Europe


CEE as a demographic ‘laboratory’:

- Massive demographic shifts after the collapse of state socialism and establishment of market capitalism and democracy
- Social and economic ruptures
- Huge regional differentiation in social policies, income, GDP level, living standards and prevailing value orientation
 - GDP per capita, 2005 in US\$ (constant 2000 level): Moldova 429, Ukraine 959, Czech Republic 6,515, Slovenia 11,382

SDT progression in Central & Eastern Europe:

- By the early 2000s, all the usual signs of the SDT firmly established
- BUT: Huge differentiation in family behaviour and living arrangements (cohabitation, non-marital childbearing, divorce rates, age at marriage)
 - No Eastern European pattern anymore – emerging division alongside secularisation vs. religiosity & cultural conservatism dimension (e.g., Czech Republic vs. Poland)

Percent men married by age 25 and women married by age 20, 1975-2005



Source: Computations based on Eurostat (2007)

SDT progression in Central & Eastern Europe

- Debated Issues:

- Interaction between values changes and demographic shifts: which came first?
- Factors driving changes in family-related behaviour
- The role of structural factors and anomie over time
- Diffusion of some new patterns from the ‘bottom’ to the ‘top’ of social hierarchy

Interaction between values changes and demographic shifts

Different patterns & arguments:

- **Hungary** (Spéder and Kamarás): Many changes in values (individualism, consumerism) before the political regime change, most pronounced changes in behaviour afterwards
- **Czech Republic** (Sobotka et al.): abrupt social and cultural change makes it impossible to separate contribution of structural and value shifts to family changes
- **Romania** (Kotowska et al.) and **Poland** (Muresan): Behavioural shifts progressing in the absence of a clear evidence for expected value shifts
- **Ukraine** (Pereli-Harris): Structural and cultural reasons not related to SDT may be behind SDT-characteristic trends

These statements in part subjective: absence of reliable data on value changes during state socialism

Social status differentials in the progression of the SDT


Delayed childbearing: Linked to higher education

Acceptance to new partnership & family behaviour and living arrangements: Typically spreads among highly educated first (Ukraine and Romania chapter)

Cohabitation and union instability: mixed evidence, country and time-specific

Non-marital childbearing: Typically starts among disadvantaged groups and diffuses from the 'bottom to the top'

Czech Republic: Extra-marital childbearing by education of mother



Ready – Willing –Able framework and the SDT in Central and Eastern Europe

Lesthaeghe-Vanderhoeft (2001), based on Coale (1973):

New behaviour adopted only if ALL three preconditions are met:

Readiness = it becomes advantageous (cost-benefit calculation)

Willingness = it becomes culturally and ethically acceptable

Ability = technical or legal means to pursue a given behaviour

Ready – Willing –Able framework and the SDT in Central and Eastern Europe

An example of cohabitation:


Prior to 1990: W dimension changing gradually, but R+A limiting factors (monetary support of marriage, lack of housing), preventing faster change in W

When W further diminished, cohabitation in parental home could spread (Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovenia), ‘bypassing’ housing non-availability problem (A dimension)

After 1990: Massive social and economic change -> structural changes removed obstacles in R+A (e.g. by decoupling marriage and housing availability). This new pattern

- changed the cost-benefit calculation and made cohabitation advantageous (R factor)
- this has further affected the ‘W dimension’
- Rapid spread of cohabitation as first union among post-1965 (1970) cohorts in Russia, the Czech Republic or Hungary

Hungary: cohabitation as a first union



Source: Hungary chapter (Speder – Kamaras 2008)

Two SDT pathways in Central and Eastern Europe?

‘Classical’ Pathway 1 (example: Delayed childbearing)

‘Alternative’ Pathway 2: (example: non-marital fertility)

- First adopted by disadvantaged groups, even when they are not *#Ready#*

- Initial spread often fuelled by anomie, uncertainty, and structural incentives and constraints



- This trend further continues even when the initial factors diminish on importance

- Wider acceptance



- Behaviour increasingly adopted by higher educated women

Conclusions on the CEE experience

- ✓ Diverse Structural Factors may be crucial for the initial spread of the SDT (R dimension in *RWA*)
- ✓ Values may frequently change in reaction to changing behaviour rather than prior to that
- ✓ Alternative (‘anomic’) pathway from diffusion from lower to higher-social status groups important for some SDT trends
- ✓ Different pathways lead to similar behavioural outcomes – common trajectories of change
- ✓ Huge regional heterogeneity in SDT consistent with the secularisation dimension

More research exploring the CEE experiences and diversity would enrich our understanding second demographic transtion concept!